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PREFACE
I N this volume Wellington's campaigning in 181~ isfollowed no 'further than the day (August 31st) on
which he set out from Madrid to drive back Clausel
from the Douro. Reasons of space make it impossible to
include the siege of Burgos and the retreatwhichfollowed.
I had written the narrative of them, but found it impos-
sible to add six long chapters to the 6~O pages already
in print. The fact is that, from the point of view of
Wellington's army, the year 1812 was much more
tightly packed with military events than any which
had gone before. In 1809 there was nothing important
to chronicle after August: in 1810 the Anglo-Portuguese
did not come into the forefront of the war till July,
when .i\lassena had crossed the frontier and laid siege to
Almeida. In 1811 the year opened with a deadlock,
which was only ended by the commencement of Mn.s-
sena's retreat on March 9th, and concluded with a
similar deadlock which endured from July to December
-interrupted only by the short campaign of El Bodon
and Aldea da Ponte, and this covered only a week
[Sept. 22-9]. In 1812 the great strategical operations
began on the first day of the year with the concentration
Ior the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and did not end till
the last week of November-which saw Wellington once
more encamped under the walls of that forb-ess. For
elevenmollths on end he bad been on the move, with only
iv lllilll?ACE
a brief rest in cantonments between April 24th, the day
when he gave up his pursuit of l\1arrnont in Northern
Portugal, and the end of 1\1a)', when his divisions began
to assemble again for the projected march on Salamanca.
But for this short break his operations were continuous,
and the narrative of them must of necessity be
lengthy.
The campaign of 1812 cannot be called the greatest
exhibition of military genius in 'Vellington's career:
that distinction must be given to the campaign of 1813.
But it included the battle of Salamanca, the most skil-
fully fought and the most decisive of all his victories,
, the beating of forty thousand men in forty minutes.'
And its earlier episodes, the two sudden strokes which
ended in the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Badajoz,
deserve the closest attention, as showing a marvellous
power of utilizing opportunities, and solving time-
problems of the most complicated sort. We shall see
how \Vellington, in face of an enemy whose whole force
was far superior to hie; O\\7n, so conducted his operations
that he had success in his hands before the French
armies could concentrate to ovel'\vhelm him. He would
have been victorious in 1812 even without the assistance
that was given him during the early months of the year
b), Kapoleon's misguided orders from Paris, and in the
summer by Soult's repeated and delibel'ate refusal to
co·operate with King Joseph and l\Iarmont for the
genel'al welfare of the French cause in Spain. The limits
of his success were largely extended by those adven-
titious circumstances, but even without them he must
have achieved great things by force of the combinations
which he had prepared.
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The reader will find that I have devoted a good deal of
space to the precise working out of the effect of Napoleon's
successive dispatches to Marmont, with reference to the
time at which each was received, and the influence
which it had on the Marshal's movements. I am bound
to say that careful study has convinced me that Mar-
mont's justification of Iris own actions from January to
May, written in the fourth volume of his Atemoircs,
is in the main fair and sensible, and that his criti-
cism of his master's orders is as sound as it is lucid.
Napier held the reverse opinion, but his arguments
in support of it are unconvincing: he is set on proving
his idol infallible at all costs, in this as in so many other
cases.
I find myself equally at variance with Napier's esti-
mate of the relative share of responsibility that falls on
Soult upon the one side and King Joscph Ilnd Jourdan
on the other, for the disasters of the summer of 1812.
Jourdan's plan of campaign, set out in his' May Aflmoire'
[see pp. 303-11], is a most clear-headed and practicable
scheme; the adoption of it would have reduced the
effect of Wellington's strategy, and have set a limit to his
successes. Soult wrecked the whole scheme by wilful
disobedience, which sinned as much against military
discipline as against common sense. The counter~pro­
jccts which he kept sending to Jourdan and the King
were founded on his own personal desires, not on a
consideration of the general situation in the Peninsula.
Soult had been kind and courteous to Napier while the
historian was working at the French archives, and had
placed his own private papers at his disposition. I think
that the obligation was repaid by the mildness of the
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censures passed on the Marshal's strange behaviour in
the summer of 1812.
A smaller proportion of the pages of this volume than
of its predecessors is occupied by the tale of those cam-
paigns in the Peninsula in which the British took no
part. The year 1812 commences with the surrender of
Blake and the occupation of Valencia by the French.
When that great city and the army that had been driven
into it succumbed before Suchet's attack, there was no
longer any large Spanish force in the field, and the
operations of Lacy, Ballasteros, and the Galicians arc
of only secondary importance and require no great
attention. Indeed the most effective service done
against the French in 1812 was that of the guerl'illeros
of Aragon, Cantabria, and Navarre, whose obstinate
resistance immobilized such a large portion of the
230,000 imperial troops that lay in Spain. It will be
noted that I have had to devote a cOllsiderable number
of pages to a much-neglected episode of the summer of
1812-the campaigns against Caffarelli of the irregular
bands of the North, assisted by the fleet of Sir
Home Popham, It canllot be too often repeated
that by immobilizing the 35,000 men of the French
Army of the North, they co-operated in the most
effective way with Wellington, and IIad their share
in making the Salamanca campaign a success for the
allies.
I trust that I may have succeeded in making the
topographical details clear at Ciudad Rodrigo, Dadajoz,
and more especially Salamanca, all of which I have
visited. I spent many hours going Dvel' the ground at
the Arapiles, and found that no mere map could have
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enabled one to grasp the situation In a satisfactory
fashion.
I have once more to express my indebtedness to the
owners of two great files of Peninsular War documents,
who were good enough to place them at my disposition
and to allow me to bring them to Oxford. The D'Urban
papers, lent to me by Mr. ''\T. S.1\I. D'Urban, of Newport
I-louse, near Exeter, the grandson of Sir Benjamin
D'Urban, Beresford's Chief-of·the-Staff, continue to be
of immense value all through 181Q.. In the first half of
the year Sir Denjamin was still at the Portuguese head-
quarters, and his diary and correspondence give the
views of those who had the best opportunity of knowing
Wellington's plans from the inside. In June he was
appointed to another post, that of commanding the
detached Portuguese cavalry brigade which covered
Wellington's left flank in the Salamanca campaign;
his notes as to his operations are of extreme interest
throughout June, July, and August; the narratives
which he drew up concerning his own fortunes at the
battle of Salamanca, and at the unfortunate combat of
Maj~ahonda, have cleared up several obscure problems,
which no published material could have enabled me to
solve.
The papers of Sir George Scovell, lent me by his
great-nephew, Mr. G. Scovell, of Hove, had already
begun to be of use to me in the chronicle of 1811. But
in 181~ they are of far greater importance, since it was
early in that year that Scovell was placed by \Vellington
in charge of the toilsome duty of studying and decoding
all French captured dispatches written in cipher. The
originals were left in his hands, and only the interpre-
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tations, written out in full, were made over to the
Commander-in-Chief. These originals, often scraps of
the smallest dimensions made to be concealed in
secret places about the person of the bearer, are
historical antiquiti~s of the highest interest. Their
importance is so great that I have thought it neces-
sary to give in Appendix XV a detailed account of
them, of the characteristics of the' Great Paris Cipher'
-as Scovell called it-and of the contents of each
document.
I must mention, as in previous volumes, much kind
help given to me from abroad. The authorities of
the Paris 'Var Office have continued to facilitate my
researches among their bulky cartons. I have to notice
willi sincere regret the death of myoId friend, 1\1. Mar-
tinien, who did so much for me while I was compiling
volumes III and IV of tlllS work. I much missed his
guidance while working over the material of 181~ during
the last two autumns. Colonel Juan Arzadun, of the
Madrid Artillery Museum, has continued to send me
occasional information, and I am specially obliged to
Don Rafael Farias for procuring for me, and making
me a present of, that very rare document the 182~
'Estados de los ejercitos espai'ioles dUl'ante la guerra
contra Bonaparte,' a collection of morning-states and
tables of organization on which I had in vain tried to
lay hands dUl'ing three successive visits to Madrid.
Another gift of the highest value was the complete set
of Beresford's Ordens do Dia for the Portuguese army,
ranging over the whole "..-ar. This most useful series
was presented to me by my friend Mr. Rafael
Reynolds, the companion of my Jast Portuguese tOUI',
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who found a copy of this almost unprocurable file at
Lisbon. I owe the two views of the field of Salamanca
to the camera of Mr. C. J. Armstrong, who sent them
to me along with many other interesting Peninsular
photographs. '
Three ft'iends in England have continued to give me
help of the most invaluable kind. l\ir. C. T. Atkinson,
Fellow of Exeter College, has looked through the whole
of my proofs, and furnished me with innumerable notes,
which enabled me to add to the accw'acy of my narra·
tive. He has also written me an appendix, No. XlV,
concerning t~e English troops which in 1812 operated on
the East coast of Spain-and the others which formed the
garrisons of Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Tarifa. The Hon. John
Fortescue, the historian of the British army, has not
only answered at length my queries on many obscme
problems, but has lent me the file of h.is transcripts of
French dispatches for 1812, a good many of which,
and those of high importance, were unknown to me.
They were especially valuable for Soult's operations.
Our narratives of the campaigns of 1812 wiU appear
almost simultaneously, and I think it will be found that
all our main opinions are in agreement. Major J. H.
Leslie, R.A., has once more contributed to this volume
an ' Artillery Appendix' on the same lines as those for
1810 and 1811 in vols. III and IV. His researches have
always proved exhaustive and invaluable for the history
of his old Corps.
Lastly, the compiler of the Index, a task executed
this summer under very trying conditions, must receive,
for the fifth time, my heartfelt thanks for her labour
of love.
x PREFACE
As in previous volumes, the critic may find some
slight discrepancies between tIle figures given with
regard to strengths of regiments or losses in action in
the text and in the Appendices. This results from the
fact that. many official documents contain incorrect
arithmetic, which was only discovered by the inde-
fatigable proof-readers of the Clarendon Press, who
have tested all the figures, and found not infrequent
(if minute) errors. The text was printed off before
the Appendices were finally dealt with: where the
numbers differ those in the Appendices arc, of course,
to be preferred. Dut the worst discrepancies do not get
beyond units and tens.
C. OMAN.
OXFORD;
July 27, 1914.
NOTE.-\Vhen every page of the text, appendices, and
inde.x of this volume has been printed off, and the final
proofs of the preface are passing through my hands, comes
the news that Great Britain is most unexpectedly involved
in a war to which there can be no parallel named save the
struggle that ended just a hundred years ago. May her
strength be used as errecti~ely against military despotism
in the twentieth liS it was in the nineteenth century.
Aug. 5, 1914.
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CHAPTER I
THE u'WASION OF VALENCIA. SIEGE OF SAGUNTUU.
SEPTE:a.mER-OCTOBER 1811
IN the last volume of this work the chronicle of all the cam-
paigns of IS11 was completed, save in one corner of Spain,
where, all the eastern coast, the fortunes of the French armies
have only been pursued down to the recall of Marshal Mac-
donald to Paris OIl October 28th. Already, before the Duke of
Tarentum had been added to the list of the generals who had
been withdrawn and superseded for failure in Catalonia, another
series of operations had been begun in the East, which was
destined to lead directly to onc more Spanish disaster, but
indirectly to the ruin of the :Frcllch cause in Spain. For, as has
already been pointed out in the last l'nges of the lust volume 1,
it was to be the diversion by Napoleon's orders of French
divisions eastward, Crom the borders of Portugal to those oC
Valencia, that was to give Wellington his long-desired oppor·
tunity of opening a. successCul oKensivc campaign against his
immediate opponents in the ·West. The Call of Valencia was to
lead to the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo in Janun.ry 1812.
It will be remembered thut the Emperor's ambitious schemes
for the conquest of the kingdom of Valencia, the last district
of eastern Spain where he had as yet secured no solid foothold,
had been deterred perforce till Figuerus fell, 011 August 19, 1811.
As long as that great fortress, which lies only a few miles from
the French frontier, and blocks the main road Crom Perpignan
to Barcelona, had been maintained against l\'lacdonald by the
OI:lAN. V
1 \'01. iv. pp. 587-9l.
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resolute l\brtinez, it was impossible to take up a new offensive
campaign: all the disposable French troops in Catalonia were
immobilized around the stubborn garrison. At length the
remnant of the star....ing miquclctcs hud laid down their arms,
and the troops which had heen for so long blockading them
became disposable for the assistance of Suchet, whose' Army
of Arugon • was to deliver the main blow against Valencia.
Six days after the surrender of Figueras the news that the
obstacle to advance had been at last removed reached Paris, 011
August 25, aod on the same evening Berthier wrote, by his
mnster's orders, to bid Suchet move forward: 'Everything leads.
us to believe that Valencia is in a state of panic, and that, whcn
Murviedro has been taken and a battle in the open field has
been won, that city will surrender. If you judge otherwise,
and think that you must wait to bring up your siege artillery
lor the attack on the place, or that you must wait for a better
season [i.e. early autumn] to commence the operation, I must
inlorm you that, in every case, it is the imperative order of the
Emperor that your head·quarters are to be on Valeneian
territory on or about September 15th, and lIS far forward towards
the city as possible.'
The orders were feasible, and (as we shall sec) were duly
executed: hut Napoleon had committed his usual mistake of
undervaluing the tenacity of the Spanish enemy, whom be so
deeply despised. Suchet set his troops in motion on Septem-
•ber 15th; he took Murviedro-hut only after a desperate siege
of two months-he beat the army of Valencia in a very decisive
pitched battle, but the city by no means fulfilled the Emperor's
prophecy by a prompt surrender. Fighting round its walls
went on for five weeks after Murviooro fell: and it was not till
troops had been brought to aid Suchet from very remote
provinces, that he at last compelled the capitulation of Valencia
after the New Year of 1812 had passed. Before the city yielded
Wellington was on the move, far away on the Portuguese
frontier, and it was not many days after Suchet's aide-dc-camp
brought the glorious news of the capitulation of Valencia, that
l\Iarmont's aide-dc-camp followed, with the wholly unexpected
and unwelcome tidings that the British had stormed Ciudad
Rodrigo, and that the hold o( the French army on Lean and
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Castile had been shaken. The one piece of information was the
complement and consequence of the other.
Suehet's invasion of Valencia, in short, was a much harder
and more venturesome enterprise than his master had calculated.
It was truc that the Spanish forces in front of him seemed in
September wholly incapable of holding him back. The Army
of Catalonia had been reduced by a series of disasters, cul-
minating in the falls of Tarragona and Figueras, to a merc
remnant of 8,000 men, lurking in the high hills of the interior.
The Army of Valencia had made a miserable exhibition of itself
during the last year: it had brought no effective help to the
Catalans, and whenever any of its detachments came into
contact with the French, they had invariably suffered dis-
creditable defeats, even when their numbers were far greater
than those of the invaders. Of all the armies or Spain this was
undoubtedly thc onc with the worst fighting reputation. It
was to small profit that the Captain-General was raising yet
newer and rawer battalions than those which already existed,
to swell thc numbers, but not the efficicncy, of his command.
In July the nominal total of the Valencian anny, including the
irregulars of the' flying column' of the Empecinado, had been
just 80,000 men. By October there were 36,000 under arms,
including the new' Reserve Didsion 1,' whose six battalions of
recruits had only 185 officers to 6,000 men-un allowance o(
one officer to 45 men, not much more than half oC the proportion
that is necessar}' even among good veteran troops. But in
truth the only valuable fighting force that wus present in the
kingdom in September was the infantry of the two weak
divisions of the old Albuera army, under ZILyns and Lardizabal,
whom Bhlkc had brought round from Cll.diz with him, when he
assumed command of the Eastern provinces. They did not
between them muster more than 6,000 bayonets, but were good
old troops, wh.o were to distiJ?gui~h themseh'es in the oncoming
campaign.
In addition, it was possible that Valencia might be able to
1 'The Reserve Division' eonsisted of a 3rd battalion from some of the old
regiments or the Valencian army, viz. 1st of Savoya, Avilll, Don CarIos,
Volunteers of Castile, CazadOlCS de Vu!encia, Orihuelu. They were each
about 1,000 strong, but averaged only 22 offieers per battalion.
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draw a few thousand men to her aid from the depIcted army
of Murcia, which had suffered so severely at Soult's hands
during the short campaign of the previous August 1, But sllch
assistance was purely problematical; if Soult should stir again
from the side of Andalusin, it would be impossible for General
Mahy to bring a single Murcian battalion to the succour of
Blake. If, by good fortune, he should not, only a {metion of
J\1ahy's small army would be free, since the greater part of it
would be required to watch the Andalusian frontier, and to
protect the great naval arsenal and fortress of Cartagena.
If the regular troops only in eastern Spain had to be counted,
it was certain that Suchct could dispose of numbers superior
to his adversaries. The gross total of the French Army of
Catalonia, where Generul Dceaen had now taken i\Iacdonald's
place, was 30,000 men. That of Suchet's own' Army of Aragon'
was nearly 50,000, if garrisons, sick, und drafts on the mareh IUC
reckoned in it, 'With thcse deducted, it could still supply about
31,000 men of all arms for the field. But these were not the
only resources available. On the upper Ebro, in Navar~e and
western Aragon, were the two newly arrived divisions of Reille
and Severoli, which had entered Spain during the summer, and
had hitherto had no occupation savc a littlc bunting of :Mina's
guerrilleros. These two di visions countcd 15,000 fresh troops of
good quality, and Suchet reckoned on their assistance to cover
his rear, when l,e should begin his march on Valencia. Tcclmj·
cally they belonged to Dorsenne's ' Army of the North,' but
Severoli's Italians had becn promised as a reinforcement for
Aragon already, and when Suehet asked for thc grant of
lleilJe's division also it was not denied him. There were 70,000
men in all to be taken into consideration when the attu.ck on
Valencia was planned out.
No such force, of course, could be set uside for the actual
invasion. The reason why not half so many thousands could
be utilized for the projected stroke was that the Spanish War,
as we have already had to point out on many occasions, was
not n. normal struggle between regular armies. The French had
not only to conquer but to occupy every province that they
overrun. Wherever an adequate garrison was not left, the
1 See voI. iv. pp. 475-83
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guerrilleros and miqueletes inundatcd the country-sidc, cut all
communications, and blockaded such small detachments as had
been left far apart from the main army. Suchct's 70,000 mcn
had to hold down Aragon and Catalonia, at the same timc that
they undertook the further extension of their master's power
on the Valcncinll side.
Decaen in Catalonia had 23,000 men fit for service, not
including sick and drafts on the march. Lacy's little army was
not morc than 8,000 strong in SeptemiJcr: yet Suchct dared
not take away a man from Catalonia. The large garrison of
Barcelona, a whole division, and the smaller garrisons of Gerona,
Rosas, and Mont Louis absorbed nearly half the effective total.
'l'he remainder were, as it turned out, not strong enough to
keep the Catalnns in check, much less to prosecute active
offensive operations agaillSt them. It was in October, after
Suehet had started against Valencia, that Lacy carried out the
series of smaU successful raids against Igualada, Ccrvera, and
1I1ontserrat, which have been spoken of in an earlier chapter!.
We need not wonder, then, that not a Frenchman was drawn
from Catalonia: they were all wanted 011 the spot to keep
a tight hold on the turbulent principality. The example of the
surprise of Figueras in the last spring .was sufficient to prove
the necessity of keeping every point strongly garrisoned, on
pain of possible disaster.
As to the Army of Aragoll, it was far stronger than the Army
of Catulonia, but on the other hund it had even more fortresses
to garrison. Saragossa, Tortosa. Tarragona, Lerida, were
large places, each absorbing several battalions. In addition
there werc thc smaller strongholds of Jaea, l\Icquinenza, 1\1011*
ZOIl, l\Iorella, requiring care. All thcse were regular fortresses,
but they did not exhaust the list of points that must be fIrmly
held, if the communications of Suchet's field-force ·with its
distant base were to be kept free and unhampered. Southern
Aragon and the mountain-ganglion whcre the borders of thn.t
kingdom and of Valencia and New CllStile meet, in thc roughest
country of the whole Spanish peninsula, had to be guarded. For
in this region lay the chosen hWlting-ground of the guerriIlel'O
bands 01 the Empccinado, DUfan, and mal1Y othcr Icsser ehids :
1 See vol. iv. pp. 54.0-1.
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draw a few thousand men to her aid from the depleted army
of Mureia, which had suffered so severely ut Soult's hands
during the short campaign of the previous August 1. But such
assistance was purel:t problematical; if Soult should stir !lgain
from the side of Andalusia, it would be impossible for General
Mahy to bring a single Mureinn battalion to thc succour of
BIake. If, by good fortune, he should not, only a fraction of
Mnhy's small army would be free, sinee the greater part of it
would be required to watch the Andalusian frontier, and to
protect the great naval arsenal and fortress of Cartagena.
If the regular troops only in eastern Spain had to be counted,
it was certain that Suchet could dispose of numbers superior
to his adversaries. The gross total of the French Army of
Ca.talonia, where General Decaen had now taken Macdonald's
place, wus 30,000 men. That of Suchct's own' Army of Arugon'
was ncarly 50,000, if garrisons, sick, and drafts on the march are
rcckoned in it. With these deducted, it could still supply about
31,000 men of aU anus for the field. But these were not the
only resources available. On the upper Ebro, in Navarre and
western Aragon, were the two newly arrived divisions of Reille
and Severoli, which had entered Spain during the summer, and
had hitherto had no occupation save a little hunting o[ Mina's
gllerrilleros. These two divisions counted 15,000 fresh troops of
good qUltlity, IUld Suchet rcckoncd on their assistance to cover
his rear, whcn he should begin his march on Valencia. Techni-
cally they belonged to Dorsenne's 'Army of the North,' but
Severoli's Italians had becn promised as a rcinforeement for
Aragon already, and when Sllchet asked for the grant of
Reille's division also it 'Was not denied him. There were 70,000
men in aU to be taken into consideration when the attack on
Valencia was planned out.
No such force, of course, eould be set asidc for the actual
invasion. The reason why not half so many thollsands could
be utilized for the projected stroke was that the Spanish War,
as wc have already had to point out on many occasions. was
not a normal struggle between regular armies. The French had
not only to conquer but to occupy every province that they
overrun. Wherever an adequate garrison was not left, the
• Scc vo\. iv. pp. 475-83
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guerrilleros and miqueletes inundated the country·side, cut all
communications, (ul(1 blockaded such small detachments us hud
been left far apart from the main army. Suehet's 70,000 men
had to hold down Aragon and Catalonia, at the same time that
they undertook the further extension of their muster's power
on the Valeneian side.
Decaen in Catalonia had 23,000 men fit for service, not
ineluding sick and drafts on the march. Lacy's little army wus
not more than 8,000 strong in September: yct Suchct dared
not take away a man from Catalonia. The large garrison of
Barcelona, a whole division, and the smallCl' garrisons of Gerollu,
Rosus, and Mont Louis absorbed nearly hall the cffeeti\'e total.
The remainder were, as it turned out, not strong enough to
keep the Catululls in check, much less to prosecute active
offensive operations against them. It was in October, after
Suehet had started against Valencia, that Lacy carried out the
series of small successful raids against Igualada, Cervcra, and
Montscrrat, which havc bcen spoken of in an earlier chapter l .
'Ve need not wonder, then, that not a Frenchman was drawn
from Catalonia: they were all wanted on the spot to keep
a tight hold on the turbulent principality. The example of the
surprise of Figueras in the last spring was sufficient to prove
the necessity of keeping every point strongly garrisoned, on
pain of possible disastef.
As to the Army of Aragon, it was far stronger than the Army
of Catalonia, but on the other hand it had even morc fortresses
to garrison. Saragossa, l'ortosa, Tarragona, Lerida, were
large places, eo.eh absorbing scvcral battalions. In addition
there were the smaller strongholds of Jaca, Mequinenza, Mon-
zon, Morella, requiring carc. All these wefe regular fortresses,
but they did not exhaust the list of points that must bc firmly
held, if the communications of Suehet's Held-force with its
distant base were to be kept free and unhampered. Southern
Amgon and the mountain-ganglion wherc the borders of that
kingdom and of Valencia and New Castile meet, in the roughest
country of the whole Spanish peninsula, had to be guarded. For
in this rcgion lay the chosen hunting-groWld of the gucl'rillcro
bands of the Empccinado, Duran, and many other lesser chiefs:
I Sce ~·oJ. iv. pp. 540-1.
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and l\Iina himscH, from his usual haunts in Navarre, not unlre_
quently led It raid far to the south of the Ebro; Suchet had
therefore to place garrisons in 'l'cruel, Daroca, Alcufiiz, Cala"
tayud, and Molina, nonc of which possessed modern fortifica-
tions. The det.nchments left to hold them had to utilize a large
convent, a mediaeval castle, or some such post of defence, in
case they were attacked by the roving hordes of the enemy.
Able to protect themselves with case against small parties,
and to keep the roads opcn under ordinary circumstances, they
were exposed to serious danger if the guerrillcros should mass
themselves in force against anyone garrison-more especially
jf the bands should have heen ICllt IL few cunnon and gunners
from the regular Spanish armies. E'or convents or old castles
could not resist artillcry firc.
'1'0 cover his rear Suchet was forced to set aside one whole
division, that of Frere, thirteen battalions strong I, and mus-
tcring ovcr 7,000 men, and immcnse detaclmlents of the three
other Freneh dh...isions of the Army of Aragon. 1'he units told
art for the field army left no less than 6,800 able-bodied men
(besides siek and convalescents) behind them, while they took
22,000 to the front. Frcre's division remaincd on thc side of
Western Catalonia, holding Lerida and 'l'ortosa in force, and
the intermcdiate places with small posts. The dctachmcnts
from Musnier's, Harispe's, and Habert's French, and from
Pnlombini's Italian divisions, took chu.rgc of Southern Arugoll,
leaving a company here and a battalion there. But the Marshal
selected with great care the men who were to march on the
Valcncian expedition: each rCJ:,timcnt drafted its most ·cffcctive
soldiers into the marching units, and left the recruits and the old
or sickly mcn ill thc garrisons. Thus the battalions uscd in
thc oncoming campaign were rather weak, averaging not much
over 450 men, but were eOlUposed entirely of sclected veterans.
The only doubtful element taken forward was the so-called
'Neupolil:ttn Division' of General Compere, which was only
1,500 strong-in reality a weak brigade-and had llO great
reputation. But what was left of this corps was its best part-
, Composed lit this time Hr the 1'Ub and 4'2nd and 115th Line. ,,1111 the
1st Uger, the first two and lust each three battalions strong, the other
(!lath) with four.
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the numerous men who wanted to desert had already done so,
and its weaklings were dead by this time. Of his cuvalry
Suehet took forward almost the whole, leaving behind only two
squadrons of the 4th Hussars for the service between the
garrisons, and of the other regiments only the weakly men and
horses 1. Practically all his horse und field artillery also went
forward with him.
or his own Army of Aragon, Suehet, llS we have thus seen, left
nearly 14,000 men • present under arms' to cover his rear.
But this was not enough to make matters wholly secure, so
untameable were the Aragonesc and Catalans with whom he bad
to deal. Indeed, if this force only had been left to discharge the
appointed task, it is clear, from subsequent happenings, that
he would have suffered a disaster during Iris absence in Vulencia.
Hc asked from the Emperor the loan of half Reillc's division
from Navarre, as '''ell as the prompt sending to the front of
Severoli's Italiuns, who had been promised him us u reinforce-
ment when fIrst they entered Spain. The petition was granted,
and these troops entered northern Aragon, and took charge of
the places along the Ebro, while the expeditionary army was on
its way to Valencia. 1\Iost of them were ultimately brought
forward to the siege of the great city, and without them neither
could Aragon have been maintained nor Valencia captured.
Practically we may say that Suchet, at his original start, took
26,000 mcn to beat the Valencians and capture their city, but
that he left nearly 30,000 more behind him, to hold down the
provinces already conquered and to deal with the guerrillcros.
Two main roads lead from the north to Valcnciu: thc onc,
coming from 1'ortosa and Catalonia, hugs the coast of the
Mediterranean, from whieh it is nevcr more than a few miles
distant. The other, far inland, and starting Irom Saragossa,
follows the valley of the )Uloca among the hills of Southern
Aragon, crosses the watershed beyond Tcrud, and descends to
the sea near Murviedro, where it joins the coast-road only a few
miles north of Valencia. There is a tlrird, and much inferior,
route between these two, which starts from Mequinenza on the
, The 24th Dragoons lert llbout 140 men behind, the 18th Cuirussiers 50
only, the Hlllillll' Dragoons of Napoleon' 124, but the 4th Hussars about
500, much more than half their force.
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Lower Ebro. crosses the mountainous Valencian frontier near
Morella, and comes down to the coast at Castellon de la Plana,
twenty miles north of Murviedro. Of these roads the first was
as good as any in Spain, and was suitable for nIl manner of
traffic: but it had the disadvantage of being flankcd at a dis-
tance of only two miles by the small but impregnable fortress
of Pcniscola, which lies on a rocky headland thirty miles beyond
'l'ortosa, and of being absolutely blocked by thc Iittllt town
of Oropcsa, twcnty milcs furthcr south. Oropcsa was no more
than a ruinous mediaeval place, with twocnstles hastily repaired,
without any modern works: but since the road passed through
it, no heavy guns or wagons starting from Tortosa could get
further south till its forts had bccn capturcd.
The second road, that from Aragon by 'l'eruel and Murviedro,
is marked on contemporary maps as a post-route fit for all
vehicles: but it passed through a very mountainous country,
and was much inferior as a line of advance to the coast-road.
It was not blocked by any fortress in the hands of the Spaniards,
but between Teruel and Segorbe it was crossed by many ridges
and ravines highly suitable for ddcnec. The third track, that
by l\1orella, was unsuitable for wheeled traffic, and could only
be used by infantry and Ctwuh·y. Its onc advantage was that
Mor~lla, its central point, had been already for some time in
French hands, and contained a garrison and stores, which made
it a good starting-point for a marching eolwnn.
Suchet determined to use all thrce of these roads, though
such u plan would have been most hazardous against a wary
and vigorous enemy; for though they aU converge in the cnd on
the same point, Murviedro, they arc separated from cuch other
by long stretches of mountain, and have no cross-communica-
tions. In cspecial, the roud by Teruel was very distant from
the other two, and any isolated column taking it might find
itself opposed by immensely superior forces, during the last
days uf its march; since Valencia, the enemy's base nnd head-
quarters, where he would naturally concentrate, lies quite close
to the concluding stages of the route Teruel-Jofurvicdro. It
must have been in sheer contempt for his opponent-a con-
tempt which turned out to be justified-that the 1tfarshal sent
a detachment of eleven battalions by this road, for such a force of
EngIM Mires
1 , I ! , I ,
I1 0 10 20 30 4ll 50
1811] SUCllli'l"S ADVANCE BEGINS •
5,000 men might have been beset by the whole Valeneiall army,
30,000 strong, and the other columns could not have helped it.
Suchet's arrangements were governed by a single fact-his
siege ul'tillery alld heavy stores were parked at '£ortosa, and
from thence, therefore, along the coast road, must be his main
line of advance, though it would be necessary to mask lleniscola
uncI to capture Oropcsa, before he could get forward to his
objective-the city of Valencia, It might havc seemed rational
to move the whole field army by this route: but some of the
troops destined for it were coming from distant points, and to
march them down the Ebro bank to Tortosa would havc taken
much time. Moreover if the whole force concentrated there,
it would all have to be fed from the magazines at Tortosa, and
those lying in Aragon would be of no use. The Marshul started
himself from this point, on September 15, with the division of
Habert, and an infantry reserve formed of Robert's brigade of
tbe division of l>Iusnicr, together with the whole of the cavalry
and field artillery of the army. The siege-train guarded by the
other brigade of Musnier's division-that of Ficatier-followed :
but l\Iusniel' himself did not accompany the expedition, having
been left in general charge of the detachments placed in garrison
on the Ebro and in Upper Aragon. The whole column made up
about 11,000 combatants.
Thc second column, consisting of the two auxiliary divisions-
Palombini's eleven Italian battalions and Compere's 1,500
Neapolitans-took (without any artillery to hamper thcm) the
mountain road by Alcal1iz and lUorella: they were slightly
over 7,000 strong, and, if all went well, were destined to unite
with the main body somewhere near 01'Opcsa or Custcllol1 de la.
Plana. It was llot likely that this column would meet with
much opPosition.
But the third detachment, Harispe's 5,000 men from Upper
Aragon, who were to take the inland and westcrn road by
'I'eruel, were essaying a very dangerous task, if the enemy
should prove activc and entcrprising, more especially as they
had 110 artillery and hardly any ca\'alry with them. Blake
might have taken the offensive with 20,000 men against them,
while still leaving something to contain---or at least to obserye-
Suchct's main column.
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The Spanish Commander~in-Chief,however, did nothing of the
sort, and met the invasion with a tame and spiritless defensive
on all its points. When Suchet's advance was reported, lllakc
had his forces ill a very scattered situation. or the 36,000 men
of whom he could nominally dispose, the Empecinado's ' flying
(,'olumn' was as usual detached in the mountains of Molilla and
Guadalajara, harassing small French garrisons. Zayns's division
had been left far to the south at VilIenu, lleur AliCUlltC, to work
off the contagion of yellow fever which it had contracted while
passing by Cartagcnu. For in that port the disease was mging
terribly at the time. Obispo's division was in the high hills on
the borders of Aragon. In the neighbourhood of Valeneio. were
only the troops of Lardizabal and Miranda, with the main body
of the cavalry. The Armyof Mureia, which was destioed to send
succour if it should not fmd itself beset by Soult on the other
side, was lying cantoned at various points in that province. As
the French were at tlti:; timc making no demonstration trom the
side of Granada, it now became clear that it would be able to
scnd certain'succours to Blake. But they were not yet dcsig·
Dated for marching, much less assembled, and it was clear that
they would comc up very latc.
This dispersion of the available troops did not, in the end,
make much diCCerence to the fo.te of the campaign, for Blake
had from the ftrst made up ltis mind to accept the defensive,
to draw in his outlying detachments, and to stand at bay in the
neighbourhood of Valencia, without attempting to make any
serious resistance on the frontier. Sinee his arrival he had been
urging on the construction ol a line of earthworks, torming
fortified camps, around the provincial capital. The ancient
walls at Valencia itscll were incapable o[ any serious resistance
to modern artillery, but outside them, all along the banks of the
Guadalaviar river, for some miles inland to the Wcst, and as tur
as the sea on the East, batteries, tites-de-pont, trenches, and evcn
closed works of considerable size had bccn constructed. It was
by holding them in force and with great numbers that Blakc
intended to eheck the invasion. In front of his chosen position,
at a distance of twenty miles, there was a great advanced
work-a newly restored fortress of crucial importanee--the
fastness ol Saguntum, or ' San Fcrnando de Sagunto ' as it had
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just been rc-christened. This was the acropolis 01 onc 01 the
most ancient towns of Spain, the Saguntum which had detained
Hannibal so long before its walls at the opening of the
Third Punic Wllr. In the age 01 the Iberians. the Cartha~
ginians. and the Romans. and even down to the days of the
Ommeyad califs. there had been a large and flourishing city on
this site. But in the later middle ages Sngulltwn had declined
in prosperity and population. and the modern town-which
had changed its name to Murviedro (muM veteres) had shrunk
down to the loot of the hill. It was now a small opcn place 01
6.000 souls, quite indefensible. But above it towered the steep
line of rock which had formed the citadel in ancient days: its
uarrow summit was crowned with many ruins of various agcs-
from cyclopeall foundations of walls, going back to the time
of the ancient Iberians. to Moorish watch-towers and palaces.
The cmpty spncc of steep slope. lrom the Ilcropolis down to the
modern town, was also sprinkled with decaying walls and
substructures of all sorts, among which were cisterns and
broken roadways. besides the remains 01 tl. large Roman
theatre, partly hewn out of thc live rock. '"
There had been no fortifications by Murviedro when Suchet
last passed near Valencia, in his abortive raid of :March 1810 I.
On that occasion he had scaled thc citadel to enjoy the view
and to take a casual survey of the picturesque ruins upon it~.
But since then a great change had taken place. On the advice.
as it is said, of the English general, Charles Doyle 3, Blakc had
determined to restore the citadel as a place of strength. This
was when he last held command in Valencia. and before he
joined the Cadiz Regency. But his ideu. had been carried out
after his departure by the Valencian Junta and the successive
Captains-General who had come after him. By means of more
tlltin It year's work the citadel hud been maue a tenable fortress,
though onc of an irregular and unscientific sort. The old
Iberian and Moorish walls had been repaired and run together
in a new enceinie, with material taken from the other ruins all
arowld. In especial the Roman theatre, hitherto one 01 the
most perfect in Southern Europe. had been completely gutted,
I Sec yol. Hi. pp. 284-6. • Suchct'~ Mt'imoirfS, ii. p. 156.
• See Artec:he, xi. 1'. 12:1.
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and its big blocks had proved most useful for building the
foundations of weak points of the circuit of fortification. This
was strong at some points, from the toughness and height of the
old ramparts, but very sketchy at others. Where the slope was
absolutely precipitous, a rough wall of dry stone without mortar
alone had been carried along the edge of the cliff. The nn.rraw
summit of the rock formed a most irregular enclosure, varying
much in height from onc point to another. It was divided into
lour separate sections cut off from each other by cross-walls.
The westernmost and lowest, facing the only point from which
there is a comparatively gentle ascent to the summit, was
crowned by a new battery called by the name of Dos de Mayo,
to commemorate the Madrid Insurrection oC 1808. Rising high
in the centre of this work was an ancient bastion named the
Tower of San Pedro. Mueh higher, 011 the extreme peak of the
summit, was the citadel tower, called San Fernando, where the
governor's flag flew, and from whence the whole fortress eould
be best surveyed. From this point the rock descended rapidly,
and its long irregul'Lr eastern crest was surrounded by weakly-
repaired walls, ending in two batteries called by the names of
Menacho, the gallant governor of Budajoz 1, and Doyle, the
English general who hud suggested the Cortifieation of the place.
But the greater part of this eastern end of the works lay above
slopes so precipitous that it seemed unlikely that they would
ever be attacked. The western end, by the Dos Mayo battery,
was the obvious point of assault by an enemy who intended to
use regular methods.
The construction was by no means finished when Suchet's
expedition began: many parts of the new walls were only
carried up to half their intended height, and no regular shelter
for thc garrison had been contrived. Instead of proper barracks
and casemates there were only rough 'leans-to,' contrived
agaiust old walls, or cover mnde by roofing in with beams old
broken towers, and bastions. The hospital was the only spacious
and regular building in the whole eneeinte: the powder magazine
was placed deep down in the cellars of the fort San Fernando.
The armament of the place was by no means complete: the
guns were being sent up just as Suchet started. Only seventeen
1 See yol, iv. p. 56.
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were ready, and of these no more than three were 12-pounders :
the rest were only of the calibre of field artillery (4- and
8-poundcrs) or howitzers. A fortress which has only seventeen
guns for an enceinte of 3,000 ylnds, and possesses no heavy guns
to reply to the 18~ or 24-pounders of a siege-train, is in a. state
of desperate danger.
Blake had thr6wn into the lllace a brigade under the com-
mand of Colonel Luis Andriani, consisting of fivc battalions,
two each of the regiments of Savoya and Don Carlos, one of
the Cazadores de Orihuela. Of these two were new 'third
battalions I' .from thc rcccntly raiscd 'Division of Reserve,'
incomplete in officers, only half drilled, and not yet fully
provided with uniforms. The total force came to 2,068 officers
and men, including about 150 artillerymen and sappers. It is
probable that these troops would have made no better show in
the open field than did the rest of the Valencinn army, a few
weeks later: but they showed behind wall~ the same capacity
for unexpected resistance which had surprised the Freneh on
other occasions at Ciudad Rodrigo, Gerona, and Figueras.
Andriani, the governor, seems to have made an honourable
attempt to do his duty at the head of the doubtfully efficient
garrison lllaccd at his disposal.
In addition to Saguntum Blake held two outlying posts in
his front, Peniseola on its lofty headland, garrisoned by about
1,000 men under General Go..rcia Navarro, and the half-ruined
Oropesa, which he had resolvcd to hold, because it blocked the
sea-coast road so effectively. But its only tenable points were
two mediaeval towers, onc in the town commanding the high~
road, the other by the shorc of the Mediterranean. Their
joint garrisons did not amount to 500 men, and it was obvious'
that they could not hold Qut many days against modern
artillery. But the gain Elf a day or two might conceivably be
very valuable in the campaign tl;tat was about to begin. It is
clear, however, that his main hQpe of resistance lay in the line of
entrenched camps and batteries along the Guudalaviar, in front
of Valencia: here hc intended to make his rent stand, and he
, The batlalions were ti,e 2nd llod Brd of So.voya (the lI~st a new levy)
the 1st and 2nd of DOli Cados, and the Brd of Orihuela, this last raw and
newly raised like the <lrd of 5avo:)-"a.
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hoped that Saguntum, so little distant from this line, would
prove a serious hindrance to the enemy when he came up
against it.
Suchet's three columns all started, as Napoleon had ordered,
on September 15th. The Marshal's own main body, coming from
Tortosa, reached Bcnicarlo, the first town across the Valcncian
frontier, next day, and on the 17th came level with Peniscola,
whose garrison kept quiet within the limits of its isthmus.
The :Marshal left a battalion and a few hussars to observe
it, and to sce that it did not make sallies against his line
of communication. On the lOth the hcad of the mn.rching
column reached Torreblanea, quite close to Oropesa. A recon-
naissance found that the place was held, and came into con·
tact with some Spllnish horse, who were easily driven off.
This was the first touch with Blake's field army that hnd been
obtained. But the encmy was cvidently not in force, and thc
garrison of Oropesa hastily retired into the two towers which
formed iLs only tenable positions. On a close inspection it was
found that the tower in the town completely commal.ldcd the
high-road, whcrelore the Marshal took a slight circuit by
suburban lanes round the place, with his main body and guns,
and continucd his advance, after leaving a kw companies to
blockade the towers. On the same cvening he was joined by
Palombini's column from Morelln, consisting of the two Italian
divisions. They had accomplished their march without meeting
any resistance, though the rond from Morclla by San Malteo
and Cabanes was rough and easily defensible. The united
force, now 16,000 strong, proeceded on its mareh next day,
and the Marshal was agreeably surprised when, on thc morning
01 the 20tb, the cavalry scouts on his right flank announced
to him that they had come in touch with Harispc's column from
Tcruel, which had appeared at the villagc of VilIafancs a lew
miles from the main road. Thus the whole army of invasion
was happily united.
Harispe, as it turned out, had left Teruel on the 15th, in
obedience to his orders, by the post-road to Segorbe and the
coast. But hearing on the second day that a large Valeneian
force was holding the defile of Las Barracas, where the road
crosses thc watershed, he had turned oIl by a. bad side-path to
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Ruvielos In thc upper valley of thc Mijo.rcs, in t.he hope of
joining his chief without being forced to storm a difficult
position. Blakc, as a matter of fact, much alarmed at the
approach of a flanking column on the Terucl side, und ignorant
of its strength, had sent the division of Obispo and some other
detachments to hold the pass. Dut no enemy came this way-
Harispc had diverged down the course of t.hc Villahermosa
river, by a country road only practicable 10r a force without
guns or wheeled transport, and got down by rapid marches to
the coast-plain beyond Aleora, without having seen any enemy
save somc scattered guerrillero bands. He had thoroughly
distracted Blakc's attention and had run no danger, because he
took an unexpected and difficult route, in a direction quite
different from that by which the Spaniards expected him to
appear 1.
The whole army was now concentrated near Villafanes on
September 21, save the detachments left to block Peniseola and
Oropesa, and the brigade of Ficatier, which, escorting the siege-
train, had been left at Tortosa, to await orders for starting when
there ·should be no enemy left inllorthern Valencia to molest it.
The hcavy guns were to come forward down the coast-road,
first to breach the towers of Oropcsa, and whell the way past
them wnli c1car, to play thcir part, if nccclisary, in the more
serious task of battering Saguntum.
On advancing from Castcllon de la Plana all September 22
the French army found a very small Spanish rearguard-SOO or
600 men-covering the bridge of Villareal over the Mijares.
They gave way before the first atl:ll.ek, which was a very
liimple affair, sinee the river was nearly dry and every·
where fordable. No more was seen of the enemy next day,
Hlld on the 23rd Suehct found himsclt on the bunks of the
Palancia stream, which flows under the foot of the rock of
Saguntum. The Spaniards had retired still further towards
Valencia, leaving the fortress to its own resources. These were
I Vacani says that t]le Terucl column was intended by Suchet as a mere
demonstration. and was never intended to follow the high_road Teroel-
Scgorbc, but to take a cross-route over the hills, such as was actually used
b~' it. But Suchct, in his iI1tmoirC8, mll.kCll 110 such statement (ii. p.152), and
speaks Wl ir H>lrispe had taken the Ruviel08 route on his own responsibility.
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unknown to Suchet. who was aware that the ruinous citadel
had been rebuilt, but could not tell without further recon-
naissance what was its strength. In order to invest the place,
and to make closer ill\'cstigation possible, Harispe's division
c.rossed the Palancia to the right of Saguntum, Habcrt's to the
left. The latter sent six companies into the town o[ l'IIurvicdro.
and drove up some Spanish pickets from it into the fortress
which towered above. The two divisions then joined hunds
to the south of Saguntum. completing its investment, while
Palombini's Italians took post at Pct.rcs and GiIlc!; all the road
to Segorbe-to the north-west-in case make might have
placed some or his troops on this side-route, with the object of
troubling the siege by attacks from the rear. The cavalry went
forwllrd down the high-road to Valencia, and sent hack news
that they had explored as far as Albalctc, only six miles from
the capital, and had met no enemy. The division of Lardizllhal
and the cavalry of San Juan, which had been the observing
force in front of Suchet, had retired beyond the GUlldulo.villr
river, and had shut themselves up (along with the rest of Blake's
urmy) in the entrenchments behind that stream. The Spanish
general was evidently acting on the strictest principles of
passive defence.
The French marshal determined not to seek his enemy on
his chosen ground, till he should have taken Saguntum and
brought up his siege-train to the front. The former condition
hc thought would not llrove difficult to accomplish. A survey
of the fortress revealed its extremely irregular and incomplete
state of defence. Though the cliffs were in all parts steep and
in some places inaccessiblc, many sections of the works above
them were obviously unfinished and very weak. After a close
recommissallcc by his engineer officers had been made, Suehet
determined that it would be worth while to try an attempt at
escalade on some of the most defective points, without waiting
for the arrival of the siege-train. He set his sappers and
carpenters to work to make sixty ladders, which were ready in
full number on the third day. The tront chosen lor the assault
was in the enceinte immediately overhanging the town of
Murviedro, where two ancient gaps in the wall werc clearly
visible; the new work was not half finished, and a low structure,
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roughly completed with beams laid above the rcgular fou.nda-
tions, was all that blocked the openings. The masons of the
garrison were heard at night, working hard to raise the height
of the stonc wall which was to replace the tcmporary woodcn
parapets. Therc being no artillery available, they could not
be hindered in their building: but it did not seem to advance
very rapidly.
Suehet set apart for thc actual escalade two columns, each
composed of 300 volunteers from I-Iabert's division: they were
to bc supported by a reserve of similar strength wider Colonel
Gudin, which was formed up, completely under cover, within the
streets of Murvicdro. At midnight on September 27th-28th the
stormers pushcd forward under covcr of the darkness, and in
small successive parties, into a. large Roman cistern above the
ruined theatre, which was • dead ground,' and not exposed to
fire from allY part of the ramparts. Hcre they were only
120 yards from the two breaches. Meanwhilc, as a diversion,
six Italian companies from Palombini's division were ordered
lo make a noisy demonstration against the distant part of the
defences which lay under the tower of San Pedro 1. General
Habert was to have 2,000 men more under arms, ready to
support the u.ssailing column.
The stormcrs reached their appointed place apparently
undiscovered, and the attack would have been delivered~
according to Suchet's dispatch~withoutany preliminary £tring,
but for an accident. The Marshal says that the Spaniards
had pushed an exploring patrol down the hillside, which fell ill
with the French pickets und drew their fire. Thereupon the
assaulting columns in the cistern, thinking thcmselvcs dis·
covered; let off a few shots and charged uphill, a little ahead
of the appointed time, and before the Italian demonstration
had bcguJl 2. The govcruor, Andl'iani, in his dispatch, makcs no
mention of this, but merely says that about 2 a.m. his sentinels
thought that thcy detected movements on the slopes, aud
1 The complete orders lor the attack may be read in the first Pitce
juslificuJ.i~ in Helllllls'", hislory of the siege, I'll, 115-17 of vol. iv of his
elaborate work.
• Vacani (v. p. 381) contradicts Suehet, saying that there was no Spanish
patrol, and that the French pickets fired rrOIll llcr"ousncl;S at Ull imaginury
l~.
c
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that n short time afterwards a fieree attack was delivered.
At any ratc thc garrison was not surprised as Suchet had
hoped.
Owing to the lowness, however, of the walls blocking thc two
old breaches, the assailants had, in their first rush, a fair chance
of breaking in. Many ladders were successfully planted, and
repeatedly small parties of the French got a footing on the
wooden parapets. I! thc garrison had flinched, the storm might
have succeeded: but far from flinching, they orfered a desperate
resistance, ovelthrew the ladders, slew all who had gained the
top of the enceinte, and kept up a furious musketry fire, which
laid low many of the soldiers who kept pressing forward to the
breaches. It was to no purpose that the demonstration by
the ltuliuns below San Pedro now began: the Spaniards fired
hard and fast in this direction also, but did not withdraw any
men from the real point of attack, where they maintained them-
selves very courageously. It was in vain that Colonel Gudin
brought up his reserve: it could make no head, and the sur-
vivors threw themselves down among the rocks and ruins in
front of the wall-unwilling to recede, but quite unable to
advance. Seeing,bis attack a hopeless failure, Suehct ordc}ed
the stormers back just before daylight began to appear. They
had lost 247 killed and wounded out of 000 mcn engaged: the
garrison only 15 killed and less than 30 wounded 1.
The escalade having eome to this disappointing conclusion,
the Marshal saw that the siege of Saguntum would be anything
but a quiek business. It would be necessary to bring up the
siege~train to the front: orders were sent back to Fieaticr to
start it at once from Torto5.'\; but it had to batter and take
Oropesu before it could even reach Murvicdro. There were
some weeks of delay before him, and meanwhile Blake might at
last begin to show some signs of life. Suehct therelore disposed
his army so as to provide both a blockading force and a covering
force, to see that the blockade was not interfered with from
without. It being evident that many days would elapse before
1 Va.cani makcs the 10000S 360 instead or 24.7, llnd it is possible that
Suehet OM given only the uosualties ut the Illuin lISS1l.ult, und /lot those in
thc distant dClllonstrolions. Vacani SU)'S that the ltalin/ls lost 52 men in
their false attack.
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thc siegc artillery arrived, the French engineer officers got leave
to employ many detachments in preparing roads fit to heax
heavy guns up the western Ijlopes of the hill of Snguntllm,
from which alone the regular attack on the fortress (.'ould be
conducted. Several emplacements for batteries were also
chosen, and work upon them wos begun.
From September 28rd, the day of Suehet's arrival before
Saguntum, down to October 16, when the heavy guns at last
arrived, the French army wos pructically 'marking time': the
idea which the Emperor had conceived, and whieh his lieutenant
had adopted, that Valencia could be conquered by a sudden
rush, bad been proved false. Apparently Suehct had gained no
more by his rapid advance to the foot of the hill 0:£ Saguntum
than he would have obtaincd by marching in more leisurely
fashion, with his siege artillcry in company, and taking Oropesa
on the way. The reduction of that place indeed was (as it
turned out) only a single dny's tusk for heavy guns: and if the
.Marshal had captured it on his march, he might have prescntcd
himself bcfore Saguntum with his sicge-train, and hal'e begun
nn active attaek on that fOl,tress, some weeks before he was
actually able to get to serious work. In fact he might have
been battering Saguntum on October 1, instead of having to
wait till October 16th. But this is 'wisdom after thc cvent' :
Napoleon thought that Valencia could be 'rushed,' and
Suchet was bound to make the experimcnt that his master
ordered.
Blake meanwhile, finding, on September 23rd, that the enemy
was 110t about to advance against his lines, and learning soon
after that the French army had settled down bclare SaglUltum,
had to revise his plans, since it was clear that he was not to be
attacked in his entrenchments as he had supposed. Three
courses wcrc now open to him: either he might collcet every
man for a decisive battle in the open, and try to raisc the siege;
or he might attempt to open up attacks on Suchet's line of
communications und on his bose ill Aragon, so us to force him
to retire by indirect opcratiolls; or he might remain passive
behind the lines of the Guadalaviar. The last was an almost
unthinkable alternative-it would have ruined his reputation
for ever to sit quiet and do nothing, as \VeUington had done
c'
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during the siege o[ Ciudad Rodrigo in 1810. Only a general
with an established reputation for courage and ability eould
have dared to take such a course; and Blakc's record was a long
series of disasters, while he was detested by the Valcneians one
und all-by the army, to whom he rightly preferred his own
excellent troops, no less than by the Captain-General Palaeios,
alld the Junta, whom he had sent out o[ the city to sit at
Alcira, when they showed a tendency to bamper his operations.
PractieaIly he was forced by his situation to take some definite
offensive move against Sllchet.
Hc chose that of indirect operations, having a well-rooted
distrust of the fighting powers of a great part of the troops that
were at his disposition. The record of the Valeneian army he
knew: the state of the Mureian army, on whieh he could draw
for reinforcements, was reprcsented to him in the most gloomy
colours by Mahy, who had recently replaced Frcire in command.
On September 12th Mahy had written to him, to warn him that
the spirit of his troops was detestable: 'the Army of Mureia was
little better than a phantom: there were only four or five olfieers
for whom the rank and file had any respect or esteem, the rest
were regarded as timid or incapable: the men hnd no confidence
in themselves or thcir chicCs. The best thing to do would be to
break up the whole army, and incorporate it into the" Expe-
ditionary Di\'isions," whose eommandcrs were known as good
soldiers, and whose battalions were trustworthy 1.'
In view of these fuets Blake resolved to threaten Suehct's
flanks with demonstrations, which he had no intention of
tuming into attacks, but to endeavour to dislodge him from
his forward position by turning loose the gucrrilleros of Aragon
all to his rear. With the former purpose he sent out two
detachments from the Valelleian lines, Obispo's division to
Segorbe.-where it cut the French communication with Teruel
and southern Aragoll,-Chul'lcs O'Donncll with Villaeampa's
infantry and San Juan's horse to Dcnaguaeil, a point in the
plains Hfteen miles west or Suguntum, where his force formed a
link between Obispo and the main body of the Valencian army,
I See MllllY'S letter to Dlake on pp. 109-12 of vol. xi of Arteche. The
General is writing Yel')' carefully so as not to speak too ill or his lll"llly: but
hit views are clear.
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which still remained cntrenched in the lincs of the Guadalaviar 1.
These two. detachments threatened Suchet's flank, and even
his rear, but there was no intention of turning the threat into
a rcality.
The real movement on which Illake relied for the discomfiture
of the invaders of Valencia was that of the guerrillero bands of
Aragon and the neighbouring parts of Castilc, to whom he had
appcaled for help the moment that Suchct commenced his
march. He believed that the 0,000 or 7,000 men which Suchet
had left scattered in small garrisons under General Musnier
might be so beset and worried by the partidas, that the Marshal
might be compelled to turn ooek to their aid. Even Mina from
his distant haunts in Navarre had been ~skcd to co-operate.
This was an excellent move, and might have succeeded, if
Musnier alone had remained to hold down Aragon. But Blake
had forgotten in his calculations the 15,000 men of Reille and
Severoli, eantoned in Navn.rre and along the Upper Ebro, who
were available to strengthen the small force which lay in the
garrisons under Musnier's charge.
The diversion of the guerriUeros, however, was effected with
considerable energy. On September 20th the Empceinado and
Duran appeared. in front of Calatayud, the most important of
the French garrisons in the mountains of western Aragon.
They had with them 5,000 foot alld 500 horse-not their full
strength, for a large band of the Empecinado's men beset at
the same time the remote castle of ~{olina, the most outlying
and isolated of all Suchet's posts. Calatayud was held by a few
companies of French, to which an Italian flying column of
a battalion had just joined itself. The guerrillcros, coming in
with a rush, drove the garrison out of the town into their
fortified post, the large convent of La l\Ierced, taking many
prisoners in the streets. Duran then beleaguered the main
body in the convent, while the Empecinado took post at the
deme of El Frasllo on the Saragossa road, to hold off any succour
that i\1usnier might send up from the Aragollese capital. This
precaution was justified-a column of 1,000 men came out of
Saragossa, hut was far too weak to force the pass and had to
1 Blake kept under hill own hand in the lillcs the divisions of Zl1yll8,
Lardizu.l.ml, Mirandll, lIod the Rea;eJvc.
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retire. with the loss of its commander, Colonel GiIlot, und muny
men. Meanwhile Duran pressed the besieged in the convent
with mines, having no ar,tiUcry of sufficient calibre to batter its
walls. After blowing down a corner of its chapel with one
mine, and killing many of the defenders, the gucrrillcro chief
c"..ploded a second on October 5, which made such a vast bre.'lch
that the garrison surrendered, still 560 strong, on the following
day 1.
This success would have gone fur to shake the hold of the
.French on Aragon, but for the intervention of n,eillc from
Navarrc. At the first news of the blockade of Calatayud, he
had dispatched a column, consisting of the whole brigade of
Bourkc. 3,500 strong, which would have saved the garrison if
it had had aless distance to march. But it arrived on the 5th to
find the convent blown up, while the Sponiards hud vanished
with their prisoners. Bourke thereupon returned to Tudcla, and
the guerrilleros reoccupied Calatayud on his departure.
Meanwhile, however, the whole Italian division of Severoli,
ovcx 7,000 strong; marched dowll the Ebro to reinforce the
small garrison of Saragossa. This large reinforcement restored
the confidence of the French. Musnier himself took charge of
it and marched at its head against Duran and thc Empecinado.
They wisely refused to fight, gave way, evacuated Calatayud,
and took refuge in the hills (October 12), While the main field-
force of the enemy was drawn off in this direction, Mina took
up the game on the other side of the Ebro. Entering Aragon
with 4,000 men he besieged the small garrison of Exea, which
abandoned its post, and cut its way through the guerrilleros,
till it met a column of 800 Italian in1antry 2 sent out from
Saragossa to bring it off. Colonel Cccoopicri, the leader of this
small force, underrating the strength of his enemy, then
marched to relieve the garrison of Aycrbe. He was surprised
on the way by Mina's whole force, and in a long running fight
between Aycrbe and Huesea was slU'founded and slain. The
column was exterminated, two hundred Italians were kiDed, six
, Vacnni gives n long nod interesting necount or the siege (v. pp. 4<»-13)
and attributes the weuk defence to quarrels between the commander of the
Itnlians and the French governor, :'.Iiiller.
• Belonging to the 7th Line of Sevcroli's division.
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hundred (including many wounded) were taken prisoners
(October 16th).
Musnier returned in haste from Calatayud at the news of
this disaster, but telt the bulk of Scveroli's division to oceupy
western Aragon. He then set himself, with the help of Reille,
to hunt down Mina. But the latter, marching with ease
between the columns that pursued him, for the peasantry kept
him informed day by day of every movement of the enemy,
retreated westward. Easily eluding the French, he made an
cxtraordinary cxcursion, right across Navarre, Alava, and
Biscay, down to the sea coast at Motrico, where he handed over
his prisoners to the captain of the British frigate Isis, and then
returned unharmed to his familiar haunts. Of such a delusive
nature was the hold of the French on Northenl Spain, that
a column of 5,000 men could march for 200 miles across it
without being intercepted or destroyed.
All these exploits of the guerrilleros were daring and well
planned, but thongh thcy had given Musnicr much trouble, and
cost t~e French many a weary hour of march and countermarch,
they had not cleared Aragon of the enemy, nor shaken Suehet's
position. Indecd, on October 20, thc general condition of
affairs in Aragon was more favourable for the invaders than on
September 20, for two fresh divisions had been drawn down
into that province, and there were 20,000 French and Italian
troops in it instead of 6,000. The petty disasters at Calatayud
and Ayerbe were irritating rather than important. Suehet never
for a moment felt inclincd to rela.x his hold upon Valencia:
that western Aragon was in an uproar affected him little, when
his communication with his two main depots of stores at
Tortosa and MoreUa was not interrupted.
Blake, it may be mentioned, did not content himself with
setting the Empecinndo and Duran in motion, he tried another
division in another quarter with even less result. Rumours had
reached him that K.ing Joseph's Army of the Centre was about
to co-operate with Suchet, by Ilcnding a column across thc
mountains to Cuenca and Rcquefia. The news was false, for
though Napoleon had orderoo the IGng to do what he could to
help in the invasion of Valencia, Joseph had replied that he
had not even one brigade to spare for a seriolls demonstration,
24 THE INVASION OF VALENCIA (OCT. 10
and had not moved-the gucrrillcros gave sufficient occupation
to his much-scattered army. of which a large portion was corn·
posed of untrustworthy Spanish Juramentad-os. But, listening
to vain reports, Blake ordered Mahy to collect the best of his
l\Iurcian troops and to march on Cllenca to meet the supposed
invaders. His subordinate, leaving Freire in command in
Murein, took seven selected battalions of foot under Creagh and
the Marquis of Montijo, with 800 horse and one battery, and
moved Irom his camp at Mula by Hcllin and Chinchilla north-
ward. The distance to be covered was great, the roads after
Chinchilla very bad. Maby arrived ill front of Cucncll. on
October 15th, to find that there was only onc battalion and two
squadrons of Joseph's army thcrc. This littlc force evacuated
the high-lying city in haste, and fled towards Madrid the
moment that the Murcio.ns showed themselves. No other
French force could be heard of in any direction. At Cuenca
Mahy received a dispatch from Blake (who had apparently
discovered his mistake about the Army of the Centre), telling
him to descend from the mountains by i\(oyo.llnd Liria, and to
join the wing of the main army, which lay under Obispo at
Segorbe. It was only on the 23rd October that he came in: his
troops, the pick of the :Murcian army, had been completely
wasted for some twenty days in a circular march against
a non-existent enemy. :Mcanwhile every man had been wanted
in Valencia.
Suchct, when once he had settled down to the siege of
Saguntum, had not failed to notice Blake's weak demonstration
against his flank by means of the divisions of Obispo and Charles
O'Donnell. He did not intend to tolerate it, and all Septem-
ber 30 had sent Palombini with his own Italian division and
Robert's :Freneh brigade to beat up Obispo's quarters at Segorbe.
The Spanish division made a poor attempt to defend itself on
a position in front of that town, but was easily beaten and
retired into the mountains. It wns then the turn of Charles
O'Donnell; when Palombini had eome back to the camp,
Suchet took Harispc's division, with Hobert's brigade, and two
regiments of cavalry, to evict the Spanish division from Bcna-
guacil. O'Donnell made 11 slightly better fight than Obispo had
done, and deployed VilIacampa's infantry behind an irrigation
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canal, with San Juan's cavalry on his flanks. But the French
were superior in numbers as well as in confldcncc: onc ficrce
charge broke O'Donnell's line, and he had to retreat in haste
to the hills behind him, losing 400 men, cut np in the pursuit
by Suchet's cavalry, while the French casualties barely reached
three officers and sixty men (October 2nd). Blake, who had been
quite close enough to succour O'DonneIl if he had chosen, made
no attempt to aid him, and kept quiet behind his lines on the
GuOOalaviar. There the TOuted troops joined him next day.
Suehet, having thus cleared his flanks, settlcd down to the
siege of Saguntum, where his heavy artillery was now much
needed. The besieging army had to content itself for another
fortnight with making preparations for the expected train-
le\'elling roads and constructing approaches on the ground
which was destined for the Iront of attack, at thc wcst cnd of
the hill of Saguntum.
Meanwhile the siege-train was lumbering down from Tortosfl
by the coast-road. On October 6th Suchet started to meet it,
taking with him the 1,500 Neapolitans of Compere. On the
8th he reached Oropesa, where he found the small Spanish
garrison still holding the two towers which have before been
mentioned. The first guns that came up were turned against
the lower by the high-rand; it was easily breached, 3nd on the
10th surrendered: 215 men and four guns were captured.
Next day came the turn of the other tower, that by the sea;
but before the siege-battery had opened on it, the British
74 Magnificent and a squadron of Spanish gunboats ran in-
shore, and took off the garrison of 150 men in their boats, under
the incCfective fire of thc }~rench.
The moment that the tower which blocked the high-road
had fallen, and before that on the shore had been evacuated,
Suchct began to push the head of his precious convoy of heavy
artillery southward. It made such a good pace that the first
guns arrived at the camp before Saguntum as early as the
night of October 12th. Meanwhile the i\{arshal himselI returned
thither, escorted by Comperc's Neapolitans: the brigade o[
Fieatier, which had escorted the train hitherto, was dispersed
to cover the line of communications, placing its five battalions
at Oropcsa, Almcnara, and Scgorbe.
SECTION XXX: CHAPTER II
THE BATTLE OF SAGUNTm[. OCTOBER 1811
AFTER. Charles O'DonneU and Obispo had been driven away
from the threatening position upon Suchet's flank, Dlake found
himself during the early days of October in a very unpleasant
dilemma. It was clear that his own feeble ctrorts to molest the
French army were a complete failure. Presently the message
reached him that Mahy's unlucky expedition to Cucnca had
been abi>olutely useless. fiut the most disheartening news was
that the attempt to OVClTun Aragon by means of the guerrillcros
had failed; its initial success, the capture of Calatayud on
October 3, had' only led to the inundation 01 the whole country-
side in that direction by the numerous battalions of Reille and
Severoli.
As the days wore on, Blakc found himself obliged to confess
that the idea of dislodging Suchet by operations in his rear was
hopeless. The only remaining alternative for him was to
endeavour to call together cvcry available man, and to try to
beat the French army in a great pitched battlc. Considering the
wen-known disrepute of both the l\furcian and the Valencian
troops, the prospect was not one that the Spanish general could
view with mueh confidence. But political reasons forced him
to fight-his policy of passive resistance had made him so un-
popular with the Valencians of all ranks, from the members of
the exiled Junta down to the private soldiers, that if he had
held back any longer it is probable that he might have been
deposed or murdered by a conspiracy. Saguntum was holding
out most gallantly, and the ignominy of leaving it to fall,
without mnking any errort for its succour, was sufficiently
evident. He made up ILis mind about the middle of October
that he must advance and fight. But, being very properly
determined to fight with all available resources, he had to
await the descent of Mahy and the Mureians from Cuenca, and
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by his own fault that important column could not be drawn
in to the main army before the 23rd. It was only OIl that
day that an advance in force became possible: for a week
and more Blake anxiously awaited the junction, and until it
took place he would not move.
Meanwhile Suehet, entirely unmolested, was pressing the
siege or Sagulltum with all possible expedition. The first siege-
gUlls from Tortosa reached his camp, as has been already men-
tioned, on October 12th. nut it was not till four days later that
thc actual bltttcring of the place begun. Though paths hud
been traced out, and the emplacements of batteries settled,
long ere the siege-train came up, the actual getting of the guns
into position proved a very tiresome business, on account of the
steep and rocky slopes over which they had to be dragged. And
the construction of approachcs and parallels upon the hillside
progressed very slowly, because or the absence of earth-at
last it wns found that soil to bind the loose stones of the ground
together would have, for the most part, to be carried up in
sandbags from the valley below, for hardly any could be scraped
together on thc spot. The engineer officer who wrote the diary
of the siege confesses that if the Spanish garrison had only becn
provided with heavy artillery, the approach-building would
have provcd almost impossible 1. But, us has been already
noted, there were but seventeen guns mounted in th~ whole
fortress, and of these only three were 12-pounders-the rest
being small field-pieces, too weak to batter down parapets oC
even modest thickness. Moreover the very steepness of the
slope over which the siege-works were being advanced made
much oC it • dead ground,' which guns above could not properly
sweep or search out.
On the 11th of October the two generals, Vallee and Rogniat,
who had regularly commanded Suchet's artillery and engineers
during his previous sieges, arrived from the rear-both had been
in France on leave, and they had come forward with the train
from Tortosa. to Oropesa. Their arrival added confidencc to
the subordinates who had hitherto worked without them, for
the reputation of each for success was vcry great. Rogniat
immediately on his arrival made several important modifiea·
, BelmlUl, iv. p. 07.
28 THE BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM rOc:r.18
tions in the projected batteries, and showed how the approaches
might he pushed forward to within seventy yards of the {artress,
by taking advantage of favourable dips and rocky outcrops in
the hillside.
On the 16th, five batteries were armed with the gUlls
which had come up, and fire was opened upon the projecting
western angle of the fortress, the tower of San Pedto. It proved
to be made of ancient Moorish stone and mortar, almost as
hard as iron. and crumbled very slowl)'. But the modern
works below it, which were only a few months old, owned no
such resisting power, and within two days showed signs of
serious damage. The Spanish counter-fire was insignificant-
there were very few guns available, and it was only when the
approaches got within easy musket shot of the walls that
the besiegers began to suffer appreciable casualties. For the
Spanish infantry, disregarding the cannonade, kept up a furious
fire against the heads of the saps all day and night.
On the afternoon of the 18th the engineer and artillery
officers reported to Suehet that they had madc a suffieicnt
breach in the curtain of the work called the Dos" layo battery,
just where it joined on the tower of San Pcdro,''and that they
regarded it as practicable for assault. Thc Marshal ordered
that the storm should be fixed for the same evening, lest the
Spaniards should succeed in repairing the breach during the
bours of darkness. The column of assault consisted of 400 mcn,
picked from Habert's dhision, supported by a reserve of
Palombilli's Italians. The fire of the siege artillery was kcpt up
to the last moment, and did much harm to the garrison, who
were very clearly seen piling gabions, sandbags, and stones on
the ruinous lip of the breach, in disregard of the steady fire that
kept pounding it down 1.
The assault was duly dc1i\'ercd at fivc o'clock, and proved
a complete failure. The stonners found the breach most difficult
to climb, liS its face was cntirely formed of big blocks of stone
without earth or debris. The column won its way half up the
ascent, and isolated officers and men got further, and were
bayoneted or shot at close quarters by the defenders, who
clustered very thickly at the top. But no general rush of men
, Sce lIurrlltive vr VaCl\ni, 1111 eye·witness (vvl. v. p. 30D).
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could reneh the summit, where (it is snid) the nctual gap in the
parapet was not more than six or seven (eet broad. After
several ineffective attempts to mount, the assailants came to
a slaud on the lower part of the slope, and opened a scat.tering
fire on the Spaniards above them. Whereupon, seeing the
opJ.Xlrtunity lost, General Habert, who had been given eharge of
the operations, ordered the men to fall back to the trenches,
and to abandon the assault.
This was a most creditable feat of arms for the garrison, who
had hardly a cannon to help them, and held their own almost
entirely by musketry fire, though they rolled some live shells,
beams, and large stones down the breach lit intervals. Their
casualties were heavy, but those of the assailants, as was
natural, much greater. Suehet lost at least 300 men, though
in his dispatch to the Emperor 1 he gave an elaborate table of
casualties showing a total of only 173. But his' returns,' even
the most specious looking of them, should never be trusted-as
will be seen when we arc dealing with the second battle of Castalla
in t1 later volume. This excellent officer was as untrustworthy
as Soult or Masscna in the figures which he sent to his master:l.
After this Suehct resolved to make no more attempts to
storm Saguntum. • \Vben even the best of soldiers,' remarks
Belmas, • have made every effort to carry a place and have
failed, they imagine that the place is impregnable. And if
an attempt is made to lead them once more to an assault,
they will not again act with the confidence which is needed to
secure victory.' Wellington was to fmd this out at Durgos, a
1 To be found in print in llehnlls, iv. pp. 124-8.
, This indictment or Suchet must be supported by details. In his
elaborate table or casualties by corps nt the end or his dispatch or Oct. 20,
he only (I11ow8 for a officers killed llnd 8 wounded, <IQ men kiUed and ]22
wounded-totul ]73. UlIt t,he lists or oflkel"l>' ellsuulti",s in Mllrtinien
show, on the otber band, five officers killed (Cout:mccau, Saint Hilaire,
'l'urno, Giardini, CUlIY), and at least ten wounded (Mathis, DUl'ilud, Gauehet,
D'Aulane, Adllcmar, Gattinara, Lamewn, D'Esclaibes, iIIllillard, Lapl:me),
and probably three marc.
Oddly enough, in his MbnoiuJ (ii. p. 173) Suchet gives by fl('lIle rour
officers killed at the breach (out of the flve), while ill his offielaJ report
he had stat.ed that there were only three killed altogether. We must
trust [lIther Vaelltli, an eye-Witness lInd l\ man mueh interested in statistics
and casualties, when he gives the total of 300 for the losses, than Suehet'Q
table.
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year latcr. Indeed in their early stages the sieges of Saguntum
and Bnrgos show a rather notable parallelism, though their euds
were dissimilar. General Rogniat easily persuaded thc Marshal
to drop the hcroic method which had gained so little success,
and to fall back on the systematic work which is slow but eer-
tain I: Suchet gave permission to the engineers to establish
morc batteries, and to defcr all further attempts to storm till
the approaches should have been carried up to the very foot
o[ the wulls, and the wholc curtain of the Dos Muyo rcdoubt
should have been battered down.
The garrison, much cncouraged by their successful ertort
of the 18th, continued to make an obstinate resistance: as
the enemy sapped uphill towards them, they kcpt up such
a careful and deadly fire that the casualties in the trenches
nmounted every day to 15 or 20 men. }~or the next six days
nothing decisive happened, though the works continucd to
creep slowly forwmd: they had to be built with parapets
consisting entirely of earth brought lrom below, and made vcry
high, since the nearer they got to the works, the more did the
plunging flre Lrom above search them out.
Meanwhile Blake was preparing, though with no great self-
confidence, to make an attack on SUellCt's sicgc·lines, und was
only awaiting the arrival of :Mahy and the Murcians before
striking. He began by trying ll. lecble diversion on the flank,
sending back Obispo's division once more to Segorbe, and
getting some of the Empeeinado's bands to threaten Tewcl, the
southernmost of the garrisons in Aragon. This so far annoyed the
French marshal that on the 20th of October he scnt off Palom-
bini, with one French and one Italian brigade and 400 horse,
to drive Obispo out of Segorbe, and to open the rond to '1'eruel.
By so doillg he plaeed himself in a dangerous position, for he
had detached .i,500 men 011 an excursion which eould not take
less than four days, and if Blake had refused to wait lor Mahy,
and had let Obispo amuse Palombini, he could have marched
against the siege-lines with 20,000 men, including uIl his best
troops, and would have found only 12,000, besides the gunners
of the siege artillery, left in the French camp. H Suehet had
left any detachments to maintain the blockade, as he probably
• Bclmas, iv. p. 96.
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would have done, he could only have fought with odds of less
than onc to two. If he had brought up all his battalions, the
garrison would have sallied Iorth and dcstroyed his sicl.rc-works.
But Blakc did not take his chance-whatevcr it may have
been worth: hc waited for Mally, who was only due on
the 23rd. Mcanwhilc Palombini made a rapid raid upon
Segorbe: but Obispo, leaving two battalions only to make
11. show of rcsistance, crossed the hills by by-paths and drew in
to Liria, on the flank of the main army, and in close touch
with it. He could hll\'e been used for a battle, if Blake
had chosen to deliver onc upon the 22nd or 23rd. But the
unlucky Spanish general did not so choose: and Palombini-
finding nothing scrious in front of him, and hearing that Teruel
had been already relieved by Severoli-rightly returned by
forced marches to Saguntum, which he reached on the afternoon
of the 24th of October.
Meanwhile the long-expected Mahy ardved at Liria on
the night of the 23rd, und found Obispo already lying
there. The two forces united, and marched on the 24th
to Detern, but there again divided, the l.furcians going
on to join Blake's main body, while the Valcncian division
received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to move as an
independent flanking column, and from Naquera to fall upon
the flank or right rear of Suchct's position in front of Saguntum.
On the same day Blake himself broke out of the lines behind
the Guadalaviar, and after issuing a well-worded proclamation,
in which he said that Andriani's gallant garrison must not
perish unassisted, and declared a confidence which he must
have been far from feeling in the resolution of his t.roops,
advanced for some miles along the high-road, so as to place him-
self at nightfall within striking distance of the enemy.
His plan of operations, which was clearly set forth in his direc-
tions to Mahy \ was ambitious in the highest degree, and aimed
at the complete destruction of his cnemy. Expecting to fmd
Suchet drawn up to meet him in the plain south of Sngwltum,
it appears that he intended to fight a battle in which an im-
mensely strong left wing was to turn and break down Suchet's
right, while a wCllker right wing (composed, however, or his
, Which may be read in full in Artcchc, xi. pp. 157-9.
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best troops) was to attack him frontally, and hold his main
body' contained,' while the turning movement was delivered.
The left wing contained 2G battalions and nearly 20 squadrons,
making nearly 16,000 bayonets and 1,700 sabres 1. The
detached division of Obispo, from Naqucra, was to fall on the
extreme French right from the rear; the two other Valcnciun
infantry divisions (l\1iranda and VilIacampa), led by Charles
O'Donnell, were to tackle it in front. Mahy's :Murcians were
to support O'Donnell, at the same time reaching out a hand
towards Obispo-in order to do this l\lahy was directed to send
out two battalions (under a Colonel O'Ronan) to Cabczbort, a hill·
side intermediate between the point where Obispo was expected
and the left of the two other Valcncian divisions. The lctt wing
had allotted to it the whole of the Mureian horse, 800 sa.hres,
and onc of the two Valcncian cavalry brigades, under General
San Juan, whieh was of about the same strength. It had also
""'- 18 gUllS.
So much for the left wing. The right wing, conducted by
Blake in person, which hud advanced up the high-road from
Valencia towards Murviedro, consisted of the two 'Expe·
ditionary Divisions' of Zayas and Lo.rdizabal, both very weak
because of the losses which they had suffered in the campaign
around Baza in August-eaeh was eight battalions strong;
but the former bad only 2,500, the latter 3,000 men, so that the
units averaged well under 400 bayonets. But these were good
old troops, which had greatly distinguished themselves at
Albuera: they were the only part of -Blake's army in which
any real confidence could be placed. In support of these
veterans the Commander-in-Chief brought up the Valeneian
'Division 'of Reserve,' which consisted entirely of the newly
raised 3rd battalions of the regiments serving with VilIaeampa
and lliranda. They had only becn under arms a few months,
were not fully equipped or clothed, and were dreadfully under-
offieered; for five strong battalions, of over 700 bayonets each,
1 "re are luckily in possession of the exact' morning state' oC Dlake's
army, which is printed in the rare Spanish goverrunent publication of
1822, EsladQs de la Orgmli.uIcion y Fuer..tJ de IQS E:jercilQS EspailoltS,
pp. 184-7. Obispo had 3,400 men, Miranda 4,000, VilIlleampa 3,350,
Malty 4,600 infantry. under Montijo and Crcagh, and 830 horse. '.rhis wing
hud 2 horse- unu 2 field·batteries, 18 gun9.
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there were only 75 officers in all-fifteen per battalion, where
there should have been thirty, and these were the mere leavings
oC the older units oC each regiment, or else newly gazetted
ensigns. As a fIghting force these 3,500 men were nearly
useless-and Blake put them where they were least likely to
get into trouble. They were divided into two brigades:
Brigadier·Ceneral'Velnsco seems to have been in command,
vice Aeufia, who had thc divisioil during thc autumn. The
right column was a.ccompanicd by the handful of horse belong.
ing to the' Expeditionary Force '-800 sabres under General
Loy-and by the second Valencian Cavalry Brigade under
General Caro, some 800 mounted men more. It was aceom·
panied, like the other wing, by three batteries. Thus, counting
its gunners and sappers, the right wing had under 10,500 men,
while the immensely strong left had over 17,000. But it is
quality rather than mere numbers whieh counts in war-the
weak wing fought a good battle against equal strength, and
looked for a moment as if it might win. The strong wing
disgraced itself, and was routed by a fourth of its own numbers.
Suehet had been somewhat troubled by the fIrst news of
Blake's sudden sally from Valencia, for though he desired a
'battle, wherein success would probably win him the immediate
surrender of the hard·pressed garrison oC Saguntum, yet he did
not wish that matters should be forced to a crisis in Palombini's
abscll{.'C. It was only alter the well-timed return of that
general to his camp, that he welcomed the approach of a decisive
action. But with Palombini III his disposition again, he was
eager to fIght.
He had at this moment with him, in the lines before Sagun-
tum, 35 battalions of foot (of which the three Neapolitan units
under Compere were mere skeletons, with little o\'cr a thousand
men between them), with 15 squadrons of horse and 36 field·
guns. He ldt behind him, to maintain the siege-works before
the fortress, two battalions of the 117th line Crom Habert's
division, and llalathier's Italian brigade, making four battalions
more. The weak Neapolitan brigade of Compere, only 1,400
men, even with its cavalry ineluded, was placed in support of
the blockading force, at GiIIet and Petres, to watch the road
from Scgorbc, by which some ouUying Spauish detachment
OMAN. v D
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might possibly attempt to communicate with the garrison of
Saguntum. This left for the line of battle 26 battalions-six
of Habcrt's, eleveu of Harispe's, four of Palombilli's Italians, and
five of Hobert's reserve brigade. The total amounted to about
12,000 infantry, while the whole of the cavalry, except the two
Neapolitan squadrons, was put in the field to the amount of
some 1,800 sabres. Counting the gunners of the six batteries of
artillery, Suchet's fighting force wa.<; not much over 14,000 men.
He had left 4,000, besides the gUlillers of the siege*train and the
sappers, to deal with the garrison of Saguntum. This was little
more than half of Blake's numbers, for thc Spanish general-
as we have seen-was marching forward with 27,000 men in
line. Tha.t Suchet gladly took the risk sufficiently shows his
opinion of the quality of the greater part of the Valencian army.
It seems, we must confess, rather ha7.ardous to have left 4,000
mcn in the blockading corps, when forces were so unequal.
In a similar case lleresford at Albuera took every mftn out of
the trenches, and fought with his whole army. Andriuni's
garrison was not numerous enough to execut.c any really
dangerous sally in the reur, and was so constricted, in its
precipitous fastness, that it could not easily come down or
dcploy itscU. Pcrhaps Suchct may have (cared, however, that
it would take the opportunity of absconding by some postern,
if it were not shut in upon all sides. But therc were to be
moments during the battle when the Marshal would gladly
have had the assistance of two or three more battalions of
steady troops.
Suchet had chosen for his fighting-ground the narrow plain
south of Saguntum, ext.cncJing from the sea to the foot of the
bills of the Sancti Espiritus mnge---a. space o( less than three
miles in very flat ground. It wus open for the most part, but
sprinkled in certain sections with olives and carob·trees, and
contained onc or two slight eminences or mounds, which rose
above the general surface, though only by a score or two o(
feet, so that they hud ll. certain command over the adjoining
flats. The left of the line, nearest to the sea, was formed of
Habert's imperfect division, which, having detached two
battalions for the blockade of Saguntum, had only six lelt-
2,500 bayonets-in line. The right consisted of Harispe's
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division, which was stronger than Habert's, as it had nin~
battalions in line, even after setting aside one regiment (the 44th)
for n flank-guard. Its force was about 3,600 bayonets. This
division lay to the right of the road from l\Iurviedro to Valencia.
The reserve consisted of thClltalian brigade (that of Saint Paul),
whieh had not been told oU lor the siege, and of the three French
cavalry regiments, in all 2,000 bayonets and 1,300 sabres. It
wus drawn up half a mile in rear of Habert and Harispe, reody
to support either of them. The batteries, horse and foot,
accompanied their respective divisions.
We have thus accounted for 10,000 men. The remainder of
Suchct's fighting force constituted a flank-guard, to prevent
his line from being turned on its right, the side of the hills. It
originally consisted of Robert's • reserve brigade,' five battalions,
or 2,500 bayonets, Ilnd of one cavalry regiment, Sehiazzetti's
Italian dragoolls-450 sabres-with onc batter)'. These troops
were drawn up on the higher slopes of the Sancti Espiritus hills,
covering the pass of the same name and the country road whieh
goes over it. To these Suehet added, at the Inst moment, onc
regiment from Hnrispe's division, thc 44th, under the Brigadier
Chlopiski, who, being senior to Robert, took command of the
whole flank-guard. These two battalions-1,200 men-took
post on the hill-slopes to the left of Robert, half-way between
his position and that of Harispc's right. The whole force,
including the drngoons and the artillery, made about 4,300 men.
Compere's Neapolitans were too far to their left renr to be
reckoned an appreciable support, and had their own separate
task, though they were never called upon to di~eharge it. The
ground occupied by Chlopiski's 4,300 mcn was exceedingly
strong, and the Marshal hoped that they might be relied upon
to hold off the turning movement, which he was awarc was
to be made against his inland flank. For he knew that Charles
O'Donnell was advancing from the direction of Betera, which
could only mean a projected attack on his own right. Had
he realized that not only O'Donnell, but also Obispo and
l\Iahy's i\lureiuns, in all some 17,000 mcn, were about to operatc
against Chlopiski, he must surely have strcngthened his cover-
ing force, for the odds would have becn impossible if the
Vulencians hud made 111ly fight at all. But they did not!
D2
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On the morning of the 25th of October Suchet was ready to
receive the attack which was impending. He could make out the
general dispositions of the enemy. and the concentric advance
of Obispo's, O'Donnell's, and Blake's own mcn was duly
reported to him. It was on receiving notice of the heavy
appearance of the second, or central, hostile column that he
detached Chlopiski's two battalions to strengthen Robert's
flank-guard. Presently, about 7 o'clock, the Spaniards came
within touch; the left, it would seem, somewhat before the
right \ the first shots being interchanged between the two
battalions which l\Iahy had sent towards Cabezbort and Hobert's
troops. This was only a trifling skirmish, the Spaniards being
completely checked. But soon after a serious attack was
delivered.
The next advance was that of the two Valencian divisions
under Charles O'Donnell, who were a long way ahead of the
main body of Mahy's Murcians, their destined reserve. Blake's
intention was apparently to strike with his left wing first, and to
force in the French right before his own column delivered its
blow. Everything depended on the successful action of the
mass of Valellcian and l\Iurcian infantry against the small
hostile force posted on the slopes of the Sancti Espiritus hills.
The divisions of Miranda and Villacampa duly descended
from the lower opposite heights of the Germanels, crossed the
bottom, and began to mount the opposing slope, ViIlacampa
on the left, somewhat in advance, Miranda a little to his right
1 1'here are terrible difficulties as to the timing of the battle of Saguntum.
Suchet says that the first engagement was bdween Obispo's flanking
division, (:olning over the hills on the west, nnd Hobcrt. Schej)c!cr says
that Obispo arrived too late altogdher, and WlI.S )lMlcl,icnJly not in the
fight (p. 472). 1 think thnt the eXllhumLion is thut Sl1ehet took O'ROIllIll'S
two battalions for Obispo, because they Cllme from the direction where he
was expeeted. I follow, in my timing of the battle, the veIj' ele[lr narrative
ofVacani (v. 1'1'.440-1), who seems to make it clear that the main fighting on
the French right was well over before that in the centre, and long bdore
that on the Idt. Schepcler (who rode witll Blake that day) also makes it
certain that Lardizabal and Zayaa were fighting long arrer Mil'llnda. ViIla-
campa,and Mahy had been dispo!>Cd of. Butdilllculties remain,which could
only be clenrcd up if wc 11IId u report by Obispo. GellcMll Artt.'Che thinks
thnt the MOon began fuirly simull.lIneously ull along Ule line, and rollows
Schepeler in snying that ObisJlo Wll.S late (xi. p. 17'l), the very reverse of
Suchet'. statemeat that he came, and was beaten, too early.
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rear: behind them in support marched San Juan's Valen~
cian cavalry. Beyond the latter there was a considerable gap
to the nearest troops of Blakc's own column, which had not yet
come into action. Mahy, whose orders definitely said that he
was to act as a reserve, and to protect O'Donllell's fiallk if the
latter were checked, occupicd thc Germancls, whcn thc Valcn-
cians bad gone on, and was still at the top of his own slope,
having to his Ielt front the two detached battalions at Cabezbort
under O'Ronan, when thc clash came. Waiting till the two
Valcllciall divisions and the cavalry in support were some little
way up the hill, and had begun to drive in his skirmishers,
Chlopiski moved down upon thcm with the whole of his
modest force-Robert's five battll.Jions in front, to thc right of
the pass and the road, his own two battalions of the 44th to
its left and somewhat on the flank. Meanwhile Schiazzetti's
regimcnt of Italian dragoons charged down the gap between
the two bodies of infantry. As VilIacampa was somewhat
ahead of l\Iiranda, the first crash feU upon him. Robert's
infantry drove him without any difficulty right downhill,
while the Italian dragoons rode at l\1iranda's battalions on his
right. ViIlacampa's men fell into hopeless confusion, but what
was worse was that Miranda's division, seeing their comrades
break, gave way before the cavalry without making any
resistance whatever, apparently before the French ,,·uh had
even got into touch with thcm on the flank. This was l/. dis-
graceful business: the 7,000 Valencian infantry, and the
1,100 cavalry in support, were routed in ten minutes by half their
own numbcrs-onc good cavalry regiment of 450 subres suffteed
to upsct a whole division of seven battalions-if a single onc
of them had formcd a steady square, thc Italian horse ought
to have been driven off with etlse!
But this was not the cnd of the affair. San Juan's horse were
close behind the routed divisions-O'Donnell ordered them up
to save the wrecks of his infantry: at thQ snme time Mnhy
hUl'l'ied forward two battalions of his Mureiuns 1 to support
San Juan, and began to advance with the rest of his division
down thc slope of the Germanels hill.
After making havoe of the Valencian foot, Chlopiski had
, BUfgoli and Tiflldow.,Ii de Cadiz.
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halted his troops for a moment, wishing to be sure that matters
werc going wcH with the French main body berorc he com~
mitted himself to any further enterprise. Dut the temptation
to go on was too great, for the rouled Spanish troops and their
support... were weltering together in confusion at the bottom of
the hill. It is said that the dragoon colonel, Scbiaz:lctti, settled
the matter for his superior, by charging at San Juan's horse
the moment that he had got his squadrons rc-Cormed. The
Valencian cavalry, though it outnumbered the Italians by
two to one, turned tail at once and bolted, riding over the two
battalions of Mureian infantry which were in its immediate
rear, and carrying them away in its panic. Chlopiski then led
on his seven battalions against the disordcred mass in front
of him, and swept the whole before him. It gave way and ned
uphill, horse and foot, the ]\Iureian cavalry brigade in reserve
going off on the same panic-stricken way as the Valencian. It
was some. time before Mahy could get a single rcgimcnt to
stand-but at last he found a sort of rearguard of two battalions
(onc of his own, one of VilIacampa's 1) which had kept together
and were still capable of obeying orders. The French were
now exhausted; the infantry could not follow in regular forma-
tion so fast as their enemy fled; the handful of cavalry was
dispersed, driving in prisoners on every side. So Mah)' and
O'Donnell ultimaicly got off, with their men in a horde scattered
over the country-side-the cavalry leading the stampedc and
the two rallied battalions bringing up the rear 2. The Spanish
Jeft wing lost over 2,000 prisoners, mainly from l\limnda's
division, but only some 400 killed and wounded; several guns
from the divisional batteries were of course lost. All this was
over so carly in the day that the fighting on Blake's right wing
was at its hottest just when the wrceks of his left were disap-
pearing ovcr thc hills. Obispo, who camc up too late to
help,a and the two dctaehed battalions under O'Ronan got off
separately, more towards the north, rctiring on Naqucra.
The tale of this part of the battlc of Saguntum is lamentable.
, Cuenea and Molinll.
I O'Rorllln'~ two Imttulions went olT in 11 scpa.rnfc dircl.'tion, unpllTSued,
and joined Obispo, not 1.Jeing ill the rout.
I See above, page 36.
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There is no record so bad in the whole war: even the Gebora
was 0. well-contested fight compared with this-and at Belehitc
the army that fled so easily gave way bdore numbers equal or
superior to its own, not inferior in the proportion of one to
lIlf(~e. The fact was that the Valeneian troops hud a long
record of disasters behind them, were thoroughly demoralized,
and could not be trusted for one moment, and that the l\1ur-
cians (as Mahy confessed) were not much better. The ddcat
was rendered more shamdul by the fact that thc smallcr half
of Blake's Army, the' Expeditionary Force,' was at the same
moment making hend in good style agn.inst numbers rather
larger than its own, and seemed for a moment about to aehie"'e
a splendid success. H the Spanish left, 17,000 strong, could
have' contained' haU its own strength, if it could have kept
8,000 instead of 4,000 French employed for one hour, Blake
might have relieved Saguntum and driven off Suchet. But the
story is disgra<:dul. 1\Ially wrote next morning to Blake, 'I
must tell you, with my usual bluntness, that you had better
sell the horses of this cawl.lry, and draft the men into the
infantry. I could not have belicved in the possibility of such
conduct, if I had not seen it with my own eyes take place and
cost us so much 1.' Blake actually ga.ve orders for onc hussar
regiment (a Mureian onc) to be deprived of its horses and
drafted out. But did the infantry behave mueh better?
We may now turn to a less deprcssing narrative, the story
of the operations of Blake's own wing. The Commander-in-
Chief, as it will be remembered, had with him the ' Expe-
ditionary Divisions,' the Valeneian Reserve Division, and Lay's
and Caro's 1,100 cavuJry. Hc took post himself on the height
called El Puig, with onc brigade of the Valencians, to the
south of the ravine of the Picador, which cros.'>Cs the plain in
n diagonal direction. The rest of the troops went forward
in two columns: ~ayas formed the right near the sea; his
flank was covered by a squadron of gunboats, which ad\'anced
parallel with him, as nenr the shore as their draught permitted.
Hc was ordcrcd to push on and gct, if possiblc, round Suchet's
flank, where Habert's line was 'refused,' because of the guns of
the flotilla, whose fire the French wished to avoid. If successful
, Quoted ill Artcchc, xi. p. 178.
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Zayas ,vas to try to communicate with the garrison of Saglln~
turn. Further inland Lardizubal's division, accompanied by
the 1,100 cavalry, and followed byibe other brigade of the Valcn~
ciao reserve, crossed the Picador at the bridge on the chau8see,
and deployed in the plain, directly opposite Harispc's division.
The whole force was about equal to the French opposed to it.
The two' Expeditionary Divisions' wcnt forward in good
order and with great confidence: Suchet remark,s in his
MbnQires that in all his previous campaigns he had never seen
Spanish troops advance with such resolution or in such good
order 1. Zayas, on the sea-flank, became immediately engaged
with Habert, before the village of Puzzol. in a heavy fight, with
exaclly equal numbers-each had about 2,500 men. Both
sides lost heavily, and neither had any advantage; Suehet had
ordered Habert not to take the offensive till matters were
settled in the centre, but the defensive proved costly, and the
Spaniards pushed on-these were the same battalions which
had behaved so well on the hill of Albuera-Irlanda, Patria, and
the Spanish and Walloon Guards.
Further to the left Lardizabal had deployed, aIter crossing
the ravine, with his two weak brigades in line; the Valencian
reserve remained behind near the bridge, but Loy's and Caro's
cavalrycame forward on the right in support, Opposite the front
brigade (Prido's) was a long low mound, the last outlying spur
of the Saneti Espiritus range. This was soon seen by both sidesto
be a point of vllntage-lhearmy thntcould occupy jt would have
a good artillery position commanding the hostile line. Suehet
ordered up Harispe's right battalions to seize jt, and galloped
thither in person at the head of his escort of fifty hussars.
But the Spaniards had also marked it, and the Marshal had
hardly reached its top when he found Prido's skirmishers
swarming up the slope. He had to retire, and rode baek to
bring up his infantry; but, by the time that they had come
forward, the enemy had formed a hasty line of battle along the
mound, with a battery in its centre. Suehct had therclorc to
attack-which he did in full force, the four battalions of the
7th Liue forming a heavy column in the centre, while those of
the 116th and the Brd of the Vistula deployed on each side
1 ilUmoiU8, ii. p. 182.
1811J THE STRUGGLE IN THE CENTRE 41
somewhat to the rear-a clear instance of the usc of the ordre
mixte which Napoleon loved. The left flank was covered by two
squadrons or the 4th Hussars and one or the 13th Cuirassicrs,
brought out rrom the reserve.
This was bringing 3,600 bayonets to bear against 1,500, for
Prieto's brigade counted no more upon the mound. The attack
was successful, but not without severe loss: General Paris,
Jetlding on the 7th regiment, was wounded, as were both his
aides-dc-camp, and Harispe's horse was killed under him; the
Spanish artillery fire had been deadly. When the mound was
stormed, the Spanish infantry wcrc forced back, but by no
means in disorder. They formed up again not far from its foot,
and Larruzabal brought up his sccond brigade to support his
first, placed two batteries in line, and stood to fight again.
Suchet, ha.ving re-formed Harispe's men, found that he had
bclore him a se<.-ond combat on the flat ground. The infantry
on both sides were heavily engaged, and six French guns had
been brought forwu.rd to enrtInde Lardizubal's right, when
a new turn was given to the battle. The Spanish general
ordered Lay's and Cara's 1,100 cavalry to charge in mass upon
the three squadrons of hussars and euirassiers which covered
Harispe's left. The move was an unexpected one, and was
concealed for some time by scattered carob-trees: the attack
was well delivcred, and the French horse, outnumhcrcd by more
than two to one, were completely routed and fled in disorder.
1.oy then wheeled in upon the French flank, captured three
guns of the battery there placed, and ncarly broke the 116th
of the Line, which had only just time to fall back and form
itself en potence to the rest of the division. The remainder
of thc Spanish cavalry pursued the retreating hussars.
The moment looked black for the Marshal: he himself
confesses in his Mbnoires that if Harispe's infant.ry had given
way the battle might have been lost 1. But he had still a reserve :
he sent back orders to Palombini to bring up Saint Paul's four
Italian battalions into the gap, and rode himself to the two
squadrons of the 13th Cuirassiers which had not yet advanced
into the fight. They were only 350 sabres, but the regiment
was a fine one, and had won, at :Margalef and other fields, a great
I MtInoiru, H. p. 185.
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confidence in its ability to facc long odds. The)· were launched
straight at the victorious Spanish cavalry, whose main body
was advancing in great disorder, and with its line broken by thc
groves of carob-trees, while the remainder had turned inward
against the French infantry. The euirassiers went straight
through the squadrons opposed to them, and swept them away:
whereupon even those units of the Spanish horse which had not
been attacked wheeled round, and retreated hastily toward the
Picador ravine and its bridge. The cuirassicrs followed, up·
setting everything in their Iront, and only halted on the edge
of the ravine, where they were checked by the fire of the battery
attached to the Valeucian reserve, and the skirmishers of that
body, who had lined the farther edge oC the depression 1. Both
the Spanish brigadiers, Loy and Caro, had behaved very
gallantly; both were severely wounded, while trying to rally
their men, and were left on the field as prisoners.
The defeat oC the Spanish horse settled the day, which had
for a moment looked doubtful. At the sight of the l;rench
hussars breaking, and the advance of their own line, the
garrison of Saguntum, who had the whole field in view from
their 10Cty perch, had lined their walls, cheering and waving
their shakos in the air-despite of the shells from the siege-
batteries which continued to play upon them. The cheers died
down as the changed Cortunes of the day became visible, and
hearts sank in the fortress. But the fighting was not yet
concluded.
The rout of Lay's and Caro's horse had not directly affccted
Lardi~bal's inCantry, for the victorious cuirassiers had galloped
, This account of the charge of the cuirassicrs comcs from the ilUfIIOirts 01
Colonel de Gonneyille, who commanded their leading squadron. There is
R curious point to bc settled hcre. Marshal Suehet says (ilUllloirts, ii. p. 185)
that he rode in person to the hend of the regiment, and harangued
it shorlly on i\largald nnd other nneicnt glories, \.Jcfol'C bidding it charge.
\Vhile speaking he was struck by a spent lmll on the shoulder. But
de GonncYille (who had rC:ld Suchet's book, as he ([uoles it in other places)
says distinctly (p. 20$ of his Souvenirs 1Ililil(lires) that he received no
orders, and charged on his own responsibility. • N'nyant la d'ordre a
reeevoir de personne, mais comprcnant la necessite d'arrHer cette massc
de eavalcrie qui nrrivait t\ nous, kc.... jc donnai le signal.' "'as Suchct
romancing about his little speech? Or was de Gonneville, who wrote his
j\1tmoirlls forty years llltcr, oblivious? Either hypothesis is difficult.
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straight before them alter the fugitives, though they had
also ridden over and captured a Spanish battery on the right
of the line of deployed battalions. The decisi ....e blow in this
quarter was givcn by Saint Paul's Italians, who, issuing Irom
olive groves behind Harispc's left, came in upon the unpro-
tectcd flank of Larrlizahal's troops, which thcy rolled up,
driving away at the same time a few squadrons which had not
been afrected by the charge of the cuimssiers. These last rode
in among their own infantry, whieh was already hotly engaged
with Harispe's battalions, and carried confusion down the line.
The diYision, which had hitherto fought most gallantly, gave
way, and retired in confusion towards the bridge over the
Picador, and the Cartllja where Lardizabal hoped to sustain
himself by means of thc battery and thc Valeneian reserve
battalions which he left there.
Meanwhile Blake, from the summit of the knoll of El Puig,
had witnessed with impotent grid thc rout of his right centre.
lie had placed himself so far to the rear that no orders which
he sent reached L'lrdi7.nbal in time, and the reser'le wh.ich hc had
kept under his own hand, three raw Valencian battalions and
a battery, would have been too weak to save the day, even if
it had not becn so far-two milcs~from the central locus of the
fight as to make its arrival in time quite impossible. The
General, from the moment that he had given the original order
to ad\'uncc, exercised no influence whatevcr on the operations;
one of his staff says that he sat on his horse in blank and stupid
amazement at the rout, and that some of those who watched
him thought him wanting in personal courage no less than in
decision 1. But at last he roused himself to issue orders Ior the
retreat of his broken left and centre towards Valencia, and for
the instnnt withdrawal of his still intact right wing.
Here Zayas's division stood in !\ most difficult place, for
though it had been contending on equal terms with Habert's in
front of the village of Puzzol, it is onc thing to keep up a stand-
ing fight, and anothcr to withdraw from it with a victorious
enemy pushing in upon the flank. However, Zayas ordered his
battalions back, and though pressed by Habert, brought them
in good ordcr across thc rayinc and back to the height of El Puig,
• Schcpclcr, p. 473.
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'where Blakc stood waiting him with his small reserve. Only
one corps, the WaDoon Guards, had thrown itscU into the
houses of PuzzoI, could not be extracted from them in time,
and was surrounded and captured. But this small disaster did
much to save the rest of the di\,jsion, for so many of the French
closed in upon the village, where the Walloons made a good
stand, that the pursuit was not so hotly pushed as it might have
been. H Suchct could have pressed in upon Dlake bc!ol'c Zayas
joined him, the whole Spanish right column might have been
completely cut oll lrom it!; retreat. But the Marshal required
some leisure to rearrange his line, after routing Lardizabal;
and by the time that he had sent off the rallied 4th Hussars to
help ChJopiski gather in prisoners, and had turned the Italians
aside to mareh against Blake, with Harispe in support, nearly
two hours had gone by, and the Spanish right, molested only
by I:Iabert, was drawing off towards safety. Following the
road along the sea-shore, it reached the suburbs of Valencia
without any further loss.
Not so the unfortunate remnant of Lardizabal's troops.
They had halted at the Cartuja, behind the Picador, while their
·general strove to rally them on the reserve there left. Tllis
delay, though soldier-like and proper, enabled Suehet to~cateh
them up: he charged them with his last fresh regiment, the
24th Dragoons, which had been kept in hand, apparently
behind Habert's position, till the retreat of the Spanish right
began. Then, attacking along the high-road, thcse squadrons
broke in upon the hair-rallied troops, swept them away, and
captured two guns put in battery across the chausscc, and badly
supported by the Valencian reserve battalions. Lardizabal's
column went off in great disorder, and WllS hunted as Inr as
the Caraixet stream, losing many prisoners to the dragoons,
as well as four flags.
So ended the day; the loss of the Spaniards was not very
heavy in killed and wounded-about 1,000 it is said, mainly in
Lurdizabal's and Zayas's divisions-for the others did not
stand to fight. But of prisoners they lost 4,6U, including
230 officers and the two wounded cuvnJry brigadiers. Miranda's
division contributed the largest proportion to the captives,
though Zayas lost 400 men of the Walloon battalion, and
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Lardizabal a still greater number out of his weak division ol
3,000 bayonets 1, Twelve guns were left behind, seven cap~
tured in the hard fighting in the right centre, five from O'Don~
nell's easily-routed divisions. The French casualties are given
by Suchet ut about 130 killed and 590 wounded-probably an
understatement, as the regimental returns show 55.officers hit,
which at the ordinary rate of casualties should imply over
1,000 rank and me disabled. As a commentary on the fighting,
it may be remarked that Chlopiski and llobert, in dealing with
Obispo, O'Donnell, and Muh)', had only 7 officers hors de
combat, while Harispc and Habert lost 41 in the real fight with
Zayas and Lardizabal 2•
The actual losses in action were not the worst part of the
battle of Saguntum-the real disaster was the plain demonstra~
tion that the Valencian troops could not stand even against very
inferior numbers. It was to no purpose that the two gallant
, Expeditionary Divisions' had sacrificed themselves, and lost
one man in three out of thcir small fOl'cc of 5,500 men in hard
fighting. They had been betrayed by their worthless associates
on the left. Dlake's generalship had not been good-he dis-
persed his columns in the most reckless way, and kept no
sufficient reserves-but with the odds in his favour of 27,000
men to 14,000, he ought yet to have won, if the larger haIr of his
IIrmy hud consented to fight. They did lIot: with such troops
no more could he hopcd Irom further battles in the open field-
whatever the numerical odds might be. They could at most
be utilized behind walls and entrenchments, for purely passive
defence. And this, as we shall see, was the deduction that their
generaJ made ITom the unhappy events of October 25.
Next morning Suchet sent in u summons to the garrison of
Saguntum, llnd the governor, Andriani, after short haggling
for temls, surrendered. He is not to be blamed: his garrison
had seen the rout of Blnke's mmy with their own eyes, and
knew that there was no more hope for them. They were, as
I 2nd or Badajoz (two battalions) was almost exterminated, losing
17 officers, 21 sergeants, aud 500 men. ' mostly priooners,' ont of 800 present.
&-e it.s history in the Collde de Clonard's great work on the Spanish army.
• The 16th Line (three battalions) alone, in fighting ZayflS, lost just
double as many officers as the seven battalions or Chlopiski and Robert
in their engagement with Mahy, Miranda, IInd Villacampn I
•• THE BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM (OCT. 21,\
we have seen, mainly raw troops, and their good bearing up
to this moment, rather than their demoralization after the
battle, should provoke notice. The French appl'Ouches were
by this time within a few yards of the Dos Mayo redoubt and
its hastily patched breaches. The artillery fire of the besiegers
was rapidly levelling the whole work, and the next storm, made
on n wide front of shattered curtain, must have succeeded. It
is true that a governor of the type of Alvarez of Gcrona would
then have held out for some time in the castle of San Fcrnando.
But Andrialli's troops were not like those of Alvarcz, and he
himself wns l\ good soldier, but not n fanatical genius. '1'wo
thousand three hundred prisoners marched out on the 26th,
leaving not quite 200 men in hospital behind them. The
17 guns of the fortress were mllny of them damaged, and the
store of shot and shell was very low, though there were plenty
of infantry cartridges left t •
• l<'or uelniJs IlCtl llclma..., iv. pp. 140--3.
SECTION XXX: CHAPTER III
THE CAPTURE OF VALENCIA AND OF BLAKE'S ARMY.
NOVEMBER 1811-JANUARY 1812
As the result of the disastrous battle of Saguntum Blake had
lost the fortl"css which had served him so well as an outwork :
while his field army was much decreased in numbers, and still
more in self-confidence. It was obviously impossible that he
should ever again attempt to take the offcnsiYC with it. But
he was still in possession of Valencia and all its resources, and
his carefully fortified lines along the Gundalavinr were so
strong that even a defeated army could make some stand
behind them. He had still, after all his losses, more than
22,000 men under anllS 1. Yet it is doubtful whether a reso-
lute push on the part of the enemy would not have dislodged
him, for morc than half his army was in a state of complete
demoralization.
Suchet, however, had made up his mind not to strike at once ;
and when a few days had passed, and the Spaniards had been
grnnted time to settle down into the lines, it would undoubtedly
have becn hazardous to attack thcm with the very modest
numbers that the Army of Aragon had still in line. 'l'he chance
would have been to press the pursuit hard, on the very day after
the battle. But when the Marshal had counted up his losscs ill
the trenches and the field, had deducted a small garrison for
Saguntum, and had detached a brigade to escort to Tortosa his
numerous prisoncrs, he thought himscU too wcak for a decisive
blow. He would not have had 15,000 men in hand, unless he
should call up };'icatier's brigade from Segorbe and Oropesa, and
this he did not want to do, as he was entirely dependent for
, A battalioo or two lett in Valencia, when the rest ot the army went out
to deliver SlLguntuln, must be udded to the 20,000 men wllo came back from
the battle. 'J'hese corps were 2nd of Leon of LardiUlool's division, nnd
one battalion of Savoya belonging to Mirnnda.
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lood and stores on the line of communication which Ficatier
WllS guarding. Accordingly he resolved to dder his next blow
at Blake, till he should have summoned Irom Aragon Severoli's
division, and Heille's too, if the Emperor would give him leave
to requisition that force. He could not utiJii"£ Rcillc without
that leave; but Sevcroli's troops belonged to his own army,
and were at his disposition, it he should judge it possible to
draw them southwn.rd without endangering the safety of
Al'ugon. This he was prepared to do, if a sufficient garrison lor
that province could be provided from another source. And the
only obvious source was the Army or the North: j( the EmpCl'or
would consent to order Dorsenne to find troops to make Sara-
gossa and the linc of the Ebro secure, it would not be over rash
to borrow both Severoli and Reille for operations against
Valcncia. But it was clear that it would take some weeks
for the permission to be sent from Paris, and for the troops
of the Army of ~he North to be moved, when and if the
permission was granted. We shaU see, as a matter of fact,
that it was not till the end of December, two full months
after the battle of Saguntum, that the two divisions wcre
collected on the desired ground, and the final blow against
Blake was delivered.
Meanwhile Suchet could do no more than place his divisions
in the most favourable position for making the advance that
would only be possible when Severoli, and perhaps Heille also,
should arrive. With this object he pushed them forward on
November 3 to the line of the Guadalaviar, close in front of
Blakc's long series of enh"CllCbmcnts. Harispc 011 the right
advanced to Paterna, Habert on the left to the close neighbour-
hood of Valcucia. He drove the Spanish outposts from the
outlying suburb of Serranos, which lay beyond the lines and
on the north side of the river, and also from the Grao, or port
and mole which forms the outlet of Valencia to the sea. It was
most unlucky for Blakc, in the eud, that his natural line of
communication with the l\fediterranean and the English fleet
Iny north of the Guadalaviar, and outside his line of fortifications.
Indeed it looks as if there was a cardinal fault in the planning
of the defences when the Grao was left outside them, for though
rather remote from the city (two miles) it would be of inestimable
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importance, supposing tha.t the }reneh were to succeed in
crossing the Guadalaviar and investing Valencia. With the
port safe, the defenders could receive succour and supplies to
any extent, and if finally reduced to extremity could retreat
by sea. Some of the energy whieh had been expended in
thro,,;ng up the immense fortified camp which embraced all
the southern suburbs, and in lining the river westward with
batteries, might well have been diverted to the fortification of
the Grno and its eonnexion with the works of the city. But
probably Blake, in his looking forward to the possible events
of the future, did not contemplate among the contingencies to
be faced that of his being shut up with the greater part of his
army within the walls of Valencia. If he were forced from the
lines of the Guadalaviar, he must have intended to fall back
inland or southward, and not to allow himself to be surrounded
in the capital. Otherwise it would have been absolutely insane
for him to leave unfortified, and abandon without a struggle,
Valencia's sole outlet to the sea.
:Meanwhile finding himself for week after week unassailed in
his lines, Blake had to take stock of his position, and see if
there was anything that he could do to avert the attack which
must come one day, and which would obviously be formidable.
For it had beeome known to him, ere long, that Severoli's
division, and probably other troops, were working in towards
Valencia. and would certainly join Suehct before the winter was
over. The only expedients of which Blake made use were to
keep masses of men continuously at work strengthening his
lines, and to renew the attempt, which he had made fruitlessly
in September, for loosing Suehet's hold on Valencia by launching
against his rear thc irrcgulars of Aragon-the bands of the
Empecinado, Duran, and the minor chiefs. To add some
solidity to their hordes he detached from his army the Conde
de Montijo, with onc of the two brigades which Mahy had
brought from Mureia. This turbulent nobleman, more noted
for his intrigues than for his fighting power, was given a.
genernl command over all the bands, and marched to join them
with three battalions 1 and a few guns-the latter provision
, One battalion each of Dadajoo;, Burgos, and Tiradores de Cuenea-
under 2,000 men in all.
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was intended to obviate the difficulty which the irregulars bad
experienced in October from their want of artillery. Blake
intended to call up Frcirc from l\Iurcia with another draft from
the depleted 'Third Army,' whose best troops Mahy had
already led to Valencia. But, as wc shall see, this detachment
was presently distracted to another quarter, and never joined
the main force. The nominal strength of the mass of troops
along the Cuadalaviar was, however, increased by degrees, owing
to the filling of the Tanks of the divisions cut up at Sagun-
turn by men from the halr·trained reserve and depots. Miranda's
division in particular, which had lost so many prisoners in the
battle, was completed lo morc than its original strength by
absorbing three raw' third battalions' from the' Heserve Divi-
sion,' besides other drafts 1. Bluke also endeavoured to make
use of ' urban guards' and other levies of irregular organization
and more than doubtful value: the population in the north
of the kingdom, behind Suchet's lines, were invited to fonn
guerrillero bands: but the Valeneians never showed the 7.cnl
or energy of the Catalans and Aragonese. The bands that
appeared were few in numbers, and accomplished nothing
of note. Indeed, it appears that the patriotic spirit of the
. province had run low. l\tahy, in a letter to Blake of this month,
complains bitterly that the peasantry refuse to convey letters
for him, or even to give him information :J.S to the position and
movements of the French, while he knew that hundreds of
them were visiting Suehet's camps daily in friendly fashion 2.
It appears that the people werc sick of the war, and discon-
tented with Blake, whose conduct to the local authorities was
even more injurious to him than thc uniform failure of all his
military operations.
The diversion to bc conducted by Montijo and the irregulars
in Aragon constituted the only real hope of salvation for Blake
and the city of Valencia. But it was, wc may say, doomed
from the first to failure, unless some favourable chance should
intervene. A couple of thousand regulars, with the aid of
guerrillero bands, hard to assemble, and not mustering at any
I Four thous,'md strong at Saguntum, it surrendered on January 8tb,
5,513 strong. or its quality, the less said the better.
• Mahy to Blake quoted at lengtb in Arteehe, xi. p. 196, (ootnote.
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time more than 6,000 or 7,000 men collected on onc spot, were
sent to paralyse the movements of more than 20,000 .Freneh.
For to that figure Reille's and Severoli's divisions, together
with the original garrison left in Aragon under :Musnier, most
certainly amounted. It cannot be denied that the diversion
gave much trouble to the cnemy, but it never prevented him
from executing any operation of primary importance. On
October 27th the Italian general, ~Iazzuchelli, with onc of
Scveroli's brigades, drove oU the Empccinado, and relieved the
long-besieged garrison of l\'Iolina, which he brought off, aban-
doning the castle. But lIS he was returning to his chief, who
then lay at Daroca, the Empecinado fell on his marching column
in the Pass of Cubillejo, and inflicted severe damage upon it t.
Scveroli then sent out a second column of 800 men, to relieve
Almunia, on the road to Saragossa, another outlying garrison.
But Dunm surprised and scattered t.his purty just as it reached
its destination, and then captured the fort with its garrison of
140 men (October 31). This provoked the enemy to march
ugainst him in force, whereupon, after fighting nn obstinate
engagement with l\Iazzuehelli near Almunia, in which the
ltalians lost 220 men, he turned sideways, and descended upon
Daroca, whieh his adversary hud left. weakly manned; he
stormed the town and laid siege to the fort. This brought down
upon him Pannetier, with onc of lleille's brigades: thereupon,
wisely refusing to fight, Durun went up into the mountains of
l\1olina (November 1811).
Here he was joined some weeks later by the regular brigade
under the Conde de l\'Iont.ijo, which Blake had sent up from
Valencia. TillS little detachment had threaded its way among
Reille's columns, and had narrowly escaped destruction near
Albarracin. The Conde, assuming chief command at the high~
lying village of l\lulmarcos, informed the Aragonesc guerrilleros
that something desperate must be done, to relieve the pressure
on Valencia; and after sending for the Empecinn.do, who Wa..'>
now beyond the mountains, in the province of Guadalajarn,
marched 011 Calatayud. Unfortunately the Partida chiefs,
accustomed to conduct their expeditions on their own responsi-
bility, viewed the advent of Montijo, a stranger of no great
For details see Vncllni, v. pp. 470-1.
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military reputation, with jealousy and dislike. Duran and the
Condc having reached Ateca near Calatayud, committed
themselves to a serious combat with a column of 2,000 men
from its garrison, having every expectation of being succoured
by the Empccillado, who had reached their neighbourhood.
He did not appear, however, and they were repulsed. There-
upon the Spaniards pijrted, the Conde and the regulars rehring
to Torrehermosa, Duran to DC7.a, in the province of Sorin.
The Empeeinado, when all was over, sent in a letter in which
he explained that he had held ort 'because his officers and
soldiers had no confldencc save in their own chic(: ' but it was
clear that he himself wrecked the expedition out of sell-willed
indisciplinc.
The month of December wa." now far advanced, and nothing
effective had bccn done to help Blakc. The Aragonese bands
had cost Reille and Severoli many toilsome marches, and had
inflicted on them appreciable losses-Severoli's division was
now 2,000 men weaker than it had been in September. But
they had failed entirely to stop the largcr movements of the
enemy, who was able to movc wherever he pleased with
a column of 3,000 men, though uny lesser force wus always in
danger o( being harried or even destroyed. When Suchet
determined that he would again risk trouble in his rear, and
would bring both the divisions from the Ebro down to Valcneia,
no one could prevent him from doing so. It is true that
Scveroli and Reille were leaving bchind them a country-side
still infested by an active and obstinate enemy. Dut if their
generalissimo judged that he was prepared to take this risk,
and was dctcrmined to crush Blake before he completed the
subjugation of Uppcr Aragon, there was nothing that could
hinder him from carrying out his intention. Dy the middle of
December Scvcroli wus on his way to the CU<ldnlnviuf by way
of Teruel, and Reille followed not far behind, though onc of
his brigadcs (Bourke's) had been distracted, by being ordered
to conduct the prisoners from Saguntum to the French frontier,
and the other (Pannetier's) had been drawn so far northwa.rd in
hunting I'Ilontijo and Duran that it was seveml marches behind
the leading columns.
It was not, however, Reille and Se...·eroli alone who were set
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in motion for the ruin of Blake and Valencia. Nor was Suchet's
mind the final controlling force of the operations which were
to spread all over eastern Spain in the months of December
1811 and January 1812. The Emperor, when he hurried the
Army of Arngon forward in September, had explained that
this was the crucial point of the war, and repeated in November
that' ('important, dans ce moment, est In prise de Valence.'
Portugal could wait-Wellington, with 18,000 men sick, llnd
forced to remain on the defensive,-was a negligible quantity
during the winter: he should be dealt with in the spring by
a general combination of all the }~rench armies 1. Acting all
this comfortable but erroneous hypothcsis, Napoleon deter-
mincd lo shift castward ami southward 1I0t only Reille and
Severoli, but other troops from the armies which were directly
or indirectly opposed to Wellington, so fiS to alter for a time
the general balance of forces on the Portuguese side o( the
Peninsula. On Octobcr 18th, before the battle of Saguntum
had been fought and won, Berthier had been directed to write
to Mal'mont that, for the support of the invasion o( Valencia,
King .Toseph and the Army of the Centre would be ordered to
send troops to Cuenea, to take Blakc in the rear. III eonsc-
quence the Army of Portugal must' facilitate the task of the
King,' i.e. find detachments to occupy those parts of New
Castile (rom which Joseph would huve to withdraw the normal
garrison for his expedition to Cuenca. But presently it became
evident that the Army of the Centre would have great difficulty
in providing a column strong enough to make this diversion,
even if it were relieved ill La l\Iancha, or the province of Toledo,
by units belonging to Mnrmont. Napoleon then made the
ull-impoltunt determination to borrow troops from the Army
of Portugal for the Valeneian expedition. By this time he
knew of the battle of Saguntum, and had received Suehet's
nppeuls for reinforcements. His dispatch to Marmont of
November 20th in(orms the Marshal that he must provide
a division of 6,000 men of all arms, to join the disposable force
which King Joseph can spare for the assistance of Suchct. The
still more important dispatch of the next day varied the orders
I Corrt:prmdanct dt NapoUon, 18,267, and cl. pp. 590-2 or vol. Iv or
this work.
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in .an .essential detail, by saying that the Marshal must send
not' a detachment of 6,000 men' but 8Uch a force as, united to
the colu'mn supplied by Ki11g Joseph, would provide a total of
12,OOO1llMfor tM diversion.' And it was added that, in addition,
the Army of Portugal would have to find 3,000 or 'l,OaO men
more, to keep up the communications of the expeditionary force
with its base in New Castile. The detachment might be made
without any fear of adverse consequences, since Wellington had
20,000 men in hospital, and barely as mUIlY in a sl;fl,tc to take
the field, so no risk would be run in depicting the force opposed
to him 1. Napoleon, conveniently ignoring the exact wording
of his own dispatch, reproached Mormont (when evil results
had followed) for having detached' an nrmy corps and thirty
guns' tor the diversion, instead of ' a light flying column 2., But
it will be secn that the Marshal was literally obeying the orders
givcn him when hc moved 12,000 men towards Valencia. For
the Army of the Centre provided not much more than 3,000 men
under General d'Armagnae for the Cucne~ expedition a, and
Marmont had, therefore, to find 9,000 mcn to bring it up to the
strength whieh the Emperor prescribed, as well as the 3,000-
4,000 men to cover the line of communications.
All thcse dispatches reached Marmont's head-quarters at
Plasencia with the tardiness that was normal in Spain, where
officers bearing ordcrs had to be escorted by detachments mllny
hundreds strong, supposing that their certain arrival at their
destination was desired. H they travelled rapidly and unes·
corted, they bec~me the incvitable prey of the guerrilleros.
The dispatch of October 18th, saying that Marmont must replace
King Joscph's garrisons in La Maneha, came to hand 0]\
November ]1, and the Marshal accordingly directed Foy's
division, then ut Toledo, to bl'eak itscU up and occupy tile
1 Sce these dispntches printed in full in Mnrnlont's lIItmoiu3, iv,
PI). 256-8. This lVording is most imJlortllllt and should IJc studied with
':nre. Note thut WellingLOll'll sick hnve gone lIll rrom 18,000 to 20,000
III twenty-rour houril, to oblige the Emperor.
• Derthier to l\!armont, January 23, 1812. Printed in the latter'!
Mtmoires, iv. pp. 297-9.
• Though King Joseph had said that if Marmont took over tile WllOle 01
La l\Iancha, he could then reinforce d'Armagnac up to 8,000 men. Tlds he
never reall)' accomplished (Joscph to Derlhicr, Nov. 20).
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various posts which the German division of the Army of the
Centre had been holding. Foy set out to fulfil these orders
on November 22.
The Emperor's second and third dispatches, those of Novem-
ber ~m-21st, turned up on December 13th \ and Marmont found
himself under orders to find 9,000 men for the Cuenca expedition,
-since d'Armngnac had only 3,000 men to contribute-and in
addition 3,00Q--4,OOO more ror the line of communications.
Now the Marshal was as fully convinced as his master that
Wellington was not ill u condition to movc, or to do any serious
harm, and under this impression, and being probably stirred
(us Napoleon afterwards remarked) Z by the desire to increase
his own reputation by a dashing fcat of arms, he resolved to
take charge of the expedition in person. He ordered that the
divisions of Foy and Surrut-both weak units, the one of eight,
the other of nine battalions 3-and ~Iontbrun's light cavalry
should prepare to march under his OWll charge to join d'At-
magnae, and movc on Valencia. Another division should come
into La Mancha to take up the cantonments evacuated by Foy,
and keepO~~the line of communications. Clausel should be
left in charge of the remaindcl' of the army, und observe
Wellington.
This scheme was never carried out, for on December 20
Mnrmont received another dispatch, ordering him to transfer
his head-quarters to Valladolid, and to move a large part oI his
army into Old Castile. Of this more hereafter. Dut being thus
prevented (Ior his own good fortullC us it tUl'Ilcd out) from going
011 the expedition, he gave over Foy's and Sarrut's divisions
to l\Iontbrun, and bade him execute the diversion. He himself
went, us ordered, Lo Valladolid. U hc had received the last
dispatch a littlc latcr, or had started a littlc earlicr, hc would
have been put in the ignominious position of being absent
Irom his own point of danger, wben Wellington suddenly struck
at Ciudad Rodrigo ill the early days of January.
I Date fixed by ~1:lrmont'M letter to Berthier of Feb. 6.
• • Sa Majcstll (wriles Berthier) pense que, dans cette circonstance, VOUIl
ave.,; plus calculll vOlre gIoire personnclle que le bien de lion servil:e,'
Jun. 23, letter quoted above on the lust page.
• Eacll division had about '1,000 or ·1<,500 men: the light cavalry about
1,700, so tile whole would have made about 10,000 SlI.bres and bayonets.
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Montbrull, his substitute, had drawn together his forces in La
Mancha by the 29th of December, but receiving fromd'Armagnac,
who was already on the move with 3,000 men, the assurance
that the road horn Cucnea to Valencia was practically impassable
at midwinter, and that he could certainly get no guns along it,
he resolved to take another route towards the scene of active
operations. Accordingly he set out to march by the road
San Clemente, Chinchilla, Almanza. which run" across the
upland plain of La Mancha and Northern Murein, and does not
cross rough ground till it nears the descent to the sea-coast on
the borders of Valencia. The column did not leave San Clemente
and El Probcncio till January 2, and (as we shall see) was too
late to help Suchet, who had brought matters to n head long
before it drew near him.
Meanwhile d'Armognoc, though his force was trifling 1, had
been of far greater use. He had reoccupied Cuenca, but
finding (as he had informed Montbrun) that the roods in that
direction were impracticable, had swervcd southward, avoiding
the mountains, and getting to Tarazona in La Mancha., marched
towards the passes of the Cabrid River, and the road on to
Valencia by way of Hequeiia. His approach being reported to
Blake, who had no troops in this direction save two battalions
under Bassecourt, the Captain-General W.'lS seized with
a lluturtll disquietude as to his rear, for he had no accurate
knmvledge of the French strength. Wherefore he directed
General Frcil'c, with the succours which he had been intending
to draw up from Murein, to abandon the idea of reinforcing the
main army, and to throw himself betwcen d'Armagllue and
Valencia [November 20]. The French general, beating the
country on all sides, und t1l1'usting before him Bassecourt's
small force and the local guerriUeros, marched as far as Yniesta,
and forced the passage of the Cabriel fit Valdocaiias, but finding
that he had got far away from Montbrun, who did not march
till mllny days after he himself had started, nnd being informed
that Freire, with a very large force, wus coming in upon his
• t\ppurently four or live battalions of the German division gathered
rrOln La Manchll, nnd n brigo.de of dragoons. .1oseph calls it in his C:1JT1~.
$pondance 11,000 men, when describing Ulis 01K:ratioll (.loSCllh lo Berthier,
Nov. 12, 1811).
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rear, he stopped before reaching Requefia and turned back
towards Lo. Manchn 1. He had succeeded, however, in prevent~
ing Freire from reinforcing Valencia, and the Murcian succours
never got near to Blake. He even for a time distracted troops
from the main Spanish army, for Zayas was sent for some days
to Uequena, and only returned just in time for the operations
that began on December 25th. The net outcome, therefore,
of Montbrun's and d'Armagnac's operations was simply to
distract !i'reire's division from Valencia at the critical momcnt-
an appreciable but not ll. decisive result.
IHeanwhilc Suchct found himself able to deliver his decisive
blow on the Guudalaviar. By his orders Scveroli and Reille had
drawn southward by way or Tcruel, deliberately abandoning
most of Aragon to the mercy of the insurgent bands; for
though Caffarelli had moved some battalions of the Army of
the North to Saragossa and the posts along the Ebro, the rest
of the province was left most inadequately guarded by the
small force that had originally been (..'Ommittcd to Musnier's
charge, when first Suchet marched on Valencia. Musnier
himself necompanied Severoli's division, leaving his detach-
ments under CaUurelli's mdcrs, for hc had becn directed to
come to the front and assume the command of his old brigades,
those of Ficatier and Robert, both now with the main army.
When Rcille and the Italians marched south, Aragoll was
exposed to the inroads of Montijo, Duran, the Empecinado,
and :Mina, all of whom had been harried, but by no means
crushcd, by the late murches and countcrmarches of the French.
That trouble would ensue both Napoleon and Suchet were well
aware. But the Emperor had made up his mind that all other
considerations were to be postponed to the capture of Valencia
and the destruction of Biake's army. \Vhen these ends were
achieved, not only Rcille and Severoli, but other troops as well,
should be drawn northwards, to complete the pacification of
Aragon, and to make an cnd of the lingcring war in Catalonia.
Severoli had reached 'feruel on November 30, but ,,.as ordered
to await the junction of Reille's troops, and these were still
, D'Armagnac'8 obscure campaign will be found chronicled in detail in
the narrative of the Bllden officer, TIicgel. Hi. pp. 357-00, who shared in it
along with the relit of the Germun divi~ion rrOlll Lu Munchu.
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far off. Indeed Reille himself only started from Saragossa with.
Bourke's brigade on December lOth, and Ponnetier's brigade
(which had been hunting Duran in the mountains) was two long
marches farther behind. Without waiting for its junction,
Severoli and Reille marched from 'femel on Dccember 20th,
and reached Segorbe unopposed on the 2,~th. Here they
were in close touch with Suchet, and received orders to make
n forced march to join him, as he intended to attack the lines
o( the Guadalaviar on the 26th. To them was allotted the most
important move in the game, (or they were to cross the
Guadalaviar high up, beyond the westernmost of Blake's long
string of batteries and earthworks, and to turn his flank and
get in his rear, while the Army of Aragon assailed his front,
and held him nailed to his positions by a series of vigorous
attacks. The point ou which Rcille and Severoli were to
march was Uibaroja, fifteen miles up-stream from Valencia.
When the two divisions from Arugon should have arrived,
Suehet could count on 33,000 men in line, but as l'annetier was
still labouring up two marches in the rear, it wns really with
30,000 only that he struck his blow-a force exceeding that
which Blake possessed by not more than 0,000 or7,000 bayonets.
Considering the strength of the Spanish fortifications the task
looked hazardous: but Suchet was convinced, and rightly,
that the greater part of the Army of Valencia was still so much
demoralized that much might be dared against it: and the
event proved him wisc.
On the night of December 25th all the divisions of the Army
of Aragon had abandoned their cantonments, and advanced
towards the Spanish lines-Habert on the left next the sea;
Palombini to thc west o[ Valcncia, opposite the village of
Mislata; Harispe and lI1usnier farther up-stream, opposite
Quarte. The cavalry accompanied this last column. Rcille
and Severoli, on their arrival, were to form the extreme right of
the line, and would extend far beyond the last Spanish entrench·
ments. The weak Neapolitan division alolle (now not much
over 1,000 strong) was to keep quiet, occupying the entrenched
position in the suburb of Scrrunos, which faced the city of
Valencia, Its only duty was to hold on to its works, in case
Blake should try a sortie at this spot, with the purpose of
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breaking the French line in two. That such a weak force was
left to discharge such an important function, is a sufficient proof
of Suchet's belief in lllake's incapacity to take the offensive.
The lincs which thc French wcre about tu assail wcre rather
long than strong, despite of the immense amount of labour
that had bcen lavished on them during the last three months.
Their extremc right, on the sidc of the sea, and by the mouth
of the Gnadalaviar was a redoubt (named after the Lazaretto
hard by) commanding the estuary: from thence a. long line of
earthworks continued the defences as far as the slight hill of
Monte Oliveto, which guarded the right flank of the great
entrenched camp oC which thc eity Cormed the nucleus. Here
there was a fort outside the walls, and connected with them
by a ditch and a bastioned line of earthworks, reaching as far
as the citadel at the north-cast corner of the town. From
thence the line of resistance for some way was formed of the
mediaeval wall of Valencia itself, thirty feet high and ten thick.
It was destitute of a parapet broad enough to bear guns: but
the Spaniards had built up against its back, ut irregular dis-
tances, scarIolding oC heavy beams, and terraecs of carth, on
which a certain amount of cannon were mounted. The gates
were protected by smull advallced works, mounting firtiUery.
Blake had made Valencia and its thrce outlying southern and
western suburbs of Ruzafa, San Vi}l'cente, and Quarte into
0. single place of defence, by building around those suburbs
a great linc of curthworks and bal.leries. It was an immense
work consisting of bastioned entrenchments provided with
a ditch eighteen feet deep, und filled in some sections with
wuter. From the eity the line of defence along the river con-
tinued fiS far as the village of Manises, with an unbroken series
of earthworks and batteries. The Guadalaviar itself formed an
outer obstacle, being 0. strcl\m running through low uud marshy
ground, and divcrtcd into many water-cuts for purposes of
irrigation.
The continuous line of defences from the sea as far as Manises
was about eight milcs IOllg. It possessed sOlDe outworks on
the farther bank of thc Guadalaviar, three of thc five bridges
which lead from Valencia northward having been leCt standing
by Blake, with good Uus-de-pont to protect them from Suchet's
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attacks. Thus the Spaniards had the power to debouch on to
the French side of the river at any time that they pleased.
This lact added difficulties to the projected uttack which the
Marshal was planning.
The troops behind the lines of the Guadulaviar consisted of
some 23,000 regulars, with a certain amount of local urban
guards and armed peasantry whose number it ii:i impossible to
estimate with any precision-probably they gave some 3,000
muskets morc, but their fighting value was ulmost negligible.
The right of the line, llear the sea, was entirely made over to
these levies of doubtful value. Mirundu's division manned the
fort of Monte Oliveto and the whole north front of the city.
Lurdizabal garrisoned the curthwol'ks from the cnd of the
town wall as far as the village of Mislata. This last place and
its works fell to t.he charge of Zayus. Creagh's Murcians were
on Zayas's left at Quarte: finally the western wing of the army
was formed by the Valencian divisions of Obispo and Villacampa;
holding San Onofre and J\1anises, where thc fortifications ended.
The whole of the cavalry was placed so as to cover lhe left rear
of the lines, at Aldaya and 'l'orrellte. A few battalions of the
raw' Rescl'\'c Division' were held in t.hc city us accnlral reserve.
The arrangements of Dlake seem liable to grave criticism, since
he placed his two good and solid divisions, lhose of Lardizabal
and ZUyllS, in the strongest works in t.he centre of his line, but
entrusted his left flunk, where u turning mO\'ement by the
French might most easily take place, to the demoralized
battalions of VilIacumpu and Obispo, who had u consistent
record of rout and disaster behind them. It is clear th.at lines,
however long, CUll always be turned, unless their ends rest, as
did those of Torres Vcdras, on an imJXlssable obstacle such as
the sea. If the French should refuse to uttack the works in
front, and should march up the Guadalaviar to far beyond the
last baltery, it would be impossible to prevent them from
crossing, all the more so becausc, after 1\Ianises, the network 01
canals and water-cuts, which makes the passage difficult in the
lower course of the river, comes to an end, and the only obstacle
exposed to the invader is a single stream of no great depth.
Blake, therefore, should have seen that the critical point was
the extremc west cud of his lines, und should havc placed there
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his best troops instead of his worst. Moreovcr he appears to
have had no proper system of outposts of eithcr cavalry Of
infantry along the upper stream, for (as wc shall see) the first
passage of the French was made not only without opposition,
but without any aJarm being given. Yet there were 2,000
Spanish cavalry only a few miles away, at Torrcnte and Aldaya.
Suchet's plan of attack, which he carried out the moment
that Reille joined him, and even before the latter's rearmost
brigade had got up into line, was a very ambitious onc, aiming
not merely at the forcing of the Guadalaviar or the investment
of Valencia, but at the trapping of the whole Spanish army. It
was conducted on such a broad front, and with such a dispersion
of the forces into isolated columns, that it argued a supreme
contempt for Blakc and his generalship. Used against such
a general as Wellington it would have led to dreadful disaster.
But Suehet knew his adversa,ry.
The gist of the plan was the circumventing of the Spanish
lines by two columns which, starting one above and the other
below Valencia, were to cross the river and join hands to the
south o( the city. Meanwhile the main front of the works was
to be threatened (and if circumstances favoured, attacked) by
a very smu.11 fraction of the French army. Near the sea Ifabcrt's
division was to force the comparatively weak line of works at
the estuary, and then to cut the road which runs from Valencia
between the Mediterranean and the great lagoon of the Albu-
fera. Far inland the main striking force of the army, com~
posed of the divisions of Harispe and Musnier, with all the
cavalry, and with Reille's three brigades following close behind,
was to pass the Guadalaviar at Ribaroja, three or four miles
above Manises, and from thence to extend along the south
front of the Spanish lines, take them in the reM, and push on
so as to get into toueh with Habert. Compere's weak Neapolitan
brigade was to block the bridge-heads out of which Blake might
make a sally northward. Palombini's Italians were to press
close up to :Misluta, which Suchet judged to be the weakest
point ill the Spanish lines, and to deliver against it an attack
which was to be pushed more or less home as circumstances
might dieblte. The whole force employed (not counting Pan~
netier's brigade, which had not yet joined Reille) was just
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30,000 men. Of these 25,000 were employed in the flanking
movcments; less than 5,000 were left to demonstrate against
Blakc's front along the lines of the GuadaIM·iar.
The main and decisive blow was of course to be delivered by
Harispe, Musnier, and Reille, who were to cross the river at
a point where the Spaniards were unlikely to make any serious
opposition, since it wus outside their chosen ground of defence.
and was clearly watched rather than held. If 20,000 men
crossed here, and succeeded in establishing themselves south of
Valencia by a rapid march, Blake would Hud his lines useless.
and would be forced to fight in the open. in order to seenre
a retreat southward, or else to shut himself und his whole force
up in the entrenched camp around the city. Suchet could
accept either altcrnativc with equanimity: a battle, as he
. judged, meant a victory, the breaking up of the Spanish army
and the capture or Valencia. H. 011 thc other hand, Bluke
refused to fight a general engagement, and retired within his
camp, it would lead to his being surrounded, and the desired
end would only be deferred for a few days. There were only
two dangers-onc wns that the Spanish general might abscond
southward with the bulk of his army. without fighting, the
moment that he heard that his enemy was ael'ass the Cuada-
laviar. The second was that, waiting till the French main body
wns committed to its flank march, he might breuk out north-
ward by the three bridges in his hands, overwhelm the Neapoli·
tuns, and escape towards Liria and Segorbe into the mountains.
Suehet judged that his enemy would try neither of these
courses; he would not be timid enough to retreat on the
instant that he learnt that his left wing was beginning to be
turned; nor would he be resourceful enough to strike away
northward, as soon as he saw that the turning movement was
formidable and certain of success. Herein Suehet judged aright.
At nightfall on the 25th-26th of December two hundred
hussars, each er.frying a voltigeur behind him, forded the
Guadalaviar at Ribaroju, and threw out a chain of posts whieh
brushed off a few Spanish cava.lry vedettcs. The moment
that the farther bank was clear, the whole force of Suchct's
engineers rt to work to build two trestle-bridges for infantry,
and to lay a solid pontoon bridge higher up for guns aod
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cavalry. A few hours later Harispc's division bcgan to pass-
then Musnier's, lastly lloussard's cavalry. The defile took
a long time, and even by dawn Reille's three brigades had not
arrived or begun to pass. But by that time ten... thousand
Freneh were over the river. The Spanish vedettes had reported,
both to their cavalry generals ut Aldayu and to Blake at
Vll.lencia, that the enemy was busy at Hibaroja, but had not
been able to judgc of his force, or to make out that he was
constructing bridges. Their commanders resolved that nothing
could be done in the dark, and that the morning light would
determine the character of the movement 1.
The late December sun soon lihowed the situation. Harispe's
di ....isioll was marching on Torrcnte, to cut the high-road to
Mureia. The cavalry and onc brigade of l\Iusllier were preparing
to follow: the other brigade of the second division (Robert's)
was st.anding fnst b)· the bridges, to cover them till Reille should
appear and cross. But while this was the most weighty news
brought to Blake, he was distracted by intelligence from two
other quarters. Habert was clearly seen coming down by the
seaside, to attack at the estuary; and Palomhini was also
approaching in the centre, in front of l\Iislata. The daylight
was the signal for the commencement of skirmishing on eaeh
01 the three lar-separated points. make. strange as it may
appear, made up his mind at first that the real danger lay on
the side ne."t the selL, nnd that Habert's column was the main
striking force 2. But when it became clear that this wing of the
l~rench army was not very strong, and was coming on slowly,
he turned his attention to Palombini, whose attack on l\lislata
was made early, and was conducted in a vigorous style. It was
to this point that he finally rode out from the city, and he took
up his position behind ZaYM, entirely neglecting the turning
movement on his left-&pp3rently beC:J.use it was out of sight,
Rnd he could not make the right deduction lrom the reports
which hili cavalry had brought him.
I So Suehet's nurmlive (~1b1wirclJ,ii. pp. 2]4-15). Hclrnns lill~'li t1mtonly
one bridge was finished when Hari6!lC and Musnier passed-the others after
dawn only.
• For Blake's opinions and actiofill sce the record of his staff-officer,
SchcpclcT (pp. 502-3).
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Meanwhile Harispe's column, pushing forward with the
object of reaching the high-road from Valencia to Mureia, the
natural foute for Blake's army to take, if it should attempt to
escape southward, ran into the main body of the Spanish horse,
which was assembling in the neighbourhood of the village of
Aldayn. The Frcnch infantry werc preceded by a squadron
of hussars, who were accompanied by General Boussard, the
commander of Suehet's cavalr)' division. This small force was
suddenly encompassed and cut up by several regiments of
Martin Carrem's brigade. Boussard was overthrown and left
for dead-his sword and decorations were stripped from his
body. But more French squadrons began to come up, and
Harispe's infantry opened fire on the Spaniards, who were soon
forced to retire hurriedly-they rode off southward towards
the Xucar river. They were soon completely out of touch with
the rest o( Blake's army.
Harispe's column then continued its way, sweeping eastward
towards the l\lurcian chuu.ssee in the manner lhat Suehet had
designed; but the rest of the operations of the I"rench right
wing were not so decisive as its commander had hoped. Mahy,
leaming of the movement of the encircling column, and seeing
Robert's brigade massed opposite the extreme flank o[ his
position at Manises, while some notice of Reille's near approach
also came to hand, suddenly resolved that he. would not be sur-
rounded, and abandoned all his lines before they were seriously
attacked. He had the choice o[ directing ViIlacampa and
Obispo to retire towards Valencia and join Blake for a serious
battle in the opeB, or o[ bidding them strike oU southward and
eastward, and escape towards the Xuear, abandoning the main
body of the army_ He chose thc second alternative, Ilnd
marched off parallel with Harispe's threatening column, direct-
ing eaeh brigade to get away as best it could. His force at
once broke up into several fractions, (or the cross·roads were
many and perplexing. ~omc regiments reached the Murciall
chaussee before J:Tarispe, and escaped in front of him, pursued
by the French cavalry. Others, coming too late, were Corced to
forgo this obvious line of retreat, and to struggle still farther
eastward, only turning south when they got to the marshy
borders of the lagoon of Albufera. Obispo, with 2,000 of his
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men, was so closely hunted by the hostile cavalry that he barely
found safety by striking along the narrow strip of soft ground
between the lagoon and the sea. On the morning of the 27th
he struggled through to CuUera near the mouth of the Xucar :
lIIahy, with the greater part of Villacampa's division and some
of Obispo's and Creagh's, arrived somewhat earlier at AIcira,
higher up the same stream, where he found the fugitive cavalry
already established. The divisions wcrc mueh disorganized, but
they had lost very few killed or wounded, and not more than
500 prisoners. Mahy rallied some 4,000 or 5,000 men at Alcira,
and Obispo a couple of thousand at Cullera, but they were
a ' spent force,' not fit for action. Many of the raw troops had
disbanded themselves and gone home.
Thus three-sevenths of Blake's army were separated from
Valencia and their Commander-in-Chief without having made
any appreciable resistance. But it seems doubtful whether
Mahy should be blamed-if he had waited an hour longer in
his positions his whole corps might have been captured. If he
had retired towards Valencia he would have been, in all
probabilit)', forced to surrender with the rest of the army
a few days later. And in separating himself from his chief he
had the excuse that he knew that Blake's intention had been to
retire towards the Xucar if beaten, not to shut himself up in
Valencia. He may have expected that the rest of the army
would follow him southward, and Blake (as wc shall sec)
probably had the chance of executing that movement, though
he did not seize it.
Meanwhile the progress of the engagement in other quarters
must be detailed. Palombini made a. serious attempt to break
through the left centre of the Spanish lines at Mislata. His
task was hard, not so much because of the entrenchments, or
of the difficulty of crossing the Guadalaviar, which was fordable
for infantry, but from the many muddy canals and water-cuts
with which the ground in front of him abounded. These,
though not impassable for infantry, prevented guns from getting
to the front till bridges should have been made for them. The
Italians waded through the first canal, and thcn throug]l thc
river, but were brought to a stand by the second canal, that of
Fabara, behind which the Spanish entrenchments lay. After
O>l.u;". Y F
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a furious fire-contest they had to retire as far as the river, under
whose bank many sought refuge-some plunged in and waded
back to the farther side. Palombini rallied them and delivered
a second attack; but at only onc point, to the left of Mislata,
did the assault break into the Spanish line. Zayas, aided by
a battalion or two which Mah)' had sent up from Quarre,
vindicated his position, and repulsed the attack with heavy
loss. But when the news came from the left that Harispc had
turned the lines, and when Muliy':; troops were seen evacuating
all their positions and hurrying oU, Zayas found himself with
his left flank completely exposed.
Blake made SQme attempt to form a line en potence to Zayas's
entrenchments, directing two or three of Creagh's battalions
from Quarte and some of his reserve from the city to make
a stand at the village of Chirivella. But the front was never
formed-attacked by some of Musnier's troops these detach·
ments broke up. Crengh's men flying to follow Mah)', and the
others retiring to the entrenched camp.
Thereupon lllake ordered Zayas and T~ardi7,abal, who lay to
his right, to retreat into Valencia before they should be turncd
by the approaching French. The movement was accomplished
in order and at leisure, and all the gUlls in and about the
Mislata entrenchments were brought away. Palombini had
been too hardly handled to attempt to pursue.
The General-in-Chief seemed stunned by the suddenness of
the disaster. 'Hc looked like u man of stone,' says Sehepeler,
who rode at his side, ' when any observation was made to him
he made no repl)', and he could come to no decision. He would
not allow Zayas to fight, and when a colonel (the author of this
work) suggested at thc commencement of the retreat that it
would be well to burn certain houses which lay dangerously
close to the entrenched camp, he kept silcnce. Whereupon
Zayas observed in bitter rage to this oflieer: "Truly you are dull,
my German friend; do you not see that you cannot wake theman
up?'" According to the narratives of several contemporaries
there would still have been time at this moment to direct the
retreating column southward and escape, as Obispo did, along
the Albufera. For Habert (as we shall see) had been much
slowel' than Harispc in his turning movement by the side of the
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Mediterranean. Some, among thcm Schepclcr, suggcst that the
whole garrison might have broken out by the northern bridges
and got away. For Palombini was not in a condition to hinder
them, and the Neapolitans in front of thc bridgc-heads were
but a handful of 1,200 men. Dut the General, still apparcntly
unconscious of what was going 011 about him, drew back into
thc entrenched camp, and did no more.
Habcrt, meanwhile, finally completed his movement, and
joined hands with Hal'ispc at last. His latcncss was to be
accounted for not by the strength of the opposition made by
the irrcgular troops ill front of him, but by tbe fact that his
advance had been much hindcred by thc fire of thc flotilla
lying oH the mouth of the Guadalal'iar. Here there was a swarm
of gunboats supported by a British 74 and a frigate. Habcrt
would not commence his passage till hc had driven thcm away,
by placing a battery of sixteen siegc-guns on the shore near
the Crao. After much firing the squadron shcered off \ and
about midday the French division crossed the Guadalaviar,
partly by fording, partly on a hastily constructed bridge, und
attacked the line of scattered works defended by irregulars
which lay bchind. The Spaniards were successively evicted
[romall of them, us far as the fort of :Montc OliveLo. i\1iranda's
division kept within the entrenched camp, and gavcno assistance
to the bands without; but itwas latc afternoon before Habert had
accomplished his tlUik, ami finally got into touch with Harispc.
make was thus shut up in Valcncia with the divisions of
Miranda, Zayas, and Lardi7.abal, and what was left of his raw
rescrve battalions: altogether some 17,000 fighting-mcn re-
mained with him. The loss in actual fighting had becn vcry
small-about 500 killed and wounded and as many prisoners.
The French captured a good many guns in the evacuated
works and a single standard. Suchct returned his total casual-
ties at 521 officers and men, of whom no less than 50 killed and
355 woundcd were among Palombini's Italians-the only corps
which eun be said to have donc any serious fighting 2. The
, Nl.pier 6l).ys (iv. 1'. :10) th:>t the gunboots lied wilhout firillg 1I shot.
Suchet and Sehcpeler spcak of much firing, as does Artcche.
, No less than three of the Italian CQloncls were hit, and thirt)'·four
officers in all.
}<' 2
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l\larshul's strategical combination would have been successful
almost without bloodshed, if only Palombini had not pressed
his attack so hard, and with so little Ilc<.'cssity. Bul the Spanish
army. which was drawn out on a long front of nine miles,
without any appreciable central reserve, and with 110 prolcction
for its exposed flank, was doomed to ruin the moment that
the enemy appeared in overwhelming force, beyond and behind
its extreme left wing. Blake's only chance was to have watched
every ford with great vigilance, and to have had a strong flying
column of his best troops ready in some central position, from
which it could be moved out to dispute Suchet's passage with·
out a moment's delay. Far from doing this, he tied down his
two veteran divisions to the defence of the strongest part of his
lines, watched the fords with nothing but cavalry vcdetLcs, and
kept no central reserve at all, save 2,000 or 3,000 men of his
untrustworthy' Reserve Di\'ision.' In face of these dispositions
the :F'rench were almost bound to be successful. A disaster was
inevitable, but Blake might havc madc it somewhat less
ruinous if he had recognized his real position promptly, and had
ordered a general retreat, when Harispe's successful turning
movement became evident. In this case he would have lost
Valencia, but not his army.
As it was, a week morc saw thc miserable end of the campaign.
Suehet's first precaution was La ascertain whether there was
any danger from the lraction of the Spanish army which i\Iahy
and Obispo had carried ort He was uncertain how strong they
were, and whether they wcrc prcpared to attack him in the
rear, supposing that he should sit down to the siegc o( Valencia.
Accordingly he sent out at dawn on the 20th December two
light columns of cavalry and voltigeurs against Alcira and
Cullera, whither he knew that the refugees had retired. These
two reconnaissances in force discovered the enemy in position,
but the moment that they were descried l\fahy retreated
towards Aleoy, nnd Obispo towards Alieantc-both in such
haste and disorder that it was evident that they had no fighting
spirit left in them.
Suchet, therefore, was soon relieved of any fear of danger
from this side, and could make his arrangements for the siege.
He sent back to the north bank of the Guadalaviar the whole
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division of Musnier, which was there joined three days later by
Heille's belated brigade, that of Pannetier. Harispe, Habert,
Severoli, and Reille's other French brigade (that of llourke)
formed the investment on the southern bank. Palombini lay
astride of the river near Mislata, with one brigade on each
bank. The whole force of 88,000 men was sufficient for the
task berore it. The decisive blow would have to be given by
the siege artillcry; the whole train which had captured S3gun~
tum had long been ready for its work. And it had before it not
regular fortifications of modern type, but, in part of thc circum-
ference of Blllke's position, mediaeval walls not built to resist
artillery, in the rest thc ditch and bank of the entrenched camp,
which, though strong as a field-work, could not be considercd
capable of resisting a formal attack by a strong siege-train.
Blake was as well aware of this us Suehet, and he also knew
(what Suchet could not) that the population of 100,000 souls
under his charge had only 10 days' provision of flour and 19 or
20 of riee and salt fish. The city, like the army, had been
living on daily convoys from the south, and had no great
central reserves of food. If he should sit down, like Palafox
at Saragossa, to make an obstinate defence behind improvised
works, he would be on the edge of starvation in less than three
weeks. But such a defence was impossible in face of the spirit
of the people, who looked upon Blakc as the author of all their
woes, regarded him as a tyrant as well as an imbecile, and were
as likely to rise against him 3S to turn their energies to resisting
the French. Palafox at Saragossa accomplished what he did
because the spirit of the citizens was with him: Blake was
despised as well us detested.
'When he recovered his composure he culled a council of war,
which voted almost unanimouslyl that the city was indefensible,
and that thc army must try to cut its way out on the north
side of the Guadalaviar. If the sally had been made on the 27th
it might have sueeeeded, fol' it was not till late on that day
tbat Suchet's arrangements for the blockade of the north bank
were complete. nut the investing line had been linked up
, Only l'tIiranda voted against a sortie, nnd thought that nothing could
be done, except to hold out tor a while in the wallll llnd then surrender.
Artcche, xi. p. 241.
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by the night of the 28th-29th, when Blake made his last stroke
(or safety. At six in the evening the field army issued from
the gate of St. Jose and began to cross the bridge opposite it,
the wcstctmllost of the three 01 which the Spaniards were ill
possession. This led not to the great chaussee to Saguntum
and Tortosa, which was known to have been cut and entrenched
by the enemy, but to the by-road to Liria and the mountains.
Lardizahal headed the march, Zayas [ollowed, escorting the
artillery and a cOllsiderttblc train, Miranda brought up the rear,
Charles O'DOllllCIl was ldt to mun the walls with the urban
guards and the' Heserve Division,' and was given permission to
capitulate whenever he should be attacked.
Lnrdizabal's vanguard, under a Colonel Michelena, swerved
from the Liria road soon after passing the Guadalaviar, in order
to avoid French posts, and successfully got as fur us the callal
of !\Iestalla before it was discovered or checked. The canal
was too broad to be passed by means of some beams and planks
which had been brought up. But l\lichelcna got his men across,
partly by fording and partly o\'er a mill-dam, and presently
got tathe village of Burjasort, wherc the artillery of Palombini's
division were quartered. These troops, surprised in the dark,
could not stop him, and he pushed on through them and
escaped to the hills with his little force-onc squadron, one
battalion, and some companies of Cazadorcs-some 500 or
000 men 1. Lardizo.bo.l, who should have followed him without
delay, halted at the canal, trying to build a bridge, till the
French all alollg the line were alarmed by the firing at llurjasort
and began to press in upon him. He opened fire instead of
pushing on at all costs, and presently found himself opposed by
forces of growing strength. Blake thereupon made up his mind
that the sany had failed, and ga....e orders for the whole column
to turn back and rc-enter Valencia. It seems probable that
at least n great part of the army might hllve got away, if an
uttempt had becn made to push on in Michelena's wake, fot
the blockading linc was thin herc, and only onc Frcneh regiment
seems to have bcen engagcd in ehcckiug Lardizabal's cxit.
, Not 5,000 as Nnpier (probably by (l. misprint) sllys on puge 31 or his
4th vol. I\ppnrently n misllrint in the origin,,] edition has been copied in
011 the later rourteen I
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Be this as it may, the sortie hud failed, and Blake was faced
by complete ruin, being drhren back with a disheartened army
into [I,. eity incapable of dclenec ftgainst a regular siege, and
short of. provisions. Next morning the despair of the garrison
was shown by the arrival of many deserters in the French
camp. The inevitable cnd was delayed for onl)' eleven days
more. On January 1, most of the siege-guns having been
brought across the GuadnJaviar, Suehetopcned trenches against
two fronts of the entrenched camp, the fort of Monte Oliveto
and the southern point of the suburb of San Vincente, both
salient angles capablc of being bll.ttcred from both flanks.
Seven batteries were built opposite them by January 4th, and
the advanced works in front were pushed up to within fifty
yards of the Spanish works. Thereupon Biake, befOIC the
siege-guns had actually opened, abandoned the whole of his
entrenched camp on the next day, without any attempt at
defence. The French discovering the evacuation, entered, and
found eighty-one guns spiked in the batteries, and a considerable
quantity of munitions. ~
Blake was now shut up in the narrow space of the city, whose
waJls were very unsuited for defence, and were easily approach-
able in many places under shelter of houses left undemolished,
which gave cover only fifty yards from the ramparts. For no
attempt had been made to clear a free space round the inner
elWet1lle, in case the outer circuit of the camp should be lost.
While fresh batteries were being built in the newl)'-eaptured
ground, to breach the city wall, Suchet set all the mortars in his
original works to throw bombs into Valencia. He gathered
that the population was demoralized and probably the garrison
also, and thought that a general bombardment of the place
might bring about a surrender without further trouble. About
a thousand shclls wcrc dropped into the city within twenty·
four hours, and Suehet then (January 6th) sent a parlementaire
to invite Blake to capitulate. The Captain-General replied
magniloquently that' although yesterday morning he might
have consented to treat for terms allowing his army to quit
Valencia, in order to spare the inhabitants the horrors of
a bomhttrdment, now, after a day's firing, he had learnt that he
could rcly on the lllngnanimity and resignation of the people.
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'fhe Marshal might continue his operations if he pleased, and
would bear the responsibility for so maltreating the place.'
As n matter of fact the bombardment had been very effective,
numerous non-comootants had perished, and the spirit of the
population was broken. :Many openly pressed for a surrender,
and only a few fanatical monks went round the streets exhorting
the citizens to resistance. The bombardment continued on the
7th and Sth, and at the same time Suchct pushed approaches
close to the walls, and in several places set his miners to work to
tunnel under them. Actual assault was never necessary, for on
the 8th Blakc held a cowlcil of war, which voted for entering into
negotiation with the enemy. The report of this meeting sets
forth that' it had taken into consideration the sufrerings of the
people under these days of bombardment; the cry of the
populace was that an end must be put to its misery; it was
impossible to prolong thc defcnee with any profit, wiLhout
exposing the city to the horrors of an assault, in which the
besiegers would probably succeed, considering the depressed
condition of the garrison, and the feebleness of the walls. The
citizens had not only faik'<1 to aid in the defellce aod to second
the efforts of the regular troops, but were panic-stricken and
demanded a surrender. The army itselr did not seem disposed
to do its duty, and after hearing thc evidence of the commanders
of different corps, the council decided in favour of negotiating
to get honourable terms. If these were refused it might be
necessary to continue a hopeless defence and die honourably
among the ruins of Valencia 1.'
It is probable that Blake would really have accepted any
terms offered him as 'honourable,' for he assented to all that
Suehet dictated to him. A feeble attempt to stipulate for
a free departure for the field army, on condition that the city
and all its armaments and resources were handed over intact,
met with the ClIl't refusal that it deserved. A simple capitula·
tion with the honours of war was grunted: onc clause, however,
was looked upon by Blake as somewhat of a. concession, though
it really was entirely to Suchet's benefit. He offered to grant
an exchange to so many of the garrison as should be equivalent
1 See the long prods verbal of the Council's proceedings trallslated in
Bclmas, h'. pp. 203-6.
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man for man, to French prisoners from the dep6~<; in Majorca
and Cabrcra, where thc unCortunate remnants oC Dupont's army
werc still in confincment. As this was not conceded by the
Spanish goverument, the clause had no real dieet in mitigating
the rate of Blake's armyl. Other clauses in the capitulation
declared that private property should be respected, and that
no inquiry should be made after the surrender into the past
conduct of persons who had taken an active part in the revolu-
lion of 1808, or the subsequent derence of the kingdom or
Valencia: also that such civilians as chose might have three
months in which to transport themselves, their families, and
their goods to such destination as they pleased. These clauses,
as we shall see, were violated by Suehet with the most shock-
ing callousness and shamcless want or respect ror his written
word.
On January 9 tile citadel and the gate adjaecnt were handed
over to thc Frcneh; Blakc (at his own request) was scnt away
straight to France, and did not remain to take part in the
formal surrender of his troops and of the city. It would seem
that he could not faee the rage or the Valencians, and was only
anxious to avoid even twenty-rour hours of sojourn among
them alter the disaster. Napoleon alCected to regard him as
a traitor, though he had never done even a moment's homage
to Joseph Bonaparte in 1808, and shut him up in close cap-
tivity in the donjon or Yiucclllles, whcre he remained. very
uncomfortably lodged till the events of April 1814 set him
free 2.
The total number or prisoners yielded up by Valencia was
16,270 regular troops, of whom some 1,500 were siek or wounded
in the hospitals. The urban guards and armed peasants, who
1 'fhe propo~l\l of exchange came IIrst to Mllhy lit AliCllntc; he culled
n council of genemls, which resolved that the release of so many Freneh
would profit Suehct ovemlUeh, because many of them had been imprisoned
ILt Alicante and Cnrtagena, and had worked on the fortifications there.
They eould give the l\Iurslml vl\hmhle information, which he had better
be denied. The proposal must therefore be sent on to the Regency at
Cndiz. That government, after muell debate, refused to ratify the proposal,
con~idcring it more profitable to the enemy than to themselves.
• Some notes aoout his captivity may be found iUlhe Mblwire8 of BarQ"
Rolli, the would-be deliverer of King Ferdinand, who was shut up in
another tower of the canle.
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were supposed to be civilians (.'O\'cred by the amnesty article ill
the capitulation, are not counted in the total. The regulars
marched out of the Serranos gate on January 10, and alter
laying down their arms and colours were sent prisoners to
France, marching in two columns, under the escort of Pan-
nctier's brigade, to Saragossa. Twenty-onc colours and no
less than 374 cannon (mostly heavy guns in the defences) were
given over, as also a very large store 01 ammunition llnd
military effects, but very little food, which was already begin-
ning to fail in the city when Blakc surrendered.
1'0 prevent unlicensed plunder Suchet did not allow his own
troops to enter Valencia till January 14th, giving' the civil
lwthorities {our days in which to make preparations for the
coming in of the new regime. Hc was better received than
might have been expected-apparently Blake's maladroit dic-
tatorship had thoroughly disgusted the people. Many of the
magistrates bowed to the conqueror and took the oath of homage
to King Joseph, and the aged archbishop emerged from the
village where he had hidden himself 101' some time, and' showed
himself animated by an excellent spirit' according to the
Marshal's dispatch.
Thil> prompt and tame submission did not save Valencia
lrom dreadful trcatmcnt at the victor's hands. Not only did
he levy on the city and district a vast fine ~f 53,000,000 francs
(ovcr £2,120,000), of which 8,000,000 were scnt to Madrid and
the rest devoted to the profit of the Army of Aragon, but he
proceeded to curry out a series 01 atrocities, whieh have been
so little spoken of by historians that it would be difficult to
Credit them, if they were not avowed with pride in his own
dispatches to Berthier and Napoleon.
The second article of Blakc'!> eapitulutioll, already cited above,
had granted a complete amnesty for past actions on the part
of the Valcneilllls-' 11 IIC sera faiteaueunc recherche pour le
passe contre ceux qui auraient pris une part :\ctive a la guerre
Oll a la revolution,' to quote the exact I:.crm. In his dispatch
of January 12 to Berthier, Suchet is shameless enough to
write: 'I have disarmed the local militia: all guilty chiefs will
be arrested, and all assassins punished; for in CQ1l8f:TIting (0
Article 11 of the Capitulation my ollly aim- was to get tlu. matter
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over quickly 1.' 'Guilty ehieCs ' turned out to mean all civilians
who had taken a prominent part in the defence of Valencia:
, assassins' was interpreted to cover guerrilleros of all sorts,
not (as might perhaps have been expected) merely those
persons who had taken part in the bloody riots against the
Freneh commercial community in 1808 2• In his second
dispatch of January 17 Suchet procceds to cxplain that hc
has arrested 480 persons as 'suspects,' that a large number of
gucrrillcro leaders havc bcen found among thcm, who have
been sent to the citadel and havc been already shot, or will be
in n few days. He has also arrested evcry monk in Valencia j
500 have bcen sent prisoners to France: five of the most guilty,
convicted of having carried round the streets a so-called' banner
of thc faith,' and of having preached against capitulation, and
excited the people to resistance, have been already executed.
Inquiries were still in progress. The;y resulted in thc shooting
of two more friars 3. But the most astonishing clause in the
dispatch is that' all those who took part in the murders of the
French [in 1808] will be sought out and Jmnished. Already
six hundred have becn executed by the firmness of the Spanish
judge Marcscot, whom I am expecting soon to meet 4.' It was
a trifling addition to the catalogue of Suchet's doings that
350 students of the university, who had volunteered to aid the
regular artillery during the late siege, had all been arrested llnd
sent off to France like the monks. Two hundred sick or footsore
prisoners who straggled from the marching column directed on
Teruel and Saragossa are said to have been shot by the wayside~.
It is probable that innumerable prisoners werc put to death in
cold blood after the capitulation of Valencia, in spite of Suehet's
guarantee that' no research should be made as to the past.'
or this Nupicr says no word', though hc quotes other purts
of Suehet's dispatches, and praises him for his' vigorous and
prudent' conduct, and his' care not to offend the citizens by
violating thcir customs or shocking thcir religious feelings.'
, Sce the dispatches printed in full in Dehnas, Appendix, vol. iv, pp. 218-
20, and 226-7 of 11i8 great work.
'For whieh sec vol. i. p. M.
o The names of all seven friars are given by Toreno and Schepeler.
• Can the frigllt1U! figure of 600 be a mistake for GO?
• Sce Toreno, iii. p. 28. 0 See his pages, iv. 83.
SECTION XXX: CHAPTER IV
SUCHET'S CONQUEST OF VALENCIA: SIDE· ISSUES AND
CONSEQU&''1CES. JANUARY-MARCH 1812
WHEN once Suchet's !ong-deIerrcd movements began, on
December 26, 1812, his operations were so rapid and successful
that the whole campaign was finished in fourteen days. The
unexpected swiftness of his triumph had the result of rendering
unnecessary the subsidiary operations which Napoleon had
directed the Armies of Portugal, the Centre, and Andalusia, to
carry out.
D'Armagnac, with his 3,000 men of the Army of the Centre,
still lay at Cucnea when Suchct's advance began, hindered
ITom further movement by the badness of the roads and the
weather. Opposite him were lying Bassccourt's small force at
Rcquefia-not 2,000 men-and the larger detaehmcnt of the
Murcian army under Frcire, which Blake had originally in-
tcnded to draw down to join his main body. This seems to
have consisted of some 4,000 foot and 1,000 horsc 1 about the
time oC the New Year.
Far more important was thc force undcr Montbrull, detached
Crom thc Army of Portugal, which had moved (all too tardily)
from La Mancha and the banks of the Tagus, by Napoleon's
orders. Assembled, as we have already shown 2, only on
December 29th, it had started from San Clemcntc on January 2
to march against Blake's rear by the route oC Almanza, the
only one practicable for nrtillery at midwinter. Thus the
expedition was only just getting under way when Suehet had
already beateD Blake and thrust him into Valencia. It con-
sisted of the infantry divisions of Fay and Sarrut, of the whole
of the light cavalry of the Army of Portugal, and of five batteries
• On February 1st Freire's in(llntry division, thongh it had suffered mueh
(rom desertion in the meanwhile, still numbered 3,aOO Illen present, llnd
11is cavalry 850 sabres. See tables in 1.06 Ejf:rcilos upmloles, pp. 149-50.
• Scc above, p. 56.
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of artillery, in all about 10,000 men. Of the succour which had
been promised from d'Armagllac's division, to raise the force
to the figures of 12,000 men, few if any came to hand 1.
l\[ontbrun marched with Sarrut and the cavalry by Albacete
and Chinchilla, leaving Fay as a rcscrve echelon, to follow by
slower stages and keep up the c01TImunication with La Mancha.
Between Chinchilla. and Almanza the advanced eavalry fell in
with Freirc's Spanish division, marching aeross its front. For
on the news of Suchet's passage of the Guadalaviar 011 Decem-
ber 26, Freire had moved southward from his position on the
C'\bricl river, with the intention of joining Mahy, and so of
building up a force strong enough to do something to succour
lllakeand the beleaguered garrison of Valencia. On January 6th
Montbrun's horse came upon one of Freire's detachments, dis-
persed it, and took some prisoners. But the greater part of the
Murcians succeeded in getting past, and in reaching Mahy at
Alicante (January 9th).
So cowed was the country-side by the disasters about
Valencia that Montbrun at Almanza succeeded in getting a
letter carried by oue or his stall to Valencia in two days 2. It
announced to Suchet his arrival on the rear of the Spanish
army, and his intention of pressing on eastward so ns to drive
away Freirc and lIIahy and completely cut oU the retreat of
llIake towards Murcia. But when the dispatch was received
Bhlke was already a prisoner, and his army had laid down its
arms on the preceding day. Suchct, therefore, wrote a reply
to Montbrun to thank him for his co-operation, to inform him
that it wns no longer necessary, and to advise him to return
m. quickly as possible toward the Army of Portugal and the
Tagus, where his presence was now much more needed than on
the eoast of the Mediterranean. The Army of Aragon was
strong enough to deal in due course with Malay and Freire, and
to take Alicante.
Montbrun, however, refused to accept this advice. He was
1 Acoording to Joseph's letter to Montbrun (Corres]JQndence of King
Joseph, viii. p. 294) a battalion or two may have joined Montbrun, ns lie
tells thllL genernl that he is glnd to know th"t the troops of hi~ army have
given satisfaction.
• Suehet, Mtnwires, ii. p. 2340, for dates.
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probably, as his chief Marmont remarks, desirous or dis-
tinguishing himself by carrying out somc brilliant entcrprise
as an independent commander 1. Knowing that Mahy's and
Frcirc's troops wcrc in a very demoralized condition, and
underrating the strength of the fortress of Alieante, he resolved
to march against that place, which he thought would make
little or no resistance. Accordingly he called forward Foy to
Albaecte nnd Chinchilla, left the main part of his guns in his
charge, and marched on Alicante with the cavalry and Sarrnt's
division, having only onc battery of horse artillery with him.
At the news of his approach Mahy, who had been at Aleoy
since he abandoned the line of thc Xuear on December 27th,
retired into Alieante with Creagh's and Obispo's infantry.
Bassecourt also joined him there, while Freire with his own
column, ViIlaeampa's division, and nU the i\Iureian and Vnlcn-
cian cavalry, occupied Elche and other places in the neighbour-
hood. Over 6,000 regular infantry were within the walls of
Alieantc by January 15th. Montbrun 011 the foUowing day
drove Freire out of Elehe westward, and presented himself in
front of the new fortification of Alieante, which had been much
improved during the last year, and ineluded a new line of
bastioned wall outside the old mediaeval enceinte and the rocky
citadel. It is probable that Montbrun had no knowledge of
the recent improvements to the fortress, and relied on old
reports of its weakness. After advancing into the suburbs,
and throwing a few useless shells into the place, whose artillery
returned a heavy fire, he retreated by Elehe and Hcllin to
Albacete~. As he went he laid wustc the country-side in the
most reckless fashion, and raised heavy requisitions of money
in Elchc, Ucllin, and other places. This invohred him in an
angry correspondence with Suehet, who insisted that no
co~nmulldcr but himself had u right to extort contributions in
the region that fell into his sphere of operations.
l Marmont accuses Montbnm exactly as Napoleon accuses Marmont!
• On his first appearancc he sent to summon Alieante, and received the
proper negative answer. But Schepeler. who was in the place, says that
the governor, General de In erlll'" 6howcd signs of yielding. l<'ortunntely
the other generals did not. It would have been nbsunJ to treat seriollsly
a force of 4,000 infantry and ],500 horse with only six light guns!
(Schepeler, p. 520.)
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Montbrun's raid was clearly tl misguided operation. Alicantc
was far too strong to be taken by escalade, whcn it was properly
garrisoned: the only chance was that the ga.rrison might
flinch. They refused to do so, and the French general was left
in an absurd position, demonstrating without siegc~guns against.
It regular fortress. His action had two iII·effccts-thc first
was that it concluded the Vnlcncilln campaign with a fiasco
-a definite repulse which put heart into thc Spaniards. The
second (and more important) was that it separated him from
rtlarmont and the Army of Portugal for ten days longer than
was necessary. His chief had gi \'ell him orders to be hack on the
Tagus by the 15th-20th of January, as his absence left the muin
body too weak. Owing to his late start he would in any case
have overpassed these dates, even if he had started baek from
Almtlnza on Junuary 13th, after rc<.:dvillg the news of the fall
of Valencia. But by devoting nine days to an advance from
Almanza to Alicante and then a retreat from Alicante to
Albaeete, he deferred his return to Castile by that space of time.
He only rcached Toledo on January 31st with his main column.
}~oy's division, sent on ll.hend, arrivcd there on the 29th.
~rontbrull's last marches were cxecuted with wild specd, for
he had received on the way letters of the most alarming kind
from Marmont, informing him that Wellington had crossed
the Agucda with his whole army and laid siegc to Ciudad
Rodrigo. The Army of Portugal must concentrate without
delay. But by the time that Montbnm reached Toledo, Rodrigo
had already been twelve days in the hands or the British
general, and further haste was uselcss. The troops were
absolutely worn out, and received with relief the order to halt
and wait further directions, since they were too late to save the
fallen fortress. It is fair to Montbrun to remark that, even if
hc had never made his raid on Alicante. he would still have
been unable to help his chief. If he had turned baek from
Almallza 011 January 13th, he would have been at Toledo only
on the 22nd-and that city is nearly 200 miles by road from
Ciudad Uodrigo, which had fallen on the 19th. 'fhe disaster
on the Agueda was attributable not to 1\fontbrun's presump·
tnous action, but to the Emperor's orders that the Army of
Portugal should make a great detachment for the Valencian
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campaign. Even it the raiding column bad started earlier, as
Napoleon intended, it could not have turned back till it goL
news of the capitulation of Blake, which only took place on
January 8tb. And whatever might then have been jts exact
position, it could not have been back ill time to join l\Iarmont
in checking the operations of Wellington, which (as wc have
already stated) came to a successful cnd on January 19th.
Wherefore, though Montbrun must receive blame, the responsi-
bility for the fall of Itodrigo lay neither with him nor with
Murmont, but with their great maskr.
Another diversion made by Napoleon's orders for the purpose
of aiding Suchet was quite as Cutile-though less trom the fault
of the original direction, and more from an unforeseen set of
circumstances. Like l\farmont and King J oseph, Soult had
also been ordered to lend 5uchct assistance against Valencia,
by demonstrating from thc sidc ol Granada against Mureia and
its army. This order, issued apparently about November 19,
1811 1, and repeated on December 6th, reached the Duke ol
Dalmatia just when he had assembled all his disposable field-
forces for the siege of Tarila, an operation where preparations
began on December 8th and which did not end till January 5th.
Having concentrated 13,000 men in the extreme southern point
of his viceroyalty, Soult had not a battalion to spare for a sally
from its extreme eastern point. He could not give up a great
enterprise already begun; and it was only whcn it had failed,
and the troops from Tarifa were returning-in a sufficiently
melancholy plight-that 50\ut could do anything. But by this
time it was too late to help Suehet, who had finished his business
without requiring assistance from without.
Whether Soult was already aware of the surrender of Valencia
or not, when January 20th hud arrivcd, he had beforc that day
issued orders to his brother, the cavalry general, Pierre Soult,
to take the light horse of the 4th Corps from Granada, and to
execute with them a raid against Mureia, with the object or
drawing off the attention of any Spanish troops left in that
direction from Suchet. The Gcncral, with about 800 sabres,
I It is alluded to in a dispatch or the Emperor to Derthier on that day.
'Ledue de Dalmatie a I'ordre d'envo)'er llne eolonne en Mureie pour f!lire
une divezsion.' St. Cloud, Nov. 19.
J{;f.ar;./ud ck-r!",t_, {j)uJu_ of..J1..Lln,/c-ru-,
f-m, dU,t0'rlffui, hp Bjuuj~
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pushing on by Velez Rubio and Lorca, arrived before the gates
of Mureia quite unopposed on Ja.nuary 25th. Frcirc had left
no troops whAtever to watch the borders of Granada, and had
drawn oU everything, save the garrison of Cartagena, toward
the Valencian frontiers. Pierre Soult summoned the defenceless
city, received its surrender, and imposed on it a rallsom of
60,000 dollars. He entered next day, and established himself
in the archbishop's pnlnee; having neither met nor heard of
any enemy he was quite at his ease, and was sitting down to
dine, when a wild rush of Spanish cavalry came sweeping down
the street and cutting up his dispersed and dismounted troopers.
This was General Martin La Carrera, whose brigade was the
nearest force to Mureia when Soult arrived. Hearing that the
French were guarding themselves ill, he had resolved to attempt
a surprise, and, dividing his 800 men into three columns, assailed
Murein by threc different gates. JUs own detachment cut its
way in witl; success, did much darnage, and nearly captured the
French general. But neither of the other parties showed such
resolution; they got bickering with the French at the entries of
the city, failed to push home, and finally retired with small loss.
The gallant and unfortunate La Canera, charging up and down
the streets in vain search for his reinforcements, was finally
surrounded by superior numbers, and died fighting gal1antly.
His enterprise warned Soult that Span.ish troops were collect·
ing in front of him, and indeed Villaeampa's infantry was not
far off. Wherefore he evacuated J\Iureia next day, after raising
so much of the contribution as he could, and plundering many
private houses. The Spaniards reoccupied the place, and
Joseph O'Donnell, now placed in command of the l\furcian
army in succession to Mahy, gave La Cancra's corpse a splendid
funeral. Soult retreated hastily to the Granadan frontier,
pillaging Alcantarilla and Lorca by the way. This was the
only part taken by the French Army of Andalusia in the
January campaign of 1812. The siege of Tarifa had absorbed
all its energies.
l\fontbrun's and Pierre Soult's enterprises had little effect on
the general course of events in eastern Spain. It was Suchet's
own operations which, in the estimation of every observer from
the Emperor downwards, were to be considered decisive.
o
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When Valencia had fallcn, every OllC on the French side supposed
that the war was practically at an cnd in this region, and that
the dispersion of the remnants of Mahy's and Frcirc's troops
and the capture of Peniscola, Alicante, and Cartagena,-the
three fortresses still in Spanish hands,-wcrc mcre matters or
detail. No onc could have foreseen that the region south of
the Xuear was destined to remain permanently in the hunds or
the patriots, and that Suchet's occupation of Valencia was
to lust lor no morc than eighteen months. Two causes, neither
of them depending on Suchet's own responsibility, were destined
to save the kingdom or Murcia and the southern region of
Valencia from conquest. The first was Napoleon's redistribution
oC his troops in eastern Spain, consequent 011 the approach of
his war with Russia. The second was the sudden victorious
onslaught of Wellington on the French in the western parts of
the Peninsula. How the former of these causes worked must
at once bc shown-the cIfed of the latter cause did lIot become
e\;dent till a little later.
01 the 33,000 men with whom Suchet hud conquered Valencia
and captured Blake, no less than 13,000 under Reille had been
lent him Irom the Army of the North, und were under ordcrs
to return to the Ebro as soon as possible. Indeed, till they
should get back, Aragon, very insufficiently garrisoned by
Caffarelli's division, was out of hand, and almost as much in
the power of the Empecinado, Dum.n, and l\Iontijo, as of the
French. Moreover, so long as Caffarelli was at Saragossa, and
his troops dispersed in the surrounding region, both Navnrre nnd
Old Castile were undermanned, and the Army of the North was
reduced to little more than Dorsenne's two divisions of the
Young Guard. To secure the troops lor thc great push against
Valencia, SO many divisions had shifted eastward, that .Marmont
and Dorscnne between them had, as the Emperor must have
seen, barely troops enough in hand to maintain their position,
if Wellington should make some unexpected move-though
Napoleon had persuaded himself that such a move was im-
probable. In spite of this, he was anxious to draw back Reille's
and eaf(arelli's, no less than l\1ontbrun's, mcn to morc ccntral
positions.
But this was not all: in Deccmber the Emperor's dispatches
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begin to show that he regarded war with Russia in the spring of
1812 as decidedly probable, and that lor this reason he was
about to withdraw all the Imperial Guard from Spain. On
December 15th a note to Derthier ordered all the light and
heavy cavalry of the Guard-chasseurs, grenadiers a cheval,
dragoons, Polish lancers-to be brought home, as also its horse
artillery and the gendarmes d'elite. All these were serving in
the Army of the North, Md formed the best part of its mounted
troops. This was but a trifling preliminary warning of his
intentions: on January 14, 1812-the results of the Valencian
cmnpaign bcing still wllmown-hedireetcdDerthicr to withdraw
from Spain the whole of the Infantry of the Guard and the
whole of the Polish regimcnts in Spain. Tbis was an order
of wide-spreading importance, and created large gaps in the
muster-rolls of Suehet, Soult, and Dorsenne. Suchet's Poles
(three regiments of the Legion of the Vistula, nearly 6,000
men, including the detachments left in Aragon) formed a. most
important part of the 3rd Corps. Soult had the 4th, 6th, and
9th Polish regiments and the Lancers, who had done such
good service at Albuera. a total of another 6,000 men. But
Dorsenne was to be the greatest sufferer-he had in tbe Army
of the North not only the 4th of the Vistula,some 1,500 bayonets,
but the whole of the infantry of the Young Guard, the two
divisions of Roguet and Dumoustier, twenty-two battalions
over 14,000 strong. The dispatch of January 14 directed that
Suehet should send off his battalions of the Legion' immediately
after the fall of Valencia.' Soult was to draft away his Poles
'within twenty-four hours after the fCl.'cipt of the order.'
Dorsenne, of course, could not begin to send off the Guard
Divisions of infantry till the troops lent from the Army of
the North (Reille and Caffarelli) were freed from the duties
imposed on them by the Valeneian expedition. A supple-
mentary order of JanUltry 27th told him that he might keep
them for some time longer if the English took the offensive-
news of Wellington's march on Rodrigo was just coming to
hand. 'Le desil',' says the Emperor, 'que j'ai d'avoir ma Garde
n'est pas tellement pressant qu'il faille la rellvoyer avant que
les aHaires aicnt pris une situation nouvelle dans le Nord 1:
1 Napoleon to Berthier. Paris, Jan, 2'1, 1812.
G'
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As n matter of fact some Guard-btigndes did not get ofl till
March, though by dint of rapid transport, whcn they had once
passed the Pyrenees, they sh'uggled to the front in time to take
part in the opening of the great Russian campaign in June.
The fourth brigade, eight battalions under Dumollsticr, did not
get away till the autumn was over.
'l'hus the Emperor had marked off ahout 27,000 good veteran
troops for removal from the Peninsula, with the intention of
using them in the oncoming Russian war. 'fhe Army of the
North was to lose the hest oC its divisious-those of the South
and of Aragon vcry heavy detachments. ~othing was to come
in return, Su.vc a few drurts and uaiaillu1ls de 11IarcJU! which
were lying at Bayonne. The Emperor in his dispatch makes
some curious self-justificatory rcmarks, to the effect that
he should leave the Army of Spain stronger than it had been
in the summer of 1811; for while he was withdrawing thirty-
six battalions, he had sent into the Peninsula, sinee June last,
forty-two battalions under Reille, Carrarelli, and Severoli. This
was truc enough: but if the total strength of the troops now
dedicated to Spain was not less than it had been in June
1811, it was left weaker by 27,000 men than it had been ill
December 1811.
Now Suchet, when deprived or Rcille's aid, and at the same
time directed to send back to France his six Polish battalions,
was left with a very inadequate force in Valencia-not much
more than hall what he had at his disposition on January 1.
It would seem that the Emperor overrated the errect of the
capture or Blake and the destruction of his army. At any
rate, in his dispatches to Suehet, he seemed to consider that
the whole business in thc East was practically completed by
the triumph at the New Year. The Marshal was directed' to
push an advanced guard towards Murcin, and put himseIr ill
communication with the 4th Corps-the eastern wing or
SouIt's army~whieh would be found at Lorca I,' But the
operations of the troops of the Army or Andalusia in this
quarter were limited to the appearance for two days at :Murcia
or Pierre Soult's small cavalry raid, o[ which Suebet got' no
news till it was passed and gone. He was left entirely to his
1 See Suchet's lI1tmoiu$, H. pp. 287-8.
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own resources, uud these were too small for any further advance:
the Emperor not only took away both ReilJe and the Poles, but
sent, 1\ few d~ys later, orders that Palombini's Italian dh'ision,
reduced by now to 3,000 men by its heavy casualties on
December 26th, should be sent into southern .'1ragon ngainst
Duran and Montijo. The departure ofPalombini (February 15th)
left Suchet with less than 15,000 men in hand. It must be
remembered that thc conqucst of a Spanish province always
meant, for the French, the setting aside of a large immobilized
garrison, to hold it down, unless it were to be permitted to drop
back into insurrection. It was clear that with the bulk of the
kingdom of Valencia to garrison, not to speak of the siege of
the still intact fortress of Peniscola, Suchet would have an
infinitesimal field-force left for the final move that would be
needed, il Mahy and Frcire were to be crushed, and AIicallte
and Cartagena-both strong placcs-to bc beleaguered. _.
The Marshal had by thc last wcck in January pushed
Harispe's division to Xativa, beyond the Xucar, and Habert's
to Gnndia near the sen-coast. These 9,000 men were nil his
disposable loree for a further advance: Valencia had to be
garrisoned j Musnier's division had gone north, to cover the
high-road as far us Tortosu and the Ebro; some of the IWiuns
were scnt to besiege Peniscola. Suchet might, no doubt, have
pushed Habert and Harispe further forward towards AIicante,
but he had many reasons lor not doing so. That lortress had bcen
praycd-by l\lontbrun's raid-to be in a posture of defence:
besides its garrison there were otherSpanish troops in arms in the
ncighbourhood. To the forces of 'Freire, Obispo. ViIlacampa, and
Bassecourt, there was added the newly-formed brigade of
General Roche, an Irish offieer lent by the British govcrnment
to the Spaniards, who had been drilling and disciplining the
cadra<; of the battalions handed over to him 1, till they were in
t\ better condition than most of the other troops 011 this eoast.
The muster-rolls of the' united 2nd and 3rd armies,' as these
remnants were now officially styled, showed, on February I,
1812, 14,000 men present, not including Villucampa's division,
I The6e were ChiJ1Chill", 2nd or Murciu, lllld u new locally misc<llmttnlion
called 2nd of Alicante. He was in March handed over alS(l Canarias, Durgos,
aDd Ligero de AragoD, which had belollged to rrreirc till that date.
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which was moving off to its old haunts in Arngon. By March 1
this figure had risen to 18,000, many deserters who had gonc
homc alter the fall of Valencia. having tardily rcjoined the ranks
of their battalions. Over 2,000 cavalry were included in the
toW-for nearly the whole of Blakc's squadrons had escaped
(not too gloriously) after the disastrous combats on Decem-
ber 26, 1812.
If Suchet, therefore, had moved forward with a few thousand
men at the end of January, he would have risked something,
despite of the depressed morale of his enemies. But in addition
there wns vexatious news from Catalonia, which presently
caused the sending of part of Musnier's division beyond thc
Ebro, and it was reported (only too correctly) that the yellow
fever had broken out with renewed violence at Murcia and
Cartagena. An advance into the infected district might be
hazardous. But most of all was any further initiative dis-
couraged by the consideration that no help could be expected
from Marmont or Soult. By the cnd o[ January Suehet was
aware of ·Wellington's invasion of Leon, and of the siege of
Ciudad Rodrigo. Not only did tltis movc absorb all thc atten·
tion of Marmont, Dorsenne, and King Joseph, but Soult was
convinced that it boded evil for him also, and that a new
attack on Badajoz was imminent. Hill's manamvres in
Estremudura (of which more elsewhere) attracted all his
attention, and he let it be known that he had ncithcr the
wish nor the power to send expeditions eastward, to eo~operate
against Murein. Last, but most conclusive, of all Suchct's
hindrances was a grave attack of illness, which threw him on
a iJcd of sickness early in February, and caused him to solicit
permission to return to France for his convalescence. 'l'he
Emperor (with many flattering words) refused tltis lcave, and
sent two of his body physicians to Valencia to treat the lIfarshal's
ailment. Dut it was two months before Suehet was able to
mount his horse. and put himselI at the head o[ his arm)'.
From February to the beginning of April operations were
necessarily suspended for the Army of Aragon. since its chief
was not one of those who gladly hand over responsibility and
the power of initiative to his subordinates.
Hencc therc was a long gap in the story of the war in south-
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eastern Spain from January to April 1812. The only events
requiring notice during that period were the occupation by the
French of Dcnia and Pelliscola. The former, a little port on
the projecting headland south of Valencia, was furnished with
fortifications newly repaired during Blake's regime, and had
been an important centre of distribution for stores and muni~
tions of war, after the Spaniards lost the Grao of Valencia in
November, sincc it was the nearest harbour to their positions
along the Guadalaviar. In the gcncral panic after Blake's
surrender MaIly WitllrlreW its garrison, but forgot to order the
removal of its magazines. Harispe seized Denia on January 20,
and found sixty guns mounted on its walls, and forty small
merchant vessels, some of them laden with stores, in its port.
He garrisoned the place, and fitted out some of the vessels as
privateers. ]orahy's carelessness in abandoning these resources
was onc of the reasons which contributed most to his removal
from command by the Cadiz Regency. It was indeed a gross
piece of neglect, for at least the guns might have been destroyed,
and the ships brought round to Alieante.
The story of Peniscola, however, WtU; far more disgraceful.
This fortress sometimes called' the little Gibraltar' from its
impregnable situation-it is a towering rock connected with
the mainland by a narrow sand~spit 250 yards long-was one
of the strongest places in all Spain. It had appeared so im-
pregnable to Suchet, that, on his southward march from Tortosa
to Valencia, he had merely masked it, and made no attempt to
meddle with it 1. Peniscolu. had suffered no molestation, and
was regularly revictualled by Spanish and British coasting
vessels Irom Alicante, Cartagena, and the Balearic Isles. The
governor, Garcia Navarro, was an officer who had an excellent
reputation for personal courage-taken prisoner at Falset in
1811 ~ he had succeeded in escaping from a French prison and
had reported himself again for further service. The garrison of
1,000 men was adequate for such a small place, and was cam·
posed of veteran troops. In directing it to be formally be·
lcaguercd after the fall of Valencia, Suchet seems to have relied
more on the general demoralization caused by the annihilation
of Blake's army than on the strength of his means of attack.
, See floove, p. a. • See \'01. Hi. pp.50a-4.
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On January 20th hc ordercd Scveroli with two Italian and two
1,'rench battalions to press the place as far as was possible, and
assigned to him part of the siege-train that had been uscd at
Saguntum. The trenches, on the high ground of the mainland
nearest the place, were opened on the 28th, and on the 31st the
besiegers began to sap downhill towards the isthmus, and to
erect five batteries on the best available points. But it was clear
that the fortress was most inaceessible,and that to reach its walls
across the low-lying sand-spit would be a very costly busincss.
Nevertheless, when a summons was sent in to tbe governor
on February 2nd, he surrendered at once, getting in return
terms of an unusually favourable kind-the men and officers
of the garrison were given leave either to depart to their homes
with all their personal property, or to enlist in the service of
King Joseph. This was a piece of mere treachery: Navarro
had made up his mind that the cause of Spain was ruined by
Blake's disaster, and had rcsolved to go over to the enemy, while
there were still good tcrms to be got for deserters. As Suchet
tells the story, the affnir went as follows. A small vessel, sailing
from Peniscola to Alicante, was taken by a privateer fittcd
ont by I-Iarispe at Denia. Among letters sei?-ed by the captors 1
was onc from the governor, expressing his disgust with his
situation, and in especial with the peremptory advice givcn him
by the English naval officers who were in charge of the rc-
victualling service and the communications. He wcnt on to say
that he would rather surrender PeniscoJa to the Frcneh than
let it be treated as a British dependency, whereupon the :Marshal
asked, and obtained. the surrender of the place. Nnpier expresses
a suspicion-probably a well-founded one-that the letter may
h::wc been really intended for Suehet's own eye, and that the
whole story was a piece of solemn deceit. •Such is thc Marshal's
account of the affair-but the colour which he thought it
necessary to give to a transaction so full of shamc to 1\0.\'31'1'0,
can only be considered as part of the price paid for Peniscola~.'
The mental attitude of the tl'aitor is sufficiently expressed by
I Suchet says that the captain of the boat threw his letters overboard
at the last moment, but that they floated and were picked up by the French.
Was this n farce? Or is the whole lItory doubtful?
• Nllpier, PCIlimmlllr War, iv. p. 38.
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a letter which reached Suchct along with the capitulation.
, I followed with zeal, with fury I may say, the side which I con-
sidered the just one. To-day I sce that to render Spain less
unhappy it is necessary for us all to unite under the King,
and I make my offer to serve him with the same enthusiasm.
Your excellency may be quite sure of me-I surrender a fortress
fully provisioned and capable of a long defence-which is the
best guarantee of the sincerity of my promise '.' .
The most astounding feature of the capitulation was that
Navalro got his officers to consent. to such a picce 01 open
treachery. If they had done their duty, thcy would have
arrested him,undsenthim a prisoncrtoAlicantc. Demoralization
and despair must have gone very far in this miserable garrison.
The capture of Peniscola was Sllchet's last success. He fell
sick not long alter, and when he once morc assumed the active
command of his troops in April, the whole situation of l.<rench
aflairs in Spain wos changed, and no further ad\'uncc was
possible. The results of Wellington's offensive operations in
the West had begun to make themselves felt.
IHeanwhile the remains of the Valencian and Murcian armies
were reorganizing themselves, with Alieante as their base and
centrul port of supply. Joscph Q'Donnell, though not a grent
generaJ, was at least no worse than BJake and Mahy-of whom
the former was certainly the most maladroit as well as the
most unlucky 01 commanders. while the latter had shown
himself too timid and resource1ess to play out the apparently
lost game that was left to his hand in January 1812. By March
there was once more an army in face of the French, and in
view of the sudden halt of the invaders and the cheerful news
from the 'Vest, hope was once more permissible. The main
body or Q'Donnell's army remained concentrated in front 01
Alicante, but ViJlacampa's division had gone oH early to
Arngon, to aid in the diversion againstSuchet's communicntiolls,
which was so constantly kept up by Duran and the Empccinado.
This was a good move: the weak point of the French occupation
was the impossibility of holding down broad mountain spaces,
in whieh small garrisons were useless und helpless, while heavy
eolumnscould notlive formore than a few days ou any given spot.
, Sec letter printed in Belmas, iv. p. 248.
SECTION XXXI
MINOR CAMPAIGNS OF THE WINTER
OF 1811-12
CHAFl'ER 1
CATALONIA AND ARAGON
THE chronicle of the obstinate and heroic defence made by
the Catalans, even after the falls of Tarragona and Figueras
had seemed to make all further resistance hopeless, was carried
in the last volume of this work down to October 28, 1811, when
Marshal Mncdonald, like St. eyr and Augcreau, was recalled
to Paris, having added no more to his reputation than had his I
predecessors while in charge of this mountainous principality.
Wc have seen how General Lacy, hoping against hope, rallied
the last remnants of the old Catalan army, and recommenced
(just !I.S Macdonald was departing) a series of small enterprises
against the scattered French garrisons. He. had won several
petty successes in evicting the enemy Crom Ccrvera, Igualada,
and Belpuig-the small strongholds which covered the main
line of communication east and west, through the centre of the
land, between LeridaandBarcelona. The enemy had even been
forced to evucuntc the holy mountuin of MonLsermt, the
strongest post on the whole line.
Hence when, in November, General Uecaen arrived to take
over Macdonald's task, he found before him a task not without
serious difficulties, though the actual force of Spaniards in the
field was far less than it had becn before the disasters at Tarra-
gona and Figueras. Lacy had a very small field army-he had
reorganized 8,000 men by October, and all through his com-
mand the total did not grow very much greater. When he
handed over his offiee to Copons fifteen months after, there
were no more than 14,000 men under arms, including cadres
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and recruits. On the other hand he had a central position,
a free range east and west, now that the line of Freneh posts
across Catalonia had been broken, and several points of more
or less safe access to the sea. Munitions and stores, and occa-
sionally very small reinforcements from the Balearic Isles, were
still brought over by the British squadron which ranged along
the coast. Some of the officers, especially the much tried and
never-desllairing Eroles, and the indefatigable Manso, were
thoroughly to be relied upon, and commanded great local
popularity. This Laey himself did not possess-he was obeyed
because of his stern resolve, but much disliked for his autocratic
and dictatorial ways, which kept him in constant friction with
the Junta that sat at Berga. Moreover he was a stranger, while
the Catalans disliked all lenders who were not of their own
blood: and he was strongly convinced that the brunt of the
fighting must be borne by the regular troops, while the popular
voice was all in favour of the somatcnes and guerrilleros, and
against the enforcement of conscription. Much ,vas to be said
on either side: the warfare of the irregulars was very harassing
to the French, and had led to many petty successes, and one
great one-the capture of Figueras. On the other hand these
levies were irresponsible and untrustworthy when any definite
operation was in hand: they might, or they might not, turn up
in force when they were required: the frank disregard of their
chiefs for punctuality or obedience drove to wild rage any
officer who had served in the old army. With regular troops it
was possible to calculate that a force would be where it was
wanted to be at a given time, and would at least attempt to
carry out its orders: with thc SOl1lotetles it was ulways possible,
nay probable, that some petty quarrel of rival chiefs, or some
rival attraction of an unforeseen sort, would lead to non-appear-
ance. To this there was the easy reply that ever since Blake
first tried to make thc Catalans work 'mililarmcnie and not
paisanmenie' thc regular army for some two years had never
gained a single battle, nor relieved a single fortrcss 1. The best
• Sce notes on discussions of this sort. in Sir Edward Codrington's
McmoiTII, i. pp. 264 !lnd 277. He had soon much or the evilM or hoth kim]~
or organization, and leaned on tile whole to tile irregulars, from a pensonal
dislike for Lacy.
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plan would probably have been to attempt to combine the
two systems: it was absolutely necessary to have a nucleus
of regular troops, but unwise to act like Blake and Lac)', who
tried to break up and discourage the somaiCll£s. in order that
they might be forced iuto the battalions of the standing army.
The constant series of defeats on record had been caused rather
by the unskilful and over-ambitious operations of the gencrnls
than by their insisting on keeping up the regular troops, who
hud behaved well enough on many occasions. But too much
had been asked of them when, halt-trained and badly led, they
were brought into collision with the veterans of France, without
the superiority of numbers which alone could make up for their
military faults.
Since the capture of Cervera, Belpuig, and Igualadain October,
the territories held by the French in CatalOllia fell into two
separate and divided sections. On the western side, adjacent
to Aragon, Frere's division, left behind by Suehet, garrisoned
Lerida, Tarragona, and Tortosa: though it was a powerful
force of over 7,000 men, it could do little more than occupy thesc
three large places, each requiring several battalions. At thc
best it could only furnish very small flying columns to keep
up the communication between them. It was hard to maintain
touch with the other group of French fortresses, along the sea-
coast road from Tarragona to Barcelona, which were often
obsessed by Spanish bands, and always liable to be molested
by FAwnrd Codrington's British ships, which sailed up and
down the shore looking lor detachmcnts or cOllvoys to shell.
The fort of the Col de Dalaguer, twenty miles north of Tortosa,
was the look-out point towards Tarragona und thc solc French
outpost in that direction.
In eastern Catalonia the newly-arrived commander, General
Deeacn (a veteran whose last work had been the hopeless
defence of Bourbon and Mauritius, where he had capitulated
in 1810), had some 24,000 men in hand. But he was much
hampered by the necessity for holding and feeding the immense
Barcelona, a turbulent city which absorbed a whole division
for its garrison. It was constantly on the edge of starvation,
and was only rcvictuallcd with great trouble by vcssels sailing
from the ports 01 Languedoc, oC which more than half were
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habitually captured by the British, or by heavy convoys
InbolU'ing across the hills Crom Gerona, which were always
harassed, and sometimes taken wholesale, by the Spanish
detachments told off by Lacy for this end. Geronaand Figueras,
both Cortresses oC considerable size, absorbed several battalions
each. Smaller garrisons had also to be kept in nosas, Hostalrieh,
l\(ataro, und Montlouis, and there were muny other fortiHed
posts which guarded roads or passes, and were worth holding.
It was with difficulty that 0,000 or 8,000 men could be collected
Cor a movable field·foree, even by borrowing detachments from
the garrisons. An additional nuisance cropped up just as
Dceuell took over the command: Lacy, seeing that the Pyre-
Ilean passes were thinly maimed, sent Eroles with 3,000 men
to raid the valleys of Cerdagne on the French side of the hills.
'fhe invaders beat two battalions of national guards near
Puigcerda, and swept far down the valley (October 29-Novem·
bel' 2), returning with thousands oC sheep and cattle and a large
money contribution levied from the villages. 'fIllS raid (which
cnrngcd Kapolcon 1) made it nccesso.ry to guard the P)'renees
better, and to send up more national guards Crom the frontier
department~.
Thus it came to pass that though Lacy had no more than
8,000 men ayailable, and no fortress of any strength to ser....c
as his base (CiLrdona and Seu d'Urgel. his sole strongholds, were
mcdiac\'al strongholds with no modern works), he paralysed
the French force which, between Lerida and l<'igueras, could
show morc than three times that strength. Such wns thc vnlue
of the central position, and the resolute hatred of the country-
sidc for its oppressors. Catalonia could only be held down by
garrisoning cvery village-und if the army oC occupation split
itself up into garrisons it was helpless. Hence, during the
winter of 1811-12 and the spring and summer of the following
yenr, it llmy be said that the initiative lay with the Catallltls.
and that the enemy (despite of his immensely superior numbers)
was on the defensive. The helplessness of the l"rench was
sufficiently shown by the fact that from June to December 18Il
Barcelona was completely cut off from communication with
, Who called the raid an 'insult '-Napoleon to Dcrthicr, Paris, Fell. 29,
]812, and compare letter of March 8.
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Gerono. and France. It was only in the latter month that
Decaen, hearing that the place was on the edge of starvation,
marched with the bulk. of LamHrquc's division from Uppcr
Catalonia to introduce a convoy; while 1\Iaurice :Mathieu, the
governor of Barcelona, came out with 3,000 men 01 the garrison
to meet him, as far as Cardadeu. Lacy, determined that
nothing short of a vigorous push by the enemy should make
their junction possible, and relieve Barcelona, offered opposition
in the dcfllc of the TrcntapllSsos, where Vives had tried to stop
St. eyr two years back, showing a front both to Decaen and to
l'tlathieu. But on recognizing the vcry superior numbers of the
enemy he wisely withdrew, or he would have been caught
between tlIe two French columns. Deenen therefore wns able to
enter Barcelona with his immense convoy. [December 3rd-4th,
181L] The Spn.niards retreated into the inland; their head-
quarters on the fIrst day of the New Year were at Vich.
There being no further profIt in pressiJlg Barcelona for the
time being, Lltcy, in January, resolved to turn his attention to
the much weaker garrison of Tarragona, which belonged to
Frerc's division and Suchet's arnl)', and was not under Dccaell's
immediate charge. Its communications with Lerida and Tor-
tosa were hazardous, and its stores were rUDuing low. The
Spanish general therefore (about January 2) sent down Eroles's
division to RellS, a few miles inlund from Tarragonu, witb ordcrs
to cut all the roads leading into that fortress. The place was
already in a parlous condition for want of food, and its governor
had sent representations to Suchet that he was in need of
instant succour. Therefore the moment that Valencia fell, the
:Marshal directed ?tIusnier, whose division he had told off to
hold the sea-coast between the Ebro and Guadalaviar, to march
with the bulk of his men to Tortosu, to piek up what reinforce-
ments he could from its garrison, and to open the road from
thence to Tnrragona.
Lafosse, the governor of Tortosa, was so impressed with the
danger of his colleAgue in Tnrragona, that he marched ahead
along the coast-road before Musnier arrived, and reached the
Col de Balaguer with a batta.lion of the 121st regiment and
onc troop of dragoons 011 Junuary 18. Here he should havc
waited for the main column, but receiving false news that
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Eroles had left. Reus and returned t.o t.he north, he resolved
to push on ahead und clear t.he wny for l\1usnier. believing that.
not.hing but. local somate'les were in front. of him. He had
reached ViIlascca, only seven miles from 'l'arragona, when he
was suddenly surprised by Eroles descending on his flank wit.h
over 3.000 men. He himself galloped on wit.h the dragoons
towards Tarragona, and escaped, wit.h only twent.y-two men,
into the fortress. But his battalion. after barricading itself in
Villascea village llnd making a good rc!tistancc 10r some hours.
was forced to surrender. El'oles took nearly 600 prisoners, and
over 200 French had fnUcn. Lafosse, sullying from Tarragona
with all that could be spared from the garrison, arrived too late
to help his men, and had to return in haste (January 19] 1.
Tarragona now seemed in imminent danger, and both
iUusnier at 'l'ortosa and Maurice Mathieu at Darcelona saw
that they must do their best to relieve the place. or it would be
starved out. l\Iusnier spent so much time in organizing a convoy
that he was late. and the actual opening or the road was carried
out by the governor of Barcelona. 'I'hat great city chanced
to be crammed with troops at the moment, since T~amarque's
division, which had escorted the December (.'ollvoy. was still
lying within its walls. Mauriee Mathieu, therefore. was able to
collect 8,000 men ror the march on l'arragonn. Eroles, unfor·
tunately for himself. was not aware of this. and believing that
the enemy was a mere sally of the Barcelona garrison, offered
them battle at Altafulla on Junuary 24. The French hud-
marched by night, and a fog chanced to prevent the Catalans
from recognizing the strength of the two columns that were
approaching them. Erolcs found himself committed to a close
fight with double his own numbers. and after a creditable
resistance was routed, losing his only two guns and the rear-
gUlll'd with which he tricd to detain the enemy. His troops
only escaped by breaking up and flying over the hills. in what
a French eye-witness described as un sa1tve-qui-petd gentral.
I There is nn interesting account of the combat of ViIlaseen in Codring-
ton's lUemoiM, L pp. 254--6: he was present, hnying chanced to comc on
shore lo confer with Eroles ll.S to eo-operntiOll against 'J'arrllgOlUl. All odd
episode of the affair was that, when the French surrendered, they were
found to have with them as prisoners Captains Flinn and Pringle, R.N.,
whOln Uley hud ~urprjlled landing ut Cape SnlulI on the previou~ dny.
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About 600 of them in all were slain or taken: the rest assembled
at Igualada three days later. Eroles blamed Lacy and Sarsfield
for his disaster, asserting that the Captain-General had
promised to send the division of the latter to his help. But his
anger appears to ha-ye been misplaced, for at this very time
Decacn, to make a di\jfion in faYour oC Maurice Mathieu's
movement, had sent out two columns from Gerona. and l'-'igucras
into Upper Catalonia. They occupied Vieh, Lacy's recent
head-quarters, on January 22, two days before the combat of
Altafulla, and Sarsficld's troops were naturally sent to oppose
them. After wasting the upper valleys, Decaen drew back to
Gerona and Olot on the 29th, having sufficiently achieved his
purpose. Tarrngona, meanwhile, was thoroughly revictunJled
by Musnier.. who brought up a large convoy from Tortosa. Rein-
forcemcnts were also thro\\'Tl into the place, and a new governor,
General Bertoletti, who was to distinguish himself by a spirited
defence in the following year.
In February the whole situation of affairs in Aragon and
wcstern Catalonia (eastern Catalonia. was less affected), was
much modified by the return from the south of the numerous
troops which had been lent to Suchct for his Valencia.n expe-
dition. It will be remembered that Napoleon had ordered that
Reille should march back to the Ebro with his own and Severoli's
divisions, and that shortly afterwards he directed that Palom-
bini's division should follow the other two into Aragon. Thus
a very large body of troops was once more available for the
subjection of Aragon and western Catalonia, which, since
Reille's departure in December, had been very inadequately
garrisoned by Caffarelli's and Frere's battaliom, and had been
overrun in many districts by the bands of the Empecinado,
Duran, Mina, and the Conde de Montijo. Napoleon's new plan
was to rearrange the whole of the troops in eastern Spain.
Reille was to be the chief oC a new' Army of the Ebro,' com-
posed of four field divisions-his own, Palombini's and Severoli's
Italians, and a new composite one under General Ferino con-
structed from so many of Frere's troops as could be spared from
garrison duty (seven battalions oC the 14th and 115th of the line),
and six more battalions (1st Uger and 5th of the line) taken
half from Musnier's division of Suehet's army and balf from
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Maurice l\Iathieu's Barcelona garrison 1. This last division never
came into existence, as Suchet and Maurice l\Iathieu both found
themselves too weak to give up the requisitioned regiments,
which remained embodied respectively with the Valencian and
CataJan armies. Nevertheless Reillc had more than 20,000 men
actually in hand, not including the fixed garrisons of Tarragona,
Lerida, and the other fortresses on the borders of Aragon and
Catalonia. This, when it is remembered that Caffaxelli was
still holding the Saragossa district, seemed an adequate force
with which to make an end of the guerrilleros of Aragon, and
then to complete, in conjunction with Decaen's Corps, the
subjection of inland Catalonia. For this last operation was to
be the final purpose of Reille; while Decaen was to attack
Lacy from the eastern side, ReilIe (with Lerida as his base) was
to fall on from the west, to occupy Urgel and Berga (the seat
of the Catalan Junta and the centre of organized resistance), and
to join hands with Deeacn across the crushed remnants oC the
Spanish army t. So sure did the Emperor feel that the last
elements of Catalan resistance were now to be destroyed, that
he gave orders for the issue of the proclamation (drawn up
long before 3) by which the Principality was declared to be
united to the French cmpire. It was to be divided into the
four departments of the Ter [capital Gerona], Montserrat
[capital Barcelona], Bouehes-de·I'Ebre [capital LeridaJ, and
Segre [capital Puigcerda]. Prefects and other officials were
appointed for each department, and justice was to be adminis-
tered in the name of the Emperor. The bumow of the arrange-
ment (which its creator most certainly failed to see) was that
three-fourths of the territory of each department was in the
hands of the patriots whom he styled rebels, and that none of
his prefects could have gone ten miles from his chef-lieu without
all escort of 200 men, under pain of captivity or death.
ReiIle's start was much delayed by the fact that one of his
French brigades had been told off to serve as escort to the mass
of Blake's prisoners from Valencia, and could not get quit of
, Nnpoleon to BerUlier, PlIris, .Jan. 25, af!.er the receipt of the new!:; of
the fall of Valencia.
• Details may be found in the dispatches of Feb. 29, and May 1st and 8th.
I See vol. iv. p. 215. •
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them till, marching by Tcruel, it had handed them over for
'transference beyond the }Jyrenees to the garrison of SarAgossa.
or hi~ two Italian divisions, Palombini's was instructed to
. devote itself to the clearing of southern Aragon, and the opening
up of the communications between the French garrisons of
Daroca, 'reruel, and Calatayud. The other, Severoli's, called
off from the siege of Pcniscola, which had originally been
entrusted to it t, marched fOr Lerida in two columns, the one
by the sea-coast and Tortosa. the other inland, by way of
Morella and Mequinenza. When his troops had begun to con-
centrate on the borders of Aragon and Catalonia, in and about
Lerida, Reille began operations by sending a column, one
French brigade and olle Italian regiment, to attack the ubiqui-
tous Eroles, who, since his deteat at Altafulla a month before,
had betaken himself to the inland, and the rough country along
the valleys of the two Nogueras, with the object of covering
Catalonia on its western front.
This expedition, entrusted to the Freneh brigadier Bourke,
ended in an unexpected eheek; Eroles offered battle with
3,000 men in a strong position at Roda, with a torrent bed
covering his front (March 5). Bour-ke, having far superior
numbers, and not aware of the tenacity of thc Catalan t.roops,
whom he had never before encountered, ordered a general
frontal attaek by battalions of the 60th French and 7th Italian
line. It was handsomely repulsed, with such heavy loss-
600 casualties it is said-that the French retreated as far as
Barbastro, pursued for somc distance by thc troops of Eroles,
who thus showed that their late diSaster had not impaired
their morale 2. Tilis wns a most glorious day for the Baron, one
of the few leaders of real capacity whom the war in Catalo.nia
revealed. He had been a civilian in 1808, and had to learn the
elements of military art under chicfs as incapable as Blake and
Cnmpoven:le. From a miquelete chief he rose to he a general
in the regular army. purely by the force or his unconquerable
, See above, p. 88 .
• The exact los~ is uncerl:ain, but BOUfke himself was wounded, and
MarUnien's lists show 15 other casualties among J"rench and Italian ofl'tcers :
Vacani (vi. p. 65) says that the 7th Italilln line alone lost 15 killed and 57
wounded. A .'OS!; of 16 officers implies at least 300 men hit.
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pertinacity and a courage which no disasters could break. As
a local patriot be had an advantage in dealing with his Catalan
countrymen, which strangers like Reding, Blake, Lacy, or
Sarsllcld never possessed, and their confidence was never
betrayed. A little active man of great vivacity, generally with
Lt. cigar in the corner of his mouth, and never long still, he Wll!!
not only a good leader of irregular bands, but quite capable of
understanding a strategical move, and of handling a division
in a serious action. His sell-abnegation during his service under
chiefs whose plans were often unwise, and whose authority was
oCtCIl exercised 'in a galling fashion, was beyond all praise 1.
The check at Roda forced Heille to turn aside more troops
against Eroles-practically the whole of Sevcroli's di\'ision was
added to the column which had just been defeated, and on
March 13th such a force marched against him that he was
compelled to retire, drawing his pursuers after him toward the
upper course of the Noguera, and ultimately to seek refuge in
the wilds of Tularn among the Ioot-hills of the higher Pyrences.
His operations with a trifling force paralysed nearly half Reille's
army during two critienl months of the spring of 1812. Mean·
while, covered by his demonstration, Sarsfield executed a
destructive raid aeross .the French border, overran the valleys
bcyond Andorra, and exncted a ransom of 70,000 dollars
from l"oix, the chief town of the department of the Arriege
(February 10). This was the best possible reply to Kapoleou's
recent declaration that Catalonia had become French soil.
The Emperor was naturally enraged; he reiterated his orders
to Rcille to' dclogcr lcs insurgents: iln'cst que trop vrui qu'ils
se Ilourrissent de France '-' il faut mcttre un terme aces
insultes 2.' But though HeiUe pllshed his marches far into the
remote mountainous districts where the borders of Al'UgOll und
Catalonia meet, he ne...·er succeeded ill destroying the bands
which he was set to hunt down: a trail of burnt villnges
marked his course, but it had no permancnt rcsult.. The
inhabitants descended from the hills, to reoccupy their fields
I For numerous Anecdotes Or Eroles ant.llively pictures or his doings the
reader may refer to the Memoirs of Edward Codrington, with whom he so
often co-opemted.
, Napoleon to Berthier, Mareh 8th, 1812.
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and rebuild their huts, whcn he had passed by, and the
insurgents were soon prowling again near the forts of Lerida,
Barbastro, and l\[onzon.
Palombini in southern Aragon had equally unsatisfactory
experiences. Coming up from Valencia by the high-roud, he
had reached Teruel on February 19th, and, after relieving and
strengthening the garrison there, set ont on n circular sweep,
with the intention of hunting down Gayan and D,uran-the
Conde de Montijo had just returned to the Murcian army at
this moment t, while the Empccinado was out of the game for
some weeks, being, as we shall presently se:, busy in New
Castile. But the movements of the Italian general were soon
complicated by the fact that Villacampa, with the remnants of
his division, had started from thc neighbourhood of Alicantc
and l\lurcia much at the same time as himself, to seek once
more his old haunts in Aragon. This division had given a very
poor account of itself while serving as regular troops under
Blake, but when it returned to its native mountains assumed
a very different efficiency in the character of a large guerrilla
band. Appearing at first only 2,000 strong, it recruited itself
up to amuch greatcr strength from local levies, and became no
mean hindrance to Palombini's operations.
On the 29th of February the Italian general relieved Daroca,
and a few days later he occupied Calatayud, which had been
lelt ungarrisoned sinee the disaster of the previous October 2.
After fortifying the convent of ~ha Senora de la l)eiia as
n new citadel for this place, he split up his division into several
small columns, which scoured the neighbourhood, partly to
sweep in provisions for the post at Calatnyud, partly to drh"e
off the guerrilleros of the region. But to risk small detachments
in Aragon was always a dangerous business j Villacampa, who
had 1I0W come up from the south, cut of! oue body of 200 mcn
at Campillo on March 5, and destroyed six companies at
Pozohondon on the 28th or the samc month. Taught prudence
by these petty disasters, and by some less successful attacks on
others of his flying columns, Pnlombini once more drew his men
, Apparently llbout the SlImc timc that ViIllloompll lmd his division
CIlmc up to replace him in Arllgoll.
I Sce abovc, page 21.
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together, and concentrated them in the upland plain of Hused
near Daroca. From thence he made another blow at Villacampa,
who was at the same timc attacked in the rear by a column sent
up by Suchet from Valencia to Teruel. 'l'he Spaniard, however,
casily avoided the attempt to surround him, and retired with,
out much loss or difficulty into the wild Sierra de Albarracin
(April 18th). lIIcRnwl!ilc, seeing Palombini occupied in hunting
Villacampa, the guerrillcro Gayan made a dash at the new
garrison of Calamyud, and entering the city unexpectedly
captured the governor and sixty men, but failed to reduce the
fortified convent in which the rest of the Italians took refuge
[April 29th]. He then sat down to besiege them, though he had
no guns, and could work by mines alone: but Palombini soon
sent n strong- column under the brigadiers Saint Paul and
Schiazzetti, who drove all Gayan and relieved Calatayud
[May 9th].
Nevcrtheless threc months had now gone by sinee the
attempt to reduce southern Aragon began, and it was now
obvious that it had been wholly unsuccessful. The hills and
great part of the upland plains were still in the possession of the
Spaniards, who had been often hunted but never caught nor
seriously mishandled. Palombini owned nothing more than
the towns which he had garrisoned, and the spot on which his
head-quarters chanced Jor the moment to be placed_ His
strength was not suffieie-nt to enable him to occupy every
village, and without such occupation no conquest could take
place. Moreovcr the time was at hand when -Wellington's
operations in the West were to shake the fabric of French
power all over Spain--even in the remote recesses of the
Aragollcse Sierras. Palombini was to be drawn ocf in July to
join the Army of the Centre and to oppose the English. And
with his departure such hold us the French possessed on the
rugged region between Calatayud, Saragossa, and Tcruel was I
to disappear. ~
It will be noted that during these operations of the spring no
mention has been made of the Empccinado, who had been so
prominent in this quarter during the preceding autumn and
winter. This chief was now at the bottom of his fortunes:
raiding in New Castile after his accustomed fashion, he had
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been completely defeatcd by Gcncral Guy and a column :of
King Joseph's army nenr Siguenza (February 7). He lost
1,000 mcn, only saved his own person by throwing himself
down nn almost impracticable cliff, and saw his whole force
dispcrsed. This arIair is said to have been the I'csult of treachery:
one of the Empecinado's lieutenants, a certain guerrillero leader
lIamcd Albuir (bctter known as El Mallco Irom having lost
a hand) being taken prisoner a few days before, saved his neck
by betraying his ehieI's position und pluns: hence the surprise.
El :Maneo entered the King's service and raised a 'counter·
guerrilla' band, with which hc did considerable harm 101'
a space. The Empe<:inado had only collected 600 men even by
April, when he joined Villacampa and aided him in a raid
round Guadalajara 1.
Mina, on the other hand, the greatest of all the partisans,
was doing some of his best scrviec to the cause 01 liberty during
the early months of 1812. This was the period when he was
conducting his bloody campaign of reprisals against Abbe,
the governor of Navarre, who had published in December 1811
thc celebrated proclamation which not only prohibited any
quarter for guerrilleros, but made their families and villages
responsible for them, und uuthorizcd the execution of' hostages'
levied on them, as well as the infliction of crushing flnes.
Mina replied by the formal declaration 01 fi, , war of extermina~
tion against aU French without distinction of rank,' and started
the system of shooting four prisoners for every Spaniard, soldier
or civilian, executed by the enemy. This he aetually carried
out for, some months, till the F'rench proclamation was with-
drawn. The most horrid ineidenL of this reign of terror was
the shooting by the French, on .March 21, of the four members
of the' insurreeLional junta' of the province of Burgos, 0.11
magistrates and civilians, whom the)' had captured in a raid,
and thecounter-e..xccution of eighty French soldiers by the Curate
Merino, one of Mina's colleagues, a few days later. This time
of atrocities ended shortly after, when Abbe withdrew his
proclamation and Mina followed his exa.mplc.
Oq the departure of Reille's troops from Valencia it will be
, For 1111 this sce Schcpcler, )lp. 5,0-1; King Joscph's 4ttcrs (DUCIISSC),
viii. pp. 291 alld 305; and Torcno, iil. IIp. 81-2.
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remembered that one of.his.French brigades, that of Pannetier,
had been sent as escort to the captive Spaniards of Blake's
army. 'While the remainder of the new' Army of the Ebro'
went off in the direction of Lerida, as has already been seen,
this brigade was turned aside against Mina. Dorsenne at the
same time directed the greater part of his available field~force
to join ill thc hunt, and all such of Caffarelli's troops us were
not shut up in garrisons were told off for the same purpose.
These detachments, when added to the normal force of occupa·
tion in Navarre and Biscay, made up in all some 30,000 men.
Divided into many columns, each of which was strong enough
to face the 3,000 or 4,000 irregulars under Mina's command,
they endeavom:ed to converge upon him, and to enclose him
within the net of thcir operations. The chase was very hot in
.March: on the first of that month CaHareIli invaded the remote,
Pyrencan valley of ROlleal, wherc it had bcC'll discovered that
Mina kept his depots, his ammunition factory, and his hospitals.
The valley was swept clean, but no appreciable numbcl' of the
guerrilleros were captured. On the 24th, however, it looked
as if disaster was impencling, as three columns under Abbe,
Dumoustier (who had a brigade of the Young Guard), and
I.aferriere had succeeded in disposing themselves around Mina's
main body, between Sangucsfa and Ochagavia. The gucrrilIero,
however, saved himself by a night march of incredible difficulty
across impracticable hills, and got away into Aragon. He was
lost to sight, and was believed to have been too harassed to
be formidable for many a day.
Such was not the tl'Ue state of nffllirs. l\Iina ut once came back
to his old haunts, by a circuitous march through southern
Navarre, and on April 9th performed one of his most notable
exploits. On that day he surprised an immense convoy of
convalescents, civilians, baggage, and food-stuffs, which was
mnrching from Vitjtorin to Mondragon, in the Pass of Snlinns (or
Puerto de Arlaban). Though escortcd by 2,000 mcn (including
the whole of the nh l)olish rcgiment just drawn off from
Soult for the Russian war), it was completely destroyed. Five
hundred of the Poles-were slain, 150 captured, and an enormous
booty, including (it is said) several hundred thousand francs in
cash, fell into Mina's hands. He also delivered 450 Spanish
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prisoners, who were being conducted to captivity beyond the
Pyrenees.
Such an exploit naturally drew down ouce more upon :Mina
,the attention of all the neighbouring French commanders:
Dorscnnc and Rcillc again sent columns to aid the governor
of Navarre, and from the 23rd to the 28th of April Mina was
being hunted by powerful detachments converging on him
from all sides 1. He himself was very nearly captured at Habres
by General Panneticr-who surprised him at dawn, helped by
treachery on the part of fL subordinate guerrillero chief, and
dispersed his followers for the moment 2, But all who were not
slain or captured rallied around their indomitable leader, and
followed him in a hazardous retreat, in which he threaded his
way between the convergillgcolumns of theFrenchand ultimately
escaped to the R}oja. He asserts in his Memoirs, and with
troth, that he was at this time of the highest service to Welling-
ton's main operations, since he attracted and detained beyond
the Ebro such a large proportion of Dorsenne's Army of the
North, that in April and May it had not a man to spare to help
lI:larmont. Even Dumoustier's Guard division, under orders
to return to France for the Russian war, was put into the
pack of pursuers who tried in vain to hunt him down.
To sum up the results of all the operations in Catalonia,
Aragon, and No.varre, which followed on the release of Reille's
troops from the Valencian expedition, it may be said that
Napoleon's scheme for the complete reduction of north-eastern
Spain had completely failed by April. Large forces had been
put in motion; toilsome marches had been executed over many
mountain roads in the worst season of the year; all the
bands of the insurgents had been more than once defeated
and dispersed. But the country·side was not conquered': the
, There seems to be an error of dates in Napier. iv. p.172, concerning
Mina's operations, as the surprise of the convoy at Salinas is put after
Minl\'~ escape from Pnnnetier lit Hobres. But lI:1inn's 0'01'11 Memoirs fix the
date or lhe latter us April 23rd, 1812, while the former certninly hllppened
on April 7th. 'l'oreno (iiL p. 81) has got the sequence right.
• There is a curious and interesting account of this in Mina's own
Memoirs, pp. 31-2,where he relates his narrow escape, and tells how he had
the pleasure of hnnging his treacherons lieutenant, and three local alealdes,
who hlld (.'()Ilsjlirt:d to keep from him the news of Pnnnetier's approach.
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isolated garrisons were still cut off from each other by the enemy.
wherever lhc heavy marching coluUllls had passed on. The
communications were no more safe and free than they had been
ill December. The loss of men by sickness and in the bum-
merable petty combats and disasters had been immense. The
game had yet to he flllished, nnd the spare time in which it
could be conducted was drawing to an end. For Wellington
wns on the march, and ere long not a man from the Armies o[
the North or the Centre was to be available to aid Reillc,
Suchet, llnd Decaen in their unending and ungrateful task.
Gonc, too, werc the days in which reservcs without end could
be poured in from France: the Hussian war was about to open,
and when once it began reinforcements were lo be drawn from
Spain rather than sent into it. The invasion had reached its
high-water mark in January 1812 before the walls of Valencia
and Alicante.
SECTION XXXI: CHAPTER II
OPERATIONS OF SOULT IN Al\'TJ)ALUSIA: THE SIEGE OF
TARIFA, DEC. 1811-.JAN. 1812
]N" the south-west no less than in the south-east of Spain
the month ol January 1812 was to witness the last oUensivc
movement of the French armies of invasion. But while Suchet's
advance ended, us we have seen, in a splendid success, that of
Soult was to meet with a. disastrous check. Neither marshal
was to have another chance of taking the initiative-thanks,
directly or indirectly, to the working out of Wellington's great
plan of campaign for the New Year.
In the previous volume the fortunes of SaulE and the Army
of Andalusia were narrated down to the first days of November·
1811, when Hill's raid into Estremadura, after the surprise of
Arroyo' dos Molinos, ended with his retreat within the borders
of Portugal. That raid had inflicted a severe blow on Drouet's
corps of observation, whieh formed Soult's right wing, and
covered his communications with Badajoz. But its net result
was only to restrict the activities of the French on this side to
that part of Estremadura which lics south of the Guadiana.
Hill had made no attempt to drive away Drouet's main body,
or to blockade Badajoz, and had betaken himself to winter
qua~ters about Elvas, Portalegre, and Estremos. Consequently
Drouet was able to settle down opposite him once more, in
equally widespread cantonments, with his right wing at l\ferida,
and his lcit at Zafra, and to devote his attention to sending
successive convo)'s forward to Badajoz, whenever the stores in
that fortress showed signs of running low. Drouet's force no
longer bore the name of the ' 5th Corps'-all the old corps
distinctions were abolished in the Southern Army this autumn,
and no prgallization larger than that of the divisions wus
permitted to remain. The troops in Estremad~ra were simply
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for the future Drouet's and,Daricau's divisi.ons of the' Armee
du Midi.' The composition of this' containing force,' whose
whole purpose was now to observe Hill, was somewhat changed
after midwinter.: for the Emperor sent orders that the 34th
and 40th regiments, the victims of Girard's carelessness at
Arroyo dos Mclinos, were to be sent home to Francc to recruit
their much depleted ranks. 'fhey duly left Drcuet, and marched
orf northward \ but they never got further than Burgos, where
Dorsenne detaincd them at a moment of nced, so that they
becnme attached to the' Army of t.he North,' and (after
rcceiving somc drafts) were involved !n the opcmtions agaiust
Wellington in the,valley of the Douro. '1'wo regiments from
Andalusia. (thc 12th Legcr and 45th Line) came up to rcplace
them in Drouet's division, but even then the French troops in
F..stremndura. did not exceed 18,500 men, if the garrison of
Badlljoz (ahout 5,000 strong) be deducted. This constituted
a field-force insufficient to hold back Rill when next he should
tuke the offensive; but aU through November and far into
December Hill remained quiescent, by 'Vellington's orders, and
his adversary clung to his advanccd positions as long as he
could, though much disturbed as to what the future might bring
forth.
or the remainder of Scult's lLrmy, the troops in front of Cadiz,
originally the 1st Corps, had been cut down to an irreducible
minimum, by the necessity for keeping flank-guards to either
side, to watch the Spanish forces in the Condado de Niebla on the
west and the mountains of Ronda on thc south. Even including
the marines and sailors of the flotilla, there were seldom 20,000
men in the Lines, and the Spanish force in Cadiz und the Isle
of Lcon, stirrcllcd by the Anglo-Portuguese detachmcnt \\:hich
Wellington always retained there, was often not inferior in
numbers to the besiegers. The bombardment from the heavy
ViIloutrcys mortars; placed in the works o( the Matagorda
peninsula, continued intermittently: but, though a shell
occasionally fell in the city, no appreciable harm was done.
, Nnpoleoll t.o Berthier, Dec. 30, 1811. speaks or the order to Illurch
having been already given. The two regiments were in Castile'b;), March:
when precisely they left Drouet I cannot !llly-perhaps lUi latc as Fcbrnary.
108 ANDALUSIA, THE SIEGE OF TARIFA [DEC.
The inhabitants killed or injured by many months of shelling
could be counted on the fingers of two hands. The citizens had
come to take the occasional descent of n missile in their streets
with philosophic calm, and sang a derisive street ditty which
told how
, De Ias bombas que titan 105 Gavachos
Se haceD Ins Gaditnnas tirabuzones.'
, The splinters 01 the bombs that the French threw served the
ladies of Cadiz as weights to curl their hair 1.'
The Fort 01 Puntales, 011 the easternmost point of the
isthmus that links Cadiz to the Isle of Leon, felt the bombard-
men~ more severely, but was never seriously injured, and
always succeeded in "keeping up an effective return fire. With
the artillery of those days---cvcn when mortars of the largest
calibre, specially cast in the arsenal of SeviUe, were used-
Cadiz was sale from any renl molestation.
Marshal Victor was still in command of the troops in the
Lines at the end of 1811, but thc Emperor gave orders [or his
return to France, when he ordered the Army of Andalusia to
drop its organization into army·corps, and replaced them by
divisions. He directed that the Marshal should set out at once,
unless he was engaged in some serious enterprise at the moment
that the summons arrived. This-as we shall·see---chanced to
be the case, and Victor was still hard at work in .January, and
did not leave Spain till early in Apri1.
'fhe third main section of Soult's troops consisted of the two
infantry and onc cavalry divisions which had lately Cormed
the 4th Corps, and bad, since their first arrival in the South,
been told off for the occupation of the kingdom of Granada.
The whole of the coast and the inland Crom Malaga as Car as
Baza Cell to their charge. The corps had bccn a strong one-
16,000 foot and 4,000 horse-but was shortly to be reduced;
the order of December 80, recalling troops for the expected
Russian war, took off the whole Polish infantry division of
Dembouski, 5,000 bayonets: the regiment of Lancers of the
Vistula, who had won such fame by their charge at Albuera,
1 See Schepeler, p. 17'l.
J811] .STRENGTH OF SaULT'S AR:'rY 109
was also requisitioned, but did not get ort till the autumn. But
in the last month of the old year the Poles were still present
and available, and Soult was far from expecting their departure.
Yet even before they were withdrawn the garrison of the king-
dom of Granada was by no means too strong for the work
allotted to it. The greater part of its available field-force had
been .drawn to the south-west, to eurb the insurrection of the
Serranos of the Ronda mountains, and the inroads of BalIastcros.
The forces left in Granada it.,elf and the other eastern towns
were so modest that Soult protested, and apparently with
truth, that he could not spare from them even !\ small flying
column of aU arms, to make the demonstration against Murcia
in assistance of Suchct's operations which the Emperor ordered
him to execute. Nothing, as it will be rainembered, was done
in this direction during December and .January, save the sending
out of Pierre Soult's raid 1, a mere affair of a single cavalry
brigade.
The total force of the Andalllsian army was still in December
as high us 80,000 men ou paper. But alter deducting the sick, the
garrison of Badajoz-5,OOO men,-the tr.oops of Drouet, entirely
taken up with observing und containing Hill, the divisions in
the Lines before Cadiz, and the obligatory garrisons of Cranada,
Malaga, Cordova, and other large towns, the surplus left over
for active operations was very small. At the most ten or twelve
thousand men, obtained by borrowing from all sides, could be
formed to act as a central reserve, prepared to assist Drouet in
Estremadurll, Victor in the Cadi'/.: region, or Leval in the East,
as occasion might demand. During the two er~ses when Soult
brought up his reserves to join Drouet, in the winter of 1811-12
and the spring of 1812, their joint force did not exceed 25,000
mcn. The Marshal was resolvcd to hold thc complete circuit
of Andalusia, the viceroyalty which brought him so much
pride and profit; and so long as he persisted in this resolve he
could make no oIIcnsive move, for want of a Held army of
competent strength.
Soult made some effort to supplemcnt the strength of his
garrisons by raising Spanish levies-both battalions and
1 Sce above, p. 81.
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squadrons of regulars, and units Ior local service in the style of
urban guards. The former 'Juramclltados' never reached
any great strength: they were composed of deserters, or
prisoners ,....ha volunteered service in order to avoid being
sent to France. Occasionally there were as many as 5,000 under
arms-usually less. The men for the most part dis!lppcared
at the nrst opportunity, and rejoined the national army ~r the
gucrrillcros: the officers were less prone to abscond, because
they were liable to be shot as traitors on returning to their
countrymen. Two or three cases arc recorded of such renegades
who committed suicide, when they saw themselves about to fall
into the hands of Spanish troops 1, The urban guards or
, escopeteros ' were or a little more service, for the reason that,
being interested in the· preservation of their own families.
goods, and houses, they would often prevent the cntry into
their towns of any roving Spanish force which showed itself
. for a moment. For if they admitted any small band, which
went on its way immediately, and could make no attempt
to defcnd thcm on the reappearance of the enemy, they were
liable to be executed a~ traitors by the l;'rench, and their town
would be fined or perhaps sacked. Hence it was to their
interest, so long as Soult continued to dominate all Andalusia,
to keep the guerrilIeros outside their walls. But their service
was, of course, unwilling; and they were usually ready to yield
on the appearance of any serious Spanish force, whose size
was sufficient to cxcuse their submission in the eyes of Soult.
Often a town was ostensibly held for King Joseph, but was
privately supplying recruits, provisions, and money contribu-
tions to the national cause. Nevertheless there were real
, Afrallcesados ' in Andalusia, people who had so far committed
themselves to the cause of IGng .Toseph that they could not
contemplate the triumph or the Patriots without terror. When
Soult evacuated Andalusia in September 1812 several thousand
refugees followed him, rather than face the vcngeancc or their
countrymen.
'One casc is noted of a captain of the' Juramentado' detachment lit
Badlljoz who blewhimself from 11. gun when he saw the plllCC mken (Lmllllre's
mjel/se de Budtijo::., p. 260).· Carlos de Espaiia shot the other five 'Spanish
officers captured on that occasion (Bclmas, iv. p. 3(2).
1811J OPERATIONS OF BALLASTEROS III
During the midwinter of 1811-12 Soult's main attention was
taken up by a serious enterprise in the extreme south of his
viceroyalty, which absorbed all the spare battalions of. his
small central rescrvc, aud rendered it imljossible 101' him to
take the offensive in any other direction. This was the attempt
to crush Ballasteros, and to capture Tarifa, which rendered his
co-operation in Suchet's Valeneian campaign impossible.
General Ballasteros, as it will be remembered, had landed
lrom Cadiz at AIgeciras on September 4th, 1811, and had been
much hunted during the autumn by detachments dra",'Il both
from the troops in the kingdom 01 Granada and those of Victor I.
As many as 10,000 men were pressing him in October, wben be
had been lorced to take refuge under the cannon of Gibraltar.
But when want 01 lood compelled the columns o[ Barrois,
Semele, and Godinot to withdraw and to disperse, he had
emerged lrom his refuge, had followed the retiring enemy, and
had inflicted some damage on their rearguards [November 5,
1811]. His triumphant survival, after the first concentrated
movement made against h.im, had much provoked Soult, who
saw the insurrectionary movement in southern Andalusia
spreading all along the mountains, and extending i~cll towards
Malaga on the one side and Areas on the other. The Marshal,
therefore, determined to make 3. serious effort to erush Ballas-
teros, and at the same time to destroy one 01 the two bases
from which he was wont to operate. Gibraltar was, of course,
impregnable: bllt TarHa, the other fortress at the southern end
of the Peninsula, was not, und had proved from time to time
very useful to the Spaniards. It was now their only secure
loothold in southern Andalusia, and was most useful llS fL port
01 call1or vessels going round lrom Cadiz to the Mediterranean,
especially 101' the large flotilla of British and Spanish sloops,
brigs, and gunboats, which obsessed the coast of Andalusia,
und made the usc of routes by the seaside almost impracticable
101' the enemy. Soult was at this time trying to open up
communications with the Moors of Tangier, from whom he
hoped to get horses 101' his cavalry, and oxen [or the army belorc
Cudiz. But he eould not hope to accomplish anything in this
way so long as Tarifa was the nest and victualling-place of
, Scc vol. iii. pp. 59!i-5.
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privateers, who lay thick in the straits only a few miles from the
coast of 1\Iorocco.
The main reason for attacking Tarifa, however, was that it
had recently become the head-quarters oC a small Anglo~Spanish
field·force, which had been molesting the rear of the lines
before Cadiz. The place had not been garrisoned in 1810,
when Soult first broke into Andalusia: but a few months after
General Colin Campbell, governor of Gibraltar, threw into it
a small force, that same battalion of flank-companies of the
9th, 28th, 30th, and 47th Foot, which distinguished itsclt so
much at Barrosa in the following year, when led by Colonel
Brown of the 28th. This hard fighter had moved on with his
regiment later in I8H, but his place had been taken by Major
King of the 82nd-a one-legged officer of great energy and
resolution 1. The garrison was trifling down to October 1811,
when General Campbell threw into Tarifa a brigade under
Colonel Skerrett, consisting of the 2;t.7th and 2/87th, and some
details 2, making (with the original garrison) 1,750 British
troops. Three days later the Spaniards sent in from Cadiz
another brigade 3 of about the same strength, under General
Copons. After the French expedition against Ball.1sleroq had
failed, Copons and Skcrrett went out and drove from Vejcr the
$outhernmost outposts of Victor's corps in the Lines (Novem-
ber 6th). A fortnight later they marched u.cros:; the hills to
Algeciras, and prepared to join llaIlasteros in an attack on the
French troops in the direction of Uonda, but returned to Tarifa
on the news that Victor was showing a considerable force at
Vcjer, and threatening to cut them oft [rom their base 4.
Ballasteros by himself was a sufficient nuisance to Soult, but
when his operations began to be aided by another separate
I After the 28th went ort, the flank-companies were those oC the 2/11th,
2/47th, and 1/82Ild, two from each battalioll .
• 2/47th (8 COIllI.nLllies) 570 men, 2/871h (560 men), 1 CQJl1Pllll}' 9.5th
(75 mell), 70 2nd HU$!IIu'll K.G.I~., 1 lield-buttcry (Captain HughCl;)
83 lIlen, or in all 1,358 or all ranks.
, A battalion each oC Irlanda and Cantabria, lInd some light companies
or C:lZadores, with 120 gunnCl'l!l and 25 cavalt)" amounting to aoout 1,650
men (sick included) .
• For details of these operations sce the anonymous Tkftllte of Tanfa
(London, 1812), and letters in Rait's Life of lArd Got/gll, j. pp. 69-10.
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force, partly composed of British troops, the Duke of Dalmatia
determined that a clean sweep must be made in southern
Andalusia.
The idea of capturing Tarifa did not appear by any means
impracticable. This little decayed plu.ee of 6,000 souls had
never been fortified in the modern style, and was surrounded
by nothing more than a. mediaeval wall eight feet thick, with
square towers set ill it at intervals. There was a citadel, the
castle of Gllzman El lllleno \ but this, too, was a thirteenth-
century building, and the whole place, though tenable against
an enemy unprovided with artillery, was reckoned helpless
against siege-guns. It is described by one of its defenders
as 'lying in a hole,' for it was completely commanded by
a range of low heights, at no greater distance than 300 yards
from its northern front. In the sea, half a mile beyond it, was
a rocky island, connected with the mainland by a very narrow
strip of sand, which was well suited to serve as a final place of
refuge (or the garrison, and which had been carefully fortified.
Itwas furnished with batteries, of which onc bore on the sand-spit
and the town: a redoubt (Santa Catalina) had been erected at
the point where the isthmus joined the mainlund: several
buildings had been erected to serve as a shelter for troops, and
a great series of caves (Cueva de los Moros) had been converted
into easematcs and store-rooms: they were perfectly safe
against bombardment. In the eyes of many officers the island
was the real stronghold, and the city was but an outwork to it,
which might be evacuated without any serious damage to the
strength of the defence. Nevertheless something had been
done to improve the weak fortifications of the place: the
convent of San Francisco, seventy yards from its northern point,
had been cntrenched and loopholed, to serve as a redoubt, and
some of the square towers in the em:einte had been strengthened
and built up so as to bcur artillery. The curtain, however, was
in all parts far too narrow and weak to allow of gullS being placed
I This WI\S the famous knight who, holding the place for King Sancbo IV
in 1294, refused to surrender it when the r.Ioors brought his son, captured
ill a skirmish, before the walls, and threatened to behead him if his father
refused to capitulate. Guzm:m would not )'ieid, saw his son slain, and
~uccessfullymaintained tile fortress.
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upon it, and there was no glacis and practically no ditch, the
whole wall to its foot being visible from the heights which
overlook the city on its eastern side. There were only twenty-
six guns available, and of these part belonged to the defences
of the island. In the town itself there were only two heavy guns
mounted on commanding towers, six field-pieces (9-pounders)
distributed along the various fronts, and four mortars. When the
siege actually began, the main defence was by musketry fire.
It was clear from the topography of Tarifa that its northern
front, that nearest to and most completelY commanded by the
hills outside, would be the probable point of attack by the
cnemy; and long before the sicgc began prcparations were
made for un interior defence. The buildings looking on the
back of the ramparts were barricaded and loopholed, the narrow
streets were blocked with traverses, and some' entanglements'
were contrived with the iron window-bars requisitioned from
all the houses of the town, which served us a sort of chevaux de
Inst. The outer enceinte was so weak that it was intended
that the main defence should be in the network of streets.
Special preparations were thought out for the right-centre of
the north front, where the walls are pierced by the ravine of
a winter torrent of intermittent flow, called the Retiro. The
point where it made its passage under the enceinte through
a portcullis was the lowest place in the front, the walls sinking
down as they followed the outline of the ravine. Wherefore
palisades were planted outside the portcullis, entanglements
behind it, and all the houses looking down Oil the tOlTcnt bed
within the walls were prepared with loopholes commanding its
course 1. There was ample time for work, for while the first
certain news that the French were coming arrived in November,
the enemy did not actually appear before the walls till Decem-
ber 20. Dy that time much had been done, tbough the balance
was only completed in haste after the siege had begun.
The long delay of the enemy was caused by the abominable
condition of the roads of the district-the same that had given
Graham and La Pens so much trouble in February 18ll 2:
1 For these precautions, the work of Captain Charles Smith, R.E., see
the anonymous Defence 0/ 'l'ari/a (p. 62), and Napier, iv. pp. 59-60.
I See vol. iv. pp. 101-2.
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moreover, any considerable concentration of troops in southern
Andalusia raised a food problem for Soult. The region
round 'I'arifa is very thinly inhabited, and it was clear
that, il a large army were collected, it would have to curry
its provisions with it, and secure its communication with its
base, under pain of falling into starvation within a few days.
Heavy guns abounded in the Cadiz liues, and Soult had no
trouble in selecting a siege-train of sixteen pieces lrom them:
but their transport and that of their ammunition was n serious
problem. To complete the train no less than 500 horses had
to be requisitioned lrom the field artillery and military wagons
of the 1st Corps. While it was being collected, Victor moved
forward to Vejer, near the coast, half-way between Cadiz and
.Tarifa, with 2,000 men, in order to clear the country-side from
the guerrillero hands, who made survey of the roads difficult
and dangerous. Under cover of escorts furnished by him,
several intelligence officers inspected the possible routes: there
were two, both passing through the mounttlinous tract betwccn
the sea and the lagoon of La Janda (which had given Gruham
so much trouble in the last spring). One came down to the
waterside at the chapel or Virgen de la Luz, only three miles
from Tarifa, but was reported to be a mere mule-track. The
other, somewhat more resembling a road, descended to the
shore several miles farther to the north, and ran parallel with it
for some distance. Dut in expectation of the siege, the Spaniards,
with help from English ships, had blown up many yards of this
road, where it was nanowest between the water and the
mountain. Moreover, ships of war were always stationed off
Tarifa, and their gUlls would make passage along this dcfile
dangerous. Nevertheless General Garbe, the chief French
engineer, held that this was the only route practicable for
artillery, and reported that the road could be remade, and that
the flotilla might be kept at a distanee by building batteries on
the shore, which would prevent any vcssel from coming close
enough to deliver an effective fire. It was determined, therefore,
that the siege·train should take this path, which for the first
half of its way passes close along the marshy borders of the
lagoon of La Junds, and then enters the hills in order to
descend to the sea at Torre Peiia.
"
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On December 8th the siege-train was concentrated at Vejer,
and in the hope that it would in four days (or not much more)
reach its destination before 'rarifa, Victor gave orders for the
movement of the troops which were to conduct the siege. Of
this Ioree t.hc smaller part, six battalions 1 and two cavalry
regiments, was drawn from Lcval's command, formerly the
4th Corps. These two divisions had also to provide other
detachments to hold :Malaga in strength, and watch Dallasteros.
The troops from the blockade of Cadiz supplied eight battalions 2,
and three more to keep up communications 3; Olle additional
regiment was borrowed (rom the brigadc in the kingdom o(
Cordova, which was always drawn upon in times of special
need 4. The whole force put in motion was some 15,000 men,
but only 10,000 actually came before Tarifa and took part in
lhe siege .
. The various columns, which were under orders to march,
came from distnnt points, and had to concentrate. Darrois lay
at Los Darrios, inland from Algeciras, with six battalions from
the Cadiz lines, watching Ballasteros, who had once more fallen
back under shelter of the guns of Gibraltar. '1'0 this point
Leval came to join him, with the 3,000 mcn drawn Irom :Malaga
and Granada. '.fhe third column, under Victor himself, con-
sisting of the siege-train and the battalions told off for its
escort, came from the side of Vejer. All three were to meet
before Turifs: but from the first start difficulties began to arise
owing to the bad weather.
The winter, which had hitherto been mild and equable, broke
up into unending rain-storms all the day appointed for the
start, and thc suddcn filling o( the torrents in the mountains
cut the communicntions between the columns. Lcval, who had
got as far as the pass of Ojen, in the range which separates the
district about Algeciras and Los Barrios from the Tarifa region,
was forced to halt therc for some days: but his real', a brigade
under Cassagne, could not come forward to join him, nor did
• Two battalions each or 43rd Line and 7th and 9th Poles, and 16th and
21st Dragoons.
• Three of 16th Ll:ger, two of 5"th Line, one each or 27th Uger and
94th and 95th Line.
• ·1'....0 or Ollrd and one or 8th Line.
• ,51st Line.
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the convoy-column succeed in advancing far from Vcjer.
Victor sent three successive officers with escorts to try to get
into touch with Cassagne, but each returned without having
becn able to push through. It was not till the 12th that a fourth
succeeded in reaching thc belated column, which only got under
way that day and joined on thc following afternoon. The
siege-train was not lcss delayed, and was blocked for several
days by the ovcrRowing of thc lagoon of La Janda, along whose
shore its first stages lay. It only struggled through to the south
end of the lagoon on the 14th, and took no less than four d~ys
more to cover the distance of sixtecn miles across the hills to
Torre Pelia, where the road comes down to the sen. :Forty horses,
it is said, had to be harnessed to each heavy gun to pull it
through I. Much of the ammunition was spoilt by the rain,
which continued to fall intermittently, and more had to be
requisitioned from the Cadi,; lines, and to be brought forward
by supplementary convoys.
These initial delays went far to wreck the whole scheme,
because of the food problem. Each of the columns had to
bring its own provisions with it, and, whell stopped 011 the road,
consumed stores that had bcen intended to serve it during the
siege. Thedist3nee from Vejer to Tarifa is only thirty miles, and
from Los Barrios to Tll.rifa cven less: but thc columns, which
had been ordered to mareh on December 8th, did not reach
their destination till December 20th, and the communications
behind them were eut already, not by the enemy but by the vile
weather, which had turned every mountain stream into a torrent,
and every low-lying bottom into a marsh. The column with
the siege art.illery arrived two days later: it had got safely
through the defile of Torre Pena: the sappers had repaired the
road by the water, and had built a masked battery for four
12-pounders und two howitzers, whose fire kept off from the
dangerous point several Spanish and English gunboats whieh
callle up to dispute the passage. The column from the pass
of Ojcn had been somewhat delayed in its march by a sally
of BalIast<:ros, who came out from the Gibraltar lincs on the
17th-18th and fell upon its rcar with 2,000 men. He drove in
the last battalion, but when Barrois turned back and attacked
, F'or details or this toilsome mlirch see Uclmas, iv.JlJl. Hi-IT.
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him with a whole brigade, the Spaniard gave way and retreated
in haste to San Roquc. Nevertheless, by issuing Crom his
refuge and appearing in the open,he had cut the CQmmunications
betwccn the army destined for the siege und the troops at
Malaga. At the same time that Ballastcros made this diversion,
Skerrett, with his whole brigade and a few of Copons's Spaniards,
had issued from 'farira to demonstrate against the head of the
approaching .French column, and advanced some distance on
the road to Fascillas, where his handful of hussars bickered
•
with the leading cavalry in the ellemy's front. Seeing infantry
behind, he took his main body no farther forward than the
convent of Nucstm Senom de la Luz, three miles from the
fortress. On the 19th the French showed 4,000 men on the
surrounding hills, and on the 20th ad\'unced ill force in two
columns, and pushed the English and Spanish pickets into
Tarifa, aftcr a long skirmish in which the British had 31, the
Spaniards about 40 casualties, while thc French, according
to Leval's report, lost only I officer and 3 men killed and
27 wounded. Dy four in the afternoon the place was invested-
the French pickets reaching from sea to sea, and their main
body being cncumpcd behind the hills which command thc
northern side of Tarifa. They could 1I0t place themselves lIear
the water, owing to the fire of two British friglltes and a swarm
of gunboats, which lay in-shore, and shelled their flanks all day,
though without great efleet.
Copons and Skerrctt had di vidcd the manning of the town and
island between their brigades 011 equul terms, eaeh keeping two
battalions in the town and a third in the island and the minor
posts. Of the British the 47th and 87th had the former, King's
battalion of flank-companies (reinforced by 70 marines landed
from the ships) the latter charge. The convent of San Francisco
was held by a company of the 82nd, the redoubt of Santa
Catalina on the isthmus by onc of the 11th. Seeing the }~reneh
inactive on the 21st-they were waiting for the siege·train
which was not yet arrivoo-Skerrett scnt out three eompllnies
to drive in their pickets, and shelled the heights behind whieh
they were encamped. On the following day the sortie was
repeated, by a somewhat larger force under Colonel Gough
of the 87th, covered by a flanking fire from the gunboats. Thc
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right wing of the French pickets was driven in with some loss,
and a house too near the Santa Catalina redoubt demolished.
The besiegers lost 3 men killed and 4 officers and 19 men
wounded, mainly from the 16th Uger. The sallying troops
had only 1 man killed and 5 wounded (2 from the 11th, 4 from
the 87th). That night the siege-train arrived, and was parked
behind the right-hand hill of the three which face the northern
side of Tarifa.
The engineer officers who had come up with the siege-train
e.xeeuted their survey of the fortress next morning, and repor{ed
(as might have been expected) that it would be best to attack
the central portion of the north front, because the ground facing
it was not exposed to any fire f.rom the vessels in-shore, as WIlS
the west front, and could only be searched by the two or three
guns whieh the besieged had mounted on the towers of Jesus
and of Guzman, the one in the midst of the northern front, the
other in a dominating position by t.he castle, at the southern
corner. However, the 24-pounders on the island, shooting
over the town, could throw shells on to the hillside where the
French were about to work, though without being able to
judge of their effect.
On the night of the 23rd the French began their first parallel,
on their right flank of the ccntral hill, at adistanee of 800 yards
from the \valls: the approaches to it needed no spadework,
being completely screened by a ravine and a thick aloe hedge.
The besieged shelled it on the succeeding day, but with small
effec~nly8 workers were killed and 4 wounded. On the 24th
a minor front of attack was developed on the left-hand hill,
where a first parallel was thrown up about 250 yards from the
walls. The gunboa.ts on the southern shore fired on this work
when it was discovered, but as it was invisible to them, and
as they could only shoot at haphazard, by directions signalled
!rom the town, they generally failed to hit the mark, and did
little to prevent the progress of the digging. The besiegers only
lost 4 killed and 25 wounded this day, and on the original
point of attack were able to commence a second parallel, in
which there was marked out the place for the battery which
was destined to brench the town wall at the lowest point of its
circuit, just south of the bed of the Rctiro torrent.
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On the two following days the French continued to push
forward with no great difficulty; they completed the second
parallel on the centre hill, parts of which were only 180 yards
from the town. On the left or eastern hill the trenches were
continued down the inner slope, as far as the bottom of the
ravine, so as almost to join those of the right attack. On the
26th a violent south-east gale began to blow, which compelled
the British and Spanish gunboats to quit their station to the
right of Tmifa, lest they should be driven lIShorc, and to run
round to the west side of the island which gave them shelter from
wind coming from such a quarter. The French works were,
therefore, only molested for the future by the little 6-pounders
un Lhe north-east (or Corchuela.) tower, a.nd the heavy guns firing
at a high trajectory from the island and the tower of Guzman.
nut the gale was accompanied by rain, and this, beginning
with moderate showers on the 26th, developed into a steady
downpour on the 27th and 28th, and commenced to make the
spadework in the trcnehes more laborious, as the sappers were
up to their a.nkles in mud, and the excavuted earth did not
bind easily into parapets owing to its semi-liquid condition.
Nevertheless the plans of the engincers were carried out, and
two batteries were finished and armed on the ccntral hill, one
lower down to batter the walls, the other higher up, to deal
with the guns of the besieged and silence them if possible. The
l,'rench lined all the advanced parallel with sharpshooters,
who kept up a heavy fire all the ramparts, and would
have made it difficult for the garrison to maintain n reply,
if a large consignment of sandbags had not been received from
Gibraltar, with which cover was contrh"cd for thc men on the
curtain, and the artillery in the towers.
At eleven o'clock on thc morning of the 29th the two Freneh
batteries opened t, with twelve heav), gUllS. The weakness of
the old town wall at once bec<'\.me cvident: the first shot fired
went completely through it, and lodged in a house to its rear.
Before evening thcrc was a definite brcach produced, just ::iouth
, The bl"Cllehing battery on tile luwer slupe with four 16- lInd two
12'poundCl'li: the upper lmttery with four howitzers for high-trajectory
fire against the more distant guns of the besieged and the island, and
two 12-pounders.
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of the Retiro ravine, and it was clear that the enemy would be
able to increase it to any extent that he pleased-the masonry
fell to pieces the moment that it was wcll pounded. The two
small field-guns on the tower of Jesus were silenced by
3 o'clock, and the heavy gun on Guzman's tower also ceased
firing-of which more anon. By night only the distant guns
on the island, and the ships in the south-westcrn bay, were
making an effective reply to the French.
This, from the psychological point of view, was the critical
day of the siege, for on the clear demonstration of the weakness
of the walls, Colonel Skerrett, who had never much confidence
in his defences, proposed to evacuate the city of Tarifs.. At
a council of officers he argued in favour of withdmwing the
garrison into the island, and making no attempt to hold the
weak mediaeval walls which the }~reneh were so effectively
battering. This would have been equivulcnt, in the cnd, to
abandoning the entire foothold of the British on this point of
the coast. For there was on the island no cover for troops, save
two or three recently erected buildings, and the recesses oC the
, Cueva de los :Moros.' Some of the inhabitants had already
taken refuge there, and were suffering great privations, from
being exposed to the weather in tents and hrustily contrivcd
huts. It is clear that if 3,000 men, British and Spanish, had
becn lodged on the wind-swept rocks oC the island, it would soon
have been necessary to withdraw thcm; however inaccessible
the water-girt rock, with its Iow cliffs, might be, no large body
of troops could have lived long upon it, c.xposed as they would
have been not only to wind and wet, but to constant molestation
by hea...·y guns placed in and about the city and the hills that
dominatc it. Meanwhile the FrCllch would have posscssed the
excellent cover of the houses of Tarifa, and wouId have effec-
tively blocked the island by leaving a garrison to watch the
causeway, the only possible exit from it. It is certain that the
abandonment of the island would have followed that of the
town within (l, few days: indeed Skerrett had already obtained
leave from General Cooke, then commanding at Cadiz, to bring
his brigade round to that port as soon rus he should feel it
necessary. He regarded the evacuation of the place as so
certain, that he ordered the IS-pounder gun on Guzman's tower
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to be l;piked this day, though it wal; the only piece of heavy
calibre in the eity I-the reason givcn was that onc of its missiles
(spherical case-shot) had fallen short within the streets, and
killed or wounded an inhabitant. But the real cause was that
he had fully decided on abandoning 'l'arifa that night or the
following day, and thought the moving of such a big gun in
a hurry impossible-it bad been hoisted with great difficulty
to its place by the sailors, with cranes and tackle 2.
Skerrett stated his decision in favour of the evacuation at the
council of war, produced General Cooke's letter supporting his
plan, and stated that Lord Proby, his second in command,
concurred in the view of its necessity. }~ortunatcly for the
credit of the British arms, his opinion was boldly traversed by
Captain C. F. Smith, the senior engineer officer, Major King
commanding the Gibraltar battalion of flank-companies, and
Colonel Cough of the 87th. The former urged that the town
should be defended, as an outwork of the island, to the last
possible moment: though the breach was practicable, he had
already made arrangements for cutting it off by retrenchments
from the body of the town. The streets had been blocked and
barricaded, and all the houses looking upon the back of the
walls loopholcd. Tarifa eoulel be defended for some time in
the style of Saragossa, lane by lane. He pointed out that such
was the configuration of the ground that if the enemy entered
the breach, he would find a fourteen-foot drop between its rear
und the ground below, on to which he would have to descend
under a concentric fire of musketry from all the neighbouring
buildings. Even supposing that the worst came, the garrison
had the castle to retire into, and this was tenable until breached
by artillery, while a retreat from it to the island would always
be possible, under cover of the gUlls of the flotilla. There was
no profit or credit in giving up outworks before they were forced.
Major King concurred, and said that his battalion, being
, According lo some auUloritics he "Iso spiked >L ;)Z-Ib. Cfl.rrolll"jc.
Sce Dt.!Cllce u! 1'ari!a, p. 6a.
• The author of the Dt.!ence of Tarifa pretends not to know the relll
story (p. 63), saying that the spiking Cfl.used much' indignation, apprehen-
sion, and discontent,' and that' whence the order proceeded is unknown.'
For the explanation see the letter from an officer oC the garriSOll in NlI.pier,
1\., Ap~ndix, p. 4;J8.
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Gibraltar troops, was under the direct orders of General Camp·
bell, from whom he had received directions to hold 'farifa till
the last extremity. If Skerrctt's brigade should embark, he and
the Annk-eompanics would remain behind, to defend it, along
with Copons's Spaniards. Gough concurred in the decision, and
urgcd that the cvacuation would be wholly premature and' con-
trary to the spirit of General Campbell's instructions' until it
W8.'l seen whether the :French were able to effeet a lodgement
inside the walls 1.
Skerrett's resolve was shaken-he still held to his opinion, hut
dismissed the council of war without coming to a decision:
he tried to avoid responsibility by requesting the omeers who
voted for further resistance to deliver him their opinions in
writing. Tbis King, Smith, and Gough did, in the strongest
wording. The first named of these three resolute men sent that
same night a messenger by boat to Gibraltar, to inform General
Campbell of Skerrett's faint-hearted decision, and to observe
that, with a few companies more to aid his own flank-battalion
and the Spaniards, he would try to hold first 'farifa and then the
island, even if Skerrett withdrew his brigade. Campbell, angry
in no small degree, sent a very prompt answer to the effect
that the town should not be abandoned without the concurrence
of the commanding officers of artillery and engineers, while the
Gibraltar battalion should be concentrated in the island, in
order to ensurc its delence even if Tarifa itself fell. Still more
drastic was an order to the oflieers commanding the transports
to bring their ships back at once to Gibraltar: tillS decisive
move made it impossible for Skerrett to carry out his plan 2,
A few days later Campbell sent two more flank-companies to
join thc garrison-but they only arrh'cd after the assault.
The idea of evacuating the tOWll without attempting any
defcnee was all the more ignominious because Copons had
declared his intention of holding it to the last, had protested
against the spiking of the heavy gun in Guzman's tower, and
, Gough spenks or his reply thnt 'evacuation would be oontrnry to the
spirit o( Geneml Cnmpbell's instructions,' as ir given at an earlier date, but,
the 29th lieCms fixed by King's letter lo Napicr in appendix to IJle latter's
Plmi>l$ldar WOlf, iv. pp. 44a-4, quoted above. .
• See especially the notes rrom officers on the spot in Napicr's appendix
to vol. iv. pp. 44z-.~.
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next morning, when Leval summoned the place to surrender,
sent in a most unhesitating, iC somewhat bombastic \ note oC
refusal. If Skcrrctt had withdrawn into thc island, or taken
to his ships, and Copons had been overwhelmcd, fighting in the
streets, the disgrace to the British flag would have been very
great. As SI. sidelight on the whole matter, we may remember
that this was thc samc officer who had reCused to land his troops
to dcCend the breach 01 Tarragona six months bclore. Hc was
no coward, as he showed in many fights, and he died gallantly
at Bergen-op-Zoom in 1814, but he was undoubtedly a shirker
oC responsibilities.
On the morning oC the 30th the besicgers' batteries opened
again, and enlarged the breach to a bl'oad gap oC thirty lect or
more; they also dismounted a field-piece which the besieged
had hoisted on the Jesus tower, to replace those injured on the
previous day. At midday Lcval sent in the summons already
recorded, and rccciving Copons's ullcompromising rcply, dirccted
the firc to continue. It was very effective, nnd by evcning the
breach was nearly sixty leet long, occnpying almost the whole
space between the tower at the pol'tcullis over the ravine, and
that llcxt south 01 it. At dusk the garrison crept out to clear
the loot oC the breach, and began also to redouble the inner
defences in the lanes and houses behind it. All work on both
sides, however, was stopped, shortly after nightfall, by a most
torrential downpour of rain, which drove the }'rcnch from their
batteries and the English and Spaniards (ram their repairing.
'fhe sky seemed to be falling-the hillsides beeame cataracts,
and the Retiro ravine was soon filled with a broad river which
came swirling agaiwit the walls, bearing with it fascines,
planks, gabions, and even dead bodies washed out oC the Frcnch
lines. Presently the mass of debris, accunmlnting against the
palisades erected in front 01 the portcullis, and urged on by
the watcr, swept away thcse outcr dclcllces, and thcn, pressing
against the portcullis itsell, bent it inwards and twisted it,
despite of its massive iron clamps, so as to make an opening
'f; Sin duda igllorara V.S. que me hallo yo en esta plaza, cuando se
pro,onfe a su gllbernador que admitruna capitulacion. It la cabe7.a de
mis trollas me eneontrani V.S. Y ent.onces Imbl~nJ()l;.' Sce Artechc,
appendix to vo!. xi. ". 52'~.
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into the town, down which everything went swimming through
the ravine. The flood also swept away some of the defensive
works on each side of the depression. When the hurricane was
over, the rain still continued to full heavily, but the garrison.
emerging from shelter, commenced to repair their works, and
had undone much of the damage by daylight 1.
If the besieged had been sorely incommoded by thc tempest,
thc besiegers on the bare hillsides had been still worse tried.
They had been forced to abandon thcir trenches and batteries,
o[ which those high up the slope were water-logged, while those
below had been largely swept away by the flood. The breach
had been pronounced practicable by the engineers. and an
llssault hud been fixed for dawn, But it wns necessary to put
it oU [or some hours, in order to allow the artillery to reoccupy
their batteries, and rccommCllee thcir fire, und the infantry
to come up from the camps where they had vainly tried to
shelter thcmselves during the downpour. Nevertheless the
Frcnch commanders rcsolved to storm as soon as the mCll
could be assembled, without waiting for further preparations.
, The troops.' says the French historian oI the siege, 'unable
to dry themselves, or to light fires to cook their rations, loudly
cried out for an assault, as the only thing that could put an
end to their miscry.' A largc forcc hud been set apart for the
storm, the grenadier and ....oltigeur companies of each of the
battalions engaged ill the sieges, making a total of over 2,200
men. They were divided into two columns-the grenadiers
were to storm the breach; the voltigeurs to try whether the gap
at the Portcullis tower was practicable 01' not: they were to
break in if possible. if not, to engage the defenders in a Iusilade
which should distract their attention from the main attack.
As soon tlS d3y dawned, the besieged could detect that the
trenches were filling, and that the storm was about to break.
They had time to complete their dispositions before the French
moved: the actual breach was held by Capons with a battalion
of his own troops 2: the 87th, under GOllgh. occupied the walls
1 For this. see. Jones, Sieges QJ tI~ PellilllJUla, ii. p. 477, from which Nnpier
copies bis narmtive, iv. p. 55.
• Their part ill the defence must not be denied to the Spaniards. Napier,
with his usual prejudice,remarks(iv. p. GO)tllatSkerrett 'assigned the charge
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both to right and left of the breach, including the Portcullis tower,
with two companies in reserve. Captain Levesey with 100 of
the 47th was posted in the south-eastern (Jesus) tower, which
completely enfiladed the route which the enemy would have
to take to the foot of the breach. The rest ol the 47th was ill
chargc of the south front of the town.
At nine o'clock the column of French grenadiers issued from
the trenches near the advanced breaching battery, and dashed
down the side of the Retiro ravine towards the breach, while
the voltigeur companies, at the same time, running out from
the approaches Oil the eastern hill, advunccd by the opposite
side of the ravine towards the Portcullis tower. Demonstrations
to right and left were made by Cassagne's brigade on one flank
and Pecheux's on the other. The progress of the storming
column was not rapid-the slopes of the ravine were rain-soddcn
and slippery; its bottom (where the 1100d had passed) was two
fcet deep in mud. The troops were fOl·ccd to movc slowly, and
the moment that they were visible from the walls they became
exposed to a \'ery hcavy fire of musketry, both from the curtain
and the enfilading towers on each of their flanks. Of guns the
besieged hud only onc u\'ailublc-a field-piece ill the northern-
most (or Corehucla) tower, which rucd case-shotdiagonully along
the foot of the walls.
Nevertheless the French grenadiers pushed forward across
the open space towards the breach, under a rain of bullets from
the 87th which smote them on both flunks. The Fusiliers were
firing fast nnd accurately, to the tune of Garry Dwell, which the
regimental band was playing by order of Gough just behind the
breach, accompanied by bursts o[ shouts and cheering. On
arriving at the loot 01 thc walls, in grcat disorder, the French
column hesitated for a moment; many men began to fire
instead of pressing Oil, but some bold spirits scaled the rough
slope of the breach and reached its Iip-only to get a momentary
glimpse of the fourteen-foot drop behind it, and to fall dead.
of the breach entirely to the Spaniards, alld if Smith had not insisted upon
placing British troops lllongside of them this would hrwc ruined the
defence, because hunger and neglect Imd 80 broken the spirit of these poor
men tlmt few uppenr(!(1 during the (.'Ombut, IInd COIl{)llS uhme displllyed the
qualities or u galhmt soldIer.'
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The bulk of the column then swerved away to its right, and fell
upon the palisades and other deft:nces in front of the Portcullis
tower, wherc the hasty repairs made after the flood of thc
preceding night did not look effective. Apparently many of the
voltigeurs who had been already engaged in this quarter joined
in their assault, which surged over the outer barricades and
penetrated as far as the portcullis itself. It was found too well
repaired to be broken down, and the stormers, crowded in
front of it, and caught in an angle between the fl"Ont wall
defended by the 87th, and the flanking Jesus tower from which
the 41th were firing, found the corner too hot Cor them, and
suddenly recoiled and fled. 'I'hc officer at the head of the
forlorn hope gave up his sword to Gough through the bars of the
portcullis, whieh alone separated them, and many other men
at the front of the column also surrendered, rather than face
the point-blank fire at close range which would have accom-
panied the first stage of their retreat.
This was a striking instance of an as!'lault on a very broad
breach, by a strong forcc, being beaten off by musketry rue
ulone. The French seem never to have had a. chance in fa.ce
of the steady resistance of the 81th and their comrades. Their
loss is givcn by the official French historian at only 48 killed and
159 wounded, which seems an incredibly low figure when over
2,000 men WCI·C at close quarters with the besieged, in a very
disadvantngeous position, for some time 1. Thc British lost
2 officers and 7 men killed, 3 officers, 2 se·rgeants, and 22 men
wounded: the SptUliards had it Iicutcllll.nt-<.'olollcl killed and
about 20 men killed and wounded.
1 Skerrett and Coj>OllS c.~ljm"ted the loss of the ~n(lmy lit 11~llrly 500, no
doubt an exaggeration. But Leva.l's ~'()7 seems fllr too few. The com-
manding officer of the 51st Ligne reports from his four lIank-oompaniu
7 officers and 81 men hit (Delmas, iv, Appendix, p. 58). Of the sapper
detachment Wllich led the column, from ;;0 men .w were /lrn. w; combal
(Dehnas, iv. p. 31). It seems incredible tha.t when 23 companies took part
in the assault 5 of them should have suffered 131 casualtiea out of a total
of 207. Martinien's tables show 18 officers killed and wounded on Dec. 31,
a figure which proves nothing. (or though at the usual casualty rate of
20 men per officcr this would imply a total loss of 360, yet it is well known
that in ll8saults the officers often suffer a loss out of all proportion to that
of the nlllk I\nd llIe. Eighteen officers hit might be compatible with a los,
as Iowa:; 200 or liS high us 400 in such 11 casc.
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'" The assault having failed so disastrously, the spirits of the
besiegers sank to a very low pitch. The rain continued to fall
during the whole day and the following night, and the already
water-logged trenches became quite untenable. On New Year's
Day, 1812, the dawn showed a miserable stntc of affairs-not
only were the roads to the rear, towards Fascinas and Vcier,
entirely blocked by the swelling of mountain torrents. but
commwlications were cut even between the siege-camps. All
the provision of powder in the siege-batteries was found to be
spoilt by wet, and a great part of the cartridges of the infantry.
NeaTly a third of the horses of the train had perished from cold
combined with low feeding. No rations were issued to the
troops that day, and on the three preceding days only incom-
plete ones bad been given, because of the impossibility of getting
them up from the reserve depot, and many of the men wandered
without leave for three miles to the rear in search of food or
shelter. An exploring party of the 47th pushing out into the
trenches found them quite unguarded 1 und full of water. Lcval
wrote a formal proposal for the abandonment of the siege to his
chief, Victor, saying that the only choice was to save the army
by retreat, or to see it perish in a few days if it remained
stationary 2. The Marshal, however, rcluS<..-d. to turn buck from
nn enterprise in which he considered his honour involved, and
the tempest having abated on the night of Jun. 2nd...Brel, ordered
the batteries and approaches to be remanncd, and directed
that an attempt should be made to sap forward toward the Jesus
tower from the left udvunced trenches. The work done was
feeble-the batteries had fired only fifty shots by evening, and
the repairs to the damaged works were very incomplete.
Even Victor's obstinacy yielded, however, when on the night
of the 31'd-4th January another furious storm arose, and oncc
more stopped all possibility of continuing operations. No food
had now come up from the base for many days, and the stores
at the front being exhausted, the Marshal saw that it was
necessary to march at once. All attempt was made to with-
draw the guns from the batteries, but only one 12·pounder and
two howitzers were got off-the horses were so weak and the
, lkfroce of Tarifa. p. 41.
I See the letter in Bclmas, Iv. PIl. 55--(1.
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ground so sodden that even when 200 infantry were set to help,
most of the pieces eould not be dragged marc than a few yards.
Wherefore thc attempt was given over, the powder in the
batteries was thrown open to the rain, the balls rolled into the
Retiro ravine, the nine remaining heavy guns spiked.
On the night of the 4th-5th the army crawled off on the road
to Vejer, abandoning nearly all its material in its camps. An
attcmpt was made to Hre a Inass of abandoncd vehicles, but
the rain stopped it. Next morning the French were passing the
defile of Torre Pena, under the not very effective fire of an
English frigate, which kept as close to the shore llS was possible
on a very rough day. The four guns from the battery at this
point were brought on, with much toil, and no woundcd were
abandoned. On the 6th the column reached Tayvilla, where
it found a convoy and lOO horses, which were of inestimable
value, for those with the Held-loree were complctely spent.
Nevertheless the one 12-pounder brought off from Tarifa was
abandoned in the mud. On the 7th Vejer was reached, and the
expedition was at nn end. 'fhe troops of Victor's division, after
a short rest, went back to the Cadiz Lines, those of Leval's
division marched for Xeres.
Thus endcd the leaguer of Tarifn, which cost the besiegers
about 500 lives, more by sickness than by casualties in the
trenches. There werc also some descrters-fifteen Poles eamc
over in a bad)' and surrendered to Captain Carroll on the 3rd 1,
and other individuals stole in from time to time. But the main
loss to the French, beyond that of prestige, was that the
battalions which had formed part of the expeditionary force
were so tired out and war-worn, that for several weeks they
continued to fill the hospitals in the Lines with sick, and were
incapable 01 lurther activc service. Wherclore Soult could not
send any appreciable detachment to help Suchet on the side
of Valencia: the cavalry brigade, which sacked Murcia on
.January 26 and killed La. Carrera,2 was his only contribution
to the operations on the east side of Spain. Thc field-force
which might otherwise ha.ve accompanied Pierre Soult's cavalry
raid had been uscd up in the Tarifa expedition.
I Defellee of Tarifa, p. 75.
• See page 8 above.
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Another distraction had come upon Soult while the Turifa
expedition was in progress. On December 27, six days after
Victor and Leval commenced the siege, General Hill had once
more begun to move on the Estremaduran side, aftcr remaining
quiescent for nearly two months since the surprise of Arroyo
dos Molioos. His advance was adiversioll made by \Vellington's
direct orders, with the purpose at drawing Soult's attention
away trom the pursuit of Ballasteros and the molesting of
'l'arifa 1. It failed to achieve the latter purpose, since the
operations of Victor had gone so far, betore Hill moved, that
the Marshal stood committed to the sicge, and indced Q.nly
heard that Hill wus on the move after the assault of Decem-
ber 31st had been made and beaten otf. But it caused Soult
to cut oft all support from Victor, to turn his small remaining
reserves in the direction of Estrcmadura, and to welcome as
a relief, rather than to deplore as a disaster, the return of the
defeated expeditionaryforce to thcLinesof Cadiz onJanuary 7th.
For about that date Hill was pushing Drouet before him, and
the reserves from Seville were moving northwards, so that
Soult was pleased to learn that the 10,000 men from Tarifa had
returned, and that, in consequence of their reappearance, he
could draw oU more mcn from thc direction of Cadiz to replace
the troops moved toward Estremadura.
Hill crossed the Portuguese frontier north of the Guadiana
on December 27th, with his own division, Hamilton's Portu-
guese, two British cavalry brigades (those of Long and de Grey 2)
and onc of Portuguese (4th and lOth regiments undcr.1. Camp-
bell of the former corps), or about 12,000 men. The small
remainder of his force 3 was left about Eh'as, to watch any
possible movement of the French from the direction of Badajoz.
His objcctivc Wll:; Mcri~a, where it was known t.hat Dom-
brouski, with the greater part of the 5th French Division, was
lying, in a position far advanced from the main body of Drouet's
troops, who wcre c.'1ntoned about Zafra and Llerena. There
was some hope of surprising this force, and a certainty of driving
it in, and of throwing Drouet and Soult into u state of alunn.
, Sce Wellington to Hill, Dec. 18th, Di.1patehes, ix. pp. 465-6.
• But the lust-numed olllccr was absent.
"One Portuguese infant!)' and onc Portuguese cavalry bdgade.
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Wellington directed Hill to keep to the desolate rond north of
the Guadiana, because a winter raid from this dircction would
be the last thing expectcd by thc encmy. He bade his lieutenant
keep a wary eye in thc direction of Truxillo and Almaraz, from
which the divisions of l'I1lumont's army then in New Castile
might possibly descend upon his. rear. But the warning turned
out to be superfluous, since, before Hill moved, Marmont had
been forced by the Emperor's orders to detach his troops on the
Tagus for the ruinous expedition undcr l\Iontbrun to Alicantc.
Marching vcry rapidly Hill rcached Albuqucrque on the 27th,
and La ROCM, only twenty miles from Merida, on the 28th.
On the next day 1 the prospect of surprising Dombrouskl came
to an cnd by the merest of chances. The French general had
sent out that morning a small column to raise requisitions of
food in the villages 011 this road. A troop of hussars at its heud
discovered Hill's advanced cavalry, near Navas de Membrillo,
and alarmed the infantry, three companies of the 88th regiment
under a Captain Nevcux, who formed up and began to retreat
hastily towards l\Icrida. Hill sent two squadrons cach of the
13th Light Dragoons und 2nd Hussars of the King's German
Legion in pursuit, with orders to head on and capture, if possible,
these 40Q men. The result was a combat of the same sort as
that of Barquilla in 1810, where it had ulready been shown that
steady infantry could not be ridden down by cavalry save
under very exceptional circumstances. Ncvcux, seeing the
dragoons hurrying forward, turned off the road, formed his
men in square, and made for a cork wood Oil a rising ground.
The cavalry overtook him, and delivered five determined
charges, which were all beaten off with heavy loss. We arc
told that their order and impetus were both broken by scattered
trees outside the wood, but the main eause of their defeat was
the impossibility of breaking into a solidly-formed square of
determined men, well commanded 2. After the final charge the
I NRpicr (iv. 4Q) wrongly puts thc combat of Navas dc McmbriJlo on
lhe 28th or Dt..'(;CIllOcr, /lot thc 2Qth. The diaries of Stolt1,enberg of the
2nd K.G.I., Hussurs und Cudell of the 28th prove tllut the sc(l()lld dute
is correct. No force could have marched from Albuquenlue to NuvulI
io one day.
I HIIl's dispatch has a handsome but ungrammatical te!ltimony to the
enemy: • the intrepid and admirable way in which the French retreated,
.,
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squadrons drew off, and Neveux hastened on through the wood,
fell back again into the road, and reached Merida, though he
lost a few men 1 by shells from Hawker's battery, which came
up late in thc day. The K.G.L. Hussars had 2 men killed
and 1 officer and 17 men wounded: the 13th Light Dragoons
1 killed and 19 wounded.
Dombrollski, warned of the approach of the allics in force,
immediately evacuated I\ferida, where Hill made prizc of
160,000 lb. of wheat, unground, and a large magazine of
biscuit. He found that the French bad been fortifying the
town., but thc works were too unfinished to allow them to
defend it. On January 1st Hill, continuing his ad\'ance,
marched across the bridge of Mcrida on AJmendralejo,
thinking that Drouet might possibly have come up to help
Dombrouski, and that he might force him to fight. This
was not to be: the rearguard of the foree from l\Ierida was
discovered drawn up in front o~ Almendralejo, but gave way
at the first push: a small magazine of food was captured
in the town.
It was now e1ear that Drouct did not intend to make a stand,
but would fall back towards the Andalusian frontier, and wait
for aid from Soult. Hill resolved to move his main body no
further, but sent out a small flying column under Major-Gencral
Abcrerombie, with orders to press thc French rearguard as long
as it would give way, but to halt and turn baek on finding
serious forces in front of him. This detachment (l/50th regi-
ment, two squadrons 2nd Hussars K.G.L., two squadrons
lOth Portuguese, thrce guns) passing Fucntc del Macstrc neared
Los Santos on January Srd, and found Dombrouski, with a
rearguard of all arms, disposed to fight. Tllis led to a sharp
Cltvalry eombnt, between two squadrons of the 26th French
Dragoons and the allied horse. Onc squadron of the hussars
and one of the Portuguese, gallantly led by Colonel Campbell,
charged the enemy in front, the other squadrons remaining in
rescrve. The dragoons, soon broken, lost 6 killed,. many
the infantry formed in square, and favoured as he was by tile nature of the
country, of which he knew how to take the fullest advantage, prevented
the cavalry alone from effecting anything against him.'
, Apparently two killed and nine wounded.
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wounded, and 2 officers and 35 men prisoners. Thereupon
the Freneh infantry moved rapidly or! southwards, making no
attempt to stand. The victors lost 1 man killed and 14 wounded
from the hussars, 1 offi<:cr and 5 men from the Portuguese.
Drouct was now concentrating at Llerena, and ready to give
up all Estremadura north of that point. He was sending daily
appeuls Ior :;uecour to Soult, who had littlc to give him, while
Victor and the expeditionary force were n.way at Tarifa. On
January 5th the Duke or Dalmatia wrote a dispatch which
ordered that the siege should be abandoned-but long ere it
eame to hand Victor had been forced to depart, as we have
seen, for reusons entirely unconnected with Hill's midwinter
raid. 'Vellingtoll's plan would have worked if the weather had
not already driven Victor away, but had in actual fact no effeet
Oil hi:; proceedings.
Hill, having accomplished all that could be done in the way
of alarming Soult, held l\Icrida and Almendralcjo for a few
days, with his advanced cavalry about Fuente del :l\1aestre; but
retired on January 13th to Albuquerque and Portalegre, to the
intense i'clief of his cnemy. Thc raising of the siege of Tarifa
being known, there was no further reason for keeping Hill in an
advanced position, which might have tempted Soult to make
a great concentration and takc the offensive. Wellington had
no desire that he should do SQ, since the Army of Andalusia,
while dispersed, was harmle:;s, but might becomc dangerous if
it should evacuate great regions, and so be able to collect in
force. Soult did not wish to make such sacrifices unJ.css he wcre
obliged, and on hearing of Hill's retreat countermanded all
orders for concentration, and contented himself with bringing
back Drouet to LJ.crena and Zalamea, and with reopening his
conmmnication with Badajoz, which had been cut while the
allies were at l<~uente del Macstre. He did not at tillS time
reoccupy Merida, partly because the position had bcen demon-
strated to bc dangerous by Hill':; recent raid, partly because its
main importance was that it covered thc road to '1'ruxillo and
Almnruz and Marmollt's army. But Marmont having, fol' the
moment, no troops in this direction, owing to the Alicante expe-
dition, it was useless to try to keep in touch with him.
Hill's expedition, by driving Drouet for some time from the
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line of the Guadiann., made possible a sudden irruption of the
Spaniards into La ]\[aneha, where none of their regular trooJls
had been sinee sinee the battle of Ocai'ia two years before. This
raid was carried out by Morillo at the head of a brigade of the
Estremaduran army of Castaiios. That general had hcard of
thc way in which the upper valley of the Guadiana had been
denuded of troops, in order that the Army of the Centre might
assist Suehet in the direction of Cuenca and Ilcqueiia 1. Nothing
was left in La. lUaneha save a few battalions of King Joseph's
Gcrman Division, and a brigade of Treillard's dragoons, a forcc
which could only provide gal'l'isolls for u few large towns and
,...ateh the high-road from Madrid to Andalusia. Morillo was
directed to slip eastward through the gap made by Hill between
the Armies of the South and Portugal, to endeavour to cut up
the Frcnch posts, and to collect recruits and contributions in
the country-side. With luek hc might even brcak the line of
communication betwcen Soult and Madrid. His force of
3,000 men was insufficient for anything more than a raid.
Starting from Montanchcs near Cagercs on December BOth-
three days aftcr Hill's expedition had begun-Morillo crossed
the Guadiana, and arter making a fruitless dash at Belaleazar,
the isolated French garrison which protected the northernmost
corner of Andalusia, marched straight on by Agudo and
Sarccl'Ucla into the hCllrt of La Maneha, wherc he seized
Ciudad Real, its capital [January 15]. The small French force
quartered there fled at his approach, which was wholly unex-
pectcd-no Spanish army had evcr marehcd up thc valley of
the Cuadiana before. On the next day Morillo attacked
Almngro, where there was it gitrrison of 500 men; but before he
had made any impression he was surprised by the arrival of
General Treillard, with a column hastily gathered from the posts
along the high-road. The Spanish g"CIlcral refused to fight, and,
abandoning Ciudud Real, withdrew with little loss into the
passes of the Sicrra de Guadalupc, whcre his enemy declined to
follow. Since Hill had by this time abandoned Merida and
returncd to Portugal, Morillo felt his position to be UIH:Qm·
fortably isolated, and feared that French troops from Estrema·
dura or rrom the Tagus valley might intercept his way home-
, Sce page 50 above.
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ward. The danger turned out to be imaginary, and on reaching
'1'ruxillo Oil January 30 the column was able to rest unmo-
lested Ior u. fortnight at that important strategical point, and
then to retire at leisure to 1'ttontanches, its originaJ starting-
point.
Thus cnded an extraordinary raid, which, though it hud no
positive results whatever, demonstrated two things clearly
cnough-onc was the marching power of the Spanish inlantry,
whieh between December 28 and January 80 covered 250
miles of vile mountain roads in bitter weather, and came baek
intact with little loss 1, the other was the slightness of the
French hold on La Mancha, where the appearance of n small
brigade of 3,000 men upset the whole country-side. lUorillo was
only driven off by a concentration of many small garrisons, and,
when they were withdrawn, the local guerrillero bands overran
the land. Their chiefs, Ellofedieo [PalareaJ, Chaleco, and others,
did an immense amount of damage while the French were
concentrated, and ravaged up to the very gates of Madrid.
Chaos reigned in New Castile till Foy's and Sarrut's divisions
came back from the Alieante expedition, and dispersed them-
selves along the valley of the Tagus at the beginning of February.
For, ItS wc huve often had occasion to remark bclorc, every
province of Spain required not only to be conquered but to bc
held down by a permanent garrison. The moment that it was
left too lightly held, the gucrrilleros came down from the hills,
occupied all the open country, and cut all communications.
I Nupier (iv. p. 50) Overrnleli the dllmuh>e tlont Marillo ~urrered. He WII~
not· eOlllplcl.cly defealed' by 'rreillard, becllusc he nbseonded without
flghling. In /,is chdJOrute dislUllch he gives his whole loss as two kill.:...:!
nncl ni"e wounded. See his life by Roclrigllez Villa, nppendices lo vol. ii,
for an almost daily seriCll of letters uescribing llis march.
SECTION XXXI: CHAPTER III
POLITICS AT CADIZ AND ELSEWHERE
THE military operations in the South during the winter of
1811-12 were inconclusive, and only important in a negative
way. as showing that the initiative of the French armies was
spent in this direction. But it must not be Corgottcll that while
Soult had been brought to a standstill, Suchct's operations were
still progressing: January, indeed, saw the last great Spanish
disaster of the war, the fall of Valencia, so that the spirits of
government and people still ran verr low. It was not till the
sudden irruption of Wellington into the kingdom of Lean hud
ended in the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo (January 19), that
there was any great occasion for hopdulness. And for 3. long
time after that event its importance was not fully understood.
That the central turning·point of the war had come, that lor the
future the allics were to be on thc oHensi\'c, and the French on
the delensi\'e, was not reulized till Badnjoz had fallen in April,
a blow which shook the whole fabric of King Joseph's power
throughout the regions where he seemed to reign. Nor was it
only the state of affairs in the Peninsula which, during the
winter or 1811-12, seemed sufficiently gloomy both for the
present and for the future. The news from the Spanish colonies
in America. grew steadily worse: in most of the viceroynlties
of the Western world there Waf; IlOW a nucleus of trouble:
the Ilamc or F'erdinand VII was still used by the insurgents as
!I. rallying cry, except in Venezuela, where Mirallda. had pro-
claimed an independent republic in July ]8] J. But in La PInta.
and Chili lip·loyalty to the sovereign was accompanied by
practical geccssion from the Spanish state: the Cabildo8 or
Juntas llaid no attention to orders received from Cadiz. In
.Mexico, though the capital and the greater part of the country
were still in the hands of the constituted .authorities, there was
a lively insurrection on foot since September 1810, under the
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priest Hidalgo-he was captured and executed in 1812, but his
death did not crush his faction. The Viceroyalty of Peru was
almost the only part of Spanish America which still remained
loyal. The Cortes at Cadiz made elaborate attempts to con-
ciliate the Amcricans, but was unable to satisfy their cxpecta.
tions or to end their discontents. The deeply-rooted belief
of the Creoles that they and their country were still being
exploited for the benefit of Spain, eould not be removed by allY
declaration that they were now to be Sp3nish citizens with
full rights, or by giving them representation in the Cortes.
The idea of autonomy was alrcady abroad in Spanish America,
and in every quarter ambitious men were quotillg the precedent
of the revolt of the Thirteen United Colonies from Great Britain
in the previous gcncmlion. Truly Spain had committcd an
unwise act when she joined France in wrecking the Dritish
domination in. North America. She revcnged an old grudge
successfully, hut she taught her own colonists a lesson impos-
sible to forget ~llld easy to copy.
The Peninsular War had hithcrto been maintained in no small
degree by the money which kept flowing in from America:
what would happen if the treasurc-ships with their regular
supply of silver dollars from the mines of Mexico and Peru
ceased altogether to come in? Already anairs were looking so
threatening that, despite of all the needs of the campaign at
homc, reinforcemcnts wcre being sent out to the New \Vorld
from Cadiz and from Corunna: the Army of Galieia, as we
shall presently scc, was ncarly put out ofactioll iu the spring of
1812 by the dispatch of an oyer-great proportion of its trained
artillerymen to America 1. Some French observers of the
situation formed the idea. that the Spaniards, if pressed to
a decision between the possible loss of their colonies and the
c111l11cc of obtailliug a frce hand by peace with Napoleon, might
make the choice for empire rather than freedom. Dy acknow·
ledging Joseph Bonaparte as king, and coming into the Napo-
leonic system, they might be ablc to turn their whole strcngth
against the discontented Americans. i'his idea had onc fatal
error: any Spulliard eould scc that submission to France
meant war with Great Britain: and then the way across the
1 See below, section xxxiii, page 337.
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Atlantic would be closed. The British governmcnt would be
forced into an alliance with the colonists; it had alrcady
thought of this device in the old days belore Napoleon's invasion
of the Peninsula. Whitelock's unhappy Buenos Ayres expedi-
tion in 1807 had been sent out prccisely to take advantage of
the discontent of the Americans, and in the hope that they
would rise against the mother country if promised assistance.
The adventurer Mirnnda had spent much time in pressing
this policy on the Portland cabinet. Whiteloek's descent on
the Rio de la Plata, it is true, had been as disappointing in the
political as in the military line: hc had got no help whatever
from the disaUeded colonists. But feeling in America had
developed into much greater bitterness since 1807: in 1812
actual insurrection had already broken out. British aid would
not, this time, be rejected: the malcontents would buy it by
the grant of liberal trading concessions, which the Cadiz
government, even in its worst time of trouble, had steadily
refused to grant. There was every chance, therelore, that
a policy of submission to Napoleon would ensure the loss of
America evcn more certainly and more rapidly than a persistence
in the present war. It does not seem that any person of impor-
tance at Cadiz ever took into serious consideration the idea of
throwing up the struggle for independence, in order to obtain
the opportunity of dealing with the American question.
The idea, however, was in the air. This was the time at
which King Joseph made his last attempt to open up secret
negotiation with the patriots. His own condition was unhappy
enough, as has been sufficiently shown in all earlier chapter:
but he was well aware that the outlook of his enemies was no
less gloomy. One of the numerous-and usually impracticable
-pieces of advice which his brother had sent him was the
suggestion that he should assemble some sort of a Cartes, and
then, posing as a national king, try to open up communica-
tions with the Cadiz government. setting lorth the somewhat
unconvincing thesis that Great Britain, and not France, was
the real enemy of Spanish greatness. The idea of calling a
Cartes fell through: the individuals whom Joseph could have
induced to sit in it would have been so 1ew, so insignificant,
and so unpopular, that such n body could only have provoked
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contempt 1. But nIl attempt was made to see if anything could
be done at Cadiz: the inducement which Joseph was authorized
to offer to the patriots was that immediately ou his recognition
us a constitutional king by the Cortes-and a constitution was
to be drawn up in haste at Madrid-the French army should
retire lrom Spain, und the integrity oC the realm should be
guaranteed. Napoleon even made a half-promise to give up
Catalonia, though he had practically annexed it to his empire in
the previous year 2.
Joseph and his ministers had no confidence either in the
Emperor's sincerity in making these offers, or in the likelihood
of their finding any acceptance among the patriots. He sent,
however, to Cadiz as his agent a certain Canon La Pena, a secret
AJrallcesadv, but a brother oC Mallucl La Pcfia, the incapable
general who had betrayed Graham at llarrosa. This officer was
on his trial at the moment for his misbehaviour on that occasion,
and the canon pretended to have eome to assist him in his day
of trouble on grounds of family affection. [t would seem that
he sounded certain persons but with small effect. Torcno, who
was present in Cadiz at thp time, and well acquainted with
every intrigue that was in progress, says that the Regency never
heard of the matter. and that vel'Y lew mcmbers 01 the Cmotes
knew what La Pena was doing. It seems that he had conversa-
tions with certain freemasons, who were connected with lodges
in Madrid that were under French influence, and apparently
with one member of the ministry. 'I do not give his name,'
says the historian, 'because I have 110 documentary prool to
bear out the charge, but moral proof I have 3.' Be this as it
may, the labours of La Peila do not seem to have been very
fruitful, and the assertion made by certain French historinns,
and by Napoleon himsell in the Memorial de Ste-HeUne, that the
Cortes would have proceeded to treat with Joseph. but for
Wellington's astonishing successes in the spring of 1812, has
little or no foundation. As Torcllo truly observes, any open
, }'or nil this schcme sce the Mcmoir~ or ;\liot de Mclito, iii. pp. 210'5-16,
hesidethe Emperor'~own r1iHp..lehes. Note especially lhe instructions which
the French ambl'~~l\(lor, l.utorcst, was lo set before Joseph.
• Sccvol.iv'Il. 215 .
• 'I'oreno, Hi. p. 100.
HO POLITICS AT CADIZ AND ELSEWHERE [JAN.
proposal of the sort would have resulted in the tearing to pieces
by the populace of the man hardy enough to make it. The
intrigue had no morc success Hum thc curlier mission of Sotclo,
which has been spoken of in another place 1. But it lingered
on, till the battle of Salamanca in July, and the flight of Joseph
from Madrid in August, proved, to any doubters that there
may havc been, that the French eausc was on the wane 2.. One
of the most curious results of this secret negotiation was that
Soult, hearing that the King's emissary was busy at Cadiz, and
not knowing that it was at Napoleon's own suggestion that the
experiment was being made, came to the conclusion that Joscph
was plottiug to abandon his brother, and to make a private
peace with the Cortes, 011 condition that he should break with
France and be recognized as king. lIe wrote, as we shall
presently sec, to denounce him to Napoleon as a traitor. Henee
came no small frictioll in the following autumn.
These secret intrigues fell into a time of kecn politicnl strife
at Cadiz-the famous Constitution, which was to cause so much
bickering in latcr years, was being drafted, discussed, and
passed through the Cortes ill sections, all through the autumn
of 1811 and the winter of 1811-12. 'l'he Liberals and the
Serviles fought bitterly over almost every clause, and during
their disputes the anti-national propaganda of thc handful of
Ajra-nccsadQs passed almost ulllloticed. It is impossible in a
purely military history to relate the whole struggle, and a few
words us to its political bearings must suffice.
The Constitution was a strange amalgam of ancient Spanish
national tradition, of hal!-understood loans from Great Britain
and America, and of political theory borrowed from France.
Many of its framers had obviously studied the details of
the abortive' limited monarchy' which had been imposed OIl
Louis XVI in the early days of the Freneh Revolution. From
this source eame the scheme whieh limited within narrow
bounds the sovereign's power in the Constitution. The system
evolved was that or a king whose main constitutional weapon
, Sec vol. ii. p. 168 .
• Toreno says that the mistress of the Duke 01 Inrantado was implicated
in the negotiation, after be had become a regent, but that he himself had
DO treasoDable intentions, being a staunch supporter 01 Ferdinand.
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was that right of veto on legislation which had proved so
unpopular in France. He was to choose ministers who, like
those of the United States of Amcriea, were not to sit in parlia-
ment, nor to be nccessarily dependent on a party majority in
the house, though they were to be responsible to it. There was
to be but one Chamber, elected not directly by the people-
though universal suffrage was introduced-but by notables
chosen by the parishes in local primary assemblies, .who
again named district notables, these last nominating the actual
members for the Cartes.
The right of ta.."ation was vested in the Chamber, and the
:Ministry was plu.ced at its mercy by the power of refusing
supply. The regular army was specially subjected to the
Chamber and not to the King, though the latter was left some
power with regard to cnlling out or disbanding the local militia
whieh was to form the second line in the national forces-at
present it was in Iact non-existent, unless the guerrillero bands
might be considered to represent it.
The most cruel blows were struck not only at the King's
power but at his prestige. A clause stating that aU trcaties or
grants illude by him wbile in captivity were null and void was
no doubt necessary-there was no knowing what documents
Napoleon might not dictate to Ferdinand. But it was unwise
to lormulate in a trenchant epigram that' the nation is free and
independent, not the patrimony of any family or person,' or
that • the people's obligation of obedience ceases when the
King violates the laws.' And when, after granting their
sovereign a veto on legislation, the Constitution proceeded to
state that the veto became inoperative after the Cartes had
passed any act in three successive sessions, it became evident
that the King's sole weapon was to be made inefIeetivc.
'So....ereignty,' it was stated, 'is vested essentially in the
nation, and for this reason the nation alonc has the right to
establish its fundamental laws.' Dut the most extraordina.ry
attack on the principle of legitimate monarchy was a high-
handed resettlement of the succession to the throne, in which
the regular sequence of next heirs was absolutely ignored.
If King Ferdinand railed to leave issue, the crown was to go to
his brother Don Carlos: if that prince also died childless, the
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,
Constitution declared that the infante Don Francisco and his
sister the Queen of Etrurio. were both to be passed over. No
definite reasons were given in the act of sett.lement for this
astonishing departure from the natural line of descent. The
real meaning of the clause concerning DOll Francisco was that
many suspected him of being the son of Godoy and not of
Charles IV 1. As to the Queen of Etruria, she had been in her
younger days a docile tool of Napoleon, and had lent herself
very tamely to his schemes. But it is said that the governing
cause of her exclusion from the succession was not so much her
own unpopularity, as the incessant intrigues of her sister
Carlotta, the wife of the regent Jono of Portugal, who had for
a long time been engaged in putting forward a claim to be
clected as sole regent of Spain. She had many membcrs of the
Cortes in her pay, and their influence was directed to getting
her name inserted in the list above that of her brother in the
succession-roll, and to the disinheritance of her sister also.
Her chance of ever reaching the throne was not a very good onc,
as both Fcrdinn.nd and Carlos were still young, and could
hardly be kept prisoners at Valen9ay for ever. It is probable
that the real object of the manreuvres was rather to place her
nearer to the regency of Spain in the present crisis, than to scat
her upon its throne at some remote date. For the regency was
her desire, though the crown too would have been welcome,
and sometimes not only the anti-Portuguese party in the Cortes,
but Wellington and his brother Henry Wellesley, the Ambassa-
dor at Cadiz, were afraid that by patience and by long intrigue
her partisans might achieve their object.
Wellington was strongly of opinion that a royal regent at
Cadiz would be most. undesirable. The personal influences of
a camarilla, surrounding all ambitious but incapable female
regent, would add another diflieulty to the numerous problems
of the relations between England and Spain, which were already
sufficiently tiresome.
This deliberate humiliation of the monarchy, by clauses
accentuated by phrases of insult, which angered, and were
intended to anger, the Servilc8" was only accomplished aiter
long debate, in which protests of the most vigorous sort were
, See Villa Urrutill, i. p. 13 lInd ii. pp. 35:1-9.
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made by many partisans of the old theory of Spanish absolutism.
Some spoke in praise of the Salie Law, violated by the mention of
Carlotta as heiress to the throne, others (ignoring rumours as to
his paternity) defended DOll Francist.'O, as having been by his
youth exempted from the ignominies of Bayollnc, and dwclt on
the injustice of his fate. But the vote went against them by
a most conclusive figure.
The majority in the Cortes, which made sueh parade of its
political liberalism, did not pursue its theories into the realm
of religion. After reading its fulsome declarations in favour
of freedom, it is astounding to note the black intolerance of the
clause which declares not only, as might na.turally be expected,
that < the religion of the Spanish nation is, and ever shall bc, the
Catholic Apostolic Roman, the onc true faith,' but that' the
nation defends it by wise la.ws, forbidding tlte exercise of any
other.' Schism and unorthodoxy still remained political as well
as ecclesiastical crimes, no less than in the time of PbiIip 11.
The Liberals, despite of murmurs by the Serviles, refused to
recreate the Inquisition, but this was as far as their conception
of religious freedom went.
Contemplating this exhibition of mediaeval intolerance, it is
impossible to rate at any very high figure the ostentatiou!>
liberalism which pervades the greater part of the Constitution.
We are bound to recognize in it merely the work of a party of
ambitious politicialls, who desired to secure control of the state-
machine for themselves, and to exclude the monarchy from all
share in its manipulation. No doubt any form of limited
gO\'ernment was better than the old royal bureaucracy. But
this particular scheme went much farther than the needs or the
possibilities of the time, and was most unsuited for a country
such as the Spain of 1812. When its meaning began to be
understood in the provinces, it commanded no enthusiasm or
respect. Indeed, outside the Cortes itself the only supporters
that it possessed were the populace of Cadiz and a. few other
great maritime tOWllS. Considered as a working scheme it had
the gravest faults, especially the m-arranged relations between
the ministers (who did not form a real cabinet) and the Chamber,
in which they were prohibited from sitting. In 1814 Lord
CastIereagh observed, with great truth, that he could now say
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from certain experience, that in practice os well as in theory
the Constitution of 1812 was one of the worst among the
modern productions of its kind 1.
Among the many by-products of the Constitution was
a change in the membership of the Regency. The old' trini-
tarian' body composed of Bloke, Agar, and Cisgar, had long
been discredited, and proposals for its dissolution had been
debated, even before its further continuance was rendered
impossible by Blakc's surrender to the French at Valencia in
the earliest days of 1812. A furiolls discussion in the Cartes
had ended in R. vote that no royal personage should be a member
of any new regency, so that the pretensions of the Princess of
Portugal were finally discomfited. The new board consisted
of the Duke of Infuntado, Joaquim Mosquern, a member ot
the Council of the Indies, Admiral Villaviecllcio, military
governor of Cadiz, Ignacio Hodriguez de Rivas, and Henry
O'Donnell, Condc de la Bispal, the energctic soldier whose
exploits ill Catalonia have Ix:cll set torth in the last volume of
this book. He was thc only man of mark in the ncw regcncy :
Infantado owed his promotion to his rank and wealth, and the
fact that he had becn the trusted fricnd of Fcrdinand YII. He
possessed a limited intelligence and little education, and was
hardly more than a cipher, with n. distinct pretcrcnce for
, Serviles' rather than for Liberals. Villaviccncio had no
military reputation, but had been an energetic organizer, and
a fairly successful governor during the siege of Cadiz. l\Iosqucra
and Rivas were elected mainly because thcy were o[ American
birth-their choice was intended to conciliate the discontented
colonists. Neither of them was entitled by any great personal
merit to the promotion which was thrust upon him. Henry
O'Donnell, now at last recovered [ram the wound whieh had
laid him on a sick bed for so many months in 1811 2, was both
capable and energetic, but quarrelsome and provocative: he
belonged to that class of mcn who always irritate their colleagues
, The be.~t and most recellt account ota1l this, c.xplllining many contra'
dictions and some insineere suppression of taet in Toreno's great history,
is to be found in chapter i" of vo!. ii of Senor Villa Urrlltia's Re/(lcu)Iles
entre E$pOl1o. y InglalaTa 1~1I..
I See vol. iv. p. 240.
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into opposition, by their rapid decisions and imperious ways,
especially when those colleagues me men of ability inferior to
their own. Thc Duke of Infantado was absent for some time
after his election-he had been serving as ambassador in
London. Of the other four Regents two ranked as ' Serviles,'
two as Liberals, a fact which told against their efficiency as
a board. They had little strength to stand out against the
Cortes, whose jealousy against any power in the State save
its own was intense. On the whole it may be said that the
substitution of the five new Regents for the three old ones had
no great political consequences. The destiny of the patriot
cause was not in the hands of the executive, but of the turbulent,
faction-ridden, and ambitious legislative chamber, an ideally
bad instrument for the conduct of a difficult and dangerous war.
Fortunately it was ncither the Regency nor the Cortes whose
actions were to settle the fate of the campaign of 1812, but
purely and solely Wellington and the Anglo-Portuguese army.
The intrigues of Camz turned out to be a negligible quantity
in the course of events.
In Lisbon at this time matters were much more quiet than
they had been a little while back. The Portuguese government
had abandoned any overt opposition to Wellington, such as
had been seen in 1810, when the Patriarch and the Presidcnt
Souza had given him so much trouble. The expulsion of !'IIns-
sena from Portugal had justified the policy of \Yellington, and
nlmost silenced his critics. He hnd not even found it necessary
to press for the removal of the men whom qe distrusted from
the Council of Regency \ in whieh the word of his loyal eoad-
jutor, Charles Stuart, who combined the rather incompatible
functions of British Ambassador and Regcnt, was now supreme.
Opcn opposition had ceased, but Wellington complained that
while compliance was always promised, 'every measure which
I proposc is frittcrcd away to nothing, the form und the words
remain, but the spirit of the measure is taken away in the
execution 2.' This was, he remarked, the policy of the Portu-
guese government: they no longer refused him anything; but
1 Early in i812, however, WellingtoD once more spoke or requiring
SOUUl's retirement from office. Disp<ltellM, ix. p. 88.
I Wellington to Charles Stuart, April 9, 18H>.. Dispatches, Ix. p. 48.
on!;. v L
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if they thought that lmy of his demands might offend either
the Prince Regent at Ilio Janeiro or the popular sentiment of
the Portuguese nation, they carried out his proposals in such
a dilatory fash.ion, and with so many exceptions and excuses,
that he failed to obtain what he hud expected.
In this there was tl good deal of injustice. Wellington does
not always seem to have realized the abject poverty which four
years of war had brought upon Portugal. The Regency calcu-
hlted that, on account oC falling revenue caused by the lale
French invasion, for 1812 they could only count on 12,000,000
cruzado8 novas of receipts l~this silver coin was worth about
28. 6d. sterling, so that the total amounted to about £1,500,000.
or this three-fourths, or 9,000,000 cruzados, was set aside for
the a.rmy, the remainder having to sustain all the other expenses
of the State-justice, civil administration, roads, navy, &c. The
British subsidy had been raised to £2,000,000 a yenr, but it was
paid with the utmost irregularity: in one month oC 1811 the
Portuguese trcasury had rc(,'civcd only £6,000, in another only
£20,000, instead of the £1£lO,OOO promised 2. When such
arrears accumulated, it was no wonder that the soldiers starved
and the magazines ran low. It was calculated that to kecp
the army up to its full numbers, and to supply all military needs
efficiently, 45,000,000 cruzndos a year were required. Taking
the British subsidy as equalling 16,000,000, and the available
national contribution at 9,000,000 eruzados, there was little
more than half the required sum available. This Portuguese
calculation appears to be borne out by the note of Beresford's
chief of the stafr, D'Urban, in February 1812. 'The Marshal
at Lisbon finds that, after a perfect investigation, it appears
that the expenditure must be nearly £6,OOO,OOO-the means at
present £8,500,000! NmtS verro1l$.'
It is cll':ar that the Portuguese government must have shrunk
Cram many of 'Vellington's suggestions on account of mere lack
1 Nnpier (iv. p. 212) W)'S Umt Portugal nliscd 25,000,000 erll~.t1dOll Ulis
yenr. [eunnot uudcrstund this, cOIllIlllring it WiUI Sorillllo de Luz, jii.
p. 523, whieh quotes 12,000,000 eruUldos as the total receipt of taxes for
1811. Does Napier include loans, and tile inconvertible paper issued by the
goverrunent l'
• See complaints of the Conde de nedondo, the Portuguese finance
minister, in SOl'iano de Luz, iii. p. 520.
J812J THE FINAKCB:S OF PORTUGAL 147
of resources, A third of thc country had been at one time or
another overrun by the French-the provinces north of the
Douro in 1800, the Bcira and northcrn Estrcmudura in 181Q-U.
It would take long years before they WCl'C in a position to make
their formcr contributions to the expenses of thc State. It was
impossible to get over this hard fact: but Wellington thought
that a rearrangement of taxes, and an honest administration
of their levy, would produce a much larger annual revenue than
was being raised in 1812. He pointed out, with some plausibilit.y,
that British money was being poured into Portugal by millions
and stopped there: some one-the merchant and contractor for
the most part-must be mnkiog enormous profits and accumu-
lating untold wealth. Moreover he had discovered cases of the
easy handling of the rich and influential in the matter of
taxation, while the peasantry were being drained of their last
farthing. Such little jobs were certain to ocellI in an adminis-
tration of the a-ncien T~gime: Hdalgos and capitalists knew how
to square matters with officials at Lisbon. 'A reform in the
abuses of the Customs of Lisbon and Oporoo, a more equal and
just collection of the Income Tax on commercial property,
particularly in those large and rich towns [it is scandalous to
hear of the fortunes made by the mercantile classes owing to
the war, and to reflect that they contribute pract.ically nothing
to bear its burdens], a reform of the naval establishment llnd
the arsenal, would make the income equal to the expenditure,
and the government would get on without calling upon Great
Britain at every moment to find that which, in the existing
state of the world, cannot be proeurctl, viz, money 1.' So wrote
Wellington, who WllS always being irritated by discovering that
the magazines of Elvas or Almeida were running low, or that
recruits were not rejoining their battalions because there was no
cash to ann or clothe them, or that troops in the field were
getting half-rations, wlless they were ou thc British subsidy list.
No doubt 'Wellington was right in saying that there was
a certain amount of jobbery in the distribution of taxation, and
that more could have been raised by a better system. But
Portuguese figures of the time seem to make it clear that even
1 Sce tables on pp. 324-5 of HallidllY'S Prt!3tm Sum 0/ PUT/ugal, 1mb-
lishcd in 1812.
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if a supernatural genius had been administering the revenue
instead of the Conde de Redondo, all could not have been
obtained that was demanded. The burden of the war expenses
was too heavy for an impoverished country, with no morc than
two and a half million inhabitants, which was compelled to
import a great part of its provisions owing to the stress of war.
The state of Portugal may he estimated by the fnct that in
the twelve months between February 1811 and January 1812
£2,672,000 worth of imported corn, besides 605,000 barrels of
flour, valued at £2,0.51,780 more, was brought into the country
and sold there I, On the other hand the export of wine, with
which Portugnl used to pay for its foreign purchases, had fn.llen
off terribly: in 1811 only 18,000 pipes were sold as against an
average of 40,000 lor the eight years before the outbreak of the
Peninsular War. An intelligent observer wrote in 1812 that the
commercial distress of the country might mainly be traced to
the fact that nearly all the money which came into the country
from England, great as was the sum, lound its way to the
countries from which Portugal was drawing food, mainly to the
United States, from which the largest share of the wheat and
flour was brought. 'As we have no corresponding trade with
America, the balance has been very great against this country:
for the last three years this cxpenditurc has been very consider-
able, without any return whatever, as the money carried to
America has been completely withdrawn from circulation.'
The shrinkage in the amount of the gold and silver current in
Portugal was as noticcable in these yeaTs as the same phenome-
non in England, and (like the British) the Portuguese govern-
ment tried to make up the deficiency by the issue of incon·
vertible puper money, whieh gradually fell in exchange value us
compared with the metallic currency. The officers 01 the army,
as well as all civil runctionaries, were paid their salaries half in
,cash and half in notes-the latter suffered a depreciation of
lrom 15 to 30 per <:cnt. Among thc cares which weighed Oil
,"Vellington and Charles Stuarl was that of endeavouring to
keep the Regency from the easy expedient of issuing more and
more of a paper currency which was already circulating at far
less than its face value. This was avoided-fortunately for the
I Hulliduy's Present State of Portugal, p. 320.
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Portuguese people and army, no less than for the Anglo-
Portuguese alliance.
After all, the practical results of the efforts made by the
Portuguese government were invaluable. Wellington could
not have held his ground, much less have undertaken -the
offensive campaign of 1812, without the aid of the trusty
auxiliaries that swelled his divisions to normal size. Without
their Portuguese brigades most of them would have been mere
skeletons of 8,000 or 4,000 men. Bercsford's army wu.:; almost
up to its full establishment in January 1812-there wcre
59,122 men on the rolls, whcn recruits, sick, men on detachment,
und the regiment Icnt Cor thc succour oC Cadiz arc all counted.
Deducting, beyond these, the garrisons of Elvas, Abrantes,
Almeida, and smaller places, as also the dismounted cavalry
left in the reur 1, there were over 30,000 men Cor the fighting·line,
in ten brigades of infantry, six regiments of cavalry, and eight
field·batteries. Beresfom, lately entrusted by orders from
Rio Janeiro with still more stringent powers over the military
establishment, was using them to the full. An iron hand kept
down desertion and marauding, executions for each of those
oUcnces appear incessantly in the Ordens do Via, which givc thc
daily chronicle of the Portuguese head-quarters. In addition
to the regular army it must be remembered that he had to
manage the militia, oC which as many as 52,000 !pen were under
arms at onc time or another in 1812. Counting the first and
the second Iinc together, there were 110,000 men enrolled-a fine
total for a people of two and a half million souls.
!lutting purely Portuguese difficulties aside, Wellington was
much worricd at this time by a trouble which concerned the
British and not the local finances. This was the delay in the
cashing of the' vales' or bills for payment issued by the Com-
missary-General for food and forage bought from the peasantry.
As long as they were settled at short intervals, no difficulty
arose about them-they werc indeed treated as negotiable
paper, and had passed from hand to hand at a lesser discount
1 The deductions were---sick, 7,::;00; untrained recruits, 4,000; dis-
mounted cavalry, 3,000; regimellt at Cadiz, 1,::;00; garrisons (infant!)'
and artillery) and men on detachment, ]0,000; leaving some 33,000 for the
field. Dy May the gross total had gone down to 56,674.
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than the inconvertible Portuguese government papers. But all
through the year 1811 the interval between the issue of the
• vale' and its payment in cash at Lisbon had been growing
longer, and an uncomforl;nble feeling was beginning to spread
about the country-side. The peasantry were growing suspicious,
and were commencing to sell the bills, Cor much less than their
lace value, to speculators who could afford to wait Ior payment.
To recoup themselves for their loss they were showing signs of
raising prices all round. l~ortunately they were :l. simple race,
and communication between districts was slow and uncertain,
so that no general tendency oC this sort was yet prevalent,
though the symptoms were making themselves visible here
and there. Hence came ·Wellington's constant applications for
more cash from England at shorter notice. Late in the spring
he devised a scheme by which interest at 5 per cent. was to
be paid by the Commissary-Gencral on bonds or certificates
representing money or money's worth advanced to the British
army, till the principal was repaid-two years being named as
the period after which the whole sum must be rc!unded. This
was a desperate measure, all endeavour to throw Iorward
payment on to a remote future, ' when it is not probable that
there will be the same difficulty in procuring specie in England
to send abroad as there is at the present moment.' The plan 1
was never tried. and was not good: lor how could small
creditors of the English army be cxpected to stand out of their
money-representing the price of their crops or their cattle-
Ior so long a period as two years, evcn if they were, in the
meantime, receiving interest on what was really their working
capital? Wellington himself remarked, when broaching the
scheme to Lord Liverpool, that there remained the difficulty
that no one could look forward, and say that the British army
would still be in the Peninsula two years hence. If it had
left Portugal-whether victorious and pushing towards the
Pyrenees, or defeated and driven back on to Great Britain-how
would thc creditors communicate with the Commissary-General,
their debtor? They eould only be referred to London, to which
they would have no ready access: indeed many of them would
, Set forth in detnil, and with U l;lImJlle bond tor 1,000 dollars added. in
Di8palcflc8, ix. Ill). 104-5.
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not know where, or what, London was. That such an idea
should havc been set forward only shows the desperate financial
situation of the British army,
We shall have to be referring to this problem at several later
points of the history of the campaign of 1812 1: at the opening
of the invasion of Leon in June it reached its worst point, just
before the great "ictory of Salamanca, But it was always
present, and when Wellington's mind was not occupied with
deductions as to the man<:euYres of French marshals, it may
undoubtedly be said that his main preoccupation was the
normally depleted state of the military chest, into which
dollars and guineas flowed, it is true, in enormous quantities,
but only to be paid out at once, in settling ll.rrears many months
old. These were never fully liquidated, and began to accumu-
late again, with distressing rapidity, after every tardy settlement.
Whig historians have often tried to represent Wellington's
financial difficulties as the fault of the home government, and·
it is easy to pick passages from his dispatches in which he
seems to assert that he is not being supported according to his
necessities. But a nearer investigation of the fll.cts will not
bear out this easy theory, the product of party spite. The
Whigs of 1811-12 were occupied in decrying the Peninsulll.r
War as a failure, in minimizing the successes of Wellington, llnd
in complaining that the vast sums of money lavished on his
army were wasted. Napoleon was invincible, peace was the
only way out of disaster, even if the peace mu~t be somewhat
humiliating, It was unseemly Cor their representatives, twenty
years after, to taunt the Pcrceval n.nd Liverpool ministries with
having stinted Wellington in his hour of need. We have learnt
to estimate at their proper value tirades against' the adminis-
tration which was characterized by all the cornlption and
tyranny of Mr. Pitt's s)'stem, without his redeeming genius.'
We no longer think that the Napoleonic War was waged' to
repress the democratic principle,' nor that the cabinets which
maintained it were' the rapacious usurpers oC the people's
rights 2.'
I See especially below in c.hapter iii of section xxxiii. p. 340.
• For these phrases and mueh more abU!le, see Napier, iv. p. 109, a most
venomous aDd unjust passage.
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Rather, in the spirit of 1.lr. Forlescue's admirable volume 011
British StateS1nfm of the Great War, shall we be prone to stand
amazed at the courage and resolution of the group of British
ministers who stood out, lor long years and against tremendous
odds, to defeat the tyrant of Europe and to preserve the British
Empire. • On the one side was Napoleon, an autocrat vested
with such powers as great genius and go<X1 fortune have rarely
placed in the hands of one man, with the resources of half
Europe at his disposition, and an armed force unsurpassed ill
strength and devotion ready to march to the ends of the world
to uphold his will. On the other were these plain English
gentlemen, with not so much as a force of police at their back,
with a population by nature five times as turbulent as it is now,
and in the manufacturing districts inflamed alike by revolu-
tionary teaching and by real distress, with an Ireland always
perilously near revolt, with a House of Conunons unreformed
indeed, but not on that account containing a less factious,
mischievous, and obstructive opposition than any other House
of Commons during a great war. In face of all these difficulties
they had to raise armies, maintain fleets, construct and pursue
a military policy, and be unsuccessful at their peril. Napoleon
might lose whole armies with impunity: five thousand British
soldiers beaten and captured would have brought any British
minister's head perilously near the block. Such were the
difficulties that confronted Pereeval, Liverpool, and Castle-
reagh: yet for their country's sakc they encountered them
without flinching 1.'
The winter of 1811-12 was not quite the darkest hour: the
Russian war was looming in the near future, and Napoleon
was already beginning to withdraw troops from Spain in
preparation for it. No longer therefore. as in 1810 und the
earlier half of 1811, was there a high probability that the main
hulk of the French armies, under the Emperor himself, might
be turned once more against thc Pcninsula. It ,,,as all but
certain that England would soon have allies, and not stand
practically alone in the struggle, as she had done ever since
\Vagram. Nevertheless, cvcn with the political horizon some-
what brightened in the East, the time was a sufficiently nnxious
, "'urtC!lC\lc·~ Rrilis/I SlatclJmell, pp. 277-8.
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one. In Great Britain, as in the rest of Europe, the harvest of
1811 had been exceptionally bad, and the high price of bread,
coinciding with much unemployment, was causing not only dis-
tress but wide-spread t.urbulcnee in the manufacturing districts.
This was the year of the first outbreak of the' Luddites,' and
of their senseless exploits in the way of machine-smashing.
The worst stringency of domestic troubles coincided 'with the
gradual disappcarance of the external danger from the ambition
of Napoleon.
In addition it must be rcmembercd that the Perceval cabinet,
on which all the responsibilities fell, was by no means fll'mly
established in power. Whcn it first took office many politicians
believed that it could not last for a single year. All through
1811 the Prince Regent had been in secret negotiation with the
Whigs, and would gladly have replaced his ministers with some
sort of a. coalition government. And in January 1812 Lord
Wclleslcy, by far the most distinguished man in the cabinet,
resigned his post as Foreign Minister. He asserted that he did
so because his colleagues had failed to accept all his plans for the
support of his brother and the Peninsular army: and no
doubt this was to a certain extcnt true. Yet it cannot be said
that, either before or after his resignation, the Ministry had
neglected Wellington; in 1811 they had doubled his force of
cavalry, and sent him about a dozen new battalions of infantry.
It was these reinforcements whieh made the victories of 1812
possible, and in that year the streum ol reinforcements did not
cease-nine morc infantry regiments came out, mostly in time
for the great crisis in June 1. In the autumn the dispatch of
further succours htLd beeome difficult, because of the outbreak
of the American war, which diverted of necessity to Canada
many units that might otherwise have gone to Spain. It is
impossible to maintain that Wellington wus stinted of men:
money was the difficulty. And even as regards money-which
had to be gold or silver, since paper was uselessin the Peninsula-
the resources placed at his disposal were much larger than in
previous years, though not so !urge as he demanded, nor us the
growing scale of the war required.
It is difficult to acquit Welleslcy of faetiousncss with regard
Per coli/m Hve dCI.leled fieCOlII! bnUuliOllS wcnt homc.
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to his resignation, and the most damaging document against
him is the apologia drawn up by his devoted adherent Shawe 1,
in the belief that it afforded It complete justification Cor his
conduct: many of the words and phrases arc the Marquess's
own. :From this paper no onc can fail to deduce that it was not
so much a quixotic devotion to his brother's interests, as an
immoderate conception of his own dignity and importance
that made Wcllcslcy resign. He could not stand the rrcc
discussion find criticism of plans and policics which is esscntifil
in a cabinet. 'Lord Wellesley has always complained, with
some justice, that his suggestions were received as those of
a mere novice.... His opinions were overruled, and the oppo-
sition he met with could only proceed from jealousy, or from
a real contempt for his judgement. It seemed to him that they
were unwilling to adopt any plan of his, lest it might lead to his
assuming a general ascendancy in the Cabinet.... He said that
he took another \'iew of the situation: the Government derived
the most essential support from his joining it, because it was
considered as a pledge that thc war would be properly sup-
ported.... "'I'he war is popular, and any government that will
support Lord Wellington properly will stand. I do not think
the war is properly supported, and I cannot, as an honest man,
deceive the nation by remaining in office." ... It is needless to
particularize all the points of difrerenee between Lord Wcllesley
and his colleagues: Spain was the main point, but he also
disapproved of their obstinate adherence to the Orders in
Council, and their policy towards America and in Sicily '-not
to speak of Catholic Emancipation.
These are the words of injured pride, not of patriotism.
The essential thing at the momcnt was that thc wnr in Spain
should be kept up efficiently. Dy resigning, Wellesley intended
to break up the Ministry, and of this a probable result might
have been the return to office of the Whigs, whose poliey was
to abandon the Pcninsula and make peace with Napoleon.
Wellesley's apologia acknowledges that his influence in the
Cabinet had brought about, on more occasions than onc, an
increase of the support given to his brother, e.g. his colleagues
had given in about additions to the Portuguese subsidy, and
1 Printed in Wellington's Sllpplemtlltary Dispatd,es, vii. pp. 257-88.
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about extra reinforcements to the army. This being so, it was
surely criminal in him to retire, when be found that some of his
further suggestions were not followed. Would the wrecking of
the Pcreeval cabinet, and the sueccssion of the Whigs to power,
have served Wellington or the general cause of the British
Empire?
Wellington himself saw the situation with clear eyes, and in
a letter, in which II touch of his sardonic humour can be detected,
wrote in reply to his brother's announcement of his resignation
that' In truth the republic of a cabinet is but little suited to
any man or taste or of large views 1.' There lay the difficulty:
the great viceroy loved to dictate, Ilnd hated to hear his opinions
criticized. Lord Liverpool, in announcing the rupture to
Wellington in a letter of a rather apologetic cast, explains the
situation in a very few words: 'Lord Wcllesley says generally
that he has not the weight in the Government which he expected,
when he accepted office•..• Thc Government, though a cabinet,
is ncccssarily inter pares, in whieh cvcry mcmber must expect
to have his opinions and his dispatches canvassed, and this
previous friendly canvass of opinions and measures appears
necessary, under a constitution where all public acts or ministers
will be hostilely debated in parliament.' 'l'he Marquess resented
all criticism whatever.
The ministers assured Wellington that his brother's resigna-
tion would make no difference in their relations with himsell,
and invited him to write as freely to Lord Castlereagh, who
succeeded Wellesley at the Foreign Office, as to his predecessor.
The assurance of the Cabinet's good will and continued confi-
dence was received-as it had been given-in all sincerity. Not
the least change in Wellington's relations with the Ministry can
be detected from his dispatches. Nor can it be said that the
support whieh he received from home varied in the least, alter
his brother's secession from the Cabinet. Even the grudging
Napicr is forced to concede this much, though he endeavours
to deprive the Pcreeval ministry of any credit, by asserting
that their only chance of continuance in office depended on the
continued prosperity of 'Wellington. Granting this, wc must
I Wellington to Wellesley, eamp before lltldajoz, SU1lplerM:nlury Vis-
palc!lu, vii. p. 307.
156 POLITICS AT CADIZ N\lD ELSEWHERE fr'ilJl,
still conelude that Wcllcslcy's resignation, cvcn if it produced
no disastrous results-as it well might have done-was yet un
unhappy exhibition of pride and petulance. A patriotic states-
man should have subordinated his mm amour propre to the
welfare or Great Britain, which demanded that a strong
administration, pledged to the continuance of war with Napoleon,
should direct the helm of the State. He did his best to wreck
Perceval's cabinet, and to put the 'Whigs in power.
The crisis in the Ministry passed off with less friction and less
results than most London observers had expected, and Lord
Liverpool turned out to he right when he asserted that in his
opinion 1 it would be of no material prejudice to the Pereeval
government. Castlereagh, despite of his halting speech and
his involved phrases, was a tower of strength at the Foreign
Office, and certainly replaced Wellesley with no disadvantage
to the general policy of Great Britain.
Here the jealousies and biekerings in London may he left
for a space. We shall only need to turn back for u moment to
ministeriul matters when, at midsummer, the whole situation
had been transformed, for France and Russia were at last
opclJy engaged in war, a great relict to British statesmen,
although at the same time a new trouble was arising in the
West to distract their attention. }~or the same month that
started Napoleon on his way to Moscow saw President Madison's
declaration of war on Great Britain, and raised problems, both
on the high seas and 011 the frontiers of Canada, that would have
seemed heart-breaking and insoluble if the strength of }'rance
had not been engaged elsewhere. But the' stab in the back,'
as angry British politicians called it, wus delivered too lute to be
effective.
, Livcr£lOOl to Wellington, Srjppklll~r1/lJryDispalclu:s, vii. 11, 257.
SECTION XXXIl
WELLINGTON'S FIRST CAMPAIGN OF 1812
CHAPTER I
THE CAPTURE OF CfUDAD RODRlGO
IT is with no small relief that we turn away from the annals
01 the petty warfare in the provinccs and or the bickering!> of
politicians, to follow the doings of Wellington. All the
'alarms and excursions' that we have been narrating were
or small import, compared with the 0llcratiollS on the frontiers
or Portugal and Lean which began at the New Year of 1812.
Here we have arrived at the true backbone of the war, the
central fuct which governed all the rest. Here wc follow the
working out of a definite plan conceived by a master-mind, and
arc no longer dealing with spasmodic movements dictated by
the necessities 01 the moment. For the initiati \'C hud at last
fallen into Wellington's hands, and the schemes of Soult nnd
1t1armont were no longer to determine his movements. On the
contrary, it was hc who was to dictate theirs.
The governing factor in the situation in the end of December
.1811 was, as we have already shown, the fact that l\iarmont's
army had been so distracted by the Alicante expedition, undcr-
taken by Napoleon's special orders, that it was no longer in
a position to concentrate, ill Cull force and within a rcasollubly
short period of time. It was on Deeember 13th 1 that the
Duke oC Ragusa received the definitive orders, written Oil
November 20-1, that bade him to send towards Valencia, for
Suchet's bencfit, such a force as, when joined by a detachment
from the Army of the Centre, should make up 12,000 men, and
to find 3,000 or 4,000 more to cover the line of communications
oC the expedition. Accordingly orders wcre issued to l\lontbl'UIl
to take up the enterprise, with the dh..isions ofFoy and Sarrut,
1 For this date see ManDont to Berthier, from Valllldolid, Feb. 6, 1812.
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and his own cavalr)'; the concentration of the corps began on
December 15th, and on December 29th it marched eastward
from La Mancha 1 on its fruitless raid.
Wellington's policy at this moment depended on the exact
distribution of the hostile armies in Iront or him. Hc lay with
the bulk of his army wintering in cantonments along the
frontier of Portugal and Lean, but with the Light Division
pushed close up to Ciudad llodrigo, and ready to invest it, the
moment that the news should arrive that the French had so
moved their forces as to make it possible for him to close in
upon that fortress, without the danger of a vcry large army
appearing to relieve it within a few days. On December 28th
he summed up his scheme in a report to Lord Liverpool, in
which he stated that, after the El Bodon-Aldea da Ponte
fighting in September, he had' determined to persevere in the
same system till the enemy should make some alteration in the
disposition of his forces ~.' In the meanwhile he judged that
he was keeping :Marmont and Dorsenne ' contained,' and pre-
venting them from undertaking operations elsewhere, unless
they were prcpared to risk the chance of losing Rodrigo. • It
would not answer to remove the army to the frontiers of
Estremadura (where a chance of effecting some important
object might have offered), as in that case General Abadia [and
the Spanish Army of Galicia] would have becn left to himself,
and would have fallen an easy sacrifice to the Army of the
North 3.' Therefore Wellington refused to take the opportunity
of descending upon Badajoz and driving Drouet out of Estrema-
dura, though these operations were perfectly possible. He
confined himsclf to ordering Hill to carry out the two raids
in this direction, of which the first led to the destruction of
Girard at Arroyo dos l't1olinos in October, and the second to
thc occupation of Mcrida und the expulsion of thc French
from central Estremadura at midwinter [December 27, 1811-
January 18, 1812J.
In October Wellington had hoped for some time that Rodrigo
would bc gravely incommoded for lack of provisions, for it was
, For details, sce chapter Hi 01 section xxx nbovc.
I J)j$palclles, viii. p. 516.
I Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dee. 28.
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almost cut off from the army to which it belonged by the
guerrillero bands of Julian Sanchez, who dominated all the
country between the Agueda and Salamanca, while the Light
Division lay on the heights close above it, ready to pounce on
any convoy that might try to pass in. This expectation, how~
ever, had been disappointed, us a large amount of lood hud
been thrown into the place on November 2nd by General
Thiebault, the governor of Salamanca. This revietualling had
only been aceomplishcd by a mixture oC good management and
good luck. '1'hc governor saw that any convoy must have
a large escort, because 01 the guerrilleros, who would have cut
oU a small onc. But a large escort eould 1Iot move very fast,
or escape notice. Wherefore, taking no mean risk, Thiebault
collected 3,400 men for a guard, stopped all exit of Spaniards
from Salamanca two days before the eonvoy started, gave out
a false destination for his movement, and sent out requisitions
for rations for 12,000 men in the villages between the starting-
place and Roorigo. ·Wellington had been on the look-out for
some sueh attempt, and had intended that the Light Division,
from its lair at Martiago in the mountain-valleys above the city,
should descend upon any forcc 01 moocratc size that might
approach. But receiving, rather late, the false news that at
least three whole divisions were to servc as escort, he forbade
Craufurd to risk unything till he should have received reinforce-
ments. The same day the Agueda became unfordable owing
to sudden rains, and no troops could be scnt aeross to join
Crnufurd. Wherefore Thicbault got by, ere the smallness of
his force was realized, and retreated with such haste, after
throwing in the food, that the Light Division could not come
up with him 1. Such luck could not be expected another
time!
Wellington had begun to hurry up the nearest divisions to
support Craulurd, and had supposed for two days that be
would have serious fighting, since he imagined that 15,000 or
18,000 men at least had been brought up to guard the convoy.
It was a grave disappointment to him to find that he had been
misled, for it was clear that Rodrigo would not be straitened
1 For details of this operation sce Thil:bault's Mt17lolrt., iv. pp. 538-43,
eorrobol'8tcd by Wellington's Dispatche$, viii. pp. 373-5 nnd 385-6.
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for food for many 3. day. He had now to fall back on his
original scheme of reducing the place by a regular siege, when
the propitious instant should come round.
Meanwhile, waiting for the moment when Marmont and
Dorscnne should disperse their troops into a less concentrated
position, he took preliminary measures to face that eventuality
when it should occur. The main thing was to get the battering.
train, with which Ciudad Uodrigo would have to be attacked,
close up to its objective. As we have already seen 1, it had
been collected tar to the rear, at the obscure village of Villa do.
Ponte near Trnneoso. Between that spot and Rodrigo there
were eighty miles of bad mountain roads: if Wellington had
waited till he heard that Marmont had moved, before he begun
to bring up his heavy guns, he would have lost many days.
Accordingly he commenced to push them forward us early as
November 12th: their temporary shelter was to be in the
fortress of Almeida, which was already so far restored that it
could be regarded as safe against anything short of a regular
siege. It was certain that Marmont would not come forward
at midwinter for any such operation, and against raids or
demonstrations the place was already secure. On December (th
Wellington reported 2 to Lord Liverpool that it would be com-
pletely • re-established as a military post' within a few weeks;
and on the 19th he announced that it was now' a place of
security,' nnd could be trusted to resist any attack whatever.
But, long before even the first of these dates, it was beginning
to receive the siege-matcrial whieh Alexander Dieksol1 was
ordered to bring up Cram the rear. As early as November 22nd
the first division of heavy guns entered its gates: it was given
ont-to deceive Freneh spies-that the pieces were only
intended to arm the walls, and at the same time Dicksoll was
actively employed in mounting on them a number of guns of
heavy ca.libre, wrecked in the explosion when Brenruer evacuated
Almeida in May 1811. Twenty-five of them were in position
before Christmas Day. The indefatigable artillery commandant
had also hunted out of the ruins no less than 8,000 round shot:
• Sce voJ. iv. p. 5·1-9.
• Ditpatch~t. viii, Report or Dec. 28 to Lord Liverpool on the late
campaign.
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it was originally intended that they should go into the magazines
of the garrison; but, when the time for action came, Wellington
sent the greater part of tlus stock of second-hand shot to the
front, because they were immediately available, and ordered
the Almcida stores to be replenished, as occasion served, by the
later convoys that arrived frOIll Villa da Ponte.
Nor was it in bringing forward guns and ammunition alone
that Wellington was busy during December: he caused a
great quantity of gabions and !ascines to be constructed by
the men of the four divisions nearest the front, giving two
vintems (2!d.) for every fascine and four for every gabion. He
had a very strong trestle-bridge cast across the Agueda at
Mariah'a, seven miles north of Rodrigo and out of the reach of its
garrison, and he began to collect carts from every direction.
Not only were they requisitioned in Beira, but Carlos de Espafia,
who was lying in a somewhat venturesome position within
the frontiers of Leon, ordered the Spanish peasantry, even
as far as Tamames, to send every available ox-wain west-
ward-and many came, though their owners were risking dire
chastisement at the hands of the governor of the province of
Salamanca.
l\Iarmont, as we have seen, began to move troops eastward for
lIIontbrun's Valencian expedition about December 15th. The
first news or this displacement reached Wellington on the 24th,
when he heard that Brennier's division had evacuated Plasencia
and fallen back behind the Tietar, taking with it all its baggage,
sick, and stores. This might be no more than a change of can-
tonments for a single division, or it might be a part of a general
strategical move. W'cIlington wrote to Hill that evening, •some
say they are going to Valencia, some that they are to cross the
Tagus. I will let you know if I should learn anything positive.
I have not yet heard whether the movement has been general,
or is confined to this particular division 1.' The right deduction
wus not drawn with certainty, because at the sume time false
intelligence was brought that Fay had started from Toledo and
gone into La Mancha, but had returned again. This was a con-
fused account or his movement; but the mmour of his coming
, Wellington to HiD, Dispalche!, viii. p. 482, comparc Wellington to
Liverpool, viii. pp. 485-6, of tile next morning.
OlolA.'1. v M
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back discounted the certain news about Brcllllicr's eastward.
move 1.
On the 29th came the ycry important additional infonnation
that on the 26th ClauseJ's Division, hitherto lying on the Upper
Tarmes, above Salamanca, had marched upon Avila, and that
the division already at Avila was moving on some unknown
eastward destination. At the same time Wellington received
the perfectly correct information that nil the cavalry of the
Imperial Guard in Old Ca-<;tile had already stnrt.ed for Bayonne,
and that the two infantry divisions of the Young Guard, whic11
formed the most effective part 01 Dorscnnc's Army of the North,
were under orders to march northward from Valladolid, and
had already begun to move.:! This was certain-less so 3. report
sent in by Castai'ios to the effect that he had learnt that the
whole Army of Portugal was about to concentrate at Toledo.
On this Wellington writes to Gruham that 'hc imagincs it
is only a rcport from Alealdes '-a class of correspondents
on whose accuracy and perspicacity he was not accustomed to
rely over-much 3.
But enough information had come to hauu to make it clear
that a general eastward movcment of the French was taking
place, and that the troops immediately available for the
succour of Ciudad Rodrigo were both decreased in numbers and
removed farther from the sphere at Wellington's tuture opera-
tions. He thought that the opportunity given justificd him
in striking at once, and had drawn at last the correct deduction:
• I conclude that all thcse movements have for their object to
support Suchet's operations in Valencia, or even to co-operate
with bim 4.' If Marmont wcrc extending his troops so far east
as the Valencian border, and if Dorsenne were withdrawing
divisions northward from Valladolid, it was clcar that they
could not concentrate in any short space of time (or the
dcliverance of Rodrigo. It wns possible that the siege might
linger on long enough to enable the Armies of Portugal and the
, See Dispatches, viii. p. 520. Sce tile Dieksoll lIlSB., edited by Major
Leslie, for letter from A1meida in December.
• Wellington to Lord LiYerpool, Jan. 1, Dispatches, viii. p. 524.
• See Wellington to Graham, Dec. 26, Dispate/les, viii, p. 52!.
• Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dispatches, viii, p. 524.
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North to unite; Wellington calculated that it might take as
much as twenty-four or even thirty days-an estimate which
happily turned out to be exaggerated; in the end he stormed
it only twelve days after investment. But even if Rodrigo
should resist its besiegers sufficiently long to permit of a general
concentration of the enemy, that concentration would disarrange
all their schemes, and weaken their hold on many outlying
parls of the Peninsula. 'If I do not succeed,' wrote Wellington,
, 1 shall at least bring baek some of the troops of the Army 01
the North, :md the Army oC Portugal, and shall so far relicvc
the Guerrillas [Mina, Longa, Perlier] ilnd thc Spanish Army
in Valencia 1.' Thc last-namcd force was, as a matLer of fact,
beyond saving, whcn Wellinl,rton wrote his letter to Lord
Liverpool. But he could not know it, and if Blake had behaved
with common prudenee and foresight in the cnd of December,
his game ought not to have been played out to a disastroui> end
early in January, just whcn the British were moving out to
the leaguer of Rodrigo.
All the divisions cantoncd UpOIl or behind the Bcirn lrontier
received, on January 2nd-3rd, the orders which bade them
prepare to push up to the line of the Agueda. Only the 6th
Di vision, which lay furthest orr, as fur back as Mangualde
and Pena\,."erde near the Upper Mondego, was 110t brought up
to the front within the next few days. The 1st Division had
a long march from Gumua, Ce1orico, and Penumacor, the 4th
and 5th Divisions very short ones from Aldea del Obispo and
Alameda, Villa de Ciervo, and otlier villages near Almeida.
The Srd Division from Aldca da Ponte Ilnd Navas Frias had
a journey greater than those 01 the two last-named units, but
much less than that of the 1st Division. Finally the Light
Division was, it may Le said, already ill position: its outlying
pickets at Pastorcs and Zamorra were already within six miles
01 Rodrigo, and its head-quarters at 1\1artiago only a short
distance farthcr back.
By January 5th the divisions were all at the front, though
their murch lmd becn carried out ill vcry inclement wcathcr-
heavy snow fell on the night of the 1st-2nd of the month, and
• Another extract from the Cxplunlltory dispnteh to Lord Liverpool,
written on Jun. 1st, 1812.
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'continued to fall on the third; while on the 4th the wind
shifted, the snow turned to sleet, and the roads grew soft and
slushy. The carts with stores and ammunition, pushing forward
from Almeida, only reached Gallegos-ten miles away-in two
days. The troops were well forward-the Ist Division at
Espcja and Gallcgos, the Sl'cl at Martiugo and Zumorru, the
4th at San Felices, beyond the Agucda. the Light Division at
Pasrorcs, 1.::1. Encina and ]~I Bodon. llut Wellington neverthe-
less had to put off the investment for three days, because the
train was not to the front. On the 6th he crossed the Agueda
with his staff and made a close reconnaissance of the place,
unmolested by the garrison. But it was only on the 8th that
the divisions, who were suffering severely from exposure to the
wintry weather, received orders to close in and complete the
investment.
at the topography ot Ciudad Rodrigo wc hu\'c already spokcn
at some length, when dealing with its siege by Ney in 1810. 'l'he
French occupation had madc no essential change to its character.
The only additions to its works made during the last eighteen
months were the erection of a smaU fort on the summit at the
Greater Teson, and the reinforcing by masonry at the three
large convents in the suburb of San Francisco, which the
Spaniards had already used as places of strength. The first-
named work was a redoubt (named Redout Renaud, from the
governor whom Juliun Sanchcz had kidnapped in October): it
mounted three guns, hud a ditch und palisades, and wus built
for a garrison of seventy men. Its gorge contained a sally-port
opening towards the town, and was closed with palisades only.
Four gUlls 011 the stone root of the Iortiflcd convent of San
Francisco, find many more in the northern tront ot the enceinte,
bore upon it, and were intended to make access to it dangerous
and costly.
The breaches madc during Ncy's siege, in the walls facing the
Tesons, had been well built up: but the new masonry, clearly
distinguishable by its fresh colour from the older stone, had
not set over well, and proved less hard when battered.
The garrisoll, supplied by the Army ot the North, was not so
numerous as it should huve been, particularly when it was
intended to hold not only the enceinte of the small circular town
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bllt the straggling suburb outside. It consisted of a battalion
each of the 34th Uger and the 113th Linc, from the division of
Thicbuult (that long commanded in 1810-11 by Serms), making
about 1,600 men, with two companies of Artillery and a small
detachment of sappers-the whole at the commencement of
the siege did not amount to quite 2,000 of all runks, even
including the siek in the hospitaL The governor was General
Barric, an offiecr who had been thrust into the post much
contrary to his will, because he was the ouly general of brigade
available at Salamanca when his predeecssor llenaud was
taken by Julian Sanehez 1• The strength of the garrison had
been deliberately kept low by Dorscnne, because of the immense
difficulty of supplying it with provisions. The first convoy for
its support had only becn introduced by bringing up 60,000 men,
at the time of the fighting about El Bodon ill September: the
second only by 'l'hiebault's risky expedient all November 2nd.
The one thing that was abundant in the garrison of Ciudad
Rodrigo on January 8th, 1812, was artillery. Inside the place
was lying the whole siege-train of the Army of Portugal, which
Masseua had stored there when he started on his march into
Portugal in September 1811. No lcss than 153 hetl.vy guns, with
the corresponding stores and ammunition, were parked there.
A small fortress was never so stocked with munitions of war,
and the besieged made I~ lavish und unsparing use of them
during the defence: but though the shot and shell were available
in unlimited quantities, the gunners were not-a fortunate thing
for the besiegers.
The details of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo are interesting.
This was the only onc of ·Wellington's sieges in which everything
went without a serious hiteh from first to last-so much so that
he took the place in twelve days, when he had not dared to
make his calculation for less than twenty-four 2, Even the
thing which s<.:cmed ut first his greatest hilldrallcL'-the extreme
t "·or dctaiht of thi", ~ Thi(:b""IC,,, MtmoirCIJ, iv. 1'. 537", where BurriC'1I
fmllk di",may at his appointment, and the argulllents lIsed 1.0 overcome it,
nre described at length.
• 'Vellington to Liverpool, Disp6wlles, viii. p. 530, Jan. 7th, 1812, • I can
scarcely venture to calculate the time tllat this operation will take, but
I should think not less than twenty-four or twenty-five da)'s.
166 THE CAPTURE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO [J~". 8
inclemency of the weather-turned out in the end profitable.
The sleet had stopped on the 6th, and a time of light frosts set
in, without any rain or snow. TJlis kept the ground hard, but
was not bitter enough to freeze it for e...·cn half an inch below
the surface; the earth was not difficult to excavate, and it
piled together well. A persistent north-cast wind kept the
~renchcs lairly dry, though it chilled the men who were not
engaged in actual spade work to the very bODCS. The worst
memory recorded in the diarics of many of the officers present
in the siege is the constant necessity for fording the Agueda
in this cold time, when its banks were fringed each morning
with thin ice. For the camps of all the divisions, except the :lrd,
whieh lay at Scrmdillu del Arroyo, some miles south-cast of the
city, were on the left bank of the river, and the only bridge was
so far off to the north that it was little used, the short cut across
the ford to the south of the town saving hours of time: 'and
as we were obliged to cross the river with water up to our
middles, every man eorried a pair of iced breeches into the
trenches with him 1.' There being very few villages in the
immediate neighbourhood of Rodrigo, many of the brigades had
to bivouac on the open ground-life being only made tolerable
by the keeping up oI immense fires, !'Ound which the men spent
their time when off duty, and slept at night. nut fol' the troops
in the trenches there could be DO such comfort: they shivered
in their great coats and blankets, and envied those of their com-
rades who did the digging, which at allY rate kept the blood cir-
culating, It is said that several Portuguese sentries were found
dead at their posts from cold and exhaustion each morning.
Wellington's general plan was to follow the same line which
Ney had adopted in 1810, i.e. to seize t1~e Greater 'resoll hill,
establish a first parallel there, and then sap down to the lower
Little 'reson, on which the front parallel and the breaching
batteries were to be established, at a distance of no more than
200 yards from the northcl'll el1cdnle of the city. But he had
to commence with an operation which Ney was spared-there
was now on the crest of the Greater Teson the new Redout
Rcnaud, which had to be got rid o[ before thc preliminary
preparation col;1ld be made.
I KinClIid, Adventures in the Ilifte Brigade, p. 104.
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This little work was dealt with in the most drastic and
summary way. On the same evening on which the army
crossed the Agueda and invested the {ortress, the Light Division
was ordered to take the redoubt by escalade, without any
preliminary battering. In the dark it was calculated that the
converging fires from the convent of San Francisco and the
northern walls would be of little importance, since the French
could hardly shell the work at random during an assault, for
fear of hitting their own men.; and the attacking column would
be covered by the night till the very moment when it reached
its goal.
Colonel Colborne led the storming-party, which consisted of
450 men, two companies from each British battalion, and one
each from the 1st and Srd Cnyndores 1. His arrangements have
received well-deserved praise from every narrator of the
enterprise. The column was conducted to within fifty yards of
the redoubt without being discovered; then the two rifle
companies and two of the 52nd doubled out to the crest of the
glaeis, encircled the work 011 all sides, and, throwing themselves
on thc ground, began a deliberate and accurate fire upon the
heads of the garrison, as they ran to the rampart, roused at last
by the ncar approach of the stormers. So closc and deadly was
the fire of this ring of trained mnrksmen, that after a few minllt,cs
the French shrank from the embrasures, and crouched behind
their parapets, contenting themselves with throwing a quantity
of grenades and live shells at haphazard into the ditch. Thcir
three cannon were only fired onec! Such casual and ineffective
opposition could not stop the veterans of the Light Division.
For three eompanics of thc 43rd and 521ld, forming the escalading
detachment, came rushing up to thc work, got into the ditch
by descending the ladders which were provided for them, and
thcn reared them a second time against the fraises of the ram_
part, up which thcy scrambled without much difficulty, fmding
the scarp not too stecp and without a 'fcvetcnuml. The garrison
, 1 takc Col borne's own account (sc:e letter in his life by l\Ioore Smith,
p.)66). Tllere were twoeompanics eaeh from the 1(4$rd, 1(52nd, Z(5Znd,
alld 95th, lInd one rrom eneh Cns-ador battalion. Joncs wrongly S/l.y~
(p. 11(;) three companies or the ,;2Ild only, Nupier (us usual) omit!!. all
mention 01 the Portuguese. cr. Hurry Smith's AUfobiogralJII!I, i. p. 55.
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flinched at once-most of them ran into their guard-house or
crouched under the guns, and surrendered tamely. At the same
time entrance was forced at another point, the gorge, where
a company, guided by Gurwood of the 52nd, got in at the gate,
which was either unlocked by somc of the French trying to
escape,or accidentaJly blown open by a live shell dropped against
it 1. Of the garrison two captains and forty--eight rank and file
were unwounded prisoners, three were killed, und about a dozen
more wounded. No more than four, it is said, succeeded in
getting back into the town 2. 'l'his sudden exploit only cost the
stormers six men killed, and three officers 3 and sixteen men
wounded. Colborne remarks in his report that all the losses
were during the advancc or in the ditch, not a man was hurt in
the actual escalade, for the enemy- took cover and gave way,
instead of trying to meet the stormers with the bayonet.
The moment that the redoubt was stormed, the French
gunners in the city and the convent of San Francisco opened
it furious fire upon it, hoping to make it untenable. But this
did little harm, for Col borne withdrew the stormers at once-
and the important spot that night was no longer the work but
the ground behind it, whieh was lelt unsearched. For here, by
Wellington's orders, a first parallel 000 yards long was opened,
und approaches to it along the top of the 'l'eson were planned
out. So littlc was the digging hindered, that by dawn the
trenches were everywhere three feet deep and four broad, sites
for three batteries had been marked out, and a communication
hnd been run from the parallel up to the redoubt, whose rear
wall was broken down into the ditch, so as to make it easily
accessible.
It had been calculated that i[ the assault had failt.'<l, the
1 In Moorsom's UU/wry of the 5211d it is stated lImt 11. sergeant of the
Ji'reneh artillery, while in the aet of throwing" a live ..llell, wns shot tlend:
the shelf fell buek within the j)lInlpcl, l.lnu WWl kiek<.>U lIwuy by onc of tbe
gurrison, all whieh it rolled dOWll into the gorge, 1I'1IS stopped l>y the gate,
and then exploded and blew it open (I'. 152).
• So Belmas, iv. p. 266. Bnrries report says that there were 00 infantry
and 13 gunnen inside altogether. It is 3D accurate and very modest
oauative, in which there is nothing to correct.
• lIIein and Woodgate of the 52nd, and Hawkcsley of the 9:Jth. The
lust named died of his wounds.
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redoubt could onl)' have been reduced by regular battering for
five days-that amount of time, therefore, was saved by the
escalade. The operation eontrru;ts singularly with the fruitless
assaults on Fort San Cristobal at Bndajoz during the summer
months of the preceding year, to which it bore a considerable
similarity. The difference of results may be attributed mainly
to the superiority of the arrangements made by Colborne, more
especially to the great care that he took to keep down the fire
of the besieged by a very large body of marksmen pushed elose
up to the walls, and to the way in which he had instructed each
officer in charge of a unit as to the exact task that was imposed
on him. At San Cristobal there had been much courage dis-
played, but little management or intelligence in lhe command.
On the morning of January 9th, the fITst parallel, along the
front of the Great Teson, was not so far advanced as to afford
good cover, and the working parties were kept back till dark, and
employed in perfecting the approaches from the rear: only
fifty men were slipped forward into the dismantled Redout
Renaud, to improve the lodgement there. The garrison fired
fiercely aU day on the parallel, but as there was little to shoot
al, very small damage was done. At noon the ht Division
relieved the Light Division at the front: for the rest of the
siege the arrangement was that each division took twenty-four
hours at the front in turn, and then returned to its camp. The
order of work was:
Light Division 8th-9th January, 12lh-13th, 16th-17th, and
for the storm on the 19th.
1st Division 9th-lOth, 13th-14th, 17th-18th.
4th Division lOth-11th, 14th-15th, 18th-19th.
3rd Division 11th-12th, 15th-16th, and for the storm on
the 10th.
The 1st Division had ver)' responsible work on the second
night of the siege, for when darkness hud set in the first parallel
had to be made tenable, and the three batteries in front of it
developed. Owing to the very powerful artillery of the besieged,
it was settled that the batteries were to be made of exceptional
strength and thickness-with a parapet of no less than 18 feet
breadth at the top. 1'0 procure the necessary earth it was
determined that an exterior ditch should be dug in front of
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them, and that their floor (terre-plain) should be sunk 3 feet
below the level of the hillside within. A row of large gabions
was placed in front of the exterior ditch to give cover to the
men digging it.
Great progress was made with the work under cover of the
night, but when morning came the besieged, whose fire had
been at haphazard during the night, could see the works and
commenced to shoot more accurately. A curious coniretemps
was discovered at dawn. By some miscalculation the locality
of the left-hand battery had been laid out a little too far to the
cast, so that half its front was blocked by the ruins of the
Hedout Henuud. This, of course, was the effect of working
in pitch darkness, when the outline of that work was invisible
even from a score or so of yards away. Possibly the error
may have originated from thc fact that, early in the night, the
directing engineer officer, Captain Ross, was killed by a Ranking
shot from the convent of San l"ranciseo. Thus the men con·
structing the battery had been deprived of all superior direction.
In the morning Colonel Flctehcr directed that the cast end ot
the battery should have no guns; the five which should have
been placed there were to be transferred to the right-hand
battery, which thus became designed for sixteen guns instead
of eleven 1.
On the 10th-11th January, whcn thc 4th Division had charge
of the trenches the first parallel was nearly completed. the
batteries continued to be built up, magazine emplacements were
constructed in them, and a trench of communication betwccn
them was laid out. When daylight revealed to the French the
exact situation of the three batteries, which were now showing
quite clearly, a very fieree fire was opened on them, the rest of
the works being neglected. The losses, which had hitherto
been insignifIcant, began to grow heavy, and so many men were
hit in the exterior trenches, whieh were being dug in front of
each battery, that Wellington and Colonel Flctcher gave orders
, Thi~ mistuke is ueknowled:;,'Cd in Joncs's Sirgcll, i. I). 120, and much
commented on by Bllrgo)"llc [Life mul Corrrspondmce, i. p. 161], who
complains that an immensc amount of work WlIS wastcd. two nights'
digging put in, tJ1C terre-plain lcvelled, and cvcn somc platforms laid,
before the error was detected.
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that they should be discontinued. Heavy damage was done
to the batteries themselves-the }~rench adopted a system of
firing simultaneous flight.. of shells with long fuses at given
points, 'of whieh several faIling together UpOll the parapets
blew away in an instant the work of whole hours,'
On the 11th-12th, with the 3rd Division in charge, the work
was continued; the platforms were placed in the batteries, and
the splinter-proof timbers laid over the magazine emplaeements.
But haIC the exertion of the men had to be expended in repairs:
as each section of the battcries was completed, part of it was
ruined by the besiegers' shells. • 'l'he nights were long and bitter
cold, and the men could not decently be kept working for twelve
hours on cnd \' especially when it was considered that they
had to march four or five miles from their camps to the trenches
before commencing their task of digging, so that they did not
arrh'e fresh on thc ground. Reliefs were therefore arranged to
exchange duty at one hour after midnight, so that no man was
at work for more than half of the cold hours of darkness.
On the 12th-13th, with the Light Division doing its seeond
turn at the front, the batteries were nearly completed, despite
of much heart-breaking toil at repairs. Wellington, before
sLarling the task of battering, put the problem to Colonel
Fleteher as to whether it would be possible to breach the walls
with the battcries in the Hrst parallel, 01' whether these would
only be useful for subduing the fire of the besieged, and the
actual breaching would have to be accomplished by another
set of balteries, to be placed in a second parallel which was, as
yet, contemplated but not begun. Flcteher, after some cogita~
tion, rcplied that hc thought it eould be done, though Ne)', in
the siege of 1810, had failed in sueh a project, and had breached
the walls with balteries in situations mueh farther forward.
Wellington's inquiry was dictated by his doubt flS to whether
Marmollt ulld Dorsenne might not be in a position to appear
with a heavy relieving force, before a second p..'l.rallel could be
thrown up. There were, as yet, no signs of such a danger; the
enemy having apparently been taken completely unawares by
the opening of the siege. But if the second parallel ad vanced
no faster in proportion than the first, and had to be built on
1 Bllrgoyne, i. p. 162.
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much more dangerous grouud, it was clear that there was a risk
01 its taking an inordinate time to eomplete. On Fleteher's
conclusion being made, Wellington decided that he would try
to breach the walls with his original batteries, but would push
forward n. second parallel also: if llInrmont and Dorsenne
showed signs of rapid concentration, he would try to storm the
place before the trenches were pressed forward to thc neighbour.
hood of the walls. If they did not, he would proceed in more
regular style, build a second and perhaps a third parallel, with
batteries close to the enceinte, and end by blowing in the
countcrsearp, and assaulting from close quarters.
This resolution hu\;ing beell formed, Wellington ordered the
second parallel to be commenced on the night of the 13th-14th,
with the 1st Division in charge. Despite of a heavy fire from
the French, who discovered (by throwing fire·balls) that men
were at work in front of the first parallel, an approach by flying
sap was pushed out, from the extreme right cnd of the original
trenches, down the slope which separates the Great from the
Lesser '1'eson, and a short length of excavation was made on the
western end of the latter height, enough to allow of a small
guard fmding cover. This move brought the besiegers very close
to the Iortified convent of Santa Cruz, ou~ide the nortlHvestern
walls of the city, llnd lest it should givc trouble during the
succeeding operations Wellington ordered it to be stormed.
The troops employed were 300 volunteers from thc Line brigade
of the German Legion and one company of the 5/60th. They
broke down the palisades of the convent with uxcs, under
a heavy fire, and as they entered the small garrison fled with
some loss. That of the stormers was 6 killed and 1 officer and
33 men wounded 1. Only by clearing the French out of this post
could the zig·zags leading down Irom the first to the second
parallel be completed without paying a hcavy price in lives, for
the musketry of the convent would have enfiladed them in
several places. The same night the siegc·guns, which had
reached the camp on \..he 11th, were moved into the three
batteries.
, See Schwcrtfegcr's I/is/ary of Ou: German lLgio", i. p. 35:1. .Jones
(Sieges, i. p. 125) is quile wrong in &lying that the convent was carried
. with 110 loss.'
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Next day (January 14-15) was a very Iive1)' one. General
Barrie was convinced that the establishment of a second
'parallel Oil the Lesser Teson, only 200 yards from his walls,
must not be allowed at any cost, and executed B sortie with
500 men, all that he could spare from the garrison. He (very
cleverly) chose for his time the hour (11 a.m.) when the 4th
Division WllS relieving the workmen of the First, for, as Jones
remarks, ' a bad eustom prevailed that as soon llS the divisio~
to be relieved saw the rclieving division advancing, the guards
and workmen were withdrawn from thc trenches, and the works
were left untenanted for some time during the relief, which the
}reneh could observe from the steeple of the cathedral, where
there was always an officer on the look·out.'
The sortie recaptured the convent of Santa Cruz, swept along
the second parallel, where it upset the gabions and shovelled
in some of the earth, and then made u. dash at the first parallel,
where it might have done mueh miscbief in the batteries if
General Graham and the engineer officer on duty had not
collected u. few belated workmen of the 24th and 42nd, who
made a stand behind the parapet, and opened a fire which
checked the advance till the relieving division came running
up rrom the renr. The French then turned and retired with
little loss into the place.
The advanced parallel and Santa Cruz were not reoccupied
while daylight Insted, but at about 4.30 in the afternoon the
three batteries opened with the 27 guns, which had been placed
in them. Two 18-pounders in thc left battery were directed
against the convent of San Francisco, the rest against the
northern part of the city, on the same point where Ney's breach
bad been made in 1810. Of the gunners, 430 in number, nearly
300 were Portuguese 1. The fire opened so late in the day
that by the time that it was growing steady and accurate
dusk fell, and it was impossible to judge what its future effect
would be.
Meanwhile, when the big guns were silent, the work of pre-
paring for the nearer approach was resumed after dark. The'
most important move on the night of thc 14tb-15th was the
storming of the convent of San Francisco by three companies
1 Scc Dick80" Papt:T8, JUIl. 1812.
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of the 40th regiment. The garrison made little resistance, and
retired, abandoning three guns and two wowlded men. Imme-
diately aftcrww:ds the posts in the neighbouring suburb were
all withdrawn by Barric, who considered that he could not
afrord to lose men Irom his small Iorce in the defence ol allUring
works, when his full strength was needcd for the holding of the
town itself. Santa Cru?, on the other side, though recovered in
the morning, was abandoncd on this same night for identical
reasons. The French general was probably wise, but it was
a great pront to the besiegers to bc relicved from the flanking
fire of both thesc convcnts, which would have enmaded the
two ends of the second purallel. That work itsclf was re-
occupied under the cover of the night: the gabions upset during
the sortie of the morning were replaced, and much digging was
done behind them. The zig-zags of the approach from the
upper trenches on the Great Teson were deepened and improved.
All this wus accomplished undcr (l hcU\'y fire Irom the guns on
the northern walls, which werc so close to the second pamllcl
that their shells, even in the dark, did considerable damage.
When day dawned on the 15th, the breaching batteries on the
Great Tcson opened again with eX<.:c1lcnt erfect. Their fire was
concentrated on the rebuilt wall 01 the enceinte, where the
French breach of 1810 had been mended. It wus necessary to
batter both the town wall proper and theJausse-braye below it,
so as to make, as it were, 31l upper and a lower breach, corre-
sponding to each other, in the two stages of the enceinte. It
will be remembered tlmt, as was explained in our narrative of
the French siege I, the mediaeval ramparts of the old wall
showed well above the eighteenth-century fau88e~braye whieh
ran around n.nd below them, while the latter wus equally visible
above the gIads, which, owing to the downward slope from
the Little 'l'eson, gave much less protection than wus desirable
to the work behind it. The French breach had been carefully
built up; but, lime being scarce in the neighbourhood, the
mortar used in its repairs had been of inferior quality, little
better than clay in many places. The litoncs, therefore, had
1 See vol. iii. p. 239. The illustration of Rodrigo on the morning
dter the stonn, inserted to faee page 170 of this volume, shows tbe
factll excellently.
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never set into a solid mass, even eighteen months after they
had been laid, and began to fly lreely under the continuous
battering.
The breaching being so successful from the first, Wellington
resolved to hurry on his operations, though there wcre still no
signs that l\farmont or Dorsellne was about to attempt any
relief of the garrison. Yct it WIIS certain that they must be on
the move, and cvery day saved would render the prospect of
their interference lcss immincnt. Accordingly it was settled
that the second parallel shoulU be completed, and that, if
possible, more batteries should be placed in it, but that it was
to be looked upon rather as the base from whieh an assault
should be delivered than us the ground from which the main
purt of the bl'eaching work was to be done. That was to be
accomplished from the original parallel on the Great Teson, and
one more battery was marked out on this hill, closc to thc
Reuout Rellaud, but a little lower down the slope, und slightly
in advance of the threc original batteries. !i'rom this new
structure, whose crection would havc been impossible so long
us San Francisco was still held by the French, Wellington
proposed to batter n. second weak point in the ellui'11te, a
mediaeval tower three hundred yards to the right of the original
breach. All the attention of the French being concentrated on
the work in the second parallel, this new battery (No. 4) was
easily completed and armed in three days, and was ready to
open all its objective on Junuury 18th.
Meanwhile the completion of the second parallel proved
a difficult and rather costly business. By Wellington's special
orders nil the energies of the lJritish batteries were devoted to
Lreaching, and no attempt was made to subdue the fife of those
parts of the enceinte which bore upon the trenches, but were
far from the points selected for assault. Hence the French,
undisturbed by any return, wcre able to shoot fust and fUl'iously
at the advanced works, and searehed the second parallel from
end to cud. It was completed on thc 18th, and two guns were
brought down into a battery built on the highest point of the
Little Teson, only 180 yards from the walls. An attempt to
sap forward from the western end of the second parallel, so as
to get a lodgement a little nearer to thc place, was completely
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foiled by the incessant fire of grape kept up on the sap-head.
After many workmen had been killed, the endeavour to push
forward at this point was abandoned, sueh an advanee forming
no essential part of 'Wellington's scheme. The encmy's fire all
the sceond parallel was madc somcwhat lcss effective on the
16th-18th by digging rifle-pits in front of the parallel, from
which picked marksmen kept up a carefully aimed fusillade 011 the
embrasures of the guns to left and right of the breach. Many
artillerymen were shot through the head while serving their
pieces, and the discharges became less incessant and much less
accurate. But the fire of the besieged was nevel' subdued, lllld
the riflemen in the pits snUered very heavy casualties.
The 18th may be described as the crucial day of the siege.
The new battery (No. 4) on the Greater Teson opened that
morning against the towerwhich had been chosen as its objective.
By noon it was in a very ruinous condition, and ut dusk all its
upper part Cell Corward 'likc an avulanche,' as the governor
says in his report, and covered all the platform of theJausse-braye
below. Barrie remarks that this point was admirably chosen
by Wellington's engineers, ' it was unique in the enceinte for the
facilities which it offered Cor breaching and the difficulties tor
defence. This is the spot where the walls arc lowest, the
parapet thinnest, and the platforms both 01 the ramparts and
the fausse-braye narrowest. Moreover here had been situated
the gun which best flanked the original great breach 1.'
The garrison found it impossible either to repair the breaches
or to clear away the debris which had fallen trom them. All
that could be done was to commence retrenchments and
inner defences behind them. This was done with some effect
at the great breach, where cuts were made in the ramparts on
each side 01 the demolished section, parapets thrown up behind
the cuts, and two 24-pounders dragged into position to fire
laterally into the lip of the easy slope of debris which trended
up to the ruined wall. At the second or smaller breach much
less was act.'Omplishcd-the warning was short, (or it had never
been guessed that this tower was to be battered, and the space
upon whic hwork could be done was vcry limited. It was hoped
that the narrowness of the gap might be its protection-it was
t Sce Barril!'~ report ill appendix to Bchnl~s, iv. p. 29fl.
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but a seam in the waD compared with the gaping void at the
first and greater breach.
On the morning of the 19th the fire was recommenced, with
some little assistance lrom the two guns which had now begun
to work lrom the advanced battery in the second parallel. The
breaches continued to crumble: that at the tower looked as
easy in slope (though not nearly so broad) as that at the original
point of attack, llnd an incessant fU'C aD day kept the enemy
from making any repairs. No' more could be done for the
breaches, wherelore Wellington ordered that some of the siege-
guns should tUl'll thcir attention to silencing the Freneh fire
from the remoter points of the northern wall. Several of their
guns were dismounted: but even by dusk there were many still
making reply.
There was 110W nothing to prevent the assault from being
delivered, since it had been settled that no attempt was to be
made to sap up nearer the walls, or to blow in the eoullterscarp.
Wellington wrote his elaborate directions for the storm sitting
under cover in a trench of one ol the advanced approaches, to
which he had dcsecnded in order to get the closest possible view
of the fortress 1.
The orders werc as follows. The chosen time was seven
o'clock, an hour suffieient.1y dark to allow the troops to get
forward without being seen as they filled the trenches, yet soon
enough alter nightfall to prevent the Freneh from doing any
appreciable repairs to the breaches under cover of the dark.
The main assaults were to be dclivered by the 31'd Division
on the great breach, and by the Light Division on the lesser
breach. There were also to bc two false attacks delivered by
small bodies of Portuguese troops, with the purpose of distract·
ing the attention of the besieged to points remote from the
main assault: either of them might be turned into serious
attempts at escalade if the circumstances favoured.
Thc two brigades of the 3rd Division were given two separate
Ways of approaching the main breach. Campbell's brigade
[2/5th, 77th, 2/83rd, 94th], after detaching the 2/83rd to line
the second parallel, and to keep up a continual fire on the walls,
was to assemble behind the ruined convent of Santa Cruz.
, Joncs'll Sieges, i. p. 137.
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Debouching from thence, the 2/5th, turning to the right, were
to make for the place where the countcrscarp (covering the
whole north front) joined with the body of the place, under the
castle and not far from the river. 'fhey were to hew down the
gate by which the ditch was entered, jump down into it, and
from thence scale the fausse-braye by ladders, of which a dozen,
25 feet long, were issued to them. It was probable that there
would be few French found here, as the point was 500 yards
west of the main breach. After establishing themselves upon
the fau.sse-braye, they were to scour it eastward, clearing off any
parties of the enemy that might be found upon it, and to push
for the breach, where they would meet the main assaulting
column. The 94th were to make a similar dash at the ditch,
half-way between the point allotted to the 5th and the breach,
but not to mount thefausse-braye: they were to move to their
left along the bottom of the ditch, clearing away any palisades or
other obstacles that might be found in it, and finally to join the
main column. The 77th was to form the brigade-reserve, and
support where necessary.
l\Iaekinnon's brigade was to undertake the frontal storm of
the great breaeh. Its three battalions (1/45th, 74th, 1/88th)
were to be preceded by a detnehmcnt of 180 sappers carrying
hay-bags, which were to be thrown into the ditch to make the
leap down more easy. The head of the column was to be
fonned by 800 volunteers Irom all the battalions, then eame
the main body in their usual brigade order, the l/45th leading.
Power's Portuguese (9th and 21st Line) {armed the divisional
reserve. and were to be brought down to the second parallel
when Mackinnon's column had usccndcd the brcach.
A support on the left Rank of the brcach was to be provided
by three companies of the 95th, detached from the Light'Divi-
sion, who, starting from beside the convent of San }~rancisco,
werc to carry out the same functiollil that were assigned to the
94th on the other side, viz. to descend into the diteh half-way
between the two breaches, and proceed along its bottom,
removing any obstacles found, till thcy joined Mackinnon's
brigade at the foot or thc wall.
Cmufurd, with the rest of the Light Division, which was to
move from the left of San Francisco, was to make the attack
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on the lesser breach. The storming-column was to be formed
of Vandeleur's brigade (1/52nd and 2/52nd, four companies of
the Ij95th, and the Brd Ca<;adores). Bamard's brigade was to
form the reserve, and to close in towards the place when the
leading brigade should reach the ditch. The division was to
detach marksmen (four companies of the 95th) who were to
keep up a fire upon the encmy on thc walls, just as the 2/83rd
did for the 3rd Division. A provision of hay-bags carried by
eae;:adores was made, in the samc fashion as at the great breach. ______
The two subsidiary fnlse attacks were to be made-one by
Pack's Portuguese (1st and 16th regiment..'l) on the outworks
of the gate of Santiago on the south·east side o[ the town, the
other by O'Toole's Portuguese battalion (2nd Ca9udores),
headed by the light company of the 2/83rd, on the outwork
below the castle, close to the bank of the Aguedll.. This column
would have to rush the bridge, which the l<"'rcnch had left
unbroken, because it was completely commanded by the castle
and other works immediately above it. Both the Portuguese
columns carried ladders, and were authorized t,o attempt an
escalade, if they met little or no resistance at points so remote
from the breaches, as was quite possible.
Both the Light and 3rd Divisions were fresh troops that
night, us the 4th Division hud been in clmrgc of the trenches
on the 19th. The stormers marched straight up from their
distant camps to the starting-points assigned to them in the
afternoon. The news that the Light Division had moved to the
front out of its turn was the clearest indication to the whole
urmy that thc assault was fu::cd for that night.
A few minutes before seven o'clock the storm began, by the
sudden rush o[ the 2/5th, under Major Uidgc, from behind
the convent of Santa Cruz, across. the open ground towards the
ditch on their left of the eastlc. The governor had expectcd
no attack from this. side, the troops on the walls were few, and
it was ouly UDder t\ very scattering fife that the battalion
hewed down the gate in the palisades, got down into the ditch,
and then planted their ladders against the Jau8se.brayc. 'fhcy
were established upon it within five minutes of their start, and
then, turning to th~ir left, drove along its platform, chasing
before them a few small parties of the enemy. In this wa.y they
N 2
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soon arrived at the heap of ruins representing the spot where
jalJ.$se-braye and inner wall had been well nigh battered into one
common mass of debris. Here they found the 94th, who had
entered the ditch at the same time as themselves, but a little
to their left, and had met with cqual1y feeble resistance, already
beginning to mount the lower slopes of the breach. Thus by
a curious chance these two subsidiary columns arrived at the
crucial point a little before tberorlorn hope or the main storming·
column. Mackinnon's bri~ade, starting from the parallels, bad
la climb over the parapets of the trenches, and to cross rougher
ground thnn the 5th and 94th: they werc also hindered by the
tremendous fire opened upon them: all the attention of the
French had been eonccntrated on thcm from the flrst, as their
route and their destination \\'ere obvious. Hence, unlike
Campbell's battalions, they suffered heavil)' before they crossed
the glacis, and they were delayed a little by waiting for the
hay-bags which were to help their descent. When the storming-
party, under !\Iajor Manners of thc 14th, reached the breach,
it was already covered by men of the 5th and nUh. The whole,
mixed together, scrambled up the higher part of the debris
under a deadly fire, and reached the lip of the breach, where
they found before them a sixteen-foot drop into the level of the
city, on to ground covered with entanglements, beams, chevaux
defrisc, and other obstacles accumulated there by the prescience
of the governor. On each flank, for the whole breadth of the
wall, was a cutting, surmounted by a parapet, on which was
mounted a 24-pounder firing grape downwards on to them.
The head of the column had scarcely gained the lip of the
breach when it wa" raked by the simultaneous discharge 01
these two guns, whieh absolutely exterminated the knot of men
at its head. At the same time an explosion took place lower
down, from some powder-bags which the enemy had left umong
the debris and fired by means of a train. The impetus of the
<.'Olumn was checked, and it was some little time before more
men fought their way up to the summit: a second discharge
from the two flanking guns made ha....oc of these, and shut in by
the cuts, upon a space of about 100 feet wide, with the imprac-
ticable descent into the town in [ront, the assailants came to
a stand again. The only way out o[ the difficulty was to cross
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the cuts, and storm the parapets behind them. This was done
at both cnds;" on the onc sidc a small party of the 88th, throw-
ing down t.I~eir muskets, so as to have hands to climb with,
scrambled over the gap and slew with their bayonets the gunners
at the left-hand gun, before they (:ould fire a third round; thcy
were followed by many men of the !.lth, and a looting was
gained on the ramparts behind the obstacle 1. On the right
flank Major Wyldc, the brigudc-major of Muckinuon's brigade,
found a few planks which the French had been using to bridge
the cut before the storm, and which they hud thrown down but
neglected to removc, These werc rclaid in huste, and a mlU;S of
men of the 45th rushed across them under a dreadful fire, and
loreed the right-hand retrenchment. The garrison, giving way
at both cnds, fired a mine prepared lUlder a postern of the
upper wall as they retired 2, This produced an explosion much
more deadly than the one at the commencement of the storm;
it slew among others General Mackinnoll, the senior brigadier
of the 3rd Division, whose body was found thrown some
distance away and mueh blackcncd with powder,
Meanwhile, even before the fighting at the great breach was
over, the fate of Ciudad Rodrigo had been settled at another
point, The storm of the lesser brefich by the Light Division
had been successful, fitter a shorter fight and with mueh less
loss of blood. Vamlcleur's brigmlc here conducted the assault,
headed by 300 volunteers from the three British regiments of
the division under Major Gcorgc Napier of the 52nd; Lieutenant
Gurwood of the same regiment had the forlorn hope of 25 men.
The column did not come under fire for some time alter leaving
cover, but the assault hud been expected, und ll. keen wateh
was being kept. Nevertheless the ditch was reached without
any great loss, and the stormcrs leaped in, unfiided for the most
part by the hay~bags which 150 of Elder's cayadores were to
1 For a lively account of this exploit see Grattan's With tht Connaught
Rangr1!, p. ]54.
I Many narratives speak of Gener~1 i}laekinnon as being killed by the
first explosion, and othcn (including Wellington's dispatch) call the secoud
explosion that of an expense magazine fired by accident. Barri~·s report,
however, settles the fact that it was a regular mine: and for Ms.ckinnon's
death after !.he storming or the euts I follow the narnltive by un eye·
witness nppcnded at the clId or the genenll's t1iury.
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have cast down for them, for the greater part of the Portuguese
were late in arriving 1. They then began to plant their ladders,
but the forlorn hope went wrong in an odd way, for mO\'ing too
far to the left along thefausse-braye they scrambled up and over
a traverse 2 whieh had been built across it, so flllding themselves
still 011 the same level. The head of the main storming purty
was better directed, and poured up the breach, which was very
narrow but clean and clear: the only obstacle at its head was a
disabled gun placed hori7.ontally across the gap. Another piece,
still in working order, had a diagonal view of the whole slope.
The first discharge of this gun, crammed with grape, shattered
the head of the column: Major Napier was dashed down with
a mangled arm, Colonel Colborne, who WfIS leading the 52nd,
got a ball in the shoulder, and several other officers fell. At
about the same moment General Craufurd, who was standing
011 the glacis above the ditch, directing the movements of the
supports, received a bullet which passed through his arm, broke
two ribs, and finally lodged in his spine. By his mortal hurt
and the almost simultaneous wounding of his senior brigadier,
Vandeleur, the command of the Light Division passed to
Andrew Barnard of the 95th, who wns leading the rear
brigade.
But the division had been started on it!> way up the breach,
and the gun 011 its flank got no second opportunity to fire. After
its first discharge the survivors at the head of the column, now
led by Uniacke and W. Johnston both of the 95th, dashed
furiously up the remaining few feet of debris and reached the
summit. The voltigeurs facing them broke before the onset,
and since therc were here no traverses or cuts to prevent thc
extension of the troops to right or left as they reached their
goal, many hundreds were soon in possession of the ramparts
, Several narrators aceuse them or shirking, but Geo. Napicr writes
(Life. p. 215), ' Neither Elder nor his excell<mt regiment were likely to
neglect any duty, and J am sure the blame rested elsewhere, for George
Elder was always ready for any service.' Compare George SimmollS's
autobiography-possibly he put things out by ordering the Portuguese
company to carry the ladders, which he clearly was not authori7;ed to do.
[A Briti$11 Riflemoll, p. 221.)
~ Some narrators say n 1011" ravelin, but the best lluthority is in favour
of its having beell a traverse.
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on each side ol the breach. The men ol the 52nd wheeled to the
lelt and swept the ramparts as far as the Salamanca gate, which
they found walled up: the 43rd and Rifles turned to the right,
and came upon the French retreating Irom thc great breach,
where the Srd Division were just bursting through. Some of
them arrived just in time to suffer from the fmal explosion
which killed Mackinnon and so many ol his brigadc 1.
With their ]jne forced in two places simultaneously, the
garrison could do no more: there was a little fighting in the
stl'cels, but not much. The majority of the garrison retired
to the Plaza l\Inyor in lront of the castle, and there laid down
their arms in mass. At the same time the two Portuguese
subsidiary attacks had succeeded. O'Toolc's cuS!ndol'es, headed
by the light company of the 2/83rd, had not only captured by
escalade the outwork against which they were directed, but
found and hewed down its sally-port by which they got entrance
into the town. Pack's brigadc, on the other side of the place,
stormed the reden in front ol the Santiago gate, and lodged
themselves therein, capturing its small garrison. The governor
and his stall had taken refuge in the castle, a mediaeval building
with a lofty square tower commanding the Agucda bridge.
They had hardly Rny men with them, and wisely surrendered
at the first summons 2.
Seven thousand excited and victorious soldiers, with all
traces of regimental organization lost, were now scattered
through the streets of Ciudad Rodrigo. This was the first time
on which the Peninsular Army had taken a plaee by assault,
• The point has often been raised as to whether it was not the success
of the Light Division at the lesser breach which enabled the 3rd Division
to break through ut the greater. Some Light Division diarists (e. g. Harry
Smith) actually state that it was their attaek on the rear of the defenders
which made them flinch from a position whieh theyhad hitherto maintained.
1 think that the ell.SC is decidcd in favonr of the 3rd Dh'ision by Bclmllll's
statement that the i<'rellch fired the mine lit the grt'nt brench only when
the 3nl Division luu.! got through, combined with the ruct tbat the leading
men or the Light Division reached Ule huek or the great breach just in
time to suffer from the explosion, which killed Captain Uniaeke or the Q5th
and a few oU.en. Apparently, therefore, the breach was forced before
the head or the Light Division stormers had come up, but only just before.
• There is considerable eontrovers~' as to what officer received Darril:'s
surrender. For the Gurwood-Mackie dispute see note in Appendix.
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and the consequent confusion does not seem to have been rore·
seen by any onc. But while the officers and the steady men
were busy in collecting the French prisoners. throwing open
the gates, and seeing to the transport of the wounded into
houses, the baser spirits-and in every battalion, as Sir John
Colborne remarks 1, there were in those days from fifty to a
hundred incorrigibles-turned to plunder. The first rush was
to the central brandy-store of the garrison, where hundreds got
drunk in a few minutes, and scveral killed themselves by
gorging raw spirits wholesale_ But while the mere drunkards
proceeded to swill, and then turned out into the streets firing
objectlessly in the air, the calculating rascals set themselves to
the plunder of private houses, which was a more profitable task
than rummaging the French magazines. There was an immense
amount of unlicensed pillage und wanton destruction of
property-inexcusable in a place where only a small minority
of the people were Afrancesados, and the majority had been
getting ready to welcome their deliverers. The officers did
their best to restore order, • the voice of Sir Thomas Pictoll
was heard with the strength of twenty trumpcls proclaiming
damnation to all and sundry, while Colonels Barnard and
Cameron with other active officers, sei:r.ed the broken barrels of
muskets, which were lying about in great abundance, and
belaboured misdemeanants most unmercifully 2.' But active
officers could not be everywhere-three houses, including the
spirit store in the great square, were set on fire by drunken
plunderers, and it wa.,.", feared that a conflagration might arise,
which fortunately did not happcn, for the solid stone structures
were not easily kindled. The disorder, however, did not reach
the shameful piteh which was afterwards seen at Badajoz and
S1. Sebastian. A competent observer, present fit all three
sacks, remarks that' no tov.'Il taken by assault suffered less than
Rodrigo. It is true that sohlicrs of all rcgiments got drunk,
pillaged, and made great noise and confusion in streets and
houses, despite of every exertion of their ol1icers to prevent it.
But bad and revolting as such scenes arc, I never heard that
either the Frcnch garrison, afLer jts surrender, or the inhabitants
, See his "~JJe all/I Letters, p. :lU6.
, I(jllcuid, Advenlures illll/tJ lliJlc Brigade, p. 117.
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suffered personal indignities or cruelty from the troops 1.' 'l'here
were apparently no lives lost, except those of a few men shot
accidentally by their drunken comrades, and of certain drunkards
who perished in the spirit store. The greater part of the men
were under control long be!ore dawn, and were collected by their
officers on the ramparts: they marched out next morning,
when the 5th Division, newly arrived at the front from its
distant cantonments in Beiru, came into the town. By an
unfortunate accident an explosion of an unsuspected magazine
took place, just as the French prisoners were being marched out,
and some or them and of their escort were killed 2. The storming
regiments made a strange spectacle as they left thc town. 'As
we marched over the bridge dressed in all varieties imaginable,
some with jack-boots on, others with white French trousers,
o.thers in frock·coats with epaulettes, some even with monkeys
Oil their shoulders, we met the 5th Division on their way to
repair the breaches. They immediatel)' formed upon the left
of the road, presented arms, and cheered us. I was afterwards
told that Lord Wellington, who saw us puss, inquired of his
staff, .. Who the devil arc those fellows 3? '"
The garrisoll, out of u little under 2,000 men present when
the siege began, showed 60 officers and ],300 rank and file of
unwoundcd prisoners. Eight officers hUll becn killcd, 21
wounded, and about 500 rank and file, mostly on the day
of the assault. The artillery and engineers suffered most-of
8 artillery officers in the place 5 were killed or wounded, of
three engineer officers two fell.
1 LeacIa's Sketches in ti,e Life of all Old So/dit!T, p. 250. For an amusing
story about a plundering Connaught Hanger who came down u chimney, see
Crattnll, p. 102. He trk>d to propitiate the ollil.'Cr who roulld him by
pre.'<Cllling him with l.\ case or surgical instrllnlcnbl. Kincaid RllCo.kll or
worse WHIn plllndcr-llrmcd violcn~ "lid wlIm Cll!<CS or rape.
I So Kapier and most other nuthorilics.•John Jones, however, says that
the explosion was not accidenlal, but delibeflll.e-some English deserters
had hidden themselves in a small magazine under the rampart. 'These
desperate men, on seeing an officer approach, deeming discovery and
capture inevitable, and assured that an ignominious death. would follow,
blew themselves up in the magazine. The c,,-oplosion first found vent
through the door, Rnd shot the refugees lip into the street, some alive, but
so mutilated, blackened. null distorted, '''' I" be painrul to behold.'
• Costello (nLigiLt Division Imrralor), pp. 1111_2.
180 TI-rE CAPTURE OF CIOOAD HODRIGO [JAN. III
The British and Portuguese loss during the whole siege was
9 officers kiUed and 70 wounded, and of other ranks 186 were
kiUed and 846 wounded, with 10 missing-apparently deserters.
Of these, 59 officers and 503 rank and file fell in the actual storm.
The tables appended at the cnd of this volume demonstrate
that the 3rd Division sufIert.'d far marc heavily than the Light-
the battalions with the greatest losses were the 2/5th and 94th,
which were early on the great breach and got the benefit of
the explosion. Of the 9 officers killed or mortally hurt two were
generals, Craufurd and l\Iackinllon. Thc dcath of the former,
who lingered in great agony for four days, though shot through
to the spine, was no small event in the war: his talents were
sadly missed in its latter years: an outpost officer of his
capacity would have been invaluable to Wellin~,'ton during the
fighting in the Pyrenees in 1813, when the Light Division,
though regimentally n.s good as ever, much lacked the skilful
leading of its old ehief. He was a man with many fTiends and
many enemies: of his merits and defects I spoke at length
in another place 1. Hcre I feel compelled to quote nothing
more than the words of his rriend, Lord Londonderry-the
Charles Stewart of the Peninsular War. 'He was an officer of
whom the highest expectation had becn formed, and who on
every occasion found an opportunity to prove that, had his ljfe
been spured, tbe proudest hopes of his country would not huve
been disappointed, and he was a man to know whom in his
profession without admiring him was impossible. To me his
death occasioncd that void which thc removal of a sineere
friend alone produces. While the memory of the brave and
the skilful shall continue to be cherished by British soldiers,
he will not be forgotten, and the hand which scrawls this
lnunble tribute to his worth must be cold as his own, before the
mind which dictates it shall cease to think of him with affection
and regret 2.'
• Sce vu!. iii. pp. 233-7.
• Londonderry's PCII:jllSU/ll1' War, ii. p. 268.
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SECTION XXXII: CHAPTER Il
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL OF CIUDAD
RODRIGO
TilE extraordinary speed with which Wellington had in
twelve days reduced Ciudad Hodrigo. a fortress that had held
out for twenty-four days of open trenches when besieged by
Ncy in 1810, surprised the captor himself, who had reckoned
on taking no shorter time in its leaguer than had the French.
But it absolutely appalled his two adversaries, Marmont and
Dorscnnc. whose whole scheme of operations had rested on the
idea that they could count on some three weeks or morc for
preparation, when the news that the place was invested got to
their hands.
Thiebault, the governor of Salamanca, had been warning
both the commander of the Army of the North and the com-
mander of the Army 01 Portugal for some weeks that Wellington
might move at any moment L. But his reports lo the effect
that the British ·were making gabions and fascines, preparing
a bridge over thc Agueda, and bringing up siege-guns to
Almeida, made little 01' no impression on his superiors, because
they had come to the conclusion that it was unlikely that
Wellington would undertake a siege at midwinter. His prepara·
lions, they thought, were probably intended to force his
enemies to concentrate, at a time when roads were bad and food
ullprocurublc: • ils n'ont cl'autre but que de nOllS Iuirc Iaire de
faux mouvements,' said one of l\1armont's aides-de-camp. It
was only in the spring that the allied army would become really
enterprising and dangerous.
Astonishing as it ma)' appear, though Wellington's troops
started on January 2nd, and though Rodrigo was invcsted and
the Hedout Renaud stormed on January 8th, the definitive
1 See TIli~bllUlt'S ....11tlllQirea, iv. pp. !i51-2. Extract.ll from two of his
letters lire printed in Marmont's Mtmoius, iv, pp. 280-1, and bear out all
that he says in his own book,
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news that the siege had actually begun only reached Salamanca
on January 13th. No better proot could be givcn of the
prcearious nature ot thc French hold on the kingdom of Leon.
The fnet was that the guenilleros of J uliun Snnchez so obsessed
nil the roads from SalnmanCil. to Hodrigo, that no messenger
could pass without a very large escort. Barrie only got the
news that he was attacked to Thicbault by entrusting it to
a Spanish cmissary, who carried his note in disguise, and by
a long detour. Marmont and Dorsenne only received it on the
14th; King .Joseph at Madrid only on the 25th. On the 13th
Marmont was in such u state of blindness us to thc actual
situation that he was writiug to Berthicr that 'si I'armee
anglaise passnit l'Agueda j'attcndrais sur In 'l'ormes la division
du Tage et les troupes que le General Dorsenne pourrait
m'amener, 'I1Iais sans doute ee eM n'arriveru pas. Ciudad
Rodrigo sera approvisionne jusqu'illa rccoltc, ct 1\ moi.ns d'un
siege il ne doit pas t:tre l'objct d'aucllne sollicitude 1.' Welling-
ton, when this was written, had already passed troops over the
Agucda somc ten days back, and hud becn beleaguering Ciudad
Rodrigo for five. Yet Marmont was dnting from Valladolid,
which was not much over 100 miles from the hard-pressed
fortress. Truly, thanks to the guerriUeros, the' fog of war'
was lying heavily round the Marshul.
Owing to t\ circumstance of which Wellington could have
no knowledge, the moment which he chose for his advance was
evcn morc propitious than he guessed. Hc knew of the march
of Montbrun towards Valencia, and had made it the determining
factor in his operations. But he was not, and could not be,
aware of another fact of high importancc. On Dccember 29th
l\tu.rmont, then tit Tulavcru, had received a dispatch from
Paris, dated on the 13th of the same month, informing him
that the Emperor had resolved on making a sweeping change
with regard to the respectivc duties and stations o[ the Armies
of the North and of Portugal. Hitherto Dorsenne had been
in charge of the whole kingdom of Lean; the troops stationed
in it belongcd to his army, and on him dcpended thc garrisons
of Ciudad Rodrigo, Astorgn, and its other fortresses. He was,
therefore, rcsponsible for the keeping back of Wellington from
, l\Inrlllont to Bcrlhicr, VUlllldolid, Jun. 1:1, 1812.
1812] :MARl\lONT'S MIDWINTER MAHCH 189
all the ground north of the Sierra de Gata. l\Iarmont, with his
Army of Portugal, had to 'contain' the Anglo-Portuguese army
south of that range, and had charge of the valley of the Tagus-
northern Estremadura and those parts of New Castile which
had been taken away from King Joseph's direct control. From
this central position the Duke of Ragusa had hitherto been
supposed to be able to stretch out a hand to Dorsenne, in case
of Wellington's making a move in the valley of the Douro, to
Soult in easc of his showing himself opposite Badajoz. This
indeed l\larmont hud done: he had brought up his army
to Dorsenne's aid in September, at the time of El Bodon and
Aldea da POlite: he had carried it down to the Guacliana and
assisted Soult to relieve Badojoz in Junc.
Berthier's dispatch \ received on December 29th-it had
taken sixteen days to reach its destination-informed l\Iarmont
that the Emperor had resolved to plllcc the tllSk of' contllining'
Wellington, when he should operate north or the 'l'agus, in the
hands of one instead of two eommanders-in-chief. 'Considering
the importancc of placing the command on the whole frontier
of Portugal under a single general, His Majesty has decided
that the provinces of Avila, Salamanca, Plasencia, Ciudad
Rodrigo, t.he kingdom of LcOH, Palcncia, and thc Ast.urias,
shall belong to the Army of ·Portugal.' Along with them were
to be handed over to Marmont Souham's division, then lying
in the direction of Zamora, Bcnavente, and La Banew, and
Bonnet's division, then in the Asturias-whose central parts
(as it will be remembcred Z) that general had reconquered in
November 1811. The district of the Army of the North was for
the future to be limited to the eastern parts of Old Castile,
Santander, Biscay, and Navarre. The real cause of this change,
though Berthier's dispatch lays no stress upon it, was the order
recently sent to Dorsenne, which bade him return to France
the two strong di\'isiolls of the Imperial Guard, which had
hitherto formed the most important and erreetive section of
the Army of the North. 'They were wanted !or the probable
Russian wnr, and without them Napoleon rightly judged that
Dorsenne would be too weak to 'contain' Wellington, hold
, Printed in full ill I\lllrmout's Mtllloire~, iv. pp. 211-6.
• Sce vol. iv. p. 586.
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down all Loon, and observe the Galieians, in addition to hunting
Mina and curbing the incursions of Longa and Porlier. Where-
fore he resolved to confine the activity of thc Army of the North
to the lands east and north of 13urgos, where its main task would
be the crushing of Mina and his compatriots. Marmont should
take upon his shoulders the entire responsibility for holding back
the Anglo-Portugu<.'SC.
But, by the Emperor's orders, the Army of Portugal, though
now charged with a much heavier task than before, was not
to get any appreciable increase in numbers. It is true that
Marmout was to take over thc divisions of Souham and Bonnet,
along with the regions that they were occupying. These were
strong units, and would have increased his total strength by
16,000 men. But at the same time he was told that Thiebault's
division 1, thc other force in the kingdom of Leon, was not to
be given him, but to be withdrawn eastward and to remain
under Dorsenne. With it were to go other details belonging
to the Army of the North, employed in garrison duty in the
valley or the Domo, such us the Swiss battalions long garrisoning
the city of Lean, llenavente, and Valladolid 2. Now it was clear
that if these garrisons were withdrawn, :Marmont would have
to find other troops from his own divisions to replace them.
Moreover, he was in addition instructed \..Imt Bonnet's division,
though now to be regarded as under his command, was not on
any excuse to be moved out of the Asturias. 'It is indispensable
that he should remain there, because in that position he menaces
Galicia, and keeps down the pcoplc of the mountnins. You
would have to use more troops to guard all the edge of the plain
from Leon to St. Sebastian than arc rcquired for the Asturias.
It is demonstrable in theory, and clearly proved by experience,
that of all operations the most important. is the occupation of
the Asturias, which makes the right of the army rest upon the
sea, and continually threatens Gn.lieia.'
U, therefore, JIofarmont was forbidden to IIse Bonnct, and had
to replace all the existing garrisons of Leon (including that o[
Ciudad Rodrigo, as he was specially informed) by troops drawn
from his own force, he was given a. vast increase of territory to
1 34th Ugcr, ll3th Line, 4th Vistula, Neuchitel.
• Also two cavalry ~gimcllts, the 1st Hussars Ilnd 31st Chs.sscurs.
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watch, but no appreciable increase of numbers to hold it-
no more in fact than the difference between the strength of
Souham's division (placed on the side of gain) and that of the
new garrisons (placed on the side of loss). The net profit would
be no more than 8,000 or 4,000 men ut the most.
In addition the Marshal was restricted further as to the way
in which he was to dispose of his army. He was told to leave
one division (or, if he chose, two) in the valley of the Tagus,
about Plasencia and Almaraz, for the purpose of keeping up
his communication with Madrid and Andalusia. The rest of his
army was to be moved across the Sierra. de Cata into the valley
of the Douro, and its head-quarters were to be placed at VnJ.la-
dolid, or if possible at Salamanca. Therefore, if 'Wellington
advanced, only four and a half, or flYC and a half, divisions out
of the eight now comprising the Army of l'ortugal, could be
concentrated against him with promptitude: Bonnet and the
troops left in the Tagus valley would be long in arriving. So
would the nearest divisions of the Army of the North, of which
the most westerly would be as far off as Burgos, the rest still
farther towards the Pyrenees. Till he had received some of
these outlying succours, MarmOllt would be too weak to resist
Wellington. Five divisions (say 30,000 men) could not keep
thc Anglo-Portugucsc contained-though cight might very
possibly suffice.
But on December 29, 1811, l'tlarmont had not eight divisions
at his disposition. The Emperor's misguided order for the
Valeucian expedition was in progress of being executed, and
it was precisely on that same day that :Montbrun with two
divisions of foot und one of horse was marching off eastward
from La Mancha, in an exccntric direction, which took him to
thc shorc of the Mediterrancall.
i\larmont's available force, after this march began, was as
follows:
(1) Souluun's division at La BllllCza, Benavente, und
Zamora. watching Abadia's Army of Galicia. This unit
had yet to be informed that it had become part of the
Army of Portugal.
(2-3) Brennier's and Maucunc's divisions at Almaraz and
Talavera in the valley of the 'l'agus.
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(4) Clauscl's division at Avila.
(5) Ferey's division in La Mancha, keeping up communica-
tion with Montbrun's expeditionary column.
Thc other three divisions of the Army of Portugal, as now
constituted, those of Bonnet in the Asturias, and of fay and
Sarrut in march for Valencia, were hopelessly out of reach.
Being directed, in very clear and dccisivc tCl'ms, to transfer
himself in person to Valladolid or Salamanca, and to move the
bulk of his troops thither from the valley of the Tagus, the
:Marsnal had to obey. He directed Brennier's division alone to
remain behind at Almaraz and Talavera. Mallcllne and Clausel,
with Fercy prescntly to follow, began a toilsome march across
the mountains to Lean. They had to abandon the magazines
(such as they were) which had been collected for their subsis-
tence in winter-quarters, and to march across bad roads, in
the most inclemcnt month of the yeur, through UIl unpcopled
country, for cantonmcnts where no stores were ready for them.
While ~fa.rmont was marching up in the early days of January
to occupy his newly-designated positions, Dorsenne was em-
ployed in withdmwing his troops castward, away from the
neighbourhood oC Wcllington, towards the province of Burgos.
He himself stopped behind at Valladolid, to sce J\Iarmont and
hand ovcr in person the charge of the districts which he was
ordered to cvaeuate. His view oC the situation at the moment
may be judged by an extract from a letter which he directed to
l\Iarmont on January 51.
, I have the honour to enclose herewith two letters dated on
the 1st and 3rd instant lrom General 'l'hi6bault at Salamanca.
I attach no crcdence to thcir contents, 101' during the last six
months I have bccn receiving perpetually similar reports....
1£, contrary to my opinion, thc English have rcally made some
tentative movements on Ciudad Uodrigo, and il Julinn Sanehez
has tried to cut our communication with that place, I can only
attribute it to your recent movemcnt on Vulencia. In that
case, the unforeseen reappearance of YOUI' Excellency here may
make the enemy change his plan of operations, and may prove
harmCul to him.'
'l'hiebault had cried' Wolf!' too often to please DOl'senne,
, Marlllont, Corrcapondance, book xv biB, p. 287.
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and the latter had no real apprehension that Wellington was
already on the move. No more hud l\1armont. On arriving at
Valladolid on January 13th he wrote to Berthier (five days
after the trenches were opcned at Rodrigo I), 'It is probable
that thc English may be on the move at the end of February,
tmd t.hen I shall havc need of all my troops: I have, therc!ore,
told Montbrun to start on his backward march towards me
before the end of January 1.' By the end 01 January Rodrigo
hud alrctldy been lor t.welve days in the hands of the British
army.
And if Dorsenne and J\farmont were blind to the actual
situation, so, most of ull, was their master. The dispatch which
gave over the charge of the kingdom of Lean to .Marmont
contains the following paragraph:
• If Gcneral Wellington (sic) aftcr thc rainy season is over
(Le. after February) should determine to take the offensive,
you can then unite all yout' eight divisions Cor a battle: General
Dorsenne from Burgos would support you, by marching up
from Burgos to your assistance. But sueh u. move is not to be
expected (n'est pas presumable). The English, having suffered
heavy losses, and experiencing great difficulties in recruiting
their army, all considerations tend to make us suppose that they
will simply confine themselves to the defence of Portugal....
Your various dispatches seem to prove that it is at present no
longer possiblc Cor us to take the oflensivc against Portugal,
Badajo7. bcing bard)' provisioned, and Salamanca having no
magazines. It is necessary, thcreforc, to wait till the crops of
the present year arc ripe [June I), and till the clouds which now
darken the political situation to the North have disappeared.
His Majesty has no doubt that you will profit by the delay, to
organize and administer the provinces under your control with
justice and integrity, and to fonn large magazines.... The
conquest of Portugal and the immortal glory of deCenting
the English are reserved for you. Use therefore all possible
means to get yourselves into good condition for commencing
this campaign, when circumstances permit that the order for it
should be givcn.... Suggestions have been madc that Ciudad
llodrigo should be dismantled. The Emperor considers that
Ibid., p. 291.
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this would be a great mistake: the enemy, establishing himself
in that position, would be able to intercept the communications
between Salamanca and Plascneia, and that would be deplorable.
The English know quite well that if they press in upon Rodrigo,
or invest it, they expose themselves to be forced to deliver
a battle-that is the last thing they want: however, if they did
so expose themselves, it would be your duty to assemble your
whole army and march straight at them 1,'
Such being Napoleon's views at midwinter, it is strange to
find Napier asserting that the disasters of the Freneh at this
time were caused partly by the jealousies of his lieutenants,
partly by their falling to understand his orders in their true
spirit, so that they neglected them, or executed them without
vigour 2. Without denying that Marmont, Dorsennc, and
Soult wcre jealous of each other, wc may assert that the real
fundamental origin of all their disasters wus that their master
persisted in directing the details of the war from Paris, founding
his orders on data three weeks old, and sending those orders
to arrive another fortnight or three weeks after they had been
written. As a fair example of what wus perpetually happening
we may cite the following dates. Wellington started to move
on January 1st, 1812, as Thiehault wrote to Dorsenne (on the
report of a Spanish spy) all January 3rd: on January 27 the
general information that the Anglo-Portuguese army had
crossed the Agucda, without any details, reached the Emperor,
and caused him to dictate a dispatch lor Dorsenne, giving him
leave to detain the two divisions of the Imperial Guard under
orders for France, and to support Marmont with them: the
Emperor added that he hoped that by January 18th Montbrun
would be nearing Mlldrid, und that by the cnd of the month his
column would have joined the Army of Portugal. Eight days
before this dispatch was written Ciudad Rodrigo was already ill
Wellington's hands: the news of its fall on January 19th seems
to have reached Pa.ris on }~ebruary 11th 3, whereupon, as we
shall presently see, the Emperor dictated another dispatch to
1>Iarmont, giving elaborate instructions on the new condition
, Berthier to Murrnont, Dec. 13, flS nbove•
• Penill8f'lar War, iv. p. 184.
• Correspondence ill King Joseph's utters, viii. pp. 306-7.
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of aUairs. This (travclling quicker than most correspondence)
reached Marmont at Valladolid on }~ebruary 26 1 ; but of what
use to the lIIarshal on that day were orders dictated upon thc
basis of the state of aUairs in Leon on January 19th? 'On ne
dirige pas la gucrre a trois Oll quatre eents lielles de distance,'
a<; Thi6bault very truly observed 2.
It was precisely Napolcon's determination to dictate such
operations as Montbrun's Alicnnte expedition, or the trans-
ference of Marmont's head-quarters from the valley of the
Tagus to Valladolid, without any possible knowledge of the
circumstances of his lieutenants at the moment when his orders
would come to hand, that was the fatal thing. With wireless
telegraphy in the modern style he might have received prompt
intelligence, and sent dircctions that suited the situation. But
under the conditions of Spain in 1812 such a system was pure
madness.
'The Empcror chose,' as 1'lIarmont vcry truly obscrvcs, 'to
cut down the numbers of his troops in Spain [by withdrawing
the Guards and Poles) and to order a grand movement which
dislocated them for a time, precisely at thc instant whcu he
had increased the dispersion of the Army of Portugal, by
sending a detachment of 12,000 men against Valencia. He
was undoubtedly aware that thc English army was cantollcd
in a fairly concentrated position on the Agucda, the Coa, and
the Mondego. But he had made up his mind-I cannot make
out why-that thc English werc not in a condition to takc
the field: in every dispatch he repeated this statement.' In
fairness to his master, Marmont should have added that he was
of the same opinion himself, that Dorscnnc shared it, and that
both of them agreed to treat the Cassandra-like prophecies which
Thicbau.lt kept sending from Salamanca as ' wild and whirling
words.'
l'IIarmont reached Valladolid, marching ahead of the divisions
or Cllluscl and Maucunc, on the 11th or 12th of January. He
found Dorsenne waiting for him, and they proceeded to concert
mcasures for the exchange of territory and troops which the
Emperor had imposed upon them. After dinner on the evening
, See llIarmont's letter acknowledging its recc.ipt in his COrreSpl)1ldancc,
iv. pp. 342-3. • lI1tnwireR, iv. p. 554.
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of the 14th arrived Thiebault's definite llnd starUing news that
Wellington, with at lenst five divisions in hund, had invested
Rodrigo on the 8th, and was bringing up a heavy battering-
train. The siege had already been six days in progress.
This was vcry alarming intelligence. The only troops
uctually in hand for the relld or Rodrigo were Thiebault's small
division at Salamanca, Souham's much larger division about
La Bancza and Bcnavcnte. and Clausel's and l'IIaucunc's
divisions, now approaching Valladolid from the side of Avila.
The whole did not make much morc than 20,000 men, a fOfC(l
obviously insufficient to attack Wellington, if he were in such
strength as 'l'hiebault reported. Dorsenne at once sent for
Roguet's division of the Imperial Guard from Burgos: Mar-
mout ordered Bonnet to evacuate the Asturias and come down
by the route of Leon to join him: he also directed Brennier to
come up from the '1'agus, and Ferey to hurry his march from
La Mancha. Aides-dc-camp wcrc sent to hunt for Foy, who
was known to bc on thc borders of the Murcian regions, where
l\lontbrun hud dropped him on his march to Alicantc. :Mout-
brun himself, with the rest of his column, was also to turn baek
as soon as the orders should reach him.
By tins conccntration Marmont calculated 1 that he would
have 32,000 men in line opposite Wellington by January 26
or 27th, as Bonnet, Brennier, and Dorsenne's Guards should
have arrived by then. And by February 1 Fcrey and Fay ought
also to be up, and more than 40,000 men would be collected.
Vain dates! For Wellington captured llodrigo on the 19th,
sevcn days before the Marshal and Dorsenne could collect even
32,000 men.
Meanwhile Marmont pushed on for Salamanca, where the
troops were to concentrate, having with him only the divisions
of Clausel and Maueune. On January 21st he had reached
Fuente Saneo, one march north of Salamanca, when hc received
the appalling news that Ciudad Rodrigo had been stormed by
Wellington two days before. This.was a thunderstroke-his
army was caught not half concentrated, and he wus for the
moment helpless. He advanced as far as Salamanca, and there
picked up Thicbault's division, but e\'cn so he had not more
1 llUmo;rts, iv. Il. 184,
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that 15,000 men in hand, and dared not, with such a handful,
mar.eh on Rool'igo, to endeavour to recover it before 'VelIington
should have restored its fortifications. Bonnet had not yet
even reached Leon: Ferey and Dorsenne's Guard division had
not been heard of. As to where Foy and Montbrun might be
at the moment, it was hardly possible to hazard a guess. The
only troops that could be relied upon to appear within the
next few days were the divisions of Souham and Brennier.
Even with their help the army would not cx<.'Ced 26,000 or
28,000 men.
Meanwhile Wellington, with seven divisions now in hand, for
he had brought up both the 5th and the 7th to the front, was
lying on the Agueda, covering the repairs of Ciudad Rodrigo.
Marmont had at first thought that, elated by his recent success,
the British general might push his advance towards Salamanca.
He mude no signs of doing so; all his troops remained eoncen·
trated on the )lortuguesc frontier, ready to protect the rebuild·
ing of Rodrigo. Here, on the day after the storm, all the
trenches were filled in, and the debris 011 the breaches removed.
Twelve hundred men were then turned to the task of mending
the breaches, whieh were at first built up with faseines and
earth only, so as to make them rendy within a few days to
resist a coop-de.main. In a very short time they were morc or
less in a state or defence, and ou February 15th CastaI10s
produced a brigade of Spanish infantry to form the new garrison
of the place. The work was much retarded by the weather.
Throughout the time of the sicge it had beeu bitterly eold but
very dry: bul; on the 28th the wind shifted to the west, and
for the nine days following there was incessant and torrential
rain, which was very detrimental to the work. It had, however,
the compensating advantage of preventing Marmont from
making any udvance from Salamunca. Every river in Leon
was over its blinks, cyery ford impassable, the roads became
prllCtieally useless. When, therefore, on February 2nd 1 the
Agueda rose to such a height. that Wellington's trestle-bridge
was swept away, and the stone town-bridge or Rodrigo was
two reet under wuter, so that the divisions cantoned on the
l Napicr 6a)'6 Jan. 29. But Jones. then employed in repfliring nodrigo,
gives Feb. 2 in his diary of the work.
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Portuguese frontier were cut of[ from the halC-repaired fortress,
there was no pressing danger from the French, who were quite
unable to move forward.
Marmont. as we have seen, had reached l;'uente Saueo on
January 21st, and Salamanca on January 22nd. On the
following day Sonhurn, coming ill Crom the direction oC
Zamora, appeared at i\latilla, half way between Salamanca
and Ciudad Rodrigo, so that he was in touch with his
chief and ready to act as his advanced guard. But no other
troops had come up, und 011 the 24th the Marshal received a hasty
note from Dorsenne, saying that the division of the Young
Guard from Burgos would not reach the '.formes till February2 1.
With only four divisions at his disposition (Clauscl, l\laUCUllC,
Thiebault, Souham) Mnrmont dared not yet move forward,
since he knew that Wellington had at least six in hand, and he
shrank from committing himself to decisive action with little
more than 20,000 men assembled. On the 28th Dorsennc sent
in a still more disheartening dispatch than his last: he had
now ordered Hoguet's Guards, who had got as far forward as
Medina del Campo, to return to Burgos 2. The reasons given
were that Mina had just inflicted a severe blow on General Abbe,
the commanding officer in Navurre, by beating him near
Pampcluna with a loss of 400 men, that the Conde de Montijo,
Irom Aragon, had laid siege to Soriu., and wus pressing its
garrison hard, and that another assembly of guerrillcro bands
had attacked Arandadel Duero, and would take it, if it were not
succoured in a few days. 'I therelore trust that your excellency
will approve of my huving called back Roguet's division, its
artillery, and Laferriere's horse, to use them for a guerre a
oulra'nce against the guerrillas.' Nothing serious-he added-
would follow, as all reports agreed that Wellington was sitting
tight near Ciudad Rodrigo, and would make no advance toward
Salamanca.
No succours whatever, therefore, were to be expected from
the Army of the North: Bonnet had only just recrossed the
Cantabrian mountains, much incommoded by the bad weather
in thc passes, and Fay and Montbrun wcre only expected in the
, DorMollllC to i\I"rmont, rrolll VulhuJoli<..l, Feb. 2~.
• Same to fiume, from VUlllidolid, Ftb. 27.
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neighbourhood of Toledo early in February. Therefore Mar~
mont abandoned all hope of attacking Wellington before Ciudad
Rodrigo ~hould be in a state of defence. The desperately rainy
weather of January 28th to February 6th was no doubt the last
decisive fact in making the Marshal give up the game. Before
the rain had ceased falling, he concluded that all chance of
a succes...,ful offensive move was gone, for he returned from
Salamanca to VaUadolid on February 5th.
On February 6th he wrote to Derthier 1 that he had ordered
l\1ontbrun and Fay, on their return from the Alicante expedition,
to remain behind in the valley of the Tagus, and not to come
on to Salnmanca. His reason for abandoning all idea of a general
concentration against Wellington in the kingdom of Lean,
wa~ that he was convinced that the next move of the British
general would be to make a dash lit Badl1joz, and that he
wished to have a considerable force ready in the direction of
Almaraz and Talavera, with which he could succour the Army
of the South, when it should be compelled to march, us in 1811,
to relieve that fortress. His forecast of Wellington's probable
scheme of operations was perfectly correct, and his idea that
the best way to foil it would be to hold a large portion of his
army in the valley of the Tagus was correct also. But he was
not to be permitted to earry out his own plan; the orders from
Paris, which he so much dreaded, once more intervened to
prescribe for him a very different policy 2.
Wellington during the critical days from January 20th to
, Marmont to Derthier, Valladolid, Feb. G. Not in l\Iarmont's iUtmoires,
but printed in King Joseph's Correspondance, viii. p. 301.
• I must confess that all Napier's COlnment on l'tIarmont's doings (vol. iv.
pp. 94-5) s«ms to me to be vitiated by a wish to vindicate Napolcon at all
costs, and to throw all possible blame on his lieutenant. His statements
contain what I cannot but call a $Ilggesfio falsi, wllen he says that' Donnet
quitted the Asturias, Montbtun hastened back from Valcnehl, Dorsenne
sent a detachment in aid, llnd on Jan. 25 six divisions of infantry and one
of cllvalry, 45,000 men in all, wcre assembled at Salamanca, from whence to
Ciudad is only four 1ll1ll'Ches.' This misses the facts tllat (1) MlU'lllont had
only four divisions (Soulul.ffi, Clausel, Mllueunc, alld thc weak division of
Thi~bll.ult); (2) thut Bonnct had not arrived, 1I0r (X>lIld for some days j
(3) that l)orsenne sent nothing, lint! on .lull. 27 unnounccd thut nothing
would be forthcoming; (4) that MontbrulI (who .....as at Alicunte on .luII. 16)
WlLll sUll far away Oil the borders or lUurcia. WitJl 22,000 men onl)' in hand
Marmont was nllturolly cautious.
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February 6th was naturally anxious. He knew that l\:Iarmont
would concentrate agaillSt him, but he hoped (as indeed he was
justified in doing) that the conccntration would be slow and
imperfect, and that thc Marshal would find himself too weak
to advance from Salamanca. His anxiety was made somewhat
greater than it nccd have bcen, by a false report that Foy and
l\Iontbrun were already returned from the Alieantc cxpedition-
he was told that both had got back to Toledo by the beginning
of January I_a most mischievous piece of false news. An
equally grol.!-ndless rumour informed him that Bonnet had left
the Asturias, many days before his departure actually took
place. On January 21 he wrote to Lord Liverpool that Bonnet
had passed l3enavente on his way to Salamanca., and that' thc
whole of what had gone eastward' [Le. Foy and Montbrun]
was reported to be coming up from the 'l'agus to Valladolid, so
that in a few days Marmont might possibly have 50,000 men in
hand 2. To make himself strong against such a concentration
he ordered Hill, on January 22, to brillg up three brigades of
thc 2nd Division to Castcllo Brunco, with which he might join
the main army at a few days' notices. At the same time he
directed General Abadia to send a force to occupy the Asturias,
which must be empty since Bonnct had evacuated it. It was not
till some days later that he got the reassuring, and concct, news
that I"oy and Montbrun, instead of being already at the front in
Castilc, wcrc not cvcn expccted at Toledo till January 2!)th, and
that Bonnet had started latc, and was only at La BUllcza whcn
February had alrendy begun. But, by the time that he had
receivcd this information, it had already become evidcnt that
l\Iarmont was not about to take the offensive, and Ciudad
Rodrigo was already in a condition to resist a coup-de-11win;
whilc, since thc whole siege-train of the Army of Portugal had
I See lJispatches, viii. p, ;;47,
• J runey thnt.Wcllinglon's crroncoll~ biutement that Mllrmont Imd six
tlivisions ....ollcetcd ut Sulnuultlcu 011 the 23rd_~~th l mil;j)rintcd by Gurwood,
D~p(J.tcllcs, viii. p. 577, us ' the 6th Division! 'J WlIS Nnpicr's source for
,,'bIting that such a force Wll~ assembled, which it certainly was not,
\Vellington reekoncd that Mllrmont hud Sonhum, Clausel, .Muucllne,
'l'hil!bulllt, and two divisions from the .East, which lust had not really
come up--and never w('re to do so,
• Wellington to Hill, Jan. 22, Dispute/les, viii. p. 568.
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been captured therein, it was certain that the Marshal could
not come up provided with thc artillery required for a rcgular
siege.
By February 12th the real state of affairs became clear, 'the
enemy has few troops left at Salamanca and in the towns on the
'l'ormcs, and it appears that Marshal Marmont hus cantoned
the right of his 3J'my on the Domo, at Zamora and '1'01'0, the
centre in the province of Avila. while one division (the 6th) has
returned to Talavera and the valley of thc Tagus.' This wus
nearly correct; l\farmont, on Fcbruary 6th, had defined his
position as follows-two divisions (those just returned from
the Alicante cxpedition) in the valley of the Tagu!>; onc, the
6th (Brcllnier), at i\lonbcltran, in onc of the passes Icading from
the Tagus to the Douro valley; onc (Clau1lel) at Avila; three
011 the Douro and the Esla (Zamora, Toro, Benaventc) with
a strong advanced guard at Salamanca. Thc heavy detach-
ment towards thc Tagus, as he explained, was to provide for
thc probable necessity of succouring Badajoz, to which Welling-
ton was certain to turn his nttcntion crc long. __
l\1armont was perfectly right in his surmise. Ciudad Rodrigo
had hardly becn in his hands for fivc days, whcn Wclliugtoll
began to issue ordcrs presupposing an attack on Badajoz. On
January 25th Alexander Diekson was directed to send the 24-lb.
shot and reserve powder remaining at thc artillery basc at
Villa da Ponte to be embarked on the Doum for Ororto, whcre
they wcre to be placed on ship-board 1. Next day it wa,s
ordered that sixteen howitzers of the sicge-train should start
from Almeida ovcrland for the Alemtejo, each drawn by eight
bullocks, while twenty 24-pouuders were to be shipped down
the Dou1'O from Darca de AlvCL to Oporto, and sent round from
thence to Sctubal, the seaport nearest to ElvRS 2. On the 28th
Dickson himself was ordered to sturt ut once for Setubal, in
order that he might be ready to receive each consignment on its
arrival, and to make arrangements for its transport to Elvas 3.
while a dispatch was sent to Hill 4 definitely stating that, if all
I DickuJII Papers, ii. p. 571 •
• 'Yellington, DisJffltchcl1, viii. pp. 5G8-9.
, DickMm Papa-a, ii. p. 57G.
• Wellington to Hill, Diapalches, viii. p. 571.
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went well, the siege of Badajoz was to begin in the second week
of March.
These plans were drawn up long before it was clear tllfl.t the
army might not have to fight i\larmont on the Agueda, for the
defence of Ciudad Rodrigo. • H they should move this way,
I hope to give a good account of them,' Wellington wrote to
Douglas (the British officer attached to the Army of Galicia) 1 :
but he judged it more likely that no such advance would be
made. 'I think it probable that when !\Inrmont shall have
heard of our success, he will not move at u1l 2.' Meanwhile
there was no need to march the army southward for some time,
since the artillery and stores would take many weeks on their
land or water voyage, when roads were bad and the sea vexed
with winter storms. So long us seven divisions were cantoned
behind the Agueda and Coa, Marmont could have no certain
knowledge that the attack on Badajoz was contemplated,
whatever he might suspect. Therclore no transference south-
ward of the divisions behind the Agucda was begun till
February 19th. But Wellington, with an eye on i\larmont's
future movements, contemplated a raid by Hill on the bridge
of Almaraz, the nearest and· best pll.Ssage whieh the French
possessed on the Tagus. If it could he broken by a flying
column, any succours from the Army of Portugal to the Army
of the South would have to take a much longer route and waste
much time &. The project was abandoned, on Hill's report that
he doubted of its prncticability, since a successful caup-de-100in
on one of the bridge-head forts might not secure the actual
destruction of the boats, which the French might withdraw to
the farther side of the river, and relay at their leisure 4. But,
as we shall see, the scheme WllS postponed and not entirely
rejected: in May it was carried out with complete success.
While Wellington was awaiting the news that his siege
artillery was well forward on the way to Elvas, i\larmont had
been undergoing one of his periodical lectures from Paris.
A dispnteh sent to him by Berthier on January 23, and received
l \Yellington to Sir Howard Douglas, Jan. 2'2, Dispatches, viii. p. 568.
• Wellington to Hill, Dispalde8, viii. p. 567, snme day liS last.
• Wellington to Hill, Jail. 28, Di$pakh~s, viii. pp. 571-2 and 586-7.
• Wellington to Hill, Feb. 12, DUpakhe,. vii!. p. 003.
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at Valladolid on l"ebruary 6th-fourteen days only having been
occupied by its travels-had of course no reference to Wellington
or Ciudad Rodrigo, the news of the investment of that fortress
having only reached Paris on January 27th. It was mainly
composed of censurcs on!\Iontbrun's Alicante expcdition, which
Napolcon considercd to havc becn undcrtakcn with too largc
a force-' he had ordered a flying column to be sent against
Vnleneia, a whole army corps had marched.' But the paragraph
in it which mled Marmont with dismay was onc ordcring him
to make over at once 6,000 men to the Army of the North,
whose numbers the Emperor considered to be running too low,
IlOW that the two Guard divisions had becn directed to return
to France.
'Twenty-four hours after the receipt of this dispatch you
will start ot! on the march onc 01 your di visions, with its
divisional artillery, and its exact composition as it stands at
thc moment of the arrival of this order, and will send it to
Burgos, to form part 01 thc Army 01 thc North. His Majesty
forbids you to change any general belonging to this division,
or to make any alterations in it. In return you will receive
thrcc provisional regiments 01 detachmcnts, about 5,000 men,
whom you may draft into your battalions. They are to start
from Burgos the day that the division which you are ordered
to send arrivcs thcre. All the Guards are under orders for
France, and can ani)' start when your division has reached
that place.... The Army 01 the North will thcn consist of three
divisions: (1) that which you arc sending air; (2) Caffarelli's
division (due at Pampcluna lrom Aragon); (3) a third division
which GCIlcrnl Dorsenne will organize lrom the 34th Legcr, the
113th and 130th of the line and the Swiss battalions.... By
this arrangcmcnt the Army of thc Korth will' be in u. posilion
to aid you with two divisions if the English should march
against you I:
, The' third division' Ilrllctieully represented Thillbnult·s old divi.~ioll
oC the Army or the North, which had long held the SalamanClL district.
This division was to be deprived of its Polish regiment (recalled to F-ranee
with all other Poles) and to be given instead the I:lOth, then at SanUlnder.
Dut the 130th re.'llly belonged to tIle Anny of l'ortugal (Sarrut's division),
thoujl:h separated from it at the moment. So )Iarmont was being deprived
of one regiment more.
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Along with this dispatch arrived another from Dorsellne 1,
clamouring for the division which was to be given him~he had
already got the notice that he was to receive it, as he lay nearer
to France than Marmont. He promised that the three pro-
visionaJ regiments should be sent off, as the Emperor directed,
the moment that the ceded division should reach him. The
Duke of Ragusa could not refuse to obey such peremptory
orders from his master, and ordered Bonnet's division, from
Benavente and Leon, to march on Burgos. His letter acknow-
ledging the reccipt of thc Empcror's dispatch was plaintive.
, I am informed that, according to the new arrangemcnt, the
Army of the North will be in a position to help me with two
divisions if I am attacked. I doubt whethcr His Majesty's
intentions on this point will be carried out, and in no wise
expect it. I believe that I am justified in fearing that any
troops sent me will have to be long waited for, and will bc an
insignificant force whcn they do appear. Not to speak of the
slowness inevitable in all joint operations, it takes so long in
Spain to get dispatches through, and to collect troops, that
I doubt whcthcr I shall obtain any help at the cl'itical momcnt.
. . . The net result of all is that I am left much weaker in
numbers.'
loIarmont might ha vc added that the three provisional'
regiments, which he was to reccive in return for Bonnet's
division and the 130th Line, were no real reinforcement, but his
own drafts, long due to arri vc at the front, but detained by
Dorsennc in Biscay and Old Castile to garrison small posts
and keep open communications. And hc was not destined to
receive them as had been promised: Dorsennc wrote on
February 24 apologizing fol' not forwarding them at once: they
were guarding the roads between Irun and Vittoria, and could
not be spared till other troops had bccn moved into their
scattered garrisons to relieve them.
On January 27th the news of the advance of Wellington
against Ciudad ll.odrigo had at last reached Paris---eight days
after the fortress had fallen. It caused the issue of new orders
by the Emperor, all exquisitely ina.ppropriate when they reached
Marmont's hands on February lOth. The Marshal had been
• Dorscnnc to Murmunt, from Uftns, Feu. 5.
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contemplating the tiresome results of the storm of thc
fortress for nearly three weeks, but Napoleon's orders presup-
posed much spare timc before Rodrigo would be in any danger:
Dorsenne is to stop the march of the Guards towards France,
and to bring up all the forces he can to help the Army of
Portugal: Montbrun will be back at Madrid by January 18
[on which day he wns really in the middle of the kingdom of
Mureia], and at the front in Lean before February 1st. After
his arrival the Army of Portugal will be able to take up its
definitive line of action. Fillolly, there is (l. stab at Marmont,
'the English apparently havc advanced in order to make
a diversion to hamper the siege of Valencia.; thcy only did so
because they had got information of the great strength of
the detachment which the Army of Portugal made in that
directioll I.'
The Marshal could only reply by saying that the orders were
all out of date. that he had (as directed) given up Bonnet's
division to the Army of the North, and that, Ciudad Rodrigo
having fallen far earlier than anyone had expected, and long
before any sufficient rclie"ing force could be collected, he had
been unable to save it, and hud now canWll<..'<1 his army (minus
Bonnet) with four divisions in thc valley of the Douro and
three in the valley of the Tagus, in expectation of an approach·
ing move on the purt of Wellingt.on towards Ba'dajoz.
These dispositions had not long been completed when another
dispatch arrivcd from Paris, datcd February 11th, in which
the Emperor censurcd ollce more nIl his lieutenant's actions,
and laid down for him a new strategical policy from whieh he
was forbidden to swer\'c.
'The Emperor rcgrets that when you had the division of
Souham and thrcc others unitcd [1. e. on January 23] you did
not move on Salamanca, to make out what was going on.
That would havc given the English much to think about, and
might have been useful to Ciudad Rodrigo. The way to help
the army under the present cireumstances is to place its
head-quarters at Salamanca, and conecntrate your force there,
detaching onc division to the Tagus valley and also reoccupying
the Asturias. [This concentration] will oblige the enemy to
, Napoleon to Derthier, Jan. 21.
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remain about Almcida and in the North, for fear of an invasion
of Portugal. You might even march on Hodrigo, and, if you
have the necessary siege artillery, capture the place-your
honour is bound up with it. If want of thc artillery or of food
.renders it necessary to put ore sueh an operation, you could at
lenst make an incursion into Portugal, and advance towards the
Douro and Almeida. This menace would keep the enemy
"contained".... Your posture should be of(cnsive, with Sala~
maneR as base and Almeida as objcetivc: as long as the
English know that you arc in strength at Salamanca they will
not budge: but if you retire to Vallndolid yourself, and scatter
divisions to the rear, and above all if you have not got your
cavalry effective by the time that the rainy season ends, you
will expose all the north of Spain to misfortunes.
'It is indispensable to reoccupy the Asturias, because more
troops are needed to hold the edge of the plain as far as Biscay
than to keep down that provim.'C. Sinec the English are
divided into two corps, onc in the South and the other opposite
you, they cannot be in heavy strength: you ought to outnumber
them greatly.... I suppose that yOll consider the English mad,
for you believe them capable of marching against Badajoz when
you are at Salamnnca, i. e. of allowing you to march to Lisbon
before they can get back. They will only go southward if you,
by your ill~devised schemes, keep two or thrce divisions de-
tached on thc Tagus: that reassures them, llnd tells them that
you have no offensive projects against them.
'To recapitulate, the Emperor's intentions are that you
should stop ut Salamanca, that you should reoceupy the
Asturias, that your urmy should base itself on Salamanca, and
that from thence you should threaten the English.'
It may seem profane to thc worshippers of the Emperor to
say that this dispatch was purely wrong·headed, and argucd
a complete misconception of the situation. Dut it is impossible
to pass any other verdict on it. Marmont, since Bonnct's
division had been stolen from him, had seven divisions left, or
about 44,000 men effective, including cavalry and artillery.
The Emperor tells him to keep onc division on the Tagus, to
scnd a second to occupy the Asturias. This leaves him about
34,000 net to concentrate at Salamanca. With this force he is
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to attempt to besiege Rodrigo, or at least to execute a raid as
far af; Almeida and the Douro. 'The English are di vided and
so must be mueh numerically inferior to you.' But, as a matter
of fact, the only British detachment that wus not under Welling-
ton's hand at the moment was Hill's 2nd Division, and he had
just brought that up to Castello Braneo, and would havc had
it with him in flvc days, if l\larmont had advanced from Sala-
manca, The PtIarshal would have seen 55,000 men falling upon
his 34,000 if he had moved on any day before the 20th of
:February, and Wellington was 'spoiling for a fight,' or, in his
own quiet phmseology, 'if the French move this way, I hope
to give a good aceolUlt of thcm 1.' Supposing Marmont had,
by some evil inspiration, done what the Emperor hud wished
him to do before the orders came, he would have been crushed
by almost double numbers somewhere in the neighbourhood of
Rodrij"'o or Almcidl1. The battlc of Salamanca would have been
fought six months too soon.
This is the erucial objection to Napoleon's main thesis: hc
undcrmted Wellington's numbers and his readiness to give
battle. As to details we may observe (I) that there was no
siege-train to batter Rodrigo, because the whole of the heavy
guns of the Army of Portugal had been captured in that
fortress. (2) That Wellington was 'mad' enough to march
upon Badajoz with his whole army, precisely 6ecause he knew
that, even if Marmont should invade Portugal, he eould never
get to Lisbon. He realized, as the Emperor did not, that an
army of five or six divisions eould not march on Lisbon in the
casual fashion recommended in this dispatch, because it would
starve by the way. Central Portugal, still suffering from the
blight of Masscna's invasion, could not have sustained 80,000
men marching in a mass and trying to live upon the country
ill the usual French style. And Marmont, as his adversary well
knew, had neither great magazines at his base, nor the immense
transport train whieh would have permitted them to be utilized.
The best proof of the imllraetieability of Napoleon's scheme
was that l\Iarmont endeavoured to carry it out in April, when
nothing lay iu front or him but Portuguese militia, and failed to
penetrate more than a few marches into the land, because he
, Wellington lo Dougllll1, Di8patdU!8, viii. p. .'568.
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eould not feed his army, and therefore could not keep it con-
centrated.
The Marshal knew long beforehand that this plan was hope-
less. He wrote to Berthier from Valladolid all February 26th
as follows:
• Your Highness informs me that if my army is united at
Salumanca the English would be " iliad" to move into Estrema·
dura, leaving me behind them, and free to advnncc on Lisbon.
But they tried this precise combination in May 1811, though
all my army was then quite close to Salamanca, and though the
Army of the North was then twice as strong as it is to-day,
and though thc season was thcn latcr and allowed us to find
provender for our horses, and though wc wcre then in possession
of Ciudad Rodrigo. They considered at that time that we could
not undertake such an operation [as a march on Lisbon], and
were perfectly right. Will they think that it is practicable
to-day, whcil all the conditions which I have just cited arc
changed to our disadvantage, and when they know that a great
body of troops has returned to France '! ... Consequently no
movement on this sidc can help Badajoz. The only possible
course is to takc measures directly bearing Oil that place, ir
we are to bring pressure upon the enemy and hope to attain our
end. The Emperor seems to ignore the food question. This
is the important problem; and if it could be ended by the
formation of base-magazines, his Ol'dcrs eould be executed with
punctuality and precision. But we are far from such a position
-by no fault of mine.... When transferred to the North in
January, I found lIot a grain of wheat in the magazines, not
a sou in the treasury, unpaid debts everywhere. As the neces'
sary result of the absurd system of administration adopted here,
there was in existence a famine-real or artificial-whose
severity was difficult to realize. We could only get food ror
daily consumption in our cantonments by using armed rorce:
there is a long distance between this statc of affairs and the
formation of magazines which would allow us tu move the army
freely.... The English army is always concentrated and can
always be moved, because it has an adequate supply of money
and transport. Seven or eight thousand pack-mules bring up
its daily food-hay for its cavalry on the banks of the Coa and
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Agueda has actually been sent out from England 1, His
Majesty may judge from this fact the comparison between their
means and ours-we have not (our days' food in any of our
lllagazincJ:i, wc hu.vc no transport, we cannot draw requisitions
from the most wretched village without sending thither a
foraging ~arty 200 strong: to li\'e from day to day we have to
. scattcr detachments to vast distances, and always to be on the
movc.... It is possible that His Majesty may be dissatisfied
with my arguments, but I am bound to say that I cannot carry
out the orders sent me without bringing about a disD.stcr ere
long. If His Majesty thinks otherwise, I must request to be
superseded-a request not made for the first time: if I am
given a successor the command will of course be placed in
better hands 2:
This was an admirable summary of the whole situation in
Spain, and might ha...·e caused the Emperor to change his
policy, if hc had not by this time so hardened himself in his
false conceptions as to be past conviction. As Mu.rmont com-
plains, his master had now built up (or himself an imaginary
picture of the state o[ affairs in the Peninsula, and argued as
if the situation was what he wished it to bc, not what it actually
was. '11 suppose "rai tout ce qu'il voudrait trouver existant 3:
A subsequcnt letter from Paris, dated February 21st and
received about March 2nd, contained one small amelioration of
Marmont's lot-he was told that he might take back Bonnet's
division, and not ecdc it to Dorsennc, on condition that he sent
it at once to occupy thc Asturias. Dut it then proceeded to lay
down in the harshest terms the condemnation of the Marshal's
strategy:
, The Emperor charges me to repeat to you that you worry
too much about mutters with which you have no concern.
Your mission was to protect Almeida and llodrigo---and you
have let them Iall. You arc told to maintain and administer
• An exaggeration, but hay was actually brought to Lisbon and Coimbra.
and used for the English cavalry brigades, which had been sent to the rear
and eantoned Oll the Lower Mondego.
• Marmont to Derthier. Valladolid. Feb. 26. ~hrmont's .Utmoires,
iy. pp. 344-5.
, Mllrmont's' Observations on the Imperial Correspondeneeof r·'eb.1812,'
Mtmoires, iy. Jl. 512.
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the North, and you abandon the Asturias-the only point Irom
which it can be dominated and contained. You arc getting into
a state of alarm because Lord Wellington sends a division or
two towards BadajO'L. Now Badajoz is a vcry strong fortress,
and the Duke of Dalmatia has 80,000 men, and can draw help
from Marshal Suchet. If Wellington were to march on Badajoz
[he had done so the day before this letter was written] you have
a sure, prompt, and triumphant meaus of bringing him back-
that of marching on Uodrigo aud Almeida.'
Marmont replied, with a suppressed rage that can be read
between the lines even more clearly than in his earlier letters,
• Since the Emperor attributes to me the fall of Almeida, which
was given up before I had actually taken over the commll.nd
of this army t, I cannot sec what I can do to shelter myself
from censures at large; ... I am accused of being the cause of
the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo; it fell because it had an
insufficient garrison of inferior quality and a bad commandant.
Dorscnne was neither watchful nor prescient. ,Vus it for me
to take care of a place not in my command, and separated from
me by a chain of mountains, and by the desert that had been
made by the six months' sojourn of the Army of Portugal in the
valley of the Tagus? ... I am blamed for having eantoned
myself in the valley of the 'l'agus after repulsing Lord Welling-
ton beyond the Coa [at the time of El Bodon], but this was the
result of the imperative orders of the Emperor, who assigned
me no other territory than the tragus valley. Rodrigo was
occupied by troops of the Army of the North.... I have
ordered General Bonnet to reoccupy the Asturias at once, and
quite see the importu.nce of the occupying of that province....
I mn told that the Emperor thinks that I busy myself too much
about the interests of others, and not enough about my own.
I had considered that one of my duties (and one of the most
difficult of them) wns to assist the Army of the South, and that
duty was fonnalIy imposed on me in some twenty dispatches,
and specially indicated by the order which bade me leave three
divisions in the valley of the Tagus. To-day I um informed that
I am relieved of that duty, and my position becomes simpler
1 To be exact. it was on May 10 that Mnrmont took over thc command
from Masscna, nnd Almcida was evacuated by Brcnnier that llO.IDe night.
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and better I But if the Emperor relies with confidence on the
effect which demonstrations in the North will produce on the
mind of 'Ve1lington, I must dare to express my contrary
opinion. Lord Wellington is quite aware that I have no
magazincs, and is acquaintcd with the immensely difficult
physical character 01 the country, and its complete lack of food
resources at this season. He knows that my army is not in
a position to cross the Coa, even if no one opposes me, and that
if we did so wc should have to turn back at the end of four days,
unable to carry on the campaign, (lnd with our horses all starved
to death 1.'
This and much more to the same dfeet had apparently some
effeet on the mind of the Emperor. But the result was confusing
}Vhen formulated on paper. Berthier replicd on :March 12 :
• Your letters of February 27 and 28 and March 2 have been
laid before the Emperor. His Majesty thinks that not only
must you concentrate at Salamanca, but that you must throw
a bridge across the Agueda, so that, if the enemy leaves less
than five divisions north of the Tagus, you may be able to
advance to the Coa, against Almeida, and ravage all northern
Portugal. It Badajoz is captured by two divisions of the enemy
its loss will not be imputed to you, the entire responsibility will
fall on the Army of the South. If the enemy leaves only two,
three, or cven four divisions north of the Ta.gus, thc Army of
Portugal will be to blame if it does not at once march against
the hostile force before it, invest Almcida, ravagc all northern
Portugal, and push detachments (IS far as the :Mondego. Its
rale is simply to" contain" six British divisions, or at least five:
it must take the offensive in the North, or, if the cnemy has
taken the initiative, or other eireurnstances necessitate it, must
dispatch to the Taf,'us, by Almaraz, the same number of
divisions that Lord 'Wellington shall have dispatched to conduct
the siege of Badajoz.'
This double-edged document reached Salamanca on March 27,
eleven days after Wellington had invested Badajoz. The whole
allied field army had marched for Estremadura in the last days
of February, and not a single British division remained north
1 I extract these various paragraphs from Ml\rmont's vast dispatch or
March 2, omitting mueh morc that ill interesting and appOllitc.
p2
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of the Tagus. In accordance with thc Emperor's dispatches of
February 11th and of February 18th, Mllrmont had already
concentrated the bulk of his resources at Salamanca, drawing
in everything except Donnet (destined Cor the Asturias), Souham,
who was left on the Esla to lace the Army 01 Galieia, and the
equivalent of another division distributed as garrisons in
Astorga, Leon, Palencia, Zllmora, and Valladolid. With five
divisions in hand, or just coming up, he was on the move, as
the Em:reror had directed, to threaten Rodrigo and Almeida
and invade northern Portugal.
The Paris letter 01 l.Inrch 12, quoted above, suddenly imposed
on Alarmont the choice between continuing the attack on
Portugal, to which he was committed, or of leading: his whole
army by Almaraz to Blldajoz-it must be the whole army,
since he was told to send just as many divisions southward
as Wellington should have moved in that direction, and every
one of the seven units of the allied army had gone off.
Since Badajoz was stormed on April 6th, only ten days after
l\Iarmont received on March 27 the Emperor's dispatch of
March 12, it is clear that he never could have arrived in time
to help the fortress. In June 1811 he had accomplished a
similar movement at a better season of the year, and when
some time had been allowed for preparation, in fifteen days, but
only by making forced marches of the most exhausting sort. It
could not have been done in so short a. time in March or April,
when the crops were not ripe, the rivers were full, and the roads
were 1ar worse than at midsummer. Moreover (as wc shall
presently sce) Wellington had placed a large containing force
at :Meridu, half-way between Almaraz and lladajoz, which
Marmont would have had to drive in-at much expense of
time.
The Marshal's per!))exity on receiving the dispatch that came
in upon March 27 was extreme. 'The instructions just received,'
he wrote to Berthier, • arc wholly contradictory to those of
February 18 and February 21, imperative orders which forced
me, against my personal conviction, to abandon my own plan,
and to make it impossible to do what I regarded as suitable to
the interests of the Emperor. Thc letters of February 18 and
February 21 told me tbat his Majesty thought me a meddler in
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matters which did not concern me: he told me that it was
unnecessary for me to worry about Badajoz, " a very strong
fortress supported by tu1 army of 80,000 men." ... He gave me
formal orders to abandon any idea of marching to succour it.
and added that if Lord Wellington went thither. he was to be
left alone. because by advancing to the Agueda I could bring
him back at once. The letters of the ]8th and 2]st made it
quite clear that His Majesty freed me from all responsibility
for lladajoz, provided I made a demonstration on the Agueda.
. . . To-day your Highness writes that I am responsible for
Badajoz, if Lord Wellington undertakes its siege with more than
two divisions. The concluding paragraph of your letter seems
to give me permission to succour the place, by bringing up
troops to the Tagus. So, after imperative orders have wrecked
my original arrangement. which had prepared and assured an
effective help for Badajoz, and after ull choice of methods has
been forbidden to me. I am suddenly given an option when it is
no longer possible to use it.... To-day, when my troops from the
Tagus valley ha'.-e repassed the mountains, and used up the
magazines collected there at their departure" when it is impos-
sible to get from Madrid the means to establish n new magazine
at Almaraz, my army. if it started from this point [Salamanca].
would consume every scrap of food that could be procured
before it eould possibly reach Badajoz.... The movement was
practicable when I was in my original position: it is almost
impracticable now, considering the season of the year, and the
probable time-limit of the enemy's operations.... After ripe
reflection on the complicated situation, considering that my
main task is to hold down the North, and that this task is much
greater than that of holding the South, taking into consideration
the news that nn English force is said to be landing at Corunna
(an improbable story. but one that is being repeatedly brought
me), considering that the Portuguese and Galieian troops
threaten to take the offensive from Braganza, remembering that
your letters of February 18 and 21 state that Suchet's Army of
Aragon is reckoned able to reinforce the Army of the South.
and considering that my dispositions have been made (in spite
of immense preliminary difficulties) for a fifteen days' march
on the Agucda, which is already begun, I decide in favour of
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intact. Moreover, Ciudad Rodrigo and its outworks form
a compact fortress, of not half the circumlercncc of Badajoz
and its dependencies. If Ney and Musscna, with an adequate
siege apparatus, treated Rodrigo with respect in 1810, and
proceeded against it by regular operations, Marmont would
have been entirely unjustified in trying the desperate mcthod
oC escalade in 1812. The fortifications, as Napicr grudgingly
admitl:i, were' healed': an escalade against Carlos de Espafia's
garrison would certainly have met the same late us Suchct's
3ssault on Snguntum, 0. much weaker and unfinished stronghold.
But it is unnecessary to follow into detail Napier's controversial
statements, which are all part of a wrong-headed scheme to
prove Napoleon inCallible OIl all occasions and at all costs.
The governiug facts cannot be disputed: l\larmont in
February placed three divisions on the 'l'agus, which were to
form the advanced guard of an army that was to march to the
relic! 01 Badajoz, whose siege he loresaw. Napoleon told him
not to concern himself about Badajoz, and compelled him to
coneentrate his army about Salamanca. He instructed him
that the proper reply to an attack on Badajoz by Wellington
was all invasion of northern Portugal, and gave him elaborate
instructions concerning it. Marmont reluctantly obeyed, and
was starting on such an expedition when he was suddenly told
that hc might move on Badajoz. But he only received this
permission ten days before that fortress was stormed: it was
therelore useless. The Emperor must take the responsibility.
SECTION XXXII: CHAPTER III
THE SIEGE OF BADAJOZ, MARCH-APRIL 1812
IN narrating the troubles of the unlucky Duke of R.'l.gusa.
engaged in {ruitless strategical controversy with.his master, we
have been curried far into the month of March 1812. It is
necessary to return to Febnmry 20th in order to take up the
story of Wellington's march to Estremadura. Wc have seen
that he commenced hi:; artillery preparations in January, by
sending Alexander Dickson to Setubal, and dispatching a large
part of his siege-train southward, partly by sea, partly across
the difficult mountuin roads of the Bcira.
The Anglo-Portuguese infantry and cavalry, however, were
not moved till the guns were far on their way. It was Welling-
t~:m's intention to show 11 large army on the frontier o[ Lean
till the last possible moment. He himsel( kept his old head-
quarters at Freneda, near Fuentes de Oiioro, till March 5th, in
order that ltfarmont might be led to persist in the belie!
that his attcntion was still concentrated on the North. Dut,
starting from February 19th, his divisions, onc by one, had madc
their unostentatious departure for the South: on the day when
he himself followed them only onc division (the 5th) and onc
C3\'alry brigade (V. Alten's) still remained behind thc Agucda.
The rest were at various stages on their way to Elvas. Most of
thc divisions marched by the route Sabugal, Castello Draneo,
Villa Vclha, Niza. But the 1st Division went by Abrantes, in
order to pick up there its clothing for the new year, which had
been brought up the Tagus in boats lrom Lisbon to that point.
Some of the cavalry and the two independent Portuguese
brigades of llack and Bradford, whose winter cantonments had
been rather to the reur, had separate routcs of their own,
through places so far wcst as Thomar 1 and Coimbra. The three
• This WIlS the case with G. Anson's brigade and Bradford's Portuguese
inCantry. Pack went by Coimbra, Slade's cavalry brigade by Covilhilo,
aDd the horse artillery of Dull and McDonald with it.
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brigades of the 2nd Division, under Hill, which had been
brought up to Castello BeaneD at the beginning of January,
were at the head of the marching army. and reached Portalcgre,
via Villa Yclha, long before the rest or the troops were across
the Tagus. Indeed, the fIrst of them (Ashworth's Portuguese)
started as early as February 2nd, and was at CastcJlo de Vide,
near Elvas, by February 8th, before the troops behind the
Agueda had begUll to move 1.
The lengthy column of inCalltry which had marched by
Castello Brallco and the bridge of Villa Vc1ha was cBntoned in
various places behind Elvas, from Villa Vic;aso. to PorWegre, by
March 8th: the 1st Division, coming in from the Abrantes
direction, joined them on March 10th, and halted at Monforte
and Azumar. Only the 5th Division and the two Portuguese
independent brigades were lacking, and of these the two former
were expected by the 16th, the latter by the 20th. With the
cxception or the 5th Division the whole or Wcllington's Held
army was concentrated near Elvas by the 16th. Only the
1st Hussars or the King's German Legion, under Victor AIten,
had been left to keep the outpost line in front of Ciudad Rodrigo,
in order that the French vedettes in Lean should not detect
1 Nothing is rllrer, liS all students of the Peninsular Wllr kilO\\' to their
cool, tlmn a ta1Jlc of thc exact 1Il0Vemclll>l oC Wellington's "rmy 011 UIIY
murch. For this purticulnr movcment the wllole of Um dctllilcd orders
htlppen to l\live been preserved ill the D' Urban !)apers. Thc starting-places
of the units were :-
1st Division-GallegO!l, Carpio, Fuentcs de OllOfO.
3rd Division-ZamoTTll (by the Uppcr Agueda).
4th Division-San Feliees and Sesmiro.
5th Division-Ciudad Roc1rigo.
6th Di\"ision-Albergaria (near Fuente Guinaldo).
7th Division-Pa;yo (in the Sierra de Gata).
Light Division-Fuente Guinaldo.
Brndrord's Portuguese--&rba del Puereo.
Pack's Port"glle~mpi1loand ltuero.
The marches were 80 nrrnngcd thnt thc 7th Divisioll passed through
CMtcHo TImnco on l<'eb. 26, I.he 6lh Di~·jsion on Feb. 211, the Light Division
on March a, the 4th Division on Mnrch £I. All the8c were up to Port.ulegre,
Vi1\" Vi,,'OSll, or Cuslel]o de Vide, in touch with ElvlI~, by Mllrch 8. The
1st Division, coming by WilY or Abruntes, joincd OIl Murch 10. Pack and
BradCord, who IlIItI very circuitous routes, the OIlC by Coimbm, the other
by 'rhoml~r, were not lip till sevcrul days later (16th). The 6th Division
did not Icnve Hodrigo till Murch 9.
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that all the army of Wellington had disappeared, as they were
bound to do if only Portuguese or Spanish cavalry showed at
the front 1. Counting Hill's corps, now long returned to its old
post in front of Badajoz, there were now nearly 60,000 troops
nearing Elvas, viz. of infantry, all the eight old Anglo-Portuguese
divisions, plus Hamilton's Portuguese division 2, and Pack's and
Bradford's independent Portuguese brigades. Of cavalry not
only were all the old brigades assembled (save Alten's single
regiment), but two po\verful units now showed at the front for
the first time. These were the newly-landed brigade of German
heavy dragoons under Dock 3, which had arrived at Lisbon on
January lst~ and Le Marchant's brigade of English heavy
dragoons'" whieh had disembarked in the autumn, but had not
hitherto been brought up to join the field army. Of Portu~
guese horse .T. Campbell's brigade was also at the front: the
other Portugucse cavalry brigade, which had served all the
Leon frontier during the preceding autumn, had been made
over to General Silveira, and sent north of the Douro. But
evcn after dcducting this small brigade of 900 sabres, Welling-
ton's mounted arm was immensely stronger than it had ever
been before. He had concentrated it all the Alemtejo front, in
order that he might cope on equal terms with the very powerful
cavalry of Soult's Army of Andalusia.
The Commander-in-Chief himself, travelling with his wonted
speed, left his old head-quarters at Freneda on March 5th, was
at Castello Branco on the 8th, at Portalcgre on the loth, and
had reached Elvas, his new head-quarters, on the 12th. Before
leaving the North he had made elaborate arrangements for the
conduct oC aClairs in that quarter. They are contained in two
memoranda, givcn the one to Castniios, who was still in com-
mand both of the Galician and the Estremaduran armies of
Spain, and the othcr to Generals Baccclar and Silveira, oC whom
the former was in charge of the Portuguese dcpartment of the
, The oLher regiment of V. "Jt~lI'S brigude (J 1th Light Drngoons) was on
1\.larelJ 12 at Ponte de Sor, Oil its way to the SQuth.
t Which Iny ut Arronches ulld Santa Olluyu.
• 1st "nu 2nd Heavy Dnlgoons K.G.L.
• 8ru Dragoons, 4th nuu 5th Drngoon Guards. They had been lying
during the winter in the direction of eusle110 Bmnoo.
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North, with hcad-quartcrs at Oporto, and the othel' of the Tras-
os-Mantes, with head·quarters at Villa Real I,
It was It delicate matter to leave l\1armont with nothing save
the Spaniards and Portuguese in his front. or the former the
available troops were (1) the Army of Galieia, four weak field
•divisions, making about 15,000 men, of whom only 550 were
cavalry, while the artillery counted only five batteries. There
were 8,000 garrison and reserve troops in Conmna, Vigo, Fermi,
and other fortified posts to the rear, but thcse were unavailablc
for service 2. Abadia still commanded the whole army, under
the nominal supervision of Castanos. He had one division
(3,000 men under Cabrera) at lluebla Senabria on the Portuguese
frontier, two (9,000 men under Losada and the Conde de
Belvcdcr) at Villafranca, obscrving the Frcnch garrison of
Astorga and Souham's division on t.he Esla, which supported
that advanced post, and one (2,500 men under Castafion) on
the Asturian frontier watching Bonnet. (2) The second Spanish
force available consisted of that section of the Army of Estrcma·
dura, which lay north .of the Sierra de Gata, viz. Carlos de
Espm1a's division of 5,000 men, of whom 3,000 had been thrown
into Ciudad Rodrigo, so that the surplus for the field was small,
and oJ Juliall Sallchez's very cfficient guerriUero cavalry, who
were about ],200 strong and were now counted as part of the
regular army and formally styled '1st and 2nd Laucers of
Castillc.'
The Portuguese troops left to defend the northern frontier
were a.ll militia, 'with the exception of a. couple of batteries of
artillery and the cavalry brigade of regulars which had been
with vVellington in Leon during the autumn, under Madden,
but was now transferred to Silveira's charge, and set to watch
the Irontier of the Tras-os-Montes, with the front regiment
at Braganza, Silveira in that province had the four local
regiments of militia, of which each had only one of its two
battalions actually embodied. Baceelar had a much more
important force, but of the same quality, the twelve regiments
1 Dated Feb. 24 and 27, DiltJl(l/ch~$, viii. pp. (I21lnnd 038.
• These figures arc th<n;e of ,January, taken [rom the' morning state' in
Los Bjtn:iJos ~8pmjole8, the invaluable lJook of 1822 pul>li~hed by the
Spani~h SlalT,
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forming the divisions of Trant and J. Wilson, and comprising
all the militia of the Entre Douro c Minho province and of
northern Bcira. Three of these regiments were immobilized by
having becn told orr to serve as the garrison of Almeida.
Farther south Lecor had under arms the two militia regiments
of the Castello Branco country, watching their own district.
The total force of militia available OIl the whole frontier must
have been about 20,000 men of very second-rate quality; each
battalion had only becn under arms intermittently, for periods
of six months, and the officers were lor the most part the
inefficient lenvings of the regular army. Of the generals
Silveira was enterprising, but over bold, as the record of his
earlier campaigns sufficiently demonstrated-Trant and Wilson
had hitherto displayed equal energy and more prudence: but
in the oncoming campaign they were convicted of Silveira's
fault. over·confidence. llaccclar passed as a slow but fairly
safe commander, rather lacking in self-confidence.
Wellington's very interesting memoranda di\'ide the possi-
bilities of March-April into three heads, of which the last
contains three sub-sections :-
(1) l\tarmont may, on lear~ling that Badajoz is in danger,
march with practically the whole of his army to succour it, as
he did in May-June 1811. If this should occur, Abadia. and
Carlos de Espaiia will advance and boldly take the offensive,
laying siege to Astorga, Toro, Zamorn, Salamanca, and other
fortified posts. Silvcira will co-operate with his ca.valry and
infantry, within the bounds of prudence, taking care that his
cavalry, which may support Abadia, does not lose communica-
tion \\ith, and a secure retreat upon, his infantry, which will
not risk itscU.
(2) Mannont may leave a considerable force. perhaps the
two divisions of Souham and Bonnet, in Lean, while departing
southward with the greater part of his army; • this is the
operation which it is probable that the enemy will follow.'
What the Army of Galicia can then accomplish will depend on
the exact relative force of itseU and of the French left ill front
of it, and on the state of the fortified places on the Douro and
Tonnes [Toro, Zamora, Salamanca] and the degree of equip-
ment with which General Abadia can provide himself for siege-
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work. But Espmia and Julian Sanchez must make all the play
that they c.'m, and even Portier and Longa, from distant Can-
tabria, mnst be asked to co-operate in making mischief. Silveira
and Baceelar will support, but risk nothing.
(3) Marmont may send to Estrcmadura only the smaller
half of his army, and keep four or five divisions in the north,
a force strong enough to enable him to take the offensive. He
may attack either (a) Galicia, (b) Trns-os-Montes, or (c) the
Beira, including Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo.
(a) If 1\Iarmont should invade Galicia, Abadia had bettcr
retreat, but in thc direction that will bL'ing him near the frontiers
of Portugal (i. e. by Puebla Senabria) rather than on Lugo and
Cormma. In that case Silveira and Baccelar will be on the
enemy's flank and rear, and will do as much mischieC as they
call on his communications, always taking carc that they do
not, by pushing too far into Leon, lose their communication
with the Galicians or with Portugal. In proportion as the
French may advance farther into Galida, Baccelar will take
measures to collect the whole of the militia of the Douro
provinces northward. Carlos de Espai''ia and Julian Sanchez
ought to have good opportunities of making trouble for the
enemy in the Salamanca district, if he pushes far from his base.
(b) If Marmont should invade Tras-os-Montes [not a likcly
operation, owing to the ronghness of the country], Baecelar and
Silveira should oppose him in front, while Abadia would come
down on his flank and rear, and annoy him as much as possible.
, Don CarIos and thc guerrillas might do Il. great dcal of mischief
in Cllstillc.'
(c) If Marmont should attack Beira, advancing by Ciudad
Rodrigo and Almeida, both these lortresses are ill such a state
of defence as to ensure them against'capturc by a cOup-M-1Ilain,
and are supplied with provisions to suffice during any time that
the enemy could possibly remain in the country. Baccelar and
Silvcira will assemble all thc militia of the northern provim:cs
in Upper Beira, and place themselves in communication with
CarIos de Espai'ia. They will endeavour to protect. the maga-
zines on the Douro and l\londcgo [at Cdorieo, Guarda, Lamcgo,
St. Joiio de Pesqueira], and may live on the last in case of urgent
necessity, but not otherwise, as these stores could not easily be
18]2] PRECAUTIONS IN TEE NORTH 223
replaced. An attempt should be made, if possible, to draw
the enemy into the Bcira Baixa (i. e. the Castello Branco
country) rather than towards the Domo. Abadia will invade
northern Leon; what he can do depends on the force that
l\Iarmont leaves on the Esla, and the strength oC his garrisons
at Astorga, Zamora, Toro, &c. Supposing l'tIarmont takes this
direction, Carlos de Espai'ia will destroy before him all the
bridges on the Yeltes and Huebra, and that oC Barba. del
Puerco, and the three bridges at Castillejo, all on the Lower
Agueda.
It will be seen that the alternative (2) was Mal'mont's own
choice, and that he would have carried it out but for Napoleon's
orders, which definitively imposed upon him (Bc) the raid into
northern Bcira. With the inconclusi vc operations resulting
from that movement wc shall deal in their proper place. It
began on March 27th, and the :Marshal was over the Agueda on
March 80th. The last British division had left Ciudad Rodrigo
three weeks before 'Marmont advanced, so difficult wus it for him
to get full and correct information, and to collect a sufficiently
large army for invasion. On the 26th February he was under
the impression that two British divisions only had yet marched
for Badajoz, though five had really started. On March 6th,
when only the 5th Division remained in the North, he still
believed that Wellington and a large fraction oC his anny were
in their old positions. This WAS the result of his adversary's
wisdom in stopping at Frcneda till1\Careh 5th; as long as he was
there in person, it was still thought probable by the French
that only a detachment had marched southward. Hence came
the lateness oC Marmollt's final advance: for a long time he
might consider that he wus, as his master ordered, • containing'
several British divisions and the Commander-in-Chief himself.
Meanwhile, Oil taking stock of his situation at Elvas on
March 12th, Wellington was reasonably satisfied. Not only was
the greater part of his army in hand, and the rest rapidly
coming up, but the siege material hllrl escaped all the perils of
storms by sea and rocky defiles by land, and was much where
he had expected it to be. The material which moved by road,
the sixteen 24-lb. howit7.ers which had marched on January
30th, and a convoy of 24-pounder and IB-pounder travelling-
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carriages and stores, which went off on February 2, had both
come to hand at Elvas, the fIrst on February 25th, the second
on March 3, and were ready parked on the glacis. Thh; wal>
. a wOliderful journey over mountain roads in the most rainy
season of the year, 'fhe sea-borne guns had also enjoyed
a surprising immunity from winter storms; Dickson, when
he arrived at Setubal 011 February lOth, found that thc 24-
pounders from Oporto had arrived thirty-six hours before him,
and on the 14th WllS beginning to forward them by river-boat
to A1caeer do Sal, from where they were drawn by oxen to
Elvas, along with thcir ammunition 1. The only difficulty
which arose was that Wellington had asked Admiral Bcrkcley,
commanding the squadron at Lisbon, to lend him, as a supple-
mentary train, twenty IS-pound ship guns. The admiral sent
twenty Russian b'llns (leavings of Siniavills's squadron captured
in the Tagus at the time of the Convention of Cintra). Diekson
protested, as these pieces were of a different calibre Crom the
British IS-pounder, and would not take its shot. The admiral
rcluscd to disgarnish his own flagship, which happened to be
the only vessel ut Lisbon with home-made IS-pounders on
board. Dieksoll had to take the Uussian guns perforce. and to
cull for their ammunition all the Portuguese stores at Lisbon,
where a certain supply of round shot that fitted Will> discovered,
though many thousands had to be rejected as ' far too low.'
On March Sth the whole fifty-two guns of the siege-train were
reported ready, and the officer commanding the Portuguese
artillery at Elvas announccd that he could even frnd a small
supplement, six old heavy English iron guns of the time of
George H, whieh had been in store there sinee General Bur-
goyne's expedition of 1761, besides some Portuguese guns of
similar calibre. 'The old brass guns which had made such bad
practice in 1811 were not this time requisitioned-fortunately
they were not needed, The garrison 01 ElvtlS had for some
weeks been at work making gabions and fascines, which were all
ready, as was also a large consignment of cutting-tools from the
Lisbon arsenal, und a train of twenty-two pontoons. Altogether
the material was in a wonderCul state of completeness.
1 For dctllils see Jones, Sie/JU 0/ tIle Peninsula, Appendix ill vol. i.
pp. 421-5, and the Dickson Puper3, ed, LeBlie, tor Feb. 1812,
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For the service of the siege Wellington could dispose of about
300 British and 560 Portuguese artillerymen, a much larger
force. than had been available at the two unlucky leaguers 01
1811. Colonel }'raminghmn was the senior officer in this arm
present, but Wellington had directed that Alexander Diekson
should take charge of the whole service of the siege, just as hc
had been entrusted wIth all the prepamtions for it. There
were fifteen British, five German Legion, and seventeen
Portuguese artillery officers under his command. The Portu-
guese gunners lIlostlyeame from·the 3rd or Elvas regiment, the
British were drawn (rom the companies of lIolcumbe, Gardiner,
Glubb, and Rettberg.1 Under Colonel "FJetcher, senior engineer
officer, there were 115 mcn of the Royal Military Artificers
present at the oommcncemcilt of the siege, and an additional
party came up from Cadiz during its last days. But though this
was an improvement over the stateof things in 1811, the numbers
were still far too small j there were no trained miners whatever,
and the volunteers from the line acting as sappers, who were
instructed by the Artificers, were for the most part unskilful-
only 120 men of the 3rd Division who had been at work during
the leaguer of Ciudad Rodrigo were compamtiveIy efficient.
The engineer arm was the wcak point in the siege, as Wellington
complained in a letter which will have to bc dealt with in its
proper place. He had already been urging on Lord Liverpool
the absolute necessity for the creation of permanent units
of men trained in the technicalities of siege-work. Soon after
Rodrigo fell he 'YTOte, ' I would beg to suggest to your lordship
the expediency of adding to the Engineer establishment a corps
of sappers and miners. It is inconceivable with what dis~
advantage we undertake a siege, for want of assistance of this
description. There is no French corps a'armee which has not
a battalion of sappers and a company of miners. We are
obliged to depend for assistance of this sort upon the regiments
of thc line; and, although the men arc brave and willing, they
want the knowledge and training which are necessary. Many
casualties occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most
critical period of the siege 2.'
, For details see DUIIClllI'S IJisfory of tll~ lWyal .4rlil/~ry, it pp. 318-HL
• Wellington, DispalchtJI, viii. p. 601.
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The situation on :March 12th, save in this single respect,
seemed favourable. It was only fourteen miles from Elvas,
where the siege-train lay parked and the material was ready,
to Badajoz. Sufficient troops were already arrived not only
La invest the place, but to fann a large covering army against
any attempt of Soult to raise the siege. There was every reason
to believe that the advance would take the French unawares.
Only Drouct's two divisions were in Estremadura, and before
they could be reinforced up to a strength which would enable
them to act with effect some 'weeks must elapse. Soult, as in
l811, would have to borrow troops from Grnnada and the
Cadiz Lines before he could venture to take the offensive. Unless
he should raise the siege of Cadiz or cvaeuate Granada, he
could not gather more than 25,000 or 80,000 men at the very
most: and it would take him three weeks to collect so many.
If he approached with some such force, he could be fought, with
very little risk: for it was not now as at the time of Alhuera :
not three Anglo-Portuguesc infantry divisions, but eight were
concentrated at Elvas: there would be nine when the 5th
Division arrived. Not three British cavalry regiments (the
weak point at Albuera), but fourteen were with the army. If
SouIt should push forward for a battle, 40,000 men could be
opposed to him, nIl Anglo·Portuguese units of old formation,
while 15,000 men were left to invest Badajoz. Or if Wellington
should choose to abandon the investmcnt for three days (as
Bercsford had done in May IS11) he could bring 55,000 mcn
to the contest, a force whieh must el1.lsh Soult by the force
of double numbers, unless he should raise the siege of Cadiz
and abandon Cranada, so as to bring" his whole army to the
Gundinna. Even if he took that despernte, but perhaps
necessary, measure, and eame with 45,000 men, leaving only
Seville garrisoned behind him, there was no reason to suppose
that he could not be dealt with.
The only dangerous possibility was the intervention of
Marmont with five or six divisions of the Army of POltugal, as
had happened at the time of the operations on the CayainJullc
1811. Wellington, as we hayc seen in his directions to Daecelar
and Castaiios, thought this intervention probablc. But from
the disposilion of Marmont's troops at the moment of his own
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departure from Freneda, he thought that he could count on
three weeks, or a little more, of freedom from any interference
from tltis side. 'l'wo at least of Marmont's divisions (Souham
and Bonnet) would almost certainly be left in the North, to
contain the Galicians and Asturians. Of the other six only one
(Foy) was in t.he valley of the Tagus: thc rest were scattered
about, at Salamanca, Avila, Valladolid, &c., and would take
time to collect 1. Wellington was quite aware of Marmont's
difficulties with regard to magazines; he also counted on the
roughness of the roads, the fact that the rivers were high in
March, and (most of all) on the slowness with which information
would reach the French marshal 2. Still, here lay the risk, So
far as Wellington could know. What he could not guess was
that the movement whieh he feared had been expressly for·
bidden to Marmont by his master, and that only on March 27th
was permission granted to the Marshal to execute the march to
Almaraz. By that lime, as we have already seen, it was loo
late for him to profit by the tardily·granted leave.
But it was the possibility of Marmont's appearance on the
scene, rat.hcr t.han anything which might be feared from Soult,
which made the siege of Hadajoz t~ time·problem, just as that
of Cindad Rodrigo had been. The place Illust, if possible, be
taken somewhere about the first week in April, the earliest date
at which a serious attempt at relief was likely to be made 3.
On March 14th, every preparation being complete, the pon-
toon train, with u good escort, moved out of Elvus, and was
brought up to a point on the Guadinna four miles west· of
1 For \Vellinglon's speeulalions (fairly correct) ns lo i\larlllont's distribu-
tion of his troops, >see Dis/mlcllcs, viii. p. HIS, F'eb. lO, to Gralmm.
• Wellington to Victor Allen, March 5, Di''',mlc/,e8, ~·iii. 1'. 1I4H, llIakes
l\ spoecial I,oint of 'the difficulties which the enemy experiences in gelting
intelligence' liS a menns of gaining lime for himself.
, Napier (iv.p. OS) tries tomakeout lhat Wellington'l;siegc began ten days
later Umn he wished llnd !lol)Cd, by the fnult of the Portugucsc Regency.
I cannot sce how Dlldnjo7. could have Ucen ill vested on the 6th of i\1areh,
when (as the route-directions show) the Ilead of the marching colnmn horn
the Agneda. ouly reached Portalegre 011 the 8th. The movement of the
army was not delayed, so far as I can sec, by the slaeknCSll of Portuguese
management at Lisbon or Elvas. Dut Wellington certainly grumbled.
Did he intend that Hill alone should invest Dadlljoz, before the rest of
the flrmy arrived?
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Badajoz, where it was laid without molestation. On the next
day Le l\Iarchant's heavy dragoons crossed, but (owing to an
accident to one of the boats) no more troops. On the 16th,
however, the BnI, 4th, and Light Divisions passed, and invested
Badajo;', without meeting any opposition: the garrison kept
within the walls, and did not even prevent Colonel Fletchcr,
the commanding engineer, from approaching for purposes of
reconnaissance to the crest of the Cerro de San l\1iguel, only
200 yards from the enceimte. The investing corps of 12,000
bayonets was under Bcrcsford, who had just returned from
a short and stormy visit to Lisbon, where he had been harrying
the regency, at .Wellington's request, upon financial matters,
and had been dealing sternly with the Junta de Viveres, or
Commissariat Department I. The situation had not been round
a happy onc. • After a perfect investigation it appears that the
expenditure must be nearly £6,OOO,OOO-the means at present
arc £3,500,000! A radical reform grounded upon a bold and
fearless inquiry into every branch of the revenue, expenditure,
and subsidy, and an addition to the latler from England, can
alone put a period to these evils. To this Lord Wellington, though
late, is now turning his eyes. And when the Marshal, in con-
junction with our ambassador, shall have made his rcport, it
must be immediately aeted upon-for there is no time to lose 2.'
The investment was only part of the general movements of
the army on the 16th. The covering-force was proceeding to
take up its position in two sections. Graham with the 1st, 6th,
and 7th Divisions, and Slade's and Le Marchant's horse, crossed
the Guadiana, and began to advance down the high road to
Seville, making for Santa Marta and Villairanea. Hill with the
other section, consisting of his own old troops or the Estrema·
duran army, the 2nd Division and Hamilton's Portuguese,
Long's British and Campbell's Portuguese cavalry, marched
by the north bank of the Guadiana, via Montijo" towards
• D'Urban's diary, :Feb. 7-16; be accompanied BeresCord, being his
Chicf-of-the·Staff.
• I spare the reader the question of Portuguese papcr moriey and English
exchequer bins, which will be found treated at great length in Napier, iv.
pp. 97-9. Kapier always appears to think that cash C()uld be had by asking
for it at London, in despite of the dreadful disappearance of the metallic
currency and spread of irredeemable bank-'loles which prevailed in 1812.
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Merida, which had not been occupied by either party since
January 17th. These two columns, the one 19,000, the other
14,000 strong, were to drive in the two French divisions which
were at thi!. moment cantoned in Estremadura-Drouet was
known to bc lying about Zafra and Llerena, covering the
Seville clul1lssee, Daricau to have his troops at Zalamea and
Los lIornachos, watching the great passage of the Guadiana at
l'IIerida. As each division with its attendant cavalry was not
much over 6,000 strong, there was no danger of their combining
so as to endanger either of the British columns. Each was
strong enough to give a good account of itseU. Hill and
Graham werc to push forward boldly, and drive their res~ti\'c
enemies·befoTe them as fur as the Sierra Morena, so that SOlut,
when he should come up from Seville (as he undbubtedly
would in the course of a few weeks), should have no foothold
in the Estremndurun plain to start from, and would have to
manreuvre back the containing force in ~is front all the way
from the summit of the passes to Albucra.
In addition to these two columns and thc invcsting corps at
Badajoz, Wellington had a reserve of which some units bad not
yet come up, though all were due in a few days, viz. the 5th
Division, Pack's and Bradford's independent Portugucse
brigades, and the cavalry of Bock and Anson-about 12,000
men-: the last of them would be up by the 21st at latest.
There was still OIlC marc eorps Crom which 'Vcllington in-
tended to get useful assistance. This was the main body of the
Spanish Army of Estremadura, thc troops DC Penne Villemur
and Morillo, about 1,000 horse and 4,000 foot 1, which he
destined to play the same part in this campaign that Blake
had played during the last siege of Badajoz. By Castaiaos's
leave this little force had been moved from its usual haunts by
Ca~res and Valencia de Alcantara, behind the Portuguese
frontier, to thc Lower Cuadiana, from whencc it was to cntcr the
Condado de Niebla. It passed Uedondo on March 11th on its
way towards San Luear de Guadiana, feeding on magazines
provided by its allies; Pennc Villcmur's orders wcre that he
, The Conde had 1,114 horse and 3,638 foot on Jan. 1, not including two
of Morillo's battalions then absent. The total force used for the raid WE\>I
probably as above.
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should establish himself in the Condado (where there was .still
a small Spanish garrison at Ayamonte), and strike at Seville,
the moment that he heard that Soult had gone north towards
Estremadura. The city would be found ill-garrisoned by
cOllvulescents, and Juramentados oC doublfulloyalty: if it were
not captured, its danger would at any rate cause Soult to turn
back, just as he had in June 1811, for he dared not lose his base
and arsenal. It was hoped that Ballasteros with his fovingcorps
from the mountain of Ronda would co-operate. when he round
that the troops usually employed to I contain' him had marched
off. But Bnllastel'os was always (l. , law unto himself,' llnd it
was impossible to count upon him: he particularly disliked
suggestions from a British quarter, while Castaflos was always
sensible and obliging 1.
Before dealing with the operations or the actual siege of
Badajoz, which require to be studied in continuous sequence, it
may be well to deal with those of the covering corps.
Graham marched in two <-'oIu'mns, onc di\'ision by Albuera,
two by AlmendrnI. He ran against the outposts of Drouet ut
Santa Marta, from which a battalion and n few cavalry hastily
retired to Villafranca, where it was reported that Drouet himself
was lying. Graham judged that the French general would
probably retire towUI·ds Llerena by the main road, and hoped
to harass, if not to surprise him, by it forced night march on that
place. This was executed in the night of the 18th-19th, but
proved a disappointment: the vanguard of the British column
entered LlefCnu only to find it empty-Drouet had retired not
southward but eastward, so as to get into touch with Daricau's
division at Zalamea-he had gone on by Ribera to Los Horna·
chos. Craham thereupon halted his main body at Zafra, with
the cavalry out as far as Usagre and Fuente Cantos. A dispatch
from Drouet to his brigadier Reymond was intercepted on the
21st, and showed that the latter, with four battalions at Fl'cgenal,
had been eut off from his chief by the irruption of the British
down the high-road, and was ordcred to rejoin him by way of
Llerena. Crabam thought that he might catch this little force,
so withdrew his cavalry from Llcrcna, in ordcr that Rcymolld
1 Details in a dispatch to Colonel Austin of March 15, DiltpolcMS, viii.
p.Of16. General scheme in a letter to Castaiios of Fcb. 16. Ibid.• p. 014.
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might make his way thither unmolested, und be caught in a trap
by ~veral British brigades converging upon him by a night
march. This operation, executed on the night of the 25th,
unfortunately miscarried. The French actually entered
LIerena, but us the columns were closing in upon them an
unlucky accident occurred. Graham and his stair, riding ahead
of the 7th Division, ran into a cavalry picket, which charged
them. 'l'hcy came back helter-skelter on to the leading battalion
of the infantry, which fired promiscuously into the mass, killed
two staff officers, find nearly shot their general l . The noise of
thi,; outburst of fire, and the return of their own dragoons,
warned the 1,800 French in Llerena, who escaped by a mountain
path towardi:l Guudalcunal, and did not lose a mun.
Improbable as it would have been judged, Drouet had
abandoned the Seville road altogether, and gone off eastward.
His only communication with Soult would have to be by Cor-
dovll: clearly he had refused to be cut off from Darieau: possibly
he may have hoped to await in the direction of Zalamea and
Castucra the arrival of troops from the Army of Portugal,
coming down by Truxillo and 1tlcdellin from Almaraz. For
Soult and his generals appear to have had no notice of the
Emperor's prohibition to Marmont to send troops to Estrema-
dura. On the other haud the Duke of Ragusa had written, in
perfect good faith, before he received the imperial rescript,
that he should come to the aid of Badajoz with four or five
divisions, as in June 1811, if the place were threatened.
On the 27th Graham resolved to pursue Drouet eastward,
even hoping that he might slip in to the south of him, and drive
him northward in the direction of Merida and Medellin, where
he would have fallen into the arms of Hill's column. He had
reached Llera and La Higuera whcn he intercepted another
lettcr--this time from Gcneral Rcymond to Drouet; that
officer, after escaping from Llerena on the night of the 25th-26th,
had marehed to Azuaga, where he had picked up another
1 'Something too like a panic was occasioned at the head oC the 7th by
the appearance of the Ccw French dragoons and the galloping back of the
staff and orderlies. A confused firing brokc out down the column without
object 1 Mem.-Even British troops should not be allowed to load bdore
a night attack.' D'Urban's diary, March 26.
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detachment under General Quiat. He announced that he was
making the best of his way towards Fuente Ovejuna, behind the
main crest of the Sierra ?I'lorena, by which circuitous route he
hoped to join his chief.
Graham thought that he had now another OPPol'tuuit)' oC
surprising Reymond, while he was marching across his Iront,
and swerving southward again made a second forced night
march on Azuaga. It laiJcd, like that on Llerena three days
before-the French, wamed by Afrancesados, left in haste, and
Graham's exhausted troops only arrived in time to sce them
disappear.
Ueymond's column was joined next day at Fuente Ovejuna by
Dronet and D.aricau, so that the whole of the French force in
Estremadura was now concentrated-but in an unfavourable
position, sinee they were completely cut oU from Seville, ulld
eould only retire on Cordova if further pressed. Should Soult
wish to join them with his reserves, hc would have to march
up the Guadalquivir, losing (our or five days,
Craham and his stun were fluttering themselves that they
had won a considerable strategical advantage in this matter,
when they were disappointed, by receiving, on Mareh 30,
a dispatch (ram Wellington prohibiting any (urther pursuit
of Drouct, or any longer stay on the slopes o[ the Sicl'ra Morcna.
The column was ordered to come back and canton itself about
Fuente del l\Iaestre, Almendralejo, and VilIafranca. By
April 2nd the three divisions were established in these plaecs.
Their recall would seem to have been cnused by Wellington's
knowledge that Soult had by now concentrated a heavy force
at Seville, and that i( he advanced suddenly by the great
ch,m$~'ee, past Monusterio and Fuellte Cantos, Craham might
be caught in a very advanced position between him and Drouet,
and find a difficulty in retreating to join the main body of the
army (or a defensivc battle 011 the Albucra position 1.
Meanwhile Hill, with the other half of the covering army, had
been spending a less eventful fortnight. He renched Merida
1 l~or details of this forgotten cumpaign I rely mainly 011 D'Urban's
unpublished diary. As he knew EstI'Crnadura well. from having served
there with Ikresford in 1811, he Wll.'I lent to Graham, and rode ....ith his
staff to advise about rOllds and the resources of the country.
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on March 17 ·and found it unoccupied. Drouet was reported to
be at Villafranca, Daricau to be lying with his troops spread
wide between Meddlin, Los HOl'llachos, and Zalarnea. Hill
crossed the Guadiuna and marched to look for them: his first
march was on ViIlafranca, but Drouet had already slipped
away from that point, avoiding Graham's column. Hill then
turned in search of Daricau, and drove onc of his brigades
out of Don Benito near Medellin. The bulk of the :French
division then went 011 to the south-east, and ultimately joined
Drouct at FUClltc Ov~juna, though it kept a rcarguard at
Castucrll. Hill did not pursue, but remained in thc neighbour-
hood of Merida and l\fedellin, to guard these two great passages
of thc Guadiana against any possible appearance of Marmont's
troops from the direction of Almaraz a~d 'l'ruxillo. "Vcllillgton
(it will be remembered) had believed that l\larmont would
certainly come down with a considerable force by this route, and
(being ignorant of Napoleon's order to thc Marshal) was cxpcct~
ing him to be heard of from day to day. As· a matter of fact
only Foy's single division was in the Tagus valley at 'l'alavera :
that officer kept receiving dispatches Ior his ehiet from Drouet
and Soult, imploring that Marmollt should move south without
delay. This was impossible, as Foy knew; but he became so
troubled by the repeated requests that he thought of marching,·
on his own responsibility, to try to join Drouct. This became
almost impracticable when Drouet and Daricau withdrew south~
ward to the borders of Andalusia: but Foy then thought or
executing a demonstration on 'l'ruxillo, on his own account,
hoping that it might at least distract \Vellington. On April 4
he wrote to Drouet that he was about to givc out that he was
Marmont's advanced guard, nnd to march, with 8,000 men only,
on that point, leaving the rest of his division in garrison at
Tulavern nnd Almaraz; he would be at Truxillo Oil the 9th 1. If
he had started a. week earlier, he would have fallen into the
hands oC Hill, who was waiting for him at Merida with four times
his force.. But the news of the fall of Dadnjoz on the Oth
reached him in time to prevent him from running into the
lion's mouth. Otherwise, considering Hill's enterprise and
• The letter maybe round in King Joseph'sCQJ7"l!spQndanc~,viii. pp.345-0.
See also Girod de l'Ain's Vie mi/itaire du Giniral Foy, pp. 3GB-9.
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Foy's complete lack of cavalry, there might probably have been
something like a repetition of the surprise of Arroyo dos
Malinos.
So much for the covering nnnies-it now remains to be
seen how 'Wellington dealt with Bndajoz, in the three weeks
during which Graham and Hill were keeping the peace for him
in southern and eastern Estrcmadura.
On surveying the fortress upon March 16th the British
engineers found that it had been c.'Ollsidcrably strengthened
since the last siege in June 1811. Fort San Cristobal had been
vastly improved-its glacis and counterscarp had been raised,
and a strong redoubt (called by the French the Lunette '''rerlc,
after the general killed at Albucra) had been thrown up on the
rising slope where Bercsford's breaching batteries had stood,
so that this ground would have to be won before it could be
again utilized. On the southern side of the Guadiana the Castle
had been provided with many more glUlS, and some parts of
the precipitous mound 011 which it stood had been scarped. The
breach of 1811 had becn most solidly built up. No danger was
feared in this quarter-it was regarded as the strongest part
of the defences. The approach toward the much more accessible
bastions just below the Castle had been made difficult, by
damming the Rivillas sb-eam: its bridge near the San Roque
gate had been built up, and the accumulated water made
a broad pool which lay under the bastions of San Pedro and
La Trinidad; its overflow had been turned into the ditch in
front of San Pedro, and, by cutting a cunette or channel, II deep
but narrow water obstruction had been formed in front of the
Trinidad also-the broad dry ditch having a narrow wet ditch
sunk. in its bottom just below the eounterscarp. This inunda-
tion was destined to give great trouble to the besiegers. The
Pardaleras fort had been connected with the city by a well·
protected trench between high earthen banks. Finally the
three bastions on the south side next the river, San Vi,z{eente,
San Jose, and Santiago, had been strengthened by demi-lunes.
which they had hitherto lacked, and also by driving a system
of mines from their {''Quntcrsearps under the glacis: these were
to be exploded if the besiege:rs should push up their trenches
and breaching batteries close to the walls on this side, which
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was one of the weakest in the city, since it was not covered,
us were the other fronts, by outlying works like the Pardalerus
and Pieuriua. forts or the San Roque lunette. The existence of
this series of mines was revealed to the besiegers by a French
sergeant-major of su,ppcrs, a skilful draughtsman, viho had
been employed in mapping out the works. Having been
insulted, as he conceived, by his captain, and refused redress
by the governor, he fled to the British camp in a rage, and
placed his map (where the mines arc vcry clearly shown) and
his services at the disposition of Wellington 1. The identical
map, a very neat piece of work, lies before me as I write these
lines, having passed into the possession of General D'Urban,
the chief of the Portuguese staff. It was in consequence of
their knowledge of these defences that the British engineers
left the San Vincente front alone 2.
Thc garrison on March 15th consisted of five battalions of
French regulars, one each from certain regiments belonging
to Conroux, Leval, Drouet, and Darieau (2,767 men), of two
battalions of the Hessc-Darmstadt rcgiment of the Rhcinbund
division of the Army of the Centre (910 men), three companies
of artillery (261 men), two and a half companies of sappers
(260 men), a handful of cavalry (42 men), a company of Spanish
Juramcntados, and (by casual chance) the escort of a convoy
which had entel'ed the city two days before the siege began.
The whole (excluding non-combatants, medical and commis-
sariat stnrr, &e.) made up 4,700 men, not more than an
adequate provision for such a large place. The governor,
Phillipon, the commandants o[ artillery and engineers (the
bst-named, Lamare, was the historian o( the three sieges of
Badajoz), and nearly all the staff had been in the fortress for
more than a. year. The battalions o( the garrison (though not
I This man is mentionoo in '''l'lllington's Dispatches, viii. p. 009: 'The
Sergenl'fIIajar tk9 Sapeu.rs and Adjudanl d~ traOOll<1: and the French miner
may bl'l sent in charge of a steady non·commissioned officer to Estremoz,
there to wait tU! I send for them.'
• This renegade's name must have been Bonin, or Dossin: I cannot
read with certainty his extraordinary signaturl'l, with a paraphe, at the
bottom of his map. The English engineers used it, and have roughly
sketched in their own works of the third siege on tOI) of the original
coloured drawing.
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the same as those who had sustained the assaults of 1811) had
been lllllny months settled in the place, and knew it almost
as well as djd the starr. They were nIl picked troops, including
the Gennnn regiment, which had an excellent record. Dut
undoubtedly the greatest factor in the defence was the ingenuity
and resource of t~e governor, which surpassed all praise: oddly
enough Phillipon did not show himself a very skiUul mover
of troops in the field, when commanding (L division in the Army
of Germany in 1813, after his capture and exchange: but
behind the walls of Badajoz he was unsurpassable 1.
The scheme of attack which Wellington, under the advice
of his engineers, employed ngainst Badujoz in :March 1812
difrered entirely from that of May.....June 1811. 'fhe fact that
the whole was a time-problem remained the same: the danger
that several of the French arf!lies might, if leisure were granted
them, unite for its relic!, was as clear as ever. But the idea
that the best method of procedure was to assail the most
commanding points of the fortress, whose capture would make
the rest untenable, was completely abandoned. Fort San
Cristobul und the lofty Castle were on this occasion to be left
alone altogether. The former was only observed by a single
Portuguese brigade (first Da Costa's and later Power's). The
second was not breached, or even battered with any serious
intent. This time the front o[ attack was to be the bastions
of Santa Maria and La Trinidad, on the south-eastern side of
the town. The reason for leaving those of San Vi~cente alld
San Jose, on the south-western side, unassailed-though they
were more accessible, and defended by no ouler forts-was
apparently the report of the renegade French sergeant-major
spoken of above; 'they were countermined. and therefore three
or four suc{.'Cssivc lodgemcnts would have to be formed against
them 2.' To attack Santa Maria and the Trinidad a preliminary
operation was necessary-they were covered by thc Picurina
Cart, and only from the knoll on which that work stands could
they be battered with effect. The Pieurinu was fur weaker
, When he communded U,e lstJ)jvision or the 1st CorlJ~under Valluumme,
llml was present when that corp6 was nearly ull destroyed on Aug. SO,
1813, lit Culm.
, Joucs, Siegell of tile PenillSf/III, i. p. 103.
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than the Pardaleras fort, from whose site a similar advantage
could be got against the bastions of San Roque and San Juan.
It must therefore be stormed, and on its emplacement would
be fLwd the batteries of the second parallel, which were to do
the main work of breaching. The c.'l:ceptional advantage to be
secured in this way was that the eounterguard (inner protective
bank) within the glads of the Trinidad bnstion was reputed to
be so low, that from the Picurina knoll the scarp of the bastion
eould be seen almost to its foot, and could be much morc
eIreetively battered than llny part of the defences whose upper
section alone was visible to the besieger. ~
Despite, therefore, of the need for wasting no time, and of
the fact that the preliminary operations against thc Picurina
must cost a day or two, this was the ,general plan of attack
adopted. The imrestment had been completed on the evening
of the 16th: on the same day 120 carts with stores of all kinds
marched from Elvas, and on the 17th these were already being
deposited in the Engineers' Park, behind the Cerrode San Miguel.
whose rounded top completely screened the preparations from
the sight of the gn.rrison.
The besieged had no notioil whatever ft." to the front which
wo·uld, on this third attempt, be selected for the attack of
the British. The elaborate fortifications and improvements
made in the Castle and San Cristobal tend to show that these
old points of attack were expected to be once more assailed.
Hence the besiegers got the inestimable advantage of an
U1U1lolested start on the night of March 17th. Colonel Fletcher
had risked the dangers of drawing the first parallel at a very
short distance from the Picurina fort. On a night of tern·
pestuous rain and high wind, a. parallel 600 yards long was
picketed out, on a line ranging only from 1{10 to 200 yards from
the covered-way of the work, and 1,800 workmen in the course
of the night threw up the parallel, and 4,000 feet of a communi-
cation-trench, leading backward to the head of a ravine in the
hill of San Miguel, which gave good cover for bringing men and
material up from the renr. Not a shot was fired by the French
all through the night, and at dawn the parallel and approach
were already 3 feet dcep and 3 Icct 6 inches widc~a good start.
With daylight the enemy discovered what had been done,
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and opened a furious fire both of cannon and musketry upon
the trenches. The three nearest bastions of the fortress joined
in with their heavy guns, but the 18th was a day of such
constant rain that even at a distance of only 500 or 600 yards
it was impossible to see much, or take accurate aim at thc
trenches. The working parties went on deepening and im-
proving the parallel and the communication behind it, without
suffering any great loss.
During the night of the 18th-19th they were able to trace
out and begin two batteries, destined to breach the Pieurina,
in the line of the parallel, and to extend it at both ends, from
the Rivillas on one side to the foot of thc hill of San Miguc1
on the other.
This was visible on the following morning, and Phillipon
thought tlle prospects of the fort so bad that he resolved to
risk a sortie, to destroy at all costs the trenches which were so
dangerously near to their objective. At midday two battalions
-1,000 men-starting from the lunette of San Roque, ,dashed
up the hill, got into thc north cnd of the parallel, and drovc out
the working parties for a distance of some 500 yards: they carried
. off many entrenching tools, for which the govemor had offered
the bonus of onc dollar a piece. But they had no time to do
any serious damage to the parallel, lor the guard ol the trenches
and the working parties, rallying fifty yards up the hill, came
down on them in force, within a quarter of an hour, and evicted
them again after a sharp tussle. The loss on the two sides was
very difCcrcnt-the British lost 150 mcn, the besieged 304, of
whom many were drowned in the inundation, while trying to
take short cuts through it to the gates. The effect ol the sortie
had been practically nil, as far as destroying the works went.
During tltis skirmish Colonel Fletchcr was wounded in the
groin bya ball, whieh hit his purse, and while failing to penetrate
further, forced a dollar-piece an inch into his thigh. He was
confined to his tent lor some fourteen days, and his subordinates,
Majors Squire and Burgoyne, had to take up ltis duty, though
Wellington ordered that he should still retain nominal charge
of the work, and consulted him daily upon it.
On the ncxt night (March 20th) the parallel and ·approach
against the l'icurina being practically complete, and only the
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battery cmplacements in it requiring to be finished, the engineers
of the besieging army resolved to continue the line of trenches
into the flat ground in front of the Bastion of San Pedro and
the Castle, it being intended that batteries should be constructed
here to play on the Trinidad and the neighbouring parts of the
fortress, when the Pieurina should have fallen. It would save
time to have everything ready on this side, when the fort should
have been mastered. Troublc at once bcgan-not only from
thc enemy's fire, which swept all this low ground, but
still more from the continuous bad weather.. Thc rain which
had easily run away from the sloping trenches on the Cerro de
San Miguel, lodged in the new works, could not be drained off,
and melted away thc earth as fast as it was thrown up. Mud
cast into the gabions ran off in the form of slimy water, and
the parapets could only be kept upright by building them of
sandbags. The men were actually flooded out of the trenches
by the accumulated water, which was almost knee deep. In
the rear the Guadiana rose, and washed away the two bridges
whieh connected the army with its base at Elvas. The deluge
lasted four days and was a terrible hindram.'C, it being impossible
to finish the parallel in the low ground, or to begin moving the
battering-guns, even those destined for the long-completed
batterics on the Ceno de Sun MigueI.
It Wl!S not till the afternoon of the 24th that finc weather a.t
last set in; this permitted the guns to be brought at once into
the two batteries facing thc Picurina, and, after herculean
efforts, into other batteries (nos. 4. and 5) in the low ground
also. Three days at least had been lost from the vile weather.
On the morning of the 25th all the batteries opened simul-
taneously, ten guns against the llieurina., eighteen against the
parts of the fortress behind it. The fort was completely
silenced, as was the little lunctte of San Roque. Not much
damage appeared to have been inflicted on the Picurina beyond
the breaking of many of its palisades, and the degradation of
its salient angle. But Wellington ordered that it should be
stormed that night, in order that he might make up for the lost
time of the 20th-24th.
'l'he storm was duly carried out by General Kempt and 500
men of the Light and the 3rd Divisions, at 'ten o'clock that
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night. It was a desperate aUair, lor the ditch was deep, and not
in the least filled with rubbish, and the scarp was intact save
at the extreme salient angle. Though the garrison's guns had
been silenced, they kept up a lurious fire of musketry, which
disabled 100 men before the stormers reached the ditch. The
main hope of the assault had been that two turning columns
might break in at the gorge: but it wns found so strongly closed,
with a double row of palisades and a cutting, that all efforts to
force an cntrance were repelled with loss. Barned here, one
party tried the ~espcratc expedient of casting three long
ladders, not into, but acrQSS the ditch on the right flank of the
fort, which though deep was not so broad but that a 30-foot
ladder would reach from its lip to the row of fraises, or project·
ing beams, ranged horizontally at the top of the scarp some
feet below the brim of the parupet. The ladders sagged down
but did not break, and some fifty men headed by Captain Dates
of the 88th ran across on the rungs and got a lodgement inside
the fort. At the snme moment Gencrnl Kcmpt launched the
reserve of the storming party-lOO men, mostly from the
2/S3rd and headed by Captain Powys of that regiment-at the
exaet salient of the fort, the only plaee where it was seriously
damaged, Blld succeeded in breaking in. The garrison, who
made a stubborn resistance, were overpowered-S3 were killed
or wounded, the governor, Colonel Gaspard·Thierry, and
145 taken prisoners, only I officer and 40 men escaped into the
town. The losses of the stormers had been over 50 per cent.
of the men engaged! Four officers and 50 rank and file were
killed, 15 officers and 250 mcn wounded, out of a little over 500
who joincd in the assault. Phillipon tricd a. sortie from the
lunette of San Roque, just as the fort fell, in hopes to recover it:
but the battalion which came out was easily beaten off by the
fire of the men in the trenches to the right, and lost 50 killed
and wounded.
The last stage of the siege hail now been reached. Dy
capturing the Picurina on its commanding knoll, the British had
established themselves within 400 yards of the Trinidad and
450 yards of the Santa Maria bastions, which they could batter
with eyery advantage of slope and ground. But it was a very
costly business to make the necessary lodgement in the ruined
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fort, to demolish it, and throw its earth in the reverse direction,
and to build in its gorge fhe two batteries (nos. 8, 9), which were
to breach the body of the place. The fire of three bastions bore
directly on the spot where the batteries were to be placed, and
there was also 0. most deadly enfilading fire from the high-lying
Castle, and even from the distant San Cristobal. Though the
three batteries in the fiat ground (to which a fourth was
presently added) endeavoured to silence this fire, they only
succeeded in doing so very imperfectly, for the French kept
replacing onc gun by another, from their ample store, when
any were disabled. From the 26th to the 80th four days were
employed in building the Picurina batteries, with great loss
of life all the time, which fell mainly on the engineer officers
who were directing the work and on the sappers under their
orders. The I'rench covered the whole of the Picurina knoll
with such a hail of projectiles that no amount of cover seemed
to guarantce those labouring in it from suddcn death. When
the batteries had been completed, the bringing forward of the
guns and the ammunition cost many lives more. Twice there
were considerable explosions ol powder, while the magazines ill
the batteries were being filled.
At last, however, on March 30, one 01 the two new batteries
in the gorge of the Picurina was able to open, and on the 31st
the other followed suit, supported by a third supplementary
battery (no. 7), planned under the left flank of the fort. The
practice was excellent, but at first the effect was not all that
had been hoped: the 'l'rinidad and the Santa Maria bastions
wcre solidly built and resisted well. On April 2, however, both
began to show considerable and obvious injury, and it was
clear that a fcw days more would ruin them. But there was
one serious contretemps: the inundation between the Picurina
and the fortress showed no signs of going down-it had been
swollen by the rains ol the 20th-24th, Md could not Dow away
so long as the dam at the lunette of San Roque kept it back.
While the water was held up, the breaches, soon about to
develop, could only be got nt by a nnrrow and curved route,
between the inundation and the steep slope on which stands
the Pardaleras. It had been intended that the assault should
be delivered from the trenches, but this was impossible till the
on",s. v It
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Rivillas should have fallen to its usual insignificant breadth
and depth. Hence efforts were made to burst the dam at all
costs, but neither did artillery fire suffice, nor a venturesome
expedition on the night of the 2nd of April by thc engincer
Lieutenant: Stanway and 20 sappers, who slipped down the
ravine and .laid powder-bags against the dam, despite of the
French fire. The powder exploded, but did not do its work.
For several days an attempt was mooe to sap down to the dam
from the second parallel. But it cost so many lives at the head
of the sap, and the zig-zags advanced so slowly, that on the
3rd of April the attempt was given up, and it was determined
that the brenehes must be assaulted from the west bank of
the RiviJIas only.
:Meanwhile the two breaches, the larger one in thc front of
the Trinidad bastion, the smaller in the flank ol the Santa
Maria, began to be very apparent, and gave good hopc to the
besiegers. 'fhe F'reneh, however, delayed their progress by
the most gallant efforts: 200 men worked in the ditch alter
dark, to clcar away the debris that was ltilling into it. This
they did uudcr constant mtillery fire from the batteries,
which played on the ditch with grape at intervals in the
night, and killed scores of the workmen. They also deepened
the diteh at the foot of the countersearp, till it was 18 feet
from the covered-way to the bottom of its level. The ruined
parapets were built up every night with earth and wool-packs,
only to be destroyed again every morning. 'fhe garrison began
to feel uncomfortable, for not only was the loss of life great,
but the furious flrc, by whieh they strove to keep down the
efficiency of the siege-batteries, bad begun to tell so much on
their reserves of ammunition that, by April B, there was no
common shell left, and very little grapc-of the round-shot
mueh more than half had been expended. Phillipon was
obliged to order the artillerymen to be sparing, or a few days
more would leave him helpless. As the French fire slackened,
that of the besiegers grew morc intense, and ·Wellington put
forward the last twelve gWIS of his siege-park, hitherto reserved,
to form some new supplementary batteries on the right of his
line [nos. 10, 11, 12].
On April 4th the breaches were both growing practicable, and
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news from the South warned Wellington that he must hurry;
Soult was at last ovcr the Sierra MOl'cna. with all the troop!:!
that he could scrape together from Andalusia. It was lucky
indeed that l\tarmont was not marching to join Soult, but
was executing a raid into central Portugal, not by his own
wish but by the special orders of the Emperor, as has already
becn explaincd elsewhere. His irruption into the Beira was
absolutely disregarded by Wellington: for as long as the two
Freneh armies were not united, the British commander did
not lUuch fear either of them. Still, if SOlut came close up to
Badajoz, it would be necessary to send part of the siege· troops
to join the covering force-and this would be inconvenient.
,Vherefore \Vellington rcsoh'cd to strike at once, while Soult
was still four or five marches away.
On the 4th the breaches, both in the Trinidad nnd in Santa
Maria, looked practicable--on the morning of the 5th they were
certainly so. But the question was raised as to whether the
mere prneLicability of the brcaches was enough to ensure success
-it was clearly made out that the garrisons were building
a semicircular inner retrenchment among the houses of the
town, which would cut oU the brcaches, and give a second line
of resistance. Moreover Colonelli'letcher, who was just out of
bed, his wound of the 19th March being on the mend, reported
from personal observation that it was clear that all manner of
obstn.cles were being accumulated behind both breaches, and
-every preparation made [or a desperate defence 01 them.
Whcre£orc Wellingtoll ordered the storm to be put orr for a day,
and turned two batteries on to a new spot, where Spanish
informants reported that the wall of the curtain wus badly
built, betwccn Sunta Maria und the Trinidad. So true was this
report, that a very few hours battering on the morning of the
6th made a third breach at this point, as practicable as either
of the others.
. To prevent the enemy from getting time to retrench this
third opening into the town, the storm was ordered for 7.30
o'clock on the same evcning-it would have been well if the
hour had been kept as first settled.
R2
SECTION XXXII: CHAPTER IV
THE STORM OF BADAJOZ. APRIL 6, 1812
THE arrangements which 'Wellington made (or the assault-
s. business which he knew would be costly, and not absolutely
certain of success-were as lollows.
The Light (lud 4th Divisions were told of! for the main attack
at the three breaches. They were forced to make it on the
narrow front west of the RiviJIas, because the inundation
cramped their approach on the right. The 4th Division, under
Colvillc, was to keep nearest to that water, and to assail the
breach in the Trinidad bastion and also the new breach in the
curtain to its left. The Light Division was to devote itself to
the breach in the flank of Santa l\Iaria. Each division was to
provide an advance 01 500 men, with which wcnt twelve ladders
and a party currying hay-bags to cast into the ditch. For the
counterscarp not being ruined, it was clear that there would
be a. very deep jump into the depths. The two divisions
followed in columns of brigades, each with a British brigade
lending, the Portuguese in the centre, and the other British
brigade in the renr. Neither division was quite complete-the
4th having to provide the guard of the trenches that night,
while the Light Division detachcd some oC its rifles, to distract
the attcntion of the enemy in the bastions to the left, by lying
down on the glacis and firing into the embrasures when their
cannon should open. Hence the Light Division put only 3,000,
the 4th 3,500 men into the assault. When the breaches were
curried, the Light Division was to wheel to the left, the 4th to
the right, and to sweep along the neighbouring bastions on
each side. A reserve was to be left at the quarries below the
Pardalerns height, and called up when it was needed.
] n addition to the main assault two subsidiary attacks were
to be made-a third (as we shall sce) was added at the last
momcnt. The guurds oC the trenches, furnished by the 4th
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Division, were to try to rush the lWlette oC San Roque, which
was in a dilapidated condition, and were to cut away the dam
if successful. A mueh more serious ml'!-tter was that, on the
express petition of General Picton, he was allowed to make
an attempt to take the Castle by escalade. This daring officer
argued that liD the attention of the enemy would bc concen-
trated on the breaches, and that the Castle was in itself so strong
that it was probable the governor would only leave a minimum
garrison in it. He had marked spots in its front where the walls
were comparatively low, owing to the way in whieh the rocky
and grassy slope at its foot ran up and down. The esculade
was to be a surpl'ise-the division was to cross the Rivillas
at a point far below the inundation, where the ruins of a mill
spanncd the strcam, and was to drag ladders up the stecp
mound to the foot of the wall.
'['wo demonstrations, or false attacks, were to be made with
the intention or distracting the enemy......-one by Power's Portu-
gucse brigade bcyond the Guadiana, who wcre to thrcatcn
an escalade on the lort at the bridge-head: the other by the
Portuguese of the .:;th Division against the Pardaleras. At
the last moment-the order does not apJX:ar in the full draft
of the directions for the storm-Leith, eommartding the 5th
Division, was told that he might try an escalade, similar to that
allottcd to Pieton, against thc river-bastion of San Vincentc,
the extrcme north-west point of the defcnccs, and onc that had
hitherto been left entirely untouched by the besiegers. For this
hc was to employ one of his two British brigades, leaving the
other in rescrve.
Every student of the Peninsular War knows the unexpected
result of the storm: the regular assault on the breaches failed
with awful loss, but nil the three subsidiary attacks, on San
Roque, the Castle, and San Vincente, succeeded in the most
brilliant style, so that Budajoz wus duly taken, but not in the
way that Wellington intended.
The reason why the main assault failed was purely and simply
that Phillipon and his garrison put into the defence of the
breaches not only the most devoted courage, but such an
accumulation of ingenious deviees as had ncver bcIore becn seen
in a siege of that generation-apparently Phillipon must share
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the credit with his commanding engineer, Lamare, the historian
of the siege. The normal precaution of cutting off the breaches
by retrenchments on both sides, and of throwing up parapets
of earth, sandbags, and wool-packs behind them, was the least
part of the work done. W"hat turned out more crfective was
a series of mines and explosive barrels planted at the foot of the
cOlmtersca.rp, and connected with the ramparts byeovered trains.
This was on the near side of the ditch, where there was dead
ground unsearehed by the besiegers' artillery. In the bottom
of it, and at the foot of the breaches, had been placed or thrown
all manner of large cumbrous obstacles, carts and barrows
turned upside down, several large damaged boats, some rope
entanglements, and piles of broken gahions and fascines. The
slopes of the breaches had been strewn with erowsfeet, and
werc <.:overed with beams studded with nails, not fixed, but
hung by ropes from the lip of the breach; in some places
harrows, and doors studded with long spikes, were set upon the
slope. At the top of each breach was a device never forgotten
by any observer, the chevaua: de frise, formed of cavalry sword-
blades 1 set ill foot-square beams, and chained down at thcircnds.
For the defcnce of the threc breaches Phillipon had told oH
700 men, composed of the light and grenadier eomp<1-nies of
each of his battalions, plus the four fusilier companies of the
l08rd Line-about 1,200 men in all. A battalion of the 88th
was in the cathedral square behind, as general reserve. The
two Hessian battalions were on the left, holding the Castle,
the lunette of San Roque, and the San Pedro bastion. The
three other French battalions occupied tlie long range of bastions
from San Juan to Sail Vineentc. As there had been many
casualties, the total of the available men had sunk to about
4,000, and since nearly half of them were concentrated at or
behind the breaches, the guard was rather thin at other points-
especially (as Picton had calculated) ut the Castle, which, though
its front was long, was held by only 250 men, mostly I1essiaus.
It was a most unfortunate thing that the time of the assault,
originally fIxed for 7.30, was put off tilllO-nnd that the siege-
batteries slucked down ufter dark. For thc two hours thus
I These swords I'"ere those or the large hody of Spauish dismounted
cnvl.lry Wllich had surrendered at the Cflpitulation ill Maf1)h 1811.
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granted to the besieged were well spent. in repairing and
strengthening all their devices for defence. An earlier assault
would have found the preparations incomplete, especially in the
matter of the combustibles placed in the ditch.
It would bc useless, in the ntuTative of the doings of this
bloody night, to make any attempt to vie with those paragraphs
of lurid description which make Napier's account of the st.orm
of Badajoz perhaps the most striking section of onc of the
most eloquent books in the English language. All that will
be here attempted is to give a clear and concise note of what
happened between ten and one o'clock on the night of April 6,
1812, so far as it is possible to secure a coherent tale from the
diaries and memoirs of a number oC cye-witnesses. Burgoync
and Jones of the Royal Engineers, Dickson the commander
of the Artillery, Grattan and :McCarthy from the 3rd Division,
Leith Hay of the 5th, and Kincaid, Simmons, and Harry Smith
of the Light Division, alollg with many more less well-known
authorities, must serve M our instructors, each for the part of
the storm in which he was himself concerned.
It had been intended, as WM said above, that all the columns
should converge simultaneously on their points of attack, and
Jar that reason the distances between the starting-point of each
division and its objective .had been calculated wit.h care. But,
as a matter of fact, the hour of 10 p.m. was not quite accurately
kept. On the right Pieton's division wus descried by the
French in the Castle as it was lining the first parallel, and was
heavily fired upon at 9.45, whereupon the general, seeing
that his men were discovered, ordered the advance to begin
at once-the 3rd Division was fording the RiviIIas under a blaze
of fire from the Castle and the SanPedro bastion before 10 struck
on the cathedral dock. On the other band, at the western flank,
the officer in charge of the ladder and hay-bag party which
was to lead the 5th Di vision, lost his way along the bank of
the Guadinnn, while coming up from the Park to t.ake his place
at the head of Leith's men. The column had to wait for the
ladders, and was more than an hour late ill starting. Only the
central attack, on the three breaches, was delivered with exact
punctuality.
It is perhaps best to deal with this unhappy assault first-it
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was a horrible affair, and fully two-thirds of the losses that
night were incurred in it. The two divisions, as ordered, came
down the ravine to the left of the Pardaleras hill without being
discovered: the line of vision from the town was in their
favour till they were actually on the glacis, and heavy firing
against Picton's column was heard as they came forward. The
4th Division was turning to the right, the Light Division to the
left, just as they drew near the ditch, when suddenly they wcre
descried, and the French, who were well prepared .and had
long been waiting for the expected assault, opened on them
with musketry from all the breaches, and with artillery from
the uuruined flanking bastions. The storm began as unhappily
as it was to end. The advance of the 4th Division bearing to
the right, came on a part of the ditch into which the inundation
had been admitted-not knowing its depth, nor that the
French had made a six-foot cutting at the foot "of the counter-
scarp. Many men, not waiting for the ladders, sprang down
into the water, thinking it to he a mere puddle. The leading
files nearly all perished-the regimental record of the Welsh
Fusiliers shows twenty men drowned-that of the Portuguese
regiment whieh was behind the Fusiliers as many as thirty.
Finding the ditch impassable here, the rest of the 4th Division
storming-party swerved to the left, and, getting beyond the
inundation, planted their ladders there: some came down in
this way, more by simply taking a fourteen-foot leap on to the
hay-bags, which they duly cast down. At the same moment
the advance of the Light Division descended in a similar fashion
into the ditch farther to the left, towards Santa Maria. Many
men were already at the bottom, the rest crowded on the edge,
where the French engineers fired the series of fougasses, mines,
and powder-barrels which had been laid in the ditch. They
worked perfectly, and the result was appalling-the 500 volun-
teers who formed the advancc of each division were almost all
slain, scorched, or disabled. Every one of the engineer officers
set to guide the column was killed or wounded, and the want
of direction, caused by the absence of auy one who knew the
topography of the breachl;s, had the most serious effect during
the rest of the storm. Of the Light Division officers with the
advance only two escaped unhurt.
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There was a horrible eheek for a minute or two, and then the
heads of the main column of each division reached the edge of
the ditch, and began to leap down, or to make use of those of
the ladders which had not been broken. The gulf below was all
ablaze, for the explosions had set fire to the carts, roats, broken
gabions, &e., whieh the J?rench had set in the ditch, and they
were burning furiously---every man as he descended was
clearly visible to the cnemy entrenched on thc top of thc
breaches. The troops suffered severely as they dribbled over
the edge of the counterscarp, and began to accumulate in
the ditch. From the first there was great confusion-the two
divisions got mixed, because thc 4th had becn forced to swerve
to its left to avoid the inundation, and so was on ground
originally intended for the Light. Many men mistook an
unfinished mvelin in the bottom of the ditch for the foot of the
central breach, and climbed it, only to find themselves on
a mass of carth divided by a wide sunken space from the point
they were aiming at. To get to the foot of the largest breach,
that in the Trinidad bastion, it was necessary to push some
way along the blazing bottom of the ditch, so as to turn and
get round the cnd of the inundation. The main thrust of the
attack, however, went this way, only part of the Light Division
making for the Santa Maria breach, on which it had been
intended that all should concentrate. As to the central breach
in the curtain, it seems that few or none made their wayl thither:
the disappointment on reaching the top of the ra\'clin in front
of it, made all who got alive to that point turn right or left,
instead of descending and pushing straight on. Jones records
that next morning there was hardly a single body of an English
soldier on the central breach, while the slopes and foot of each
of the two flank breaches were heaped with hundreds of corpses.
This was a. misfortune, as the curtain breach was the easiest
of the three, and having been made only that afternoon was
not retrenched like thc others.
From ten to twelve the surviving men in the ditch, fed by the
coming up of the rear battalions of each division, and finally by
the reserve, delivered a series of desperate but disorderly attacks
, ThIs fact, much insisted on by Joncs, b disputed by certain Light
Division witnesses, but dOCll not seem to be disproved by them.
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on the Trinidad and Santa Maria. breaches. It is said that on
no occasion did morc than the equivalent of a company storm
at oncc-cach officer us he struggled to the Cront with those of
his men who stuck to him, tried the breach opposite him, and
was shot down nearer or farther from its root. Very few ever
arrived at the top, with its chevaux de frise of sword-blades.
The footing among the beams and spikes was uncertain, and
the French fue absolutely deadly---evcry man was armed with
three muskets. Next morning observers say that they noted
only one corpse impaled on the chevau.x de Jrise of the Trinidad
breach, and a few more under it, as if men had tried to crawl
below, and had had their heads beaten in or blown to pieces.
But the lower parts of the ascent were absolutely carpeted with
the dead, lying onc on another.
More than two hours were spent in Lhese desperate buL vain
attempts to carry the breaches: it is said that as many as forty
separate assaults were made, but all to no effect-the fire
concentrated on the attacked front was too heavy for any man
to face. At last the assaults eeased: the survivors stood-unable
to get forward, unwilling to retreat-vainly answering the
volleys of the French on the walls above them by an inerfeetive
fire of musketry. Just after twelve, Wellington, who had been
waiting on the hill above, receiving from time to time reports
of the progress of the assault, sent down orders for the reeall
of the two divisions. They retired, most unwillingly, and
formed up again, in sadly diminished numbers, not far from the
glaeis. The only benefit obtained from their dreadful exertions
was that the attention of the French had been concentrated
on the breaches for two hours-and meanwhile (without their
knowledge) the game had been settled elsewhere.
The losses had been frightful---over one mall in four of those
engaged: the Light Division had 68 officers and 861 men
killed and wounded out of about 8,000 present: the 4th Divi-
sion 84 officers Ilnd 841 men out of 3,500. The Portuguese
battalions whieh served with them had lost 400 men more-
altogether 2,200 of the best troops in Wellington's army had
fallen-and all to no result.
But while the main stroke failed, each of the subsidiary
attacks, under Picton and Leith, had met with complete success,
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and despite of the disaster on the breaches, Badajoz was at
Wellington's mercy by midnight. The success of either escalade
by itseU would have been enough to settle the game.
Picton's division, as already mentioned, had been detected by
the :Freneh as it was filing into the parallel below the Castle: and
since a heavy fire was at once opened on it, there was 110 use
in halting, and the gcncrnJ gavc the order to advance without
delay. The men went forward on a narrow front, having to
cross the RiviUas at the ruined mill where alone it was fordable.
This was done under fire, but with no great loss. The palisade
on the other bank of the stream was broken down by a general
nlsh, and the storming-party found itself at the foot of the
lofty Castle hill. To get the ladders up it was a most difficult
business-the slope was very steep, almost precipitous in
parts, and the ladders were thirty feet long and terribly heavy,
Though no assault had been expeeted here, and the preparations
were not so elaborate as at the breaches, yet the besieged were
not caught unprepared, and the column, as it climbed the hill,
was torn by cannon shot and thinned by musketry. The Freneh
threw fire-balls over the wall, and other incandescent stufi:
(carcasses), so thcrc was fail' light by which to sce the stormcrs.
Pieton was hit in the groin down by the Rivillas, and the charge
of the assault fell to his senior brigadier, Kempt, and :Major
Burgoync of the Engineers.. The narrow spuce ut the loot of
the walls being reached, the ladders were reared, one after the
other, toward the south end of the Castle wall. Six being at last
ready in spots close to each other, an attempt was made to
mount, with an officer at the head of each. But the fire was so
h~avy, that no man reached the last rungs alive, and the
enemy overthrew all the ladders und broke several of them.
One is said to have been pulled up by ma.in force into the
Castlc! Meanwhile the besieged east heavy stones and broken
beams into the mass of men clustering along the foot of the
wall, and slew many. But the 3rd Division was not spent-
Kempt's brigade had delivered the first rush-Champlcmolld's
]lortuguese headed the second, when they had climbed the
slope-but also to no cUect. Lastly the rear brigade-Camp-
bcll's---came up, and gave a. new impetus to the attack. 'l'here
was now a very large force, 4,000 men, striving all along the base
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of the wall, on a front of some 200 yards. 'Vherever footing
eould be found ladders were reared, now at considerable distances
from cach other. The garrison of the Castle was not large-two
Hessian and onc French company and the gunners, under
800 men, and when simultaneous attacks were delivered at
many points, some of them were scantily opposed. Hence it
came that in more places than one men at last scrambled to the
crest of the wall. A private of the 45th is said to have been the
first man whose body lcll inside, not outside, the battlcmcnts-
the second, wc are told, was an ensign (McAlpin) of the 88th,
who defcnded himself for a moment on the crest before he was
shot. The third man to gain the summit was Colonel Ridge
of the 5th Fusiliers, who Iound a point where an empty em-
brasure made the wall a little lower, entered it with two or
three of his men, and held out long enough to allow marc ladders
to be planted behind him, and a nuclellS to gather in his rear. He
pushed on the moment that fifteen or twenty men had mounted,
and the thin line or defenders being once pierced the resistance
suddenly broke down-all the remaining ladders were planted,
and the 3rd Division began to stream into the Castle. Pieton
was by this time again in command; he had recovered his
strength, and had hobbled up the slope, relieving Kcmpt, who
was by now also wounded. The time wus about elevcn o'clock,
and the din at the breaches down below showed that they were
still being defended. .
It took some time todislodgc the rcmaindcrof thc garrison from
the Castle precinct; many took refuge in thc keep, and defcndccl
it from stair to stair, till thcy were cxterminated. nut by
12 midnight all was over, and Picton would have debauched
from the Castle, to sw<.'Cp thc ramparts, but for the fact that all
its gates, save onc postern, were found to have been bricked
up-the French having intended to make it their last point of
resistance if the town should fall. The onc free postern being
at last Iound, the division wus preparing to break out, when thc
head of its column wus attacked by the French gencral rescn'c.
a battalion of the 88th, which Phillipon had sent Ill' from the
cathedral square, when he heard that the Castle had been forced.
There was a sharp fight bcIore the French were driven ocr, in
which (most unhappily) Ridge, the hero of the escalade, was
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shot dead. By the time that this was over, Badajoz had been
entered at another point, and Picton's success was only part
of the decisive stroke. But as he had captured in the CasUe
ull the French ammunition reserve, and nearly all their food,
the town must anyhow have faUen, because of his daring
exploit. The loss of the division was not excessive considering
the difficulties thcy had overcome, ahout 500 British and 200
Portuguese out of 4,000 men engaged.
Meanwhile, in the valley below the Castle, the guards of the
trenches had stormed the lunette of San Roque, and were hard
at work cutting the dam, so that in an hour or two the inunda-
tion was beginning to drain off rapidly. This also would have
been a decisive success, if nothing else had been accomplished
elsewhere.
The blow, however, whieh actuaUy finished the business, and
caused the French to fail at the breaches, was delivered by
quite another force. It will be remembered that a brigade-
Walker's--of the 5th Division, had been directed to esculade
the remote river-bastion of San Vincente. It was nearly an
hour late, because of the tiresome mistake made by the officer
charged with the bringing up of the ladders from the Park.
And only at a few minutes past eleven did Leith, heading the
column, arrive before the palisades of the covered way, near
the Guadiana. Walker's men were detected on the glacis, and
a heavy artillery fire was opened on them from San Vincente
and San Jose, but tbey threw down many ol the palisades and
began to descend into the ditch-a drop of 12 feet. There was a
cut in the bottom, to which water from the Guadiana had been
let in, and the wall in front wus 30 feet high. Hen<:c the first
attempts to plant the ladders were unavailing, and many men
fell. But coasting around the extreme north end of thc bastion,
close to the ri"er, somc offieers found that the flank sloped down
to a height of only 20 feet, where the bastion joined the water-
side wall. Threc or four ladders were successfully planted here,
while the main attention of the garrison was distracted to the
frontal attack, and a stream of men of the 4th, 30th, and 44th
began to pour up them. The French broke before the flank
attack: they were not numerous, for severa.l companies had
been drawn oIf to help at the brCtlChes, and thc bastion was
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won. As soon as (l. few hundred men were formed, General
Walker led them along the ramparts, and carried the second
bastion, that of San Jose. But the two French battalions
holding the succeeding western bastions now massed together,
and made u fl1'ln resistance in that of Santiago. The stormers
werc stopped, and an unhappy incidcnt broke their impetus-
some lighted port-fires thrown down by the French artillery-
men were lying about-some one called out that they were the
matches of mines. Thereupon the advancing column instinc-
tively fcll back some paces-the French charged and drove
them in, and the whole retired fighting confusedly as far as
San Vincente. Here General Leith hOO fortunlLtely left lL reserve
battalion, the 2/88th, which, though only 280 strong, stopped
the panic and broke .the French advance. Walker's brigade
rallied and advanced again-though its commander was
desperately wounded-and onee more the enemy were swept
all .along the western bastions, whieh they lost onc by one.
Some of the 5th Division descended into the streets of the
town, and pushing for the rear of the great breaches, by a long
detour through the silent streets, at last came ill upon them,
and opened a lively rue upon the backs of the enemy who were
"manning the retrenchments. The main body, however, driving
before them the garrison of the southern bastions, hurtled in
upon the flank of the Santa Maria. At this moment the 4th and
Light Divisions, by Wellington's orders, advanced again towards
the ditch, where their dead or disabled comrades were lying
so thick. They thought that they were going to certain death,
not being aware of what had happened inside the city. But as
thcy descended into thc ditch only a few scattcring shols
greeted them. The French main body-for 2,000 men had been
driven in together behind the breaches-had just thrown down
their arms and surrendered to the 5th Division. Even when
there was no resistance, the breachcs provcd hard to mount, and
the obstructions at the top were by no means easy to remove.
'l'he governor, Ilhillipon. had escaped into San Cristobal
with a few hundred men, and surrendered there at dawn, having
no food and little allununition. But he first sent out the few
horsemen of the garrison to run the gauntlet of the Portuguese
pickets, and bear the evil news to Soult.
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Thus fell Badajoz: the best summary of its fall is perhaps
that of Leith Hay, who followed his relative, the eonuuander
of the 5th Division, in the assault on San Vincente :-
'Had Lord Wellington relied on the storming of the breaches
alone, the town would not have been taken. Had General Leith
received his ladders punctually and escnladed at 10, as intended,
he would have been equally successful, and the unfortunate
divisions at the breaches would have been saved an hour of
dreadful loss. If Leith had failed, Badajoz would still have
fallen, in consequence of the Brd Division carrying the ensUe-
but not till the following morning; and the enemy might have
given further trouble. Had Picton failed, still the success of
the 5th Division ensured the fall of the place.' The moral would
seem to be that precautions cannot be too numerous-it was
the afterthoughts in tins case, and not the main design, that
were succ'cssful and saved the game.
Wellington himself, in a document-a letter to Lord Liver-
pool-that long escaped notice, and did not bret printed ill its
right place in the ninth volume of bis Dispatches I, made
a commentary on the perilous nature of the struggle and the
greatness of the losses which must not be suppressed. He
ascribed them to deficiencies in the engineering depurtment.
'The capture of Badajoz affords :l.S strong an instance of
the gallantry of our troops as has ever been displayed. But
I greatly hope that I shall neycr again be the instrument of
putting them to such a test as they were put to last night.
I assure your lordship that it is quite impossible to carry
fortified places by vive force without incurring grave loss and
being exposed to the chance of failure, unless the army should
bc provided with a sufficient trained corps of suppcrs and
miners.... 'rhe consequences of being so unprovided with the
people necessary to approach a regularly fortified place are,
first, that our cngineers, though well-cducated and bravc, havc
never turned their minds to the mode of conducting a regular
siege, as it is useless to think of that which, in our service, it is
impossible to perform. They tllink that they have done their
duty when they have constructed a battery, with a secure
I My attention was called lo this letlcr, round among l,ofd Lh'crpool's
papers in 18f11l, by Mr. F. Turuu, or "~rome.
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communication to it, which can breach the place. Secondly,
these breaches have to be carried by vive force at an infinite
sacrifice of officers and soldiers.... These great losses could be
avoided, and, in my opinion, time gained in every siege, if we
had properly trained people to carry it on. I declare that
I have never seen breaches more practicable in themselves than
the three in the walls of Badajoz, and the fortress must have
surrendered with these breaches open, if I had been able to
" approach" the place. But when I had made the third breach,
on the evening of the 6th, I could do no more. I was then
obliged either to storm or to give the business up; and when
I ordered the assault I was certain that I should lose our best
officers and men. It is a cruel situation lor any person to be
placed in, and I earnestly request your lordship to have a corps
of sappers and miners formed without loss of time.'
The extraordinary fact that no trained corps of sappers and
miners existed at tins time was the lault neither ol Wellington
nor ol the Liverpool ministry, but of the professional advisers
of the cahinets that had borne office ever since the great French
War broke out. 'fhe need had been as obvious during the sieges
of 1793--4 in Flanders as in 1812. That the Liverpool ministry
could sce the point, and wished to do their duty, was shown by
the fact that they at once proceeded to turn six companies of
the existing corps of 'Hoyal Military Artificers' into sappers.
On April 23, less than three weeks after Badajoz feU, a warrant
was issued for instructing the whole corps in military flcld-
works. On August 4. their name was changed from 'Royal
Military Artificern' to 'Hoya.l Sappers and Miners.' The
transformation was much too late for the siege of Burgos, but
by 1813 the companies were be/;,'1nlling to join the Pcninsular
Army, and at Sun Sebastian they were well to the front. An
end was at last made to the system hitherto prevailing, by which
the troops which should have formed the rank and file of the
Royal Engineers wcrc treatcd as skilled mechanics, mainly
valuable for building and carpcntering work at home stations.
One more section, a most shameful one, must be added to
the narrative of the fall of Badajoz. 'Ye have already had to tell
ol the grave disorders which two months before had followed
the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo. These were but trifling and
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venial compared with the offences which were committed by
the men who had just gone through the terrible experiences of
the night of April 6th. At Rodrigo there was much drunken·
ness, a good deal of plunder, and some wanton fITe-raising:
many houses had been sacked, a few inhabitants were mal-
treated, but none, it is believed, were mortally hurt. At
Bada.joz the outrages of nll kinds passed belief j the looting WQS
general and systematic, and rape and bloodshed were deplorably
common. Explanatory exeuses have been made, to the efIeet
that the army had an old grudge against the inhabitants of the
city, dating back to the time when several divisions were
quartered in and about it, after Talavcra. It was also said that
all the patriotic inhabitants had fled long ago, and that those
who had remained behind were mainly Afram:csadcs, traitors
to the general cause. There was some measure of truth in both
allegations: it was no doubt truc that there had been quarrels
in 1800, and that many loyalist families had evacuated the city
after the French occupation, and had transferred themselves
to other parts of Estremadura. The population at the time of
the British storm was not two-thirds of the normn! figure. But
these excuses will not serve. There can be no doubt that the
outrages were in no sense reasoned acts of retribution, but were
a simple outburst of ruffianism.
Old military tradition in all the armies of Europe held that
a garrison whieh rdused to surrendcr when the breaches had
become practicable was at the mercy of the conqueror for life
and limb, and that a town resisting to extremity was the
natural booty of the stormcrs. Iuthe eighteenth ccntury thel'e
were countless instances of a. fortress, defended with courage
up to the moment when an assault was possible, surrendering
on the express plea that the lives of the garrison were forfeit
if it held out, when resistance could no longer bc successful.
The attacking party held that all the livcs which it lost after the
place had become untenable were lost unnecessarily, because
of the unreasonable obstinacy of the besieged: the latter
therefore could expect no quarter. This was not an unnatural
view when the circumstances are considered. 'fhe defender of
a wall or a breach has an immense advantage over the stormer,
till the moment when the latter has succeeded in closing, and
OlllM", v S
•
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in bringing his superior numbers to bear. In a curious hortatory
address which Phillipon published to his garrison 1, the passage
occurs, < realize thoroughly that a man mowlting up a ladder
cannot use his weapon unless he is lelt unmolested: the head
come's up above the pUTilpet unprotected, and a wary soldier
can destroy in succession as many enemies as appear at the
ladder-top.' This is perfectly true: but Phillipoll naturally
avoided stating the logical conclusion, viz. that when the
stormers flllnlly succeed in crowning the ramparts, they will
be particularly ill-disposed towards the garrison who have,
till the last moment, been braining their comrades or shooting
them through the head at small risk to thcmsclves. When the
assailant, after seeing scvcrul of his predecessors on the ladder
deliberately butchered by ll. man under cover, gets by some
special piece of luck on a level with his adversary, it will be
useless for the latter to demand quarter. If it is a question
o( showing mercy, why did not the other side begin? Que
messieurs les a8sassi11$ commencent, us the Frcnch humorist
remarked to the humanitnritul, who protested against capital
punishment (or murderers. There is a grim story of a party of
Tusean soldiers of the 113th Line, who werc pinncd into a
ravelin on the flank of the lesser breaeh at llCKlrigo, and after
firing to the last minute upon the flank of the Light Division,
threw down their arms, when they saw themselves cut off,
calling out that they wcre •PfrJeTOS ItaliullOs ,_" So you're not
French but Italians arc you-then hcre's a shot for )'ou,' was
the natural answer 2 :-refiections as to the absenl'-C of any
national enmity towards the victors should have occurred to
the vanquished before, and not aftcr, the breach was carried.
The same thing happened at the Castlc of Badajoz to the
companies, mainly ITessians, who so long held down the
stormers of the 3ro Division. If thc defenders of the breaches
escaped summary massacre, it was because the breaehcs were
not carried by force, and the main body of the French sur-
rendered some time aftcr the assault had ceased, and to troops
or the 5th Division, who had not been personally engaged with
them.
, Printed in Bclmaa, iv, Appendix, p. 369, and dated MarclJ 26.
• The story may be found in Kineaid, p. 114, IUld In several other SOIlJ'CC!l.
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It was universally held in all armies during the wars of the
early nineteenth century that the garrison which resisted to
the last moment, after success had become impossible, had
no rights. Ney wrote to the governor of Ciudnd Rodrigo in
]810, < further resistance will force the Prince of Essling to
treat you with all the rigour of the laws of war. You have to
ehoose between honourable capitulation und the terrible
vengeance of a victorious anny 1.' Suchet, in more brutal
words, told the governor of Tortosa that he should put to the
sword a garrison which resisted instead of capitulating' when
the laws of war make it his duty to do so, large breaches being
opened and the walls ruined 2.' A very clear statement of this
sanguinary theory is found in a passage in the :Memoirs of
Contreras, the unlucky governor of Tarragona in 1811 3. 'The
day after the storm General Suehet had me brought before
him on a stretcher (he was severely wounded) and in presence
of his chiel officers and of my own, told me in a loud voice
that I was the cause of all the horrors which his troops had
committed in 'farragona, because I had held out beyond the
limit prescribed in the laws of war, and that those laws directed
him to have me executed, for not capitulating when the breach
was opened; that having taken the place by assault he had
the right to slay and burn ad infinitum.' I replied that' if it
is true that the laws of WiLr stale that, if the besieger gets in,
he may deliver to the sword and the flames town and garrison,
and if they therefore suggest as a proper moment for capitula-
tion that when an ussflult hus become praeticllble, it is nevel'·
theless true that they do not prohibit the besieged from resisting
the assault, if he considers that he can beat it oil: I had sufficient
forces to hold my own, and should have done so if my orders
had been properly carried out. Therefore I should have been
called a coward if I had not tried to resist, and no law prohibited
me from repulsing an assault if I could.'
But, as has been pointed out recently 4, Wellington himself
may be quoted in favour of this theory. III a letter written to
, Document in Delmas, iii. p. 287. • Ibid., p. 442.
• Published. in the collection of Mhnoirt. sur la gllerrt d'Espagne in 1821 •
• By Colonel Callwell. in an article in Blackwood'. Mugazint for Sep-
tember 1913,
.2
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Canning in 1820 concerning quite another matter, he remarked,
• I believe that it has ahvays been understood that the defenders
of a. fortress stormed have no claim to quarter, and the practice
whichprevailed during the last centuryof surrendering fortresses
when a breach was opened, and the counterscarp blown in, was
rounded on this understanding. or late years the French
lwailed themselves or the humanity 01 modern warfare, and
made a new regulation that n brench should stnnd ODC assault
at least. The consequence of this regulation of Bonaparte's
was the loss to me of the flower of my army, in the assaults on
Ciudud Rodrigo and Budajoz. I should have thought myscU
justified in putting both garrisons to the sword, and jf I had
done so at the first, it is probable that I should have saved.
5,000 mcn at the sccond. I mention this to show you that the
practice which refuses quarter to a garrison that stands an
assault is not a weles8 cUusion of blood.'
Comparatively few of the garrisons of Rodrigo and Dadajoz
were shot down, and those all in hot blood in the moment after
the walls were carried. Suchet's army was much more pitiless
at Tarragona, where a great part of the Spanish garrison was
deliberately hunted down und slaughtered. But there was,
of course, a much more bitter feeling between French and
Spaniards than between English and French.
The only reason Cor enlarging on this deplorable theme is
that there was a close conncxion in the minds of all soldiers of
the early nineteenth century, from the highest to the lowest
ranks, between the idea that an over-obstinate garrison had
forfeited quarter, und the idea that the lawn they had defended
was liable to sack. This may be found plainly stated in Lannes's
summons to Palafox at Saragossa in January 1809 1, in the
eapitulation-debate before the surrender of Badaioz in 1811, in
Augereau's address to the inhabitants of Geronu 2, in kval's
summons to the governor of Tarifa 3, and with special emphasis
in Suehet's threatening epistle to Blake on the day before the
fall of Valencia: 'in a few hours a gcncral assault will prccipi~
tate into your city the Freneh columns: if you delay till this
terrible moment, it will not be in my power to restrain the fury
1 See Dclmas, ii. p. 381. • Ibid., ii. PI). 844--5.
• Text in the Defence of Tarifa, p. 64, and in Ar~hc.
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of the soldiery, and you alone will be responsible before God
and mlln for the evils which will overwhelm Valencia. It is
t.he desire to avert t.he eomplet.e destruction of a great town
that determines me to offer you honourable terms of capitula-
tion 1.' It was hardly necessary in the Napoleonic era to
enlarge on the conncxion between storm and sack-it was
presupposed. Every governor who capitulated used to put. in
his report to his own government a mention of his 'desire to
spare the unfortunate inhabitants the horrors of a storm.'
This idea, sad to say, was as deeply rooted in thc minds of
British as of French soldiers. It is frankly confessed in many
a Peninsular diary. 'The men were permitted to enjoy them-
selves (I) for the remainder of the day,' says Kincaid in his
narrative of the fall of Badajoz, ' and the usuH.lIrightful scene
of plunder commenced, which officers thought it prudent to
avoid for the moment by retiring to the camp z: 'The troops
were, of course, admitted to the immemorial privilege of tearing
t.he town to pieces,' says another writer on another occasion 3.
The man in the ranks regarded the connexion of storm and sack
as so elose that he could write, 'the prisoners being secured
and the gates opened, we were allowed to enter the town
for lite purpose of plunder·ing it 4.' But perhaps the most eye·
opening sentence on the subject is Wellington's official order
of April 7, 1812, issued late in the day, and when the sack
Imd already been going Oil Ior fiftccn or eighteen hours, ' It is
now full time that the plunder of Badajoz should cease; an
officer and six steady non-commissioned officers will be sent
from each regiment, British and !:,ortuguese, of the 3rd, 4th,
5t.h, and Light Divisions into the town, at 5 a.m. to-morrow
morning, to bring away any men still straggling there :;:
It was unfortunately the fact that Badajoz was a Spanish
and not n French town, nnd this adds a special shame to the
lamentable outrages which were perpetrated in its streets for
many hours a[ter the storm. It is comparatively seldom in
war that an army takes by nssault a town which does not
belong to the hostile power. The only parallel of recent years
•
, BelmllS. iv. p. 20'.1. I Kincnil1, p.a9. • Leith Hay, ii. pp. 256-7 •
• Memoirs of Donaldson of the 94th, p. 158.
• Wellington, SltpplcmenlanJ Di8]Jald~!, vii. p. 311.
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to the sack of Badajoz had been that of Liibeck in November
1806. Blucher's Prussian corps, retiring before the pursuing
French, trespassed on neutral territory by seizing on the old
Hanseatic city, which lay in its way, and endeavouring to
.defcnd it. The magistrates protested, but were powerless, as
they had no armed force at their disposition. Then the French
came upon the scene, and, after a fierce fight, won their way
over wall and ditch and took the place. They sacked it from
cud to cnd with every circumstance of atrocity 1: Marshal
Bernadotte, when importuned by the Burgomaster to stay
the horrors, said that he was sorry, but that his troops only
recognized the fact that they were in a stormed town-he and
his officers could only succeed ill calling them of{ after the city
had been half destro;ycd. Tlus wus sufficiently horrible; but
to sack a town belonging to a friendly nation is a shade worse
than to sack a neutral place-and this the British troops did.
Two short quotations from eye-witnesses may serve to show
the kind of scenes that prevailed in Badajoz from the early
hours of the morning on April 7th down to the following night.
• Unfortunate Badajoz,' writes one narrator 2, 'met with the
usual fate of places taken at the point of the bayonet. In less
than an hour after it fell into our possession it looked as
if centuries had gradually completed its destruction. The
surviving soldier, after storming a town, considers it as his
indisputable property, and thinks himself at liberty to commit
any enormity by way of indemnifying himsell for the risking of
his life. The bloody strife has made him insensible to every
better feeling: his lips are parched by the extraordinary
exertions that he has made, and from necessity, as well as
inclination, his first search is for liquor. This once obtained,
every trace of human nature vanishes, and no brutal outrage
can be named which he does not commit. The town was not
only plundered of every article that could be carried orr, but
whatever was useless or too heavy to move was wantonly
1 It is said on good lirst.·hnnd l\uthorit.y tllat.l1l1 the inmates or all l18ylum
ror remllle IUI111tiCS were mpcd. Sce Lcttow-Vorbeck, Geschichte dc8 Krit!gu
OOlll806-7, ii. p. 884. 7
• Hodenbcrg or the K.G.L. Sce his letters published ill Blnd.'WOOd'8
Magozine tor Ml1l'(lh 1013, by myself.
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destroyed. Whenever an officer appeared in the streets the
wretched inhabitants flocked round him with terror and
despair, embraced his knees and supplicated his protection.
But it was vain to oppose the soldiers: there were ]0,000 of
them crowding the streets, the greater part drunk and dis·
charging their pieces in all directions-it was difficult to escape
them unhurt. A couple of hundred of their women from the
camp poured also into the place, when it was barely taken,
to have their share of the plunder. They were, if possible,
worse than the men. Gracious God 1 such tigresses in the
shape of women! I sickened when I saw them coolly step over
the dying, indiIrcrcnt to their eries for a drop of water, and
deliberately search the pockets of the dead for money, or even
divest them of their bloody coats. But no more of these scenes
of horror. I went deliberately into the town to harden myselI
to the sight of human misery-and I have had enough of it: my
blood has been frozen with the outrages I witnessed.'
Another eye·witness gives a passing glimpse of horrors.
'Duty being over, I chanced to meet my servant, who seemed
to have his haversack already well fIlled with plunder. I asked
him where the regiment was: he answered that he did not
know, but that he had better conduct me to the camp, as
I appeared to be wounded. I certainly was hit in the head, but
in the excitement of the escalade had not minded it, nor had
I felt a slight wound in my leg: but, as I began to be rather
weak, I took hi~ advice, and he u~~isted me on. In passing what
appeared to be a religious house I saw two soldiers dragging
out an unfortunate nun, her elothes all torn: in her agony she
knelt and beld up a cross. Remorse seized one of the men, who
appeared more sober than the other, and he swore she shouJd
not be outraged. The other soldier drew back a step and shot
his comrade dead. At this moment we found ourselves sur-
rounded by several l)ortuguese: they ordered us to halt, and
presented their muskets at us. I said to my servant, "throw
them some of your plunder:" he instantly took off his haver·
sack and threw it among them: some dollars and other silver
coin rolled out. They then let us pass-had he not dOlle so they
would havc shot us-as they did several others. We got safe
to the bastion, and my senrant carried me on his back to the
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Wellington visited the' works lignin, an4 the advanced
battny was armed wilh four guns and opened llext morning j
but an accident prevented thc arrival of one gnn, the cncmy
dismonnted another, and only two, instead of si.x guns Wl
Wellington had designed, smote the demi-bastion of 81. John
and the cnd of the high curtain. However the general firing
was severe upon tlle castle Rnd the town-works and the
defellces were damaged j the Frend} guns were nearly silenced,
ndditional mortars were mounted at the Chofres, making in all
sixty-three pieces of which twenty-nine threw sllclls, llnd the
superiority of the besiegers was established, Now llowever
the Urumea was discovered to be fordable b)' cnptain Alexander
Macdonald of the artillery, who had waded across in the night,
and passed close Illlder the works to the breach. A few
minutes would suffice to brillg the ene~y into the Chofre
batteries, and therefore, to save the guns from being spiked
their vents were covered at night with iron-plates fnstcned by
chains,
This day the mawrials and orduonce for 0. battery of six
pieces, to t:lke tbll defences of the Monte Orgullo ill reverse,
were sent to tbe island of Sanl.ll. Clam; lInd from the Cuofrell
some guns pla)'cd on the retaining wall of the horn-work;
but with low charges to shake down any mines constructed
there without dcstl'oying the wall itself, which offered cover
for the troops in an assault.. The trenches at the isthmus
were now wide and good, the sap was pushed close to the
horn-work; :md the sea-wall, sUJlporting thc high road into
tIle town, wllieh had ill tIle first assault lengtllened the run
ano cramped the columns, wn! broken thrOtlgh to give access
to tIle strand and shorten the npproneh to the breaches, 'I'he
crisis ''illS now at hand, and in the night of the 29th n falso
attack WM ordered, to mnke the enemy spring his mines.
'1'11;8 dcsp<lmte service wos executed by lieuteuant Macadam of
the nint·h regiment; tho order was sudden (md no volunteers
were demanded, no rell'aros olfered, no means of excitement
resorled to j rei sueh is tue inllercnt bmvery of British soldiers,
that seventccn meu of the ropls, the llearellt at bund, hume-
diately leaped forth ready nud willing to encounter whnt seemed
certain death. With a rapid pace, aU tbe breaehiug-batterics
SECTION XXXII: CHAPTER V
OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH DUlUJ.~G THE SIEGE OF
BADAJOZ
BE),'OltE proceeding to demonstrate the wide-spreading
results of the fall of the great Estremadurall fortress, it is
necessary to follow the movements of the !i'rench armies which
had been responsible for its safety.
Soull; had been before Cadiz when, on 1t'larch 11, he received
news from Drouet that troops were arriving at Elvas from the
North, and on March 20 the more definite information that
Wellington had moved out in force on the 14th, and invested
Badajoz on the 16th. The Marshal's long absence from his
head-quarters at Seville ut this moment, when he had every
reason to suspect that the enemy's next stroke would be in his
own direction, is curious. Apparently his comparative freedom
from an....:icty had two causes. The first was his confidence that
Badujoz, with its cxcellent go\'crnor and its picked garrison,
could be relied upon to make a very long defence. The second
was that he was fully persuaded that when the time of danger
arrived he could count on l\Iurmont's help-as he had in June
1811. On February 7 he wrote to his colleague 1 that he had
just heard of the fall of Rodrigo, that WeJlington's next move-
ment would naturally be against Badajoz, and that he wus
glad to learn that l\Iontbrun's divisions, on their return from
AJicante, were being placed in the valley of the Tagus. 'I see
with plcasure that your exccllency has given him orders to get
in touch with the Army of the South. As long as this commu-
nication shall exist, the enemy will not dare to make a push
against Badajoz, because at his fIrst mo\'ement we can join our
forces and march against him for a battle. I hope that it
may enter into your plans to leave a corps between the Tagus
and the Guudiana, the Truxillo roud, und the Sierro de Guuda-
lupe, where it can feed, and keep in touch with the troops
which I keep in the Sercna [the district about Mcdellin, Don
, The letter ill prinLed in Marmont's CorresPQmianC/J, iv. pp. 304--5.
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BOund part of the rnmpart by traverses at the extremities.
'rhe only really pmcticable rood into the town was by the
narrow euu of the high curtain above the hnlf bastion of
St Jolm. About the mid(lIl;l of the great breach stood the
tower of Los Homos, still capable of some defence, and
beneath it a mine charged with twelve bundred weight of
]Xlwder. The streets were all trenehed and furuishcd with
traverses to dispute the passage and cover a retreat to tlle
Monte Orgullo; to reach the main breach it was necessary
also to form a lodgment in the horn-work, or pass, as in the
former assault, under a flanking fire of musketry for two
hundred yards: and the first step was close under the sea wall
at the 8lI1ient angle of the covered way, where two mines
charged with eight hundred pounds of powder were prepared.
Besides these retrenclmlCnts Rnd mines, the }'rench had
still some artillery in reserve. Onc sixteen-pounder mounted
at St. Elmo flanked the left of the breaches on the river face;
a tweh'e and an eigM-pounder, preserved in tho cascmatcs of
the Cavalier, were ready to flank the land fllce of the half·
bastion of St. John; many guns from the Monto llelmu.
OrgulIo, especially those of the Mirudor, could
play upon the eoluillus, and tllCrO was a four-pounder
hidden on the horu-work to be brought iuto action when the
assault colllmenced. Nl!ither tlle resolution of tlle governor
nor the courage of the garrison was abated, but t.he over-
whelming fire of the last few days had reduced the numbu
of fighting men; uud Rey who hOO ouly two hundred and
fifty men in reserve, demllnded of Soult whether his brav.,
garrison should be exposed to another lL!ISIIult. 'The army
would endeavour to sueoour him' was the reply, and be
abided his fato.
Napoleon's ordinance, w1lieh forbade tho surrender of 3
fortress without having stood at least one assault, hll.'J becn
strongly censured by English writers upon slender grounds.
The obstinate defences made by French governors in the
Peninsula were tho results; Il.IlJ to condemn an enemy's system
from which we Imve ourselvcs suffered will scunocly briug it
into disrepute. 'I'he argument runs that the besiegers work-
iute by the rules of art mu~t make way iuto the place and to
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that British troops were accumulating behind Elvas, Soult
ought to have taken the alarm at oncc, to have moved back to
Seville from Santa l\fu.ria by Cadiz, where he lay on that date,
and to have issued orders for the concentration of his reserves.
He did none of these things, was still in front of Cadiz on
March 20 1, and did not prescribe any movement of troops till,
on that day, he received Drouct's more defmite and alarming
news that Wellington was in person at Elvas, and had moved
out toward Badajoz on the 16th. Clearly he lost nine days by
want of sufficient promptness, and had but himself to blame
if he could only start from Seville with a considerable field-force
on :March BO. All that he appears to have done on March 11
was to write to J\larmont that the long-foreseen hypothesis of
a move of Wellington on Badajoz was being verified, and that
they must prepare to unite their forces. Jourdun has, therc£ore,
some justification for his remark that he does not see why
SoUlt should have been before Cadiz, amusing himself by
throwing shells into that place 2 as late as :March 20th.
From the 20th to the 30th or that mouth Soult was busily
engaged in organizing the relief·column which, after picking
up Drouet on the way, was to march to the succour of Badajoz.
He could not venture to touch the divisions 01 Collroux and
Cassagne, which together were none too strong to provide for
the manning of the Cadiz Lines and the lending off of Ballasteros
from their rear. But he called off the whole division 01 Barrois,
nearly 8,000 strong s, Vichery's brigade of inlantry from
Leval's division in the province of Granada ., and six regiments
01 Digeon's and Pierre Soult's dragoons. This, with the corre-
sponding artillery, made a column of some 13,000 men, with
1 Thc date is provcd by Soult's lctter to the Emperor of that date
from Santa Mafia, in which hc announces his intention to start, and
says that he is writing to Marmont, to gct him to unite the armies as
soon as possible. • See his llUmoires, p. 377.
• To be exact, 7,776 officers and men on Mareh 1. ne also brought with
him some' bataillons d'tlite' of grenadier oompanies from Villatte·s division.
• The 55th, three battalions about 1,500 strong, the fOllrth being left at
Jacn. Soult says in his dispatch of April 8 that he took a whole brigade
from Lcvnl, but the statcs of April 14 show tlle 32nd and 58th regiments
of Leval's division, and three or the rour battalions or the 43rd, all left
in the kingdom of Grann.da. Apparently three battalions or tile 55tll and
.one of the 43rd marched, about 2,200 strong.
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which the Marshal started from Seville on the 30th March,
crossed the Guadalquivir at Lora del Rio next day, and moved
on Constantina and Guadalcanal. An interesting complication
would have been caused if Graham had been allowed to stop
with his 19,000 men at Azuaga and Llcrcna. where he was
directly between Soult and Drouct's position at Fucntc Ovcjun8,
and if Hill from Merida had moved against Drouet's corps. But
as Wellington had withdrawn Graham's column to Villafranca
011 March 31, there was nothing Ielt to prevent Dronet from
coming in Irom his Cx(:clltric position, aud joining his chicl
at Llerena on April 4th, with the 12,000 men of his own and
Daricau'sdivisions. 'I'his gave the Marshal some 25,000 men1 in
hand, a force which would be manifestly incapable of raising the
siege of Badajoz, for he knew that Wellington had atlcast 45,000
men inhand,aud, us a matterof fact, thearrivo.lof the5thDivision
and other late detachments had raised the Anglo-Portuguese
anny to something more like 55,000 sabres and bayonets.
Wellington's orders, when he heard that Soult was in the
passes, and that Drouet was moving to join him, directed
Graham to fall back on the Albuera position, and Hill to join
him there by the route of Lobon and Talavera Rcal, if it should
appear that all the French columns were moving directly to
the relief of Badajoz, and nonc of them spreading out eastward
towards the Upper Guadiana 2.. These conditions were realized,
, Though he enlls them only 21,000 in hi1:l dislmtchcs. RuL t,he IigurCll
lsce Appendix no. VIIIJ show 23,500. The total in the monthly reports
indicate 25,000 Il.8 more likely.
• The orders to Hill issued by Wellhlgton on April 4. and 5 (Di3palchu,
ix. p. 30) contemplate two possibilities: (1) Soultis marching with his whole
force on Villafranca, and Fay is remaining far away: in this case Hill is
to move en masse on Albuera. This is the case that aetuany occurred;
(2) if Foy is moving tOW3rd the Upper Guadiann, and Soult is shol'<ing
signs of extending to join him, How:ud's British :\Ild Ashworth's Portu-
guese brigades and Campbcll's Portuguese horse will stay at Merida as long
U8 j~ prudent. in order to prevent the junction, and will break thc bridge
fit lhe hll,t moment and then tollow Hill.
\Vellington, when he wrote hill flN,t ordcr!> of the 4th to Hill, was
intending to storm &dajo1. on the 5th, and knew, by etlleulatillg dis-
tanocs, that Soulteould not be in tront ot Albucm till the 7th. He ultimately
chanced another dny of bombardment, running the time limit rather line.
But there was no real risk with Gl'llh3m aud Hill at Albnera: Soult could
not have forced them.
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as Soult moved in one solid body towards Villafranea. and
F'uente del l\Iaestre: so Hill evacuated Merida, after destroying
its bridge, and joined Graham on the old Albuera ground ou
April 6th. They had 31,000 men, including four British
divisions and four British cavalry brigades, and Wellington
could have reinforced them from the lines before lladajoz with
two divisions more, if it had been necessary, while still leaving
the fortress adequately blockaded by 10,000 or 12,000 men.
But as Soult did not appear at Fuente del Uaestre and Villa·
franea till the afternoon of April 7th, a day after lladajoz had
fallen, this need did not arise. The Marshal, learning of the
dislLSter, lmstily turned back and retired towards Andalusia,
wisely observing that he • could not fight the whole English
arm)',' It is interesting to speculate what would have happened
if he had lingered five days less before Cadiz, had issued
his colwentru.tion orders on the 14th or 15th instead or the
20th l\farch, and had appeared at Villafrancaon the 2nd instead
of the 7th of the next month. His dispatch of April 17 states
that he had intended to fight, despite or odds, to save Badajoz:
if he had done so, and hud attacked 40,000 Anglo-Portuguese
with his 25,000 men, he must inevitably have suffered a dreadful
disaster. He must have Cought a second battle of Albuera
with much the same strength that hc had at the first, while his
enemy would haye had six British divisions instead of two, and
an equal instead of a wholly inferior cavalry. The result of
such a battle <:ould hardly havc railed to be not only a crushing
defeat for the French, but the prompt loss of aU Andalusia; for
thrown back on that kingdom with a routed army, and unable
to gather in promptly reservcs seattercd ovcr the whole land,
from the Cadiz Lines to Granada and Malaga, he must have
c..·acuated his viceroyalty, and have retreated in haste either
on La l\1allcha or on Valencia.
It is most improbable, however, thnt Soult would really haye
ventured to attack the Albuera position \ in spite of the
, Hc says in hi~ letter to Berlhier oC AJlril 8 UIU,t he hud inteuded (but
Cor the Call oC Blldlljoz) to move by his right UlIlt morning, to the IowCl'
course ofthe Guad.ajira rivCl'-which would have brought ou IIll action near
'1'alllvera Real, lower down the litrcam or the Albucm thun the IJutUe-spot
of .May 1811.
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confident language of his ex-post·facto dispatches. His whole
plan of operations depended on bis being joined by the
Army of Portugal, in accordance with .Mllrmont's promise of
February 22nd. And he was well aware, by a letter sent by
Foy to Dronet on March 31st, and received on April 6th, that
he could expect no help from the North tor many weeks, if any
came at all. That Badnjoz was never relieved was due, not to
Soult's delay in concentrating. (though this was no doubt
unwise), nor to his over-confidence in Phillipon's power of
resistance, which was (as it turned out) misplaced. Hc wrote
to Bcrthicr that' the garrison wanted Cor nothing-it hud still
food for two months, aud was abundantly provided with
munitions: its total strength wns 5,000 men: it had victoriously
repulsed three assaults: the men were convinced that, however
great a hostile force presented itself before the breaches, it
would never carry them: Phillipon had been informed on
March 28th that I was marching to his help: the troops were
in enthusiastic spirits, though they had already lost 500 men
in successful sorties: my advanced guard wus at only OIlC long
day's march fTom the place, when it succumbs!' It WllS
indeed an evCnement funeste!
But Soult's late arrival and miscalculation of the time that
the siege would take, were neither of them the causes of the
fnll of Budajoz. It would have fallen none the less if he had
arrived on the Albuera upon April 2nd. The fate of the place
was really settled by Napoleon's dispatches to Marmont, with
which wc dealt at great length in an earlier chapter 1. The
orders of February 11 and February 21 (received by the Du~e
of Hagusa on }<~ebruary 26 and March 2 respectively) forbade
him to worry about Badajoz, ' a very strong fortress supported
by an army of 80,000 men,' and told him to withdraw to
Salamanca two of the three divisions which he was keeping in
the valley of the Tagus, and to reply to any movement of
Wellington into Estremadura by invading Northern Portugal.
The plan which Soult and Marmont hud concerted for a joint
relicf of Badajoz was expressly forbidden by their master, on
his erroneous hypothesis that a thrust at Ciudad Rodrigo and
Almeida must bring Wellington home agaiu. Marmont's
, See chapter ij nbove, pp. 54, 55.
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promise of co-operation, sent oIr on February 22nd to Seville,
was rcndered impossible-through no fault of his-by thc
imperial dispatch rcceived four days later, whieh expressly
forbade him to stand by it. 'The English will only go south-
ward if you, by your ill-devised scheme, keep two or thrce
divisions detuched on the Tagus: that reassures them, and
tells them that you have no offensive projects against them.' So
Marmont, protesting and prophesying future disaster, was
(.'ompclled to withdraw two divisions from the central position
on the 'l'agus, and to leave there only Foy's 5,000 men-
a negligible quantity in the problem. Nor was this all-he was
not even allowed to send them back, since the whole Army of
Portugul WllS ordered to murch into the Beira.
Soult, therefore, was justified in his wrath when he "'Tote to
l\larrnont that he had been given a promise and that it had
been broken, 'il there had been the least attempt to cOllcert
operations between the armies or Portugal and the South, the
English army would have been destroyed, lmd Badnjoz would
still be in the power of the Emperor. I deplore bitterly the
fact that you have not been ablc to come to an arrangement
with me on the subject.' But the wrath should have been
dirccted against the Emperor, not against his lieutenant, who
had SO unwillingly been lorced to break his promise. The only
censure, perhaps, that can be laid upon Mannont is that he
should have made it more clear to Soult that, by the new
directions lrom Paris, he was rendered unable to redeem his
pledge. Soult was not, howevcr, without warnings that some~
thing of the kind might happen: Berthier had written to him
on February 11th, and the lettcr must have arrived by the
middle of March, that the Emperor was displeased to find him
appealing for troops of the Anny of }lortugal to be moved to
Truxillo, and that he ought to be marc dependent on his own
strength 1. It would have been better if the Emperor's trusty
scribe had explained to Soult that Marmont was expressly
lorbidden, in a dispatch written that same day, to keep more
than olle division Oil the 'I'agus, or to worry himself about t.he
danger of Badajoz.
, Berthier to Soult, Feb. 11. The same date l\ll the fatal dispatch sent
to ManllonL, wllO was given a COP)' of that to Soult as an enclosure.
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Marmont'l'l original pla.n for joining Soult via Almaraz might
have failed-he himself confesses it in one of his replies to
Berthier. But it was the only scheme which presented any
prospect of success. By making it impossible Napoleon rendered
the fall of Bndnjoz certain. For it is no defence whatever to
point out that his dispatch of March 12th, which reached
Salamanca on March 27, finally gave :Marmont the option of
going southward. By that time it was too late to try the move:
-if the Duke of Ragusa hud marched for Almarnz and Truxillo
next morning, he would still have been many days too late to
join Soult before April 6th, the date on which Badajoz fell.
Swnming up the whole operation, we must conclude that
'Wellington's plan, which depended for its efficacy on the slow·
ness with which the French always received information, and
the difficulty which they always experienced in concentrating
and feeding large bodies of troops in winter or early spring,
was bound to be successful, unless an improbable conjunction
of chances had occurred. If Marmont and Soult had both
taken the alarm at the earliest possible moment, and had each
marched with the strongest possible field army, SOlut with the
25,000 men that he actually collected, Marmont with the
three divisions that lay on the Tagus on March 1st, and three
more from Castile 1, they might have met east of Merida some·
where about the last days of March. In that case their united
strength would have been from 50,000 to 55,000 men: Welling·
ton had as many, so that he would not have been bound down
to the mere defensive polie)' that he took up on the Caya in
June-July 1811, when his numbers were decidedly less than
now. But the chance that both l\tarmont aod Soult would do
the right thing in the shortest possible time was unlikely.
They would ha vc had terrible difficulties from the torrential
rains that prevailed in the last ten days of March, and the
consequent badness of the roads. Marmont's (if not Soult's)
Iood-problem would have been a hard one, as he himself shows
in several of his letters. Soult got his first definite alarm on
1 More probably he would have brought only tiro divisions from north of
tlle mountains, 8.8 he had to leave Bonnet to look after the Astllrians, and
Sollham's single division would hflrdlyhave sufficed to contain the Galieians,
tlle Portuguese, llnd the Guerrilleros.
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March 11th: Marlllont could hardly move till he had learnt
that 'Wellington had started for Estremadura in person: till
tins was certain, he could not be sure that the main body of the
Anglo-Portuguese anny was not still behind the Agueda.
Wellington only left Frcllcda on March 5th, and l\Iarmont did
not know of his departure till somc days later. If the two
marshals had each issued prompt concentration orders on
March 11, it still remains very doubtful if they would have met
in time to foil Wellington's object. As a matter of fact Soult
(as we have seen) delayed lor ninc days bdorc hc dctermincd
to concentrate his field-force and march on Bndo.joz, and this
lateness would have wrecked the combination, even if l\farmont
had been more I'eady than his colleague.
Still there was some ehallce that the armies might have joincd,
if Napoleon had not intervened with his misguided refusal to
allow Mannont to keep three divisions in the valley of the
Tagus or to ' worry about affairs that did not concern him.'
Wellington could not know of these orders: hence came his
anxieties, and his determination to hurry the siege of Badajoz
to a conclusion at the earliest possible date. He was never-as
.it turned out-in serious danger, but hc could not possibly be
aware of the fact that l\farmont WM lettered by his instructions.
It was only the gradual accumulation of reports proving that
the Army of Portugal was moving agaiillit Ciudad Rodrigo,
and not on Almaraz, that finally gave him eo~parative ease of
mind with regard to the situation. As to Soult, he somewhat
over-estimated his force, taking it at 30,000 or cvcn 35,000 men
rather thun the real 25,000: this wns, no doubt, the reason
why he resolved to fight with his ' covcring army' ranged on
the Albuera position, and not larther lorward. It he had known
that on April) Soult had only 13,000 men at Monastcrio, and
was still separated from Drouet, he might possibly have been
more cnterprising.
No signs of i\:larmont's arrival being visible, ·Wellington could
afford to contemplate with great equallimity Soult's position
at ViIlafranca. on April 7th. If the Marshal moved forward he
would be beaten-but it was almost certain that hc would
move back at once, for, as it will be remcmbered, precautions
had been taken to give him an alarming distraction in his
O.."N. V T
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rear, by mcans of the operations of Penne ViIlemur and
Ballasteros I, This combination worked with perlcct success,
far more accurately than Blake's similar raid on Seville had
done in June 1811. Bnllasteros, it is true, did much less than
was in his power. He started from his refuge under the guns
of Gibraltar, passed down from the Ronda mountains, and
reached Utrcra, in the plain of the Guadalquivir less than
twenty miles from Scville, on April 4. But hc then swerved
awa)', having done more to alarm than to hurt the French,
though he had a force of 10,000 infantry and 800 horse 2,
snfficient to have put Seville in serious peril. But Penne
Villemur and Morillo, though they had not half the numbers
of Ballasteroo, aecomplished all that Wellington required:
having slipped into the Condado de Niebla almost unobserved,
they pushed rapidly eastward, and occupied San Lucar Ill.
Mayor, only twelve miles from Seville, on April 4, the same day
that Ballastcros appeared at Utrcra. Their cavalry pushed up
so boldly toward the suburbs that they had lo be driven oU
by cannon~shot from the tete~de-pont at the bridge of Triana.
General Rignoux, go"-ernor of Seville, had a very motley and
insufficient garrison, as Wellington had calculated when he
sent Pennc VilIemur forth. The only organized units were
a battalion of • Swiss' Juramentndos-really adventurers of all
nations-and a regiment of Spanish horse, making 1,500 men
altogether: the rest consisted of convalescents and weakly men
belonging to the regiments in the Cudiz Lines, and of 600 dis-
mounted dragoons. These made up some 2,000 men more, but
many were not fit to bear arms. In addition there were some
companies of the recently raised • National Guards.' The
enormous size of Seville, and the weakness of its old wall, com-
pelled Rignoux to concentrate his force in the fortified Cartuja
convent, leaving only small posts at the gates and the bridge.
He sent at once, as 'Vellington had hoped, pressing appeals to
Sault, saying that he was beset by 14,000 men, and that the
citizens ''''ould probably rise and let in the enemy.
On the 6th Ballasteros received false news that Conroux was
, See above, p. 229 •
• Infantry divisions or Crn>; Murgeon (5,400 men) and the Prince or
Anglona (4,300 men) and five squadrons of horse, besides irregulars.
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marching against him with the troops from the Cadit Lines,
and drcw hack into the mountains. It is said that he was
wilfully deceived by persons in the French interest; at any
rate he must have been badly served by his cavalry and int.elli·
gence officers, who ought to havc been ablc to tell him that therc
was no foundation for the report. Penne and Morillo, however,
though disappointed at failing to meet their colleague's army,
made a great parade of their small force under the walls oC
SeviUe, and skirmished with thc French at the bridge·head
of Triana, and under the walls of the Cartuja, so boldly that
Rignoux expected a serious attack. They could only have
accomplished something more profitable iC the people of Seville
had risen, but no disturbance t.ook place. After remaining in
front of the place all the 7th and 8th of April, they disappeared
on the 9th, having received news of the fall of Badajoz, and
drawn the correct deduction that Soult would turn back to
hunt them when freed from his othcr task. Wellington, indeed,
had written to givc them warning to that effect on the very
morning that they retired 1: but they anticipated the danger,
and were safely behind the Rio 'l'into when Soult turned up
in hot haste at Seville on the 11th, after four days of exhausting
forced marches.
The Marshal had left the two divisions of Dronet and Darieau
with Perreymond's cavalry in Estremadura., to aet as an observing
force, and had marched with his remaining 13,000 men to save
Seville, which owing to Ballasteros's timidity had never been
in any real danger. But the Spanish diversion had nevertheless
had precisely the effect that Wellington had expected and
desired. During Soult's short absence of twelve days great
part of thc open country of Andalusia had fallen out of his COll-
trol, thc communications with La l\funeha and King Joseph had
been cut off, and the guerriUeros had blockaded all the smaller
French posts. The hold of the invaders upon the kingdom
was never so secure as it had been before the fall of Ba.dajoz.
llaIIastcros, after his fiasco in front of Seville, made two
fruitless attempts against isolated French garrisons. Hc failed
at the Castle of Zahara on April nth. One of his columns
in an assault on Osuna two days latcr got into the town and
1 Wellington to Col. Austin from Badajoz, April 9.
T 2
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killed or captured 60 of the defenders, but failed to take thc
citadel, where the remainder defended themselves till Pierre
Soult was reported. to be at hand, and the Spaniards withdrew 1.
He ended his campaign oC raids, however, with a more successful
stroke. Hearing that the brigadier Rey, with three battalions
and somc dragoons, was marching from Malaga to relieve the
garrison of Ronda, he fell upon him at Alhaurin on the 14th
with his main body, encompassed him with fourfold strength,
and drove him in rout back to Malaga, capturing his two guns
and inRieting more than 200 casualties upon him 2. Ballasteros
thcn hoped to seize on Malaga, whcre thc Frcnch were much
alarmed, and prepared to shut themselves up ill the citadel of
Gibalfaro. But the news that Pierre Soult and Conroux were
approaching with a strong column caused the Spaniards to
retire to the mountains above Gibraltar [April 19th]. Thus
the operations in Andalusia, which had opened with Soult's
march to llndajoz, came to nn end, with no ruinous disaster
to the French, but with a diminution of their prestige, and
a distinct weakening of their hold on the kingdom. In the
Condado de Niebla Soult made no attempt to reoccupy lost
ground, and east of Granada his line of posts had recoiled
considerably on the l\1urcia.n side: Baza. and Ubeda had been
abandoned for good. It was but a vain boast when the Marshal
Wl'Olc to Bcrthicr that, aLter he had set all things to rights in
the central parts of Andalusia, he intended to organize a general
concentration to crush Ballasteros, and that hi.s next task
would be to lay siege for a second time to Tarifa, , the loss of
which }llaee would be more injurious to the English and the
Insurgents than that of Alicnnte, or even that of Badajoz-
against which last·named fortress I ought to make no attack
1 Naplef, I know not 011 what authority, says that Osuna was only
defended by , .Tumment:ulos ' WllO made 11 gllllant fesistance against their
own countr,)'men. But Soult, in a letter to Berthier dated April 2l from
Seville, 6UyS that Osuna was held by some companies or the .l-::Ifd Line and
0. deluchment of the 21st Dmgoons. He cannot be wrong. Moreover,
the 43rd shows losses lit Osuna, April 13, in MartiniCI1'S tublcs.
I Mll.rtiniell's tables show three omcers killed ulld nine wounded ut • Alom
Ilwr Mulllgl" 011 this dute, in the 43rd, 58th Liue, and 2ht Drugouns.
Soult'g dispatch makes out that only Hey's advanced guard unde~
lUuruusin was cut up, and that tbe main body defeated the Spaninrds.
If so, why did they rctfeat on Malll~1l ?
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till I shall have finished matters on the Tari!a side, and so have
nothing to fear on my left flank 1.'
'1'0 complete the survey of the fortunes of the Army of the
South in April, it only remains that we should mention the
doings o! Drouet, now ldt oncc more with his two old divisions
to form the' corps of observation' opposite the Anglo-Portu-
guese. Soult during his retreat had dropped his lieutenant
at Llerena, with orders to give back on Seville without fighting
any serious action, if the enemy should punme him in force,
but if he were left alone to hold his ground, push his cavalry
forward, and keep a strong detachment as near the Upper
Guadiana as possible. For only by placing troops at Cam~
panario, Mcdellin, and (if possible) l\fcrida, could communication
be kept up via Truxillo and Almaraz with the Army of Portugal.
As it turned out, Drouet WIIS not to be permitted to occupy
such a forward position as Soult would have liked. Hc was
closely followed by Staplcton Cotton, with Le Marchant's and
Slade's heavy and Ponsonby's 2 light cavalry brigades, who
brought his rearguard to action at Villagarcia outside Llerena
on April 11th. This was a considerable fight. Drouct's horse
was in position to cover the retirement of his infantry, with
Lallemand's dragoons in first line, and Perreymond's hussars
and chasseurs in support. Lallemand cvidently thought that
he had only Ponsonby's brigade in front of him, as Le Mnrchant's
was coming up by a side-road covered by hills, and Slade's was
lar out of sight to the rear. Accordingly he accepted battle all
an equal front, each side having three regiments in line. But,
just as the charge was delivered, the 5th Dragoon Guards,
Le Marehunt's leading regiment, eamc on the ground Irom the
right, and, rapidly deploying, took the :French line in flank and
completely rolled it up 3. The enemy went to the rear in
I Soult to Berthier from Seville, April 17, 1812.
• This officer was in command of the brigade of Anson, then absent on
leave, which at this time eonsi!lted of the 12t]I, 14th, and 16th Light
Dragoons.
• Thcre is a good account of all this in the admirable diary of Tomlinson
of the 16th, which 1 so often have ha.d to cite. He has an interesting note
that the 16th in their charge found a stone wall In their wa.y, and that the
whole regiment took it in their stride, and continued their advance i"
perfect order (p. 150).
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confusion, and the pursuit was continued till, haIr-way between
Villagarcio. and Llerena, the French rallied on their reserve
(2nd Hussars) behind n broad ditch. Cotton, who had not let
his men get out of hand, re-formed Anson's brigade and delivered
a second successful charge, which drove the French in upon
Drouet's infantry. which was in order of battle to the left of
Llercna town. It was impossible to do morc, as tlu'cc cavalry
brigades could not attack 12,000 men of all arms in n good
position. Dut a few hours later the whole French corps was
seen in retreat eastward: it retired to Berlanga and Azuaga on
the watershed of the Sierra Moreua, completely abandoning
Estremadura.
The French (outnumbered, if Slade's brigade be counted, but
it was far to the renr nnd never put in line) lost 58 killed nnd
wounded and 4 officers and 182 ra.nk and file taken prisoners.
Cotton's ca.sualties were 14 killed and 2 officers and 35 men
wounded: he insisted that his success would have been much
greater if Ponsonby had held back n little longer, till the whole of
Le Marchant's squadrons came on the field-Lallemand would
then have been cut off from Llerena and his line of retreat, and
the greater part at his brigade ought to have been captured,
though the light cavalry in the second line might have got orr I •
However, the affair was very creditable to all concerned.
Hill's infantry did not follow the retreating French, and had
halted about Almendralejo and Villatranca, only the cavalry
having gone on in pursuit to L1erella. The rest of the Anglo-
Portuguese army was already in movement for the North, as
Wellington had given up the idea, which had somewhat tempted
him at first, of pursuing Soult to Scville and trying to upset the
whole fabric of French power in Andalusia. Ot tillS more in ils
due place. Suffice it to say here that he fell back on his old
partition of forces, leaving Hill in Estremadura as his' corps
ot observation', with precisely the samc force that he had been
I Soult only acknowledges a loss of threc officer!! and ubout 110 men in bis
dIspatch 01 April 21 to Berthier, adding the ridiculous statement that the
BritIsh had 100 killed aud many nwre wounded, and that the 5th Dragoon
Guardli had been practically destroyed. lIIartluien's tables sbow lour
French officers wounded and one killed, but (of course) take no aewunt
of unwounded prisoners. The British lost two missing, men who had
rIdden ahead in the pursuit into the Freuch infantry.
1812] HILL LE1"'T IN ESTREMADURA 279
given in 1811, save that one British cavalry brigade (that of
Slade) was added. The rest of the corps consisted of the
2nd Division, Hamilton's two Portuguese brigades, Long's
British and John CampbeU's Portuguese horse 1. The whole
amounted to about 14,000 men, sufficient not only to hold
Dronet in check, but also to.keep un cye upon the French troops
in the valley of the l'agus, against whom Wellington was now
meditating a raid of the sort that he had already sketched out
in his correspondence with Hill in February.
So much for the Army of Andalusia and its fortull(,."S in
April 1812. We must now turn to those of Marmont and the
Army of Portugal during the same critical weeks.
The Duke of Ragusa, as it will be remembered, had been
ca.ught at Salamanca, on March 27th, by Napoleon's dispatch
giving him an over-late option of detaching troops to the relief
of Badajoz. But being already eonunitted to the i.llvasion of
Portugal prescribed by thc Emperor's earlier letters, and
having his field-force aud bis magazines disposed for that
project, he had resolved to proceed with it, though he had no
great belief in thc results that would follow from his taking the
offensive 2. As he informed his master, there was nothing at
whieh he could strike errectively. • It would seem that His
Majesty thinks that Lord Wellington has magazines close
behind the frontier of northem Portugal. Not so. 'I'hese
magazines are at Abrantes, or in Estremadura. His hospitals
are at Lisbon, Castello Branco, and Abrantes. There is nothing
of any importance to llim on the Con.' And how was Almeida
or Ciudad Rodrigo to be assailed in such a way as to eause
Wellington any disquietude, when the Army of Portugal had
not a single heavy gun left? 'General Dorsellne had the happy
idea of leaving in Rodrigo, a fortress of inferior character on the
front of our line, the whole siegc-train prepared for this army
at great expense, so that new guns of large calibre must actually
be brought up from France.'
1 Thiswas the brigade farmerlyunder Barba~ena,4thand 10thregiments.
• Mes dispositions etant faites poUt une nunche de quinze jOUt3 sur
l'Agueda, deja commenc~, je continue ce mouvemcnt, sans cepcndant
(jc le repete) avair une tres grande confiance dans Ies r61ultats qu'il doit
donncr: MarmoDt to Derthier,l'tIarch 27.
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Marmont's striking force was not so large us he would have
wished. BOllnet was, by the Emperor's orders, beginning his
advance for the reoecupation of the Asturias. Foy was in the
valley of the Tagus. Souham bad to be left on the Esla, to
observe the Army of GaUda. This left five divisions for active
operations: but the Marshal came to the conclusion that he
must split up onc morc (Fcrcy's) to hold Valladolid, Salamanca,
Zumora. Toro, Avilu, BenUvclltc, and other places, which in an
elaborate calculation sent to llerthier he showed to require
4,910 men [or their garrisons. He therefore marched with
four infantry divisions only [Clausel, Muucune, Sarrut. Brennier]
and 1,500 light cavalry, about 25,000 men in all: his division 01
dragoons was left behind in Lean, to keep open communication
between his various garrisons. A rather illusory help was
sought by sending to Poy, who then lay at Almaraz, orders to
the effect that he might push a detachment to Plasencia, and
give out that he was about to join the main army by the pass
01 Perules. But Fay's real concern, ns he was told, was to
keep up communication with the Army of the South, and
to give any help that was possible on the side of Truxitlo, if
(by some improbablc chance) the Army ol thc Centre should
be able to lend him the aid of any appreciable number of
battalions.
On the 80th the Frcnch army appeared in lront of Rodrigo,
and Carlos de Espaiia, leaving 3,000 men as garrisou therc,
under General Vives, retired with the small remainder of his
division towards the Portuguese hontier. He was pursued and
molested by the encmy's cavalry, not having bccn covered or
assisted, as Wellington had directed, by Victor Altcn's regi-
ment of German Hussars. That officer, neglecting his orders
in the most flagrant fashion, did not retire slowly and in a
fighting posture, when the French drove in his line of vedcttes
in front of Rodrigo, but collected his regiment and rode hard
for Castello Branco, without concerning himself in the least as
to the safcty of the Spanish and Portugucse forccs in his
neighbourhood, or the procuring of intelligence as to the
strength and the purpose of the :French army. His carelessness
or shirking of responsibility, which was to be displayed in still
worse form as the campaign went on, drew on him sueh a sharp
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and bitter rebuke from Wellington that it is a wonder that he
wus not sent home forthwith I.
Marmont looked at Hodrigo, but refused to attempt anything
against it, though he was informed that the garrison was
undisciplined and dispirited. Without siege artillery he held
that it was useless to attack the place. After sending in SI. formal
summons to Vives (who gave the proper negative answer in
round terms), and throwing into the streets a few shells from
the howit7.ers attached to his field-batteries, he told off Bren-
nier's division to blockade Rodrigo, as also to guard a flying
bridge which he cast across the Aguedu at La Caridnd, SI. few
miles up-stream. ~
His next move was to send forward Clausel with two divisions
to investigate the state of Almeida. He had heard that its
walls were unfinished, and thought that there might be some
chance of executing a cQup·de-main against it. The general,
howcvcr, camc back next day, reporting that he thought the
scheme impossible. He bad apparently been deterred from
pressing in upon the place both by the defiant attitude of the
governor, Le Mesurier, whose outposts skirmished outside the
walls for some time before allowing themselves to be driven in,
and still more by the sight of a considerable force of Portuguese
troops encamped close to thc town on the other side o( the Coa.
This wns Trant's militia, the first detachment thnt had got to the
(ront of the various bodies of troops which Wellington had told
0(( (or the ddenec or the Bcira. They hud taken up the strong
position behind the bridge of the COft, whieh Crallfurd had so
obstinately defended against Ney in July 1810.
• Wellington to V. Alten, April 18, • You were desired" not to be in a
huI'l)'," to give them (Espana and General Daceelllr) your eountefUlnce
so lar as might be in your power, and to tell tllem that you were left in the
front for a particular object.... I beg )'OU to observe that il you had
assembled the 1st Hussars at Pastores on March 30 and April 1, the Agueda
being then scarcely fordable for cavalry, you could have kept open the
communicatiol1ll between Almcida and Ciudad Rodrigo...• You wrote on
the seventh from Castello Draneo that you knew nothing about the enemy I
and ifi/ltead of receiving from you (as I had expected) a daily account of
their operations, you knew nothing, and, from the way in which you made
your march, all those were driven orr the road who might have given me
intelligence, and were destined to keep up the COIIJlllunielltion betwcen
me and CarlO;S de Espana.'
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On the alarm being given on March 29th that Marmont was
marching against tbat provin<.'e, and not against Galicia or the
Trus-os-lIIontcs, Wellington's orders suiting that contingency
were Cltrried out with more or less accuracy. Silveira, with the
'l'ras-os-Montes militia and his small body of regular cavalry,
began to move on Lamego, where Baccelar, the chief commander
in the North, had concentrated the regiments from the Oporto
region and the Bcira Alta, even beIore Marmont had left
Salamanca..' Genernl Abadill. had been requested to press forward
against the French on the Esla, so as to threaten the flank and
rear of the invading mmy. He did not accomplish much, being
convinced that thc forces lcft opposite him were too strong to
be lightly meddled with. But he dil'ccted a raid to be madc
from thc Western Asturias towards the city of Lean, and the
division at Puebla de Senabria threatened Benavente. Both
movements werc cxccuted too late to bc of any importance in
affecting the course of the campaign.
Baccclar hud been ordered to avoid committing himself to
a general action with any large body of the enemy, but to show
sueh a mass of troops concentrated that l\1armont would have
to keep his main body together, and to act cautiously on the
offensive. His primary duty wus to eovcr, if possiblc, the large
magazines at Slio JaM de Pesqueira and Lamego on the Douro,
and the smaller ones at Villa. da l)onte, Pinhel, and Celorioo, '1'0
these Wellington attached much importance, as they were the
intermediate depots from which his army drcw its sustenance
when it was on the northern frontier, and he knew that he
would be requiring them again ere many week.<; had passed.
As long as Marmont remained near Ahncida, it was necessary
to keep a force as far forwu.rd as possible, behind the very
defensible line of the Con, and Trnnt was advanced for this
purpose, though he was directed not to commit himself. His
presence so close to Almeida was very valuable, as he would
have to be driven of{ before the Marshal formally invested the
place. Le Mesurier, the governor, was not at all comfortable
as to his position: though he had a proportion of British
artillery left with him, the whole of the infantry of the garrison
consisted of Beirn. militia, who had no experience under arms.
On taking over charge of the place, on March 18. the govcrnor
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had complained that though the walls were in a sufficient state
of repair, and there were plenty of guns forthcoming, yct few
or none of them were mounted ready for service, the powder
magazines were insufficiently sheltered, and many details of
fortification (palisades, platforms, &c.) had to be completed in
a hurry 1. However, the place looked so sound for defence
when Clauscl reconnoitred it, that-as we have sccn-he
made no attempt to invest it, and promptly withdrew, report-
ing to his chief that Almeida was not to be taken by a coup-
de-main.
Marmont then made the move which Wellington had most
desired, and which in his dispatcll to Daccclar he had specified
as the happiest thing that could come about. Instead of
sitting down before Almeida or Ciudad Rodrigo, or making
a push against the depots on the Douro, he turned southward
towards the Lower Beira, and (le8,,;ng Brennier behind to
guard communications) marched with three divisions to
Sabugal via Fuentc Guinaldo. This policy could have 110
great results-the :Marshal might ravage t.he country-side, hut
such a movement with such a force could not possibly alarm
Wellington overmuch, or draw him away from the siege of
Dndajoz if he were determined to persevere in it. There was
nothing of importance to him in central Beira-only minor
depots at Cclorico and Castello Branco, much less valuable than
the larger ones at Lamego and Siio Joao de Pesqucira on the
Douro. 'He can do no more,' as an acute observer on the
Portuguese stuff rcmul'ked, • than drive off some cattle, burn
some cottages, nnd ruin a few wretched peasants 2.' For the
country nbout the sources of the Zezere and round Castello
Branco is one of the most thinly peopled districts of
Portugal.
To meet Marmont's southe.rn move Baeeelar brought up
Trant's and Wilson's militia by a parallel march to Guarda,
while Le Cor, with the two regiments of the Beira Baixa, held
011 at Castcllo Branco t.iIl be should be evicted from it. To
• For complaints by Le Mesurier as to. the defects of the place whell he
took over charge of it OD March 18. sce his letter of the 28th of the same
month. to Wellington, in the Appendix to Napier, iv. pp. 450-1.
• The observation comcli from D'Urban's unpUblished Journal.
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Wellington's intense disgust J, Victor Alten, whose orders
directed him to fall back no farther than that town, continued
his precipitate retreat with the German Hussars to the bridgc of
Villa Vclha on t.hc Tagus, and began to take measures to destroy
that all-important link of communications between north and
south. Fortunately he was stopped be!ore he had done the
damage. The bridge was only taken ovcr to the south bank,
not committed to the flames.
Halting at Sabugal, on April 8th, Marmont scnt out flying
columns, which ravaged the country-side us far as Penllmlleor,
F'Ulldtio, and Covilhiio, and dispatched Clausel with a whole
division against CastelIo Branco, the one important place in the
whole region. Le Cor evacuated it on April 12th, after burning
such of the magazines as could not be removed in haste: and
Clausel-who occupied it for two days--did not therefore get
possession of the stores of food which his chief had hoped to find
there. In revenge the town and the small proportion of its in-
habitants who did not take to the hills were badly maltreated:
mtUlY buildings, including the bishop's palace, were burnt.
Hearing that l\Inrmont had dispersed the larger portion of
his army with flying columns, and was lying at Sabugal, on the
12th, with ouly a few thousand men, Trant conceived the rash
idea that it would be possible to surprise him, at his head-
quarters, by a night march of his own and 'Vilson's combined
divisions from Guarda. The distance was about twenty mile!!
over lllountain roads, and the scheme must have led to disaster,
for-conll'ary to the information which the militia gcnerals
had gathered-the Marshal's concentrated main body was still
stronger than their own, despite of all his detachments 1..
1 Wellington to Alten, Di$palclles, ix. p. 69. 'You wen positively ordered
by ;your instructions to go to Castello Dranoo and no tarther, The reason
tor this instruction was obvious. Fitst the militia of Lower Deira would
be there in the ca.se supposed [that of Marmont's making an invnsion south
of the Dourol, rind they were there. Secondly, 3S soon as r should be
informed of the enemy's approach to the Con, it ","oul,t be necess.nry for me
to assemble a force at COJltcllo Bran.oo-of which the foundation would be
the 1st Hussll.l'!l K.G.I.. Yet notwitllstllnd,ng my orders you lllnrchcd from
Castello Dmneo on the 8th, nnd erOflSCd the 'l'ngus on the 9th. Till
I reeei\'ed your letLcr r did not conceive it possible lhat yOIl oould so far
disregurd your instructions.'
I· 1 (.'tlUllot resist quoting here, us nn exnlllJ!le of '1'ranl's over-daring and
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'You could not have succeeded in your attempt, and you would
have lost your division and that of General Wilson 1,' wrote
Wellington to Trant, when the scheme and its failure were
reported to him a week later. It was fortunately never tried,
owing to Baeeelar's having made objections to his subordi-
nate's hare-brained plan.
But the best comment on the enterprise is that on the very
night (Apl'il 18-14) which Trnnt had fixed for his march, he
was himself surprised by Marmont, so bad had been his arrange-
ments for watching the eountry-side. The Marshal had learnt
that therc was an accumulation of militia at Guarda threatcning
his flank, and resolved to give it a lesson. He started with
a brigade each from Sarrut's and l'oIaueune's divisions and five
squadrons of light cavalrY-lLbout 7,000 men-and WItS, at
dawn, on the 14th, at the foot of the hill of Guarda, where he
had the good luck to cut off all 'l'rant's outposts without their
firing a shot-so badly did the militia keep their look-out.
• Had he only dashed headlong into the town he might have
captured Wilson's and my divisions without losing probably
a singlc man,' wrotc Trant. But the ascent into Guarda was
long and steep, and Marmont, who had only cavalry up, did
not guess how careless were his adversaries. He took proper
military precautions allli waited 101' his infantry: meullwhilc
the Portuguese were roused, almost by chance as it seems.
'l'tfy distrust of the militia with regard to the execution of
precautions,' continues Trant, ' had induced me at nil times to
have a drummer at my bedroom door, in readiness to beat to
reckless temperament, his letter to Wilson, urging him to co-operate in
the raid, which was lent me by Wilson's representative of to-day :_
GU,o\.ROA, 11th April, 1812.
My DEAR \VILSON",-I arrived last night. Hasten up your division:
there never was a finer opportunity of destroying a French eol'pS, in other
words and in m~' opinion, their 2nd Division: but I have no eertaint~· of
what loree is the enemy. At any rate send me ~'our squadron of cavalry, or
even Iwenty dragoons. lam very ill-treated byDaccelar in regard to cavalry.
Push on yoursell pCrllOnally. You know how happy I shaH be in having
you once more as the partner of my operations. Order up cvcrythiog you
can from Cclorico to cat: here there is tlothillg.-'l'rs. N. T.
The French 2nd Division was Clausel's, as it chanced, the onc that WIIS
precisely 1101 at Sabugal, but executing the raid on Castello Branoo.
, Wellington to TTant, DlspolcMS, ix. p. 73.
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arms. This was most fortunately the case on the night of
April 18, 1812, Cor the first intimation that I had of the enemy
being nea.r at hand was given me by my servant, on bringing
me my coffee at daybreak on the 14th. He said that there was
such a report in the street, and that the soldiers were assembling
at the alarm rendezvous. I instantly beat to arms, and the
beat being as instantly taken up by every drummer in the
place, l\Iarmont, who was at that very moment with his
cavalry at the entrance of the town, held back I was myself
the first man out of the town, and he was not then 400 yards
away I:
The Marshal, in his account 01 the affair, says that the
Portuguese formed up on the heights by the town, apparently
ready to fight, but drew off rapidly so soon as he had prepared
for a regular attack on the position.' Wise not quite in time,
the two militia. generals sent their men at a trot down the steep
road at the back of the place, with the single troop of regular
dragoons that they possessed bringing up thc rear. It had now
begun to rain in torrents, and Trant and Wjl.son having obtained
two or three miles start, and being able to see no distance
owing to the downpour, thought that they had got off safe.
'.fhis was not the case: l\larmont realized that his infantry
eould not eatch them, but seeing their hurry and disorder
ordered his cavalry-his own escort-squadron and the 13th
Chasseurs-to pursue and charge the rearguard of the retreating
column. They overtook it by the bridge of Faya, three miles
outside Guarda, where the road to Cclorico descends on a steep
slope to cross; the river. The leading French squadron scattered
the forty dragoons at the tail of Trant's division, and rode on,
mixed with them, against the rearguard battalion (that of
Oporto). 'fhe militiamen, startled and caught utterly by
surprise, tried to form across the road and to open fire: but
the rain had damped thcir cartridges, and hardly a musket
gave fire. Thereupon the battalion went to pieces, thc mcn
nearest the French throwing down thcir guns and asking lor
quartcr, while those behind scattered uphill or downhill from
the road, seeking safety on the steep slopes. The charge swept
downhill on to the battalion of Aveiro, and the other successive
1 Narrath'c of Trant in Napicr'6 Appendix to vol. iv. p. 451.
1812J THE ROUT OF GUARDA 287
units of the Oporio brigade, which broke up in confusion. Five
of their six colours were taken, and 1,500 prisoners were cut off,
while some tumbled into the Mondego and were drowned, by
losing their footing on the stcep hillside. Hardly a Frenclunun
fell, and not very many Portuguese, for the chM8eurs, finding
that they had to deal with helpless militiamen who made no
resistance, were sparing with the sabre 1. The greater part of
the prisoners were allowed, in contempt, to makc oH, and only
a few hundred and the five flags were brought bnck to Marmont
at Guarda. The pursuit did not penetrate so far as Wilson's
division, whieh got across the Mondego while Trant's was being
routed, and formed up behind the narrow bridge. where the
Cha88CUt"8, being a triAi.ng force of 400 men, did not think fit
to attack them. The French infantry had marched over twenty
miles already that day, and were dead beat: Marmont did not
send them down from Guardl1 Lo pursue, in spite of the brilliant
success of his cavalry.
The day after the' Rout of Guarda' Marmont pushed an
advanced guard to Lagiosa, hall-way to Celorico, where Trant
and Wilson had taken refuge, with their rlInks short of some
2,000 men scattered in the hills. Thereupon the militia
generals set fire to the stores, and evacuated Cclorico, falling
back into the hills towards l'rancoso. But finding that thc
l<~reneh were not coming on, thcy halted; and when they
ascertained that the enemy was actually returning to Guarda,
they eame back, extinguished the fires, and rescued great part
of the magazines. Marmont's unexpected forbearance was
caused by the fact that the news of the fall of Badll.joz reached
him on the 15th, along with a report from Clausel (who had
just evacuated Castello Branco) that 'Wellington's army had
1 There is an account of this rout from the Freneh side in t]le 1I1blloires
of Parquin, of the 13th Chasseurs, an officer mentioned in Manuont's
dispatch as having taken onc ot tile flags. Parquin clllIs it t]lat of the
regiment of Eurillas. There was no such corps: those which lost
standards were Aveiro, Oliveira, and Penaliel. A lengthy llccount may
be found also in lleresford's Ordtlls do Via for Ma;}' 7, where blame and
praise are carefulI:r distributed, and the curious order is made that the
disgraced regiments are to leave their surviving flags at home. till they
have washed out the stain on their honour by good service in the
field.
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already started northward, and that its advanced guard was
across the 'l'agus at Villa Velha.
This was startling, nay appalling, intelligence. Badajoz had
been reckoned good for a much longer resistance, and the news
had eome so slowly-it had taken nine days to reach Marmont-
that it was possible that the British army was already in
a position to cut off his expeditionary force from its base on
the Agueda. Wherefore Marmoot hastily evacuated Guarda,
and was back at Sabugal by the 16th, where Clausel and the
other dispersed fractions of his army joined him. Here he
regarded himself us reasonably safe, but determined to retire
behind the Spanish frontier ere long, raising the blockade of
Ciudad Rodrigo. • My troops,' he wrote to Berthier on that
day, • have used up the little food to be gathered between the
Tagus and the Zc:tere; and now that the enemy is on the Tagus
I cannot possibly remain on the l\londego, as I should be leaving
him on my line of communications. I shall [all back to the
right bank of the Agucda. If the enemy resolves to pursue me
thither I shall fight him. If not I shalllall back on Salamunca,
because of the absolute impossibility or feeding an army
between the Agueda and the Tormes.'
l\tarmont remained at Sabugal and its neighbo~rhood lor
nearly a. week-by the 22nd he had drawn ba.ck a few miles to
:Fuente Guinaldo--with about 20,000 men. His position was
more dangerous than he knew; for on the 18th the heavy rains,
which begun Oil the day or the L'Qmbnt of Guurda, broke his
bridge over the Agueda at La Cnridad, so that he was eut off
from Brennier and from Salamanca. He was under the impres-
sion that Wellington had only brought up a couple of divisions
against him, and that these were still south of Cnstello BrallCO 1,
• Murmont to Herthicr: Fllentc Guinn/do, April 22. 'Les rapports des
priWlll\iers SOllt que trois divisions de l'Urln&: lUlgluiliC reviennent sur le
Con. Mais ccttc llouvelle nyunt c\..C donllec uvec nIfccl..lltioll pnr les parle-
mentaires, et n'llyunt VII jumais lllltre chosc que le sclIl I" de Hnssards
AlIemllnds, qlli ctuit precMcmment sur ccttc rive, et point d'infantcrie, lIi
riell qui 1l1l110nCC In presence d'un (:(Jrps de trollpeS, je suis nutorist 11. croiro
que c'est UIl lIruit qu'on II fait courir >\ desscin, et qu'iJ n'y a pas d'Anglais en
prc9Cncc. Je suis 11. peu pres certain qu'il a parti dc Portal~grc deux
divisions, qui !le SOllt port(:cs il. Villa Velha: mllis iI me parnit cvident
qu'clles ne !le sont bcauCQup cloignl:es du Tage.' The actual situntion was
1st Hussars KG.L. Quadraseyes in front of Sabugal; Light Divis.ion,
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whereas as a matter of fact seven had marched; and on the
da.y that he wrote this inca.utious estimate Wellington's head-
quarters were at Pcnamacor, the Light and 3rd Divisions were
closing in on Sabugnl, the 4th nnd 5th were a full march north
of Cnstello Branco, nnd the Ist, 6th, and 7th were at Losa, quite
close to that city. Thirty-six hours more of delay would have
placed Marmont in the terrible position 01 finding himself with
a broken bridge behind him, and 40,000 enemies closing in
upon his front and flank.
To explain the situation, Wellington's movements after the
capture 01 Badajo:l must now be detailed. It had been his hope,
though not his expectation, that Soult might have remained at
Villafranca after hearing of the disaster of the 6th April; in
this ease he had intended to faU upon him with every available
man, crush him by Iorcc of numbers, and then Iollow up his
routed army into Andalusia, where the whole Iabrie of Freneh
occupation must have crumpled up. But Soult wisely retreated
at a sharp pace; and the idea of following him as far as Seville,
there to fInd him rein!oreed lor u general action by all the
troops from the Cadiz Lines and Granada, was not so tempting
as that of bringing him to battle in Estremadura. On the day
after the fall of Badajoz Wellington formulated his intentions
in a letter to Lord Liverpool. • It would be very desirable
that I should have it in my power to strike a blow against
Marshal Soult, before be could be reinforced.... But it is not
very probable that he will risk an action in the province of
Estremadura, which it would not be difficult for him to avoid;
and it is necessary for him that he should return to Andalusia
owing to the movements of General BaIlastcros and the COllde
de Penne Villemur ... if he should retire into Andalusia I must
return to Castille 1.'
The reason given by Wellington for his resolve to turn north
again was that Carlos de Espafia had informed him that Ciudad
Rodrigo, though otherwise tenable enough, had only provisions
Sabugal: Srd Division, Sortclha; 4th Division, Pcdrogil.o, 5th Division,
A1pcdlinha; 1st, 6th, 7th Divisions, Loss.; Pack's Portuguese, Memoa.
The map will show wbat a Ccadul situation Murmont would have been in
had he halted Cor another day.
• Wellington to Liverpool, April 7, Di3patdlell, ix. p. 43.
O:w.liI. v U
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for twenty-three days, partly Crom what Wellington called the
gencml policy of • Mailana 'l-of shiftless proerastination-
partly from the definite single fact that a very large convoy
provided from the British magazines on the Douro had been
stopped at Almeida 011 March 30th. This, in Wellington's
estimation, was the fault of Victor Alten, who, if he had held
the outposts beyond the Agueda for a day longer, might have
covered the cntry of thc convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo 2. :Mar-
mont's operations on the Coa and the Agueda would have been
quite negligible from the strategic point of view but for this
one fact. He might ravage as far as Guarda or Castello Branco
without doing any practical harm, but it could not be permitted
that he should starve Rodrigo into surrender: even allowing
for a firm resistance by the garrison, and a judicious resort to
lessened rations, the place would be in danger from the third
wcek of April onward. Wherclorc, unless Marmont withdrew
into Spain by the middle of the month, he must be forced to do
so, by the transference of the main body of the Anglo-Portuguese
Army to the North.
The Marshal, during the critical days following the full Q[
Badajoz, showed no such intention. Indeed he advanced to
Sabugal on the 8th, seized Caste.llo Braneo on the 12th, and
executed his raid on Guarda upon the 13th-14th. Ignorant 01
the fall of Badajoz, he was naturally cxtcnding the sphere of
his operations, under the belief that no serious force was in his
front. While he was overrunning Beira Baixa, Ciudad Rodrigo
continued to be blockaded by Brenllicl', and its storcs were now
running very low.
On Aprilllth 3 Wellington made up his mind that this state
of things must be brought to an end, and he determined that
no mere dctaclunent should march, but a force sufficient to
I Wellington to Henry Welles[ey, April 4, DispatcllflS, ix. p. 29.
• Wellington to Alten,April IS, Dispatches, ix. p. 68, 'I beg to observe that
if you had assembled the 1st Hussars at Pastores on the 30th March and
18t April ... YOII would have kept open the communication between
Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, and the convoy would probably have got into
the latter place.'
I The date can be fixed Irom D'Urban'~ .Journal: 'Marmont has
blockaded Rodrigo, reconnoitred Almeidll, and has now made un inroad
as Ii'll' as JI'undilo: all this obliges n movement toward him. April 11.'
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overwhehn 1tIarmont if he could be brought to action. The
movement began with the march of the 11th Light Dragoons
and l)ack's and Bradford's Portuguese to Elvas on the afternoon
of the 11th April, all being ordered to move on Arronches and
Portalegre. On the 12th a larger force started oIl irom the
camps around Badajoz and on the Albuero. position: the Srd
and Light Divisions moved (following Pack und Bradford) on
Portalegre via Arronehes, the 4th and 5th, making a shorter
move, to Campe j,\[ayor on the same road, the 7th from Valvcrde
to Eh'fis. The Ist and 6th under Grahnm, bringing up the rear,
went off on the 13th from Valverde and Elvas northward.
Orders were sent to Stapleton Cotton, then in pursuit of Dronet
in southern Estremlldura, to come with Anson's and Le
1Ifarehant'g cavalry brigades to join the main army, leaving
only Slade's and Long's to Rill. Bock's Heavy Dragoon brigade
of the King's German Legion was also directed to take part in
the general movement.
Only Hill, with the troops that had served under him since
the summer of 1811, plus onc new cavalry brigade, was left
behind in Estremadura to 'contain' Drouet. It was highly
unlikely that Soult would be heard of in that province, as he
had his own troubles in Andalusia to keep him employed.
Indeed Wellington in his parting message to this trusty
lieutenant told hjm that it was • impossible' that the enemy
could assemble enough troops to incommode him at present,
and explained that his chief duty would be to cover the repairing
of Badajoz, into which threc Portuguese line regimcnts 1 under
Power, hitherto iorming the garrisons of Elvas and Abrantes,
were thrown, to hold it till Castanos should provide 3,000
Spaniards for the purpose.
The movement of the army marching against Marmont was
rapid and continuous, though it might have been even mote
swift but for the fact that the whole long column had to pass
the bridge of Villa Velha, the only passage of thc Tagns that
lay straight on the way to the Lower Deim: to send troops
by Abrantes would have cost too much time. On the 16th the
Light and Srd Divisions crossed the bridge, on the 11th some
cavalry and Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese, while the 4th,
• 5th and 17th from Elvas, 22nd from Aurn~tes.U,
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5th, and 6th Divisions were now close to the river at Castello de
Vide and Alpahao, and only the 1st was rather to the rear at
Portalegre 1. Alten's German Hussars, picked up at Castello
Braneo on the 18th by the head ot the column, were the only
cavalry which Welliuf:,rton showed in his trout. This was dOlle
on principle: MarmOllt knew that this regiment was in his
neighbourhood, and if it pressed in upon his outposts, it told
him nothing as to the arrival of new troops opposite him. As we
have alrcady seen, when quoting one of his dispatches 2, he drew
the inference that 'Wellington intended, and so late as the 22nd
believed that his adversary's main army was still behind the
'l'agus, and that at most two divisions had come up to Villa
Velha-but probably no further.
Steadily advancing, the column, with the aed and Light
Divisions leading, reached Castello Braneo on the 17th. They
found that it had been reoccupied on the 15th by Alten's
Hussars and Le Cor's militia; but it was in a dreadful state of
dilapidation owing to thc ravages of Clausel's troops during the
two days of their flying visit. Clear information was received
that l\1armont was still at Sabugal, and his vedettes lay as far
south as Pedrogao. The British staff wcre in hopes that he
might be caught. • His ignorance (us we hope) of the real force
in march against him mo.)' end in his destruction,' wrote
D'Urban to Charlcs Stewart on thc 18th, • for he has put the
Agueda in his rear, which the late rains ha\'e made impassable:
his situation is Yery critical. H he discovers his error at once,
he may get off by his lelt down the Perales road, and so reach
Plasencia; but if he does not, and waits to be driven out of the
ground he holds, I don't scc how he is to get away. Lord
Wellington will be all closed up by the 21st; meanwhile he
shows little to his front, and avoids giving serious alarm: the
fairest hopes may bc cntertained of a deeisivc blow 3.'
It looked indeed as if Marmont was waiting over-long: all
the 17th-18th his exploring parties came as far south as Idanha
Nova, where by an ill chanee they captured Wellington's most
famous intelligence-officer, Major Colquhoun Grunt, who there
• All these movements are taken from the elaborate tables in D'Urban's
Journal for these days.
• See above, p. 288. • Letter in thc D'Urbnn Pnpcrll.
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commenced that extraordinary series of adventures which are
told in detail in the liCe of his brother-in-law, Dr. McGrigor,
Wellington's chief medieal officer. He escaped at Bayonnc,
and returned to England via Paris and the boat of a Bretou
fisherman 1.
The rear of the column had dropped behind somewhat, owing
to the incessant rains which had set in from April 14th, and
which had broken Murmont's bridge lour days later. Welling-
ton had given the 4th Division leave to halt for a day, because
of the statc of the roads and the entire want of cover for the
night in the desolate tract between Villa Vclha and Abrantes 2.
It reached Castello Braneo, however, on the 20th, on. which day
only (by some extraordinary mismanagement) Wellington got
the tardy news of Trant's disaster at Guarda on the morning
of the 14th. And this news was brought not by any official
messenger, but by a fugitive ensign of militia, who garnished
it with aU manner of untrue additions-whereupon Beresford
had him tried and shot, for deserting his troops and spreading
false intelligcncc. Clcarly Trant, Wilson, and Baccelar between
them should have got the truc narrative to head-quarters before
six days had elapsed.
The 21st April was the critical day of this campaign. Mar-
mout was still at Fueute Guillaldo, on the wrong sidc of thc
Agueda, and his bridge at La Caridad was still broken and
not relaid. Though unaware that Wellington was close upon him
with an overwhelming force, whose existence he denied (as we
ha.ve seen) in a. letter sent off so late as the 22nd, he was yet
feeling uncomfortable, both because of his broken communica-
tions, and becausc hc had used up his food. Wherefore he gave
orders that his arlillcry, using very bad side-roads, should pass
the Agueda by the bridge of Villarubia, a small mountain
I Sce the l.ile of Surgeon-General Sir JIUJ. MeGrigm, pp. 284-06. I have
before me, :unong the Scovel1 papel'l:l, Grnnt'$ origim,l signed pllrole AA far
llS Bayonne, witnessed by General Lamnrtinil:!rc, the chief of Mnnnont's
sturr. It wns COI)tured by GmrrillcTIJ8 in C!L~tiIe, and sent to Wellington.
Accompnl')'ing it is the GeneM\I's private letter, commending Gnmt to the
attention or the French !lOlicc, with the exphwntion Ihnt he was only
not treated as u spy because he wus captured ill British uniform, thongh
far ill thc rear or the l"rcnch outpost line.
• Wellington to Graham, Castcllo Branco, April 18, Disp(J~lje$, ix. p. 70.
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crossing quite near its source, which would take it, not by
the ordinary route past Ciudad Rodrigo, but by Roblcdo to
Tamames, through a very difficult country.l He himself with
the infantry stood fast on the 21s;t and 22nd, unaware of his
dangerous position,
For the allies were closing in upon him-the head-quarters
of Wellington were on thc 21st at Pedrogao, thc 1st Gcrman
Hussars, covering the advance. hud reached Sabugal, and the
Light and 3rd Divisions were close behind, as were Pack's and
Bradford's Portuguese, while the 4th and 5th were both
beyond CastclIo Braneo. On the morning of the 22nd the head
of the infantry column had passed Sabugai, and the Hussars
were in front of them, pushing in Mnrmont's vedettes. A delay
of twenty-four hours more on the part of the Freneh would
have brought the armies into collision, when Marmont gave
orders for his infantry to retreat across the Agueda by the fords
near Ciudad Rodrigo, where the water on that day had at last
fallen enough to render the passage possible, though difficult
and dangerous. The leading division marched on the 22nd, the
rcst on the 2Brd: by the night of the latter day all were across
the river, and retiring rapidly on Salamanca.; for, as l\1armont
truly observed, there was not a ration of food to be got out of
the devastated country between Rodrigo and the Tonnes.
The odd part of this sudden, if long-deferred, retreat was that
it was made without the slightest knowledge that it was
imperative, owing to Wellington's near approach; in the letter
announcing it to Berthier the Marshal reiterates his statement
that he does not believe that Wellington has a man north of
Castcllo Branco save the 1st Hussars K.G.L. The retreat
is only ordered because it is clear that, with 20,000 men only in
hand, it is useless to continue the tour of devastation in the
, Mllrlnont to Dcrthicr, Fucnt.e Gllinaldo, April 22 (origifilll int.eroeplcd
dispatch ill &'Ovcll PopeN): • J'ni eu la plus gnlllde pcillc it faire orriver
mOll "rtilleric l;lIr IR rivc uroitc de cello: riviere. Le!l ponhl quc j'nvuis fllit
construire sur I'Aguoon nynnt Hll dHruit811nr lcs gr:llllles crues d'eRlI, ct
n'Ryant pUll III fuculU: dc les r£,t,,1Jlir, je I\'ui 811 u'uutro; moyen que de III
dirigcr pur Ics sources de ee.ttc rivjerc, et les contrerorts des mOllwgncs.'
'1'he wording of Wellington's intereept.etl copy difrcl'!! slightly from that of
the duplicate printed ill DUCMSC'lj Corrt8JK1ndcl~ of King Joseph, viii.
PI). 404-10.
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Beira. 'Your highness may judge that the result of the
diversion which I have sought to make in favour of thc Army
of the South has been practically nil. Such a movement could
only be effective if carried out with a force great enough to
enable me to march against the enemy with confidence, and to
orrcr him battle, even if he had every available man l.'Ollectcd.
With 18,000 or 19,000 men (reduced to 15,000 or 16,000 because
I have to leave detachments to keep up communications) I could
not move far into Portugal without risk, even it I have no one
in front of mc, and the whole hostile army is on the farther bank
of the 'l'agus. For it I passed the Zezere and marched on
Santarem, the enemy-master of Badajoz and covered by the
Guadiana-J::ould pass the Tagus behind mc, and seize the
defiles of Zal"Ml. Major, Perules, and Payo, by which wone I could
return.... There are several places at which he could cross the
'l'agus, above and below Aleantara, and so place himself by
a rapid and secret movement that my first news of him would
be by the sound of caIlnon on my line of communications-and
my position would then be desperate].'
The real danger that was threatening him, on the day that he
wrote this dispatch, l\Iarmont did not susped in the least,
indeed he denied its existence. But he moved just in time, and
was across the Aglleda when, on the 24th, Wellington had his
head-quarters at Alfayates, and three divisions at Fuente
Guinaldo, which the French had only evacuated on the preceding
day, with three more close behind. Only the 1st and 6th, under
Graham, were still at Castello Branco and Losa. Evidently
if the fords of the Agueda had remained impassable for another
twcnty·four hours, Marmont's four divisions would have been
overwhelmed by superior numbers :md drh...cn against the
bridgeless river, over which there would have been no escape.
As it was, he avoided an unsuspected danger, and returned to
Salamanca with his army little reduced in numbers, but with
his cavalry and artillery almost ruined: his dispatch of the
22nd says that he has lost 1,500 horses, and that as many more
needed a long rest if they were ever again to be fit for service.
On the 24th Wellington bade all his army halt, the Corced
, lntcrecptcd dispatch in thc Scovcll Papers, F'ucntc Guinnldo, April 22.
quoted abovc.
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marches which they had been carrying out for the last ten days
having failed to achieve the end o[ surprising and o\'erwhclming
Marmont, who had obtained an undeserved escape. On the
26th he paid a Bying visit to Ciudad Jlodrigo, whose sa.fcty he
had at least secured. and commended General Vives ror his
correct attitude during the three weeks of the late blockade.
The next movements of the allied anny belong to a. different
series of operations, and must be dealt with in a new section.
S ECTIO N XXXIII
THE SALAMANCA CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER I
KlNG .JOSEPH AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
ON March 16, 1812, the day on which Wellington opened
his trenches before Badajoz, the Emperor Napoleon took a. step
of no small importance with regard to the control of his armies
in Spain. He had now made up his mind that the long-
threatened war wjth Russia must begin within a few months,
and that he must leave Paris ere long, and move forward to some
central point in Germany, from which he could superintend
the preparations for a campaign, the greatest in scale of any
which he had hitherto undertaken. Hc was persuaded that war
was inevitable: the Czar Alexander had dared to dispute his
will; and in the state of megalomania, to which his mind had
now accustomed itself, he could tolerate no opposition. Yet
he was aware, in his morc lucid moments, that hc was taking
a great risk. On :March 7th Colonel Jnrdet, 1\1armont's con-
fidential aide-dc-camp, was granted an interview, in which he
set 10rth all the difficulties of the Army 01 Portugal. The
Emperor heard him out, and began, • Marmont complains that
he is short of many resources-food, money, means, &c....
Well, here am I, about to plunge with an immense army into
the heart of tL great country which produces cWsQlmely nothing.'
And then he stopped, and after a long silence seemed suddenly
to rouse himself from a sombre reverie, and looking the colonel
in the face asked, •How will it all cnd?' Jardct, thrown oU his
balance by such a searching query, stammered that it would
of course end in the best possible fashion. Dut he went out
fillcd with gloomy forebodings, inspired by his master's cvidcnt
lack of confidence in the future 1.
Some weeks were yet to elapse before the Emperor's actual
, See Marmont's .iU~moires, iv. p. 202. Jaroet's long report to l\farmont
was captured 00 its joume)" out to Salamanca from Paris, and lies amoug
the Scovell Papers.
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departure from France; but, ere he went, he had to set in
good working order the conduct of his policy during his absence,
and of all its complicated machinery the Spanish section was
one of the most puzzling and the most apt to get out of order.
It was clearly impossible that he should continue to send from
Dresden or Wilna elaborate orders every five or ten days, as he
had been wont to do from Paris. If it took three weeks to get
an order to Seville in February, it might take fivc or six in July,
when the imperial head-quarters might be in some obscure
Lithuanian hamlet. Something must be done to solve the
problem of continuous policy, and of co-operation between the
five armies of Spain, and after much consideration the Emperor
dictated to Dcrthier the solution which he thought least bad-
• Send by special messenger a dispatch to the King of Spain,
informing him that I confide to him the command of all my
Spanish armies, and that Marshal Jourdnn will serve as his
Chief-of-the-Staff. You will send, at the same time, a similar
intimation to that marshal. You will inform the King that
I shall keep him advised of my political in~entions through
my ambassador at Madrid. You will write 1;0 Marshal Suchct,
to the Duke of Dalmatia, and the Duke of Uagusa that I have
entrusted the King with the eharge of all my armies in his
realm, and that they will have to conform to all the orders
which they may receive from the King, to secure the co-opera-
tion of their armies. You will write, in particular, to the
Duke of Ragusa that the necessity lor obtaining common action
between the Armies of the South, of Valencia, and of Portugal,
has determined me to give the King of Spain control over all
of them, and that he will have to regulate his operations by the
instructions which he will receive. To-morrow you will write in
greater detail to the King, but the special messenger must start
this very night for Bayonne I,'
or thc bundle of dispatches that lor the King was delivered
at Madrid on March 28th, after twelve days of travel. Marmont
, Kiug Joseph had been prepared for the formal proposal by a tentative
letter sent off to him about three weeks earlier, on February 19, inquiring
whether it would suit him to haveJourdan as his Chiel-ol-the-Starr, supposing
that the E'nperor went off to Russia and turned over the command ill
Spain to him. Sec Duca.sse's CfJrrupfJlldellCfJ, iI'. p. 322.
]812] THE EMPEROR'S RESOLVE 299
got his a little later, as he had started on his Portuguese expe-
dition when it reached Salamanca. Communication between
his field-force and his base being difficult, owing to the activity
of Julian Sanchez, it appears to have been on l'lIarch 80, when
before Ciudad Rodrigo, that he became aware that he had
a new commander-in-chief 1. Soult was apprised of the situa-
tion much later, because, when preparing for his expedition to
relieve Badajoz, he had ordered his posts in the Sierra Morena
to be evacuated, and the communication with La Mancha to be
broken off for the moment. It seems that he must have got
Berthier's dispatch quite late in April, as on the 17th of that
month he was only acknowledging Paris lettersof February23rd 2,
and the first courier from Madrid got through only some time
later. Suchet would appear also to have been advised of the
change of command very late-he published the imperial
decree in his official gazctte ut Vulencia only on May 10, giving
as its date the 29th instead of the 16th of March 3, which looks
as if the first copy sent to him had miscarried, and the repetition
made thirteen days later had alone reached him. Thesc dates
are only worth giving as illustrations of the extreme difficulty
of getting orders from point to point in Spain during the French
occupation, even when Andalusia and Valencia were supposed
to be thoroughly subdued.
It will be noted that in Napoleon's instructions to Berthier
no mention is made of either the Army of Catalonia or the Army
of the North 4; and it might have been thought that, clinging
I This is proved by Berthier's letter to King Joseph or April 10 (Ducasse's
Correlfpondau:e of King JotIeph, Yiii. p. 382), which says that he has just
reeeiveci MMmont's dispatch of March 30 aeknowleflging hiR own of
March 16, llnd Urnt Ille lItarshal now knOWlIlllll.t he must obey orders from
Madrid. t Soult to Rerthier from Seville, April 17•
• A copy of this print is among the Scovell Papers: it does credit to the
Valeneiull I)ress by iIB neut appeurnnce•
• 'J'he qucstion about the Army of the Norl,h is a vcry curious ooc. The
autllori1.eol copy of tile dispatch of 1\1,,)' ]6, printed in Nupoleon'8 (:Qrre-
slJOndenoo alld in Ducusse's CQrrelf]Jaw.lence of King J08el'h, eertninly omits
iIB llame. But the King declared t1mt ill his origioul oopy or it D01'!:!ClIne
nnd his :mny were mentioned as put under hi8 charge. In one of l,he
intercepted dispatches in the Soovel1 Papers, Joseph writes angrily to
Berthier, btiving what i'urporIB to be a verblltim dnJllicute of the document,
nnd in this dnplicute, which lies beraTe lily eyes us I write this, the Army
of the Nurth i$ eited with the relit.
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to the theory of his paper annexation of Spain north of the
Ebro, he was deliberately exempting from the King's control the
troops in the districts on which he had resolved to lay hands
for his own benefit. But 11 supplementary dispatch of April 28rd
placed Decaen and the garrison of Catalonia under the general
charge of Suchet, and as that marshal had been directed to
obey King Joseph's military instructions, the four ncw' Freneh'
departments on the Ebro were now theoretically under the
same general command as the rest of Spain. As to the Army
of the North, Dorscnne wrote (April 19th), with evident glee,
to say that he was exempted from obedience to the King, by
not bcing included in the list of recipients of the dispatch of
March 16, and that he regretted his inability to carry out
a series of orders which Jourdan had sent him. But he had
not many more days to serve in his present capacity, and
his successor, CaHarelli, though equally recalcitrant ill spirit,
presently received a formal notice that he was under King
Joseph's command.
Napoleon's general policy in placing the supreme control of
all the Spanish annies in the hands of one chief, and bringing
to an end (in theory at least) the system of separate viceroyalties
was undoubtedly the right one. And it cannot be disputed
that one second-rate commander-ill-chief is more effective than
four good ones, working each for his own private and local
profit and glory. But in this particular case the new arrange-
ment was not likely to bring about allY great change for the
better, owing to the personal equation. During the last three
years Napoleon had been inflicting affronts at short intervals
upon his brother, had .annexed integral portions or his realm,
had disregarded most of his complaint:>.. l\.lld suggestions, and
had allowed him to become the butt of the viceroys, whose
insults and injuries he had never been allowed to resent. They
had raided the districts assigned to his personal governance \
had plundered his magazines, imprisoned his officials, and set
up courts of justice of their own to supersede the regular
magistracy of the land. The Emperor had never punished such
'One of Marmont's colonels in the province of Segovia was at this
moment threatening to use armed force against the King's troops fot
resisting his requisitions. Sce l\Iiot, ili. p. 222.
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proceedings; at the most hc had ordered that they should
cease, when they were injurious to the progress of the French
arms in Spain. It was useless to issue a sudden order that for
the future the marshals were under .Joseph's control, and that
, he must makc them obey him,' as the phrase ran in one letter
to Madrid. As the King's minister, ~Iiot de :Melito, wrote,
'What chance was there of success when all the individuals
concerned were at variance with eaeh other? The marshals
had been accustomed for three years to absolute independencc.
The new Chief-of-the-StnfI, in spite of his acknowledged capacity,
was known to be out of favour with the Emperor, and in
consequence could exercise no moral authority over the masters
of the armies. The apparent testimonial of confidence which
was given to the King, by making him Commander-in-Chief, was
0. matter to cause disquietude rather than satisfaction 1.' 'fhe
plain fact was that Napoleon was over-busy, worried with other
problems, and he merely took the easiest and simplest method
of throwing the burden of the Spanish war on to the shoulders
of another. 'fhe consequences, be they what they might be,
were now of little importance, compared with the success or
failure of the impending Russiall campaign.
Jourdan sums up the situation in much the same terms.
, 'l'he King for two years had been allowed to have no direct
relations with the generals-in-chief: he had no exact knowledge
of the militury situation in eaeh of their spheres of command,
nor was he better informed as to the strength, organization,
and distribution of the troops under their orders. Unable to
use his new authority till hc had got togcther detailed state-
ments as to these data, he directed his chief-of-the-staff to ask
for reports. Dorsenne replied that he should not send any at
present, because Berthier, whcn announcing to him that the
Armies of the Soutb, of Portugal, and of Aragon had been put
under the King's orders, had informed him that the Emperor
would let him know in due eoursc whut was to be done with
the Army of the North. Marshal Suchet demonstrated that
he had received special instructions from the Emperor, which
prescntly wcre secn to make the King's authority over the
Army of Aragon quite iUusory. Soult had removed all the
1 See Miot lie Mclito's Mtmniru, Hi. p.lo!U'.i.
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posts on the lines of communication when he marched to relieve
Badajoz, and showed so litUe zeal in reopening them, that evell
in May it was not known at Madrid whether he was yet aware
that he was under the King's orders. I'Ifarmont was the only
onc who sent without delay the report which bad been askcd
for-but he announced at the same time that, in obedicncc to
the Emperor's earlier orders, he was already operating beyond
thc Agueda, to make a diversion for the relief of Badajoz 1.'
·Of what use was it to send orders to the marshals, when they
could plead that the execution oC them was rendered impossible
by instructions received direetly from the Emperor, which
prescribed a different policy? Unfortunately for King Joseph
each commander-ill-chief still preserved his direct communi·
cation with the Minister oC War at Paris: even alter the Emperor
had startcd for Poland in May, caeh continued to selld in hi.\!
own plans, and to demonstrate how far superior they \vcxe to
those prescribed by King Joseph. Soult, in particular, generally
commenced a dispatch by demonstrating that the directions
received from Madrid could not possibly be executed, and then
produced an elaborate scheme of his own, which would be
beneficial lor the ArmyoC Andalusia, but impracticable for those
of Portugal, Valencia, aud the Centre. Whcn his suggestions
were rejected, he wrote privately to Paris, declaring that Joseph
and Jonrdan were absolutely incapable, and sometimes adding
that the King was trying to serve his private interests rather
than those of his brother and suzerain. It was the accidental
receipt by .Toseph of an intercepted letter of Seult's to the
1tIiuister of 'War, in which he was accused oC absolute treason
to the Emperor, that brought about the fma.l rupture bc2twcen
the King and the Marshal, and led to the recoll of the latter to
France 2.
King Joseph, though liable to fits of depression and despair,
was, on the whole, of nmercurinl and seIC·sufficienttemperament.
A few weeks before the receipt of the Emperor's dispatch
1 Jourdan's ilUmmrt'.8, p. 384.
• Oddly enough thj,~ letl.er WIl8 in duplicute, and while one COllY reil into
JOSCllh'ti hands, the otller was captured by guerriUeros and scnt to Welling-
ton. The cipher WllS worked out by ScovelJ, und the contents gave
Wellington useful inrormlltion as to the relations ilctWCCIl SouJt and Um
King. Sce below, pages 530-30.
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granting him the command of the Spanish armies, all his letters
had been full of complaints and threa.ts of a.bdication. Dut the
dec.ree of Marc.h 16th filled him with a sudden confidence-at
last his military talents should he displayed and recognized ;
he would, as his brother desired, 'make the marshal!> obey
him;' Lor the future the armies should all act together for
a single end, and not be guided by the selfish interests of their
leaders. He accepted the position of Commander-in-Chief with
undisguised pleasure, and proceeded to draw out schemes of his
own, with Jourdan as his adviser in technical matters of military
logistics.
It cannot be denied that the' 1I1hrwirc of May 1812 \' in
whieh Jouroan set forth the situation alter the fall of Dadajoz,
and the policy which he considered that it demanded, is a
document of much greater merit than might have been expected.
It is by far the best summary of the position of the French
power in Spain that was ever drawn up, llnd it recognizes with
great clearness the two main limitations of that power, which
were (1) that the imperial troops were an army of occupation
rather than a b'Cnuille field army, and (2) that the Napoleonic
system, by whieh hosts were supposed to 'live on the country-
side,' might be applicable for a short campaign in Lombardy
or Bavaria, but was impossible for protracted manreuvres in
an exhausted and thinly-peopled land like central Spain.
Jourdnn's note on the Me-moire sums up the situation in a few
Iines-' Two measures were indispensable; one was to render
the army mobile, by giving it ample transport, and by establish-
ing large magazines on all lines of communication: without
these all permanent concentration of heavy forces, and all
<.'ontinuous operations were impossible. The seeond was to
abandon the deplorable system of occupying as much territory
as possible--of which the real object was double: firstly, to
enable the armies to live on the country-side; secondly, to
appear in the eyes of Europe to be dominant over the whole
of Spain.'
I The Mhnoire itself is worth analysing. hs gist runs as
follows :-
'(1) The recent departure of the Imperial Guards, the Poles,
, Printed whole in Jourdan'6 iJUmoire8, pp. 386-9'~.
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und other troops, and the lack of any adequate system of
transport or magazines, renders the Imperial Army-though
still 230,000 men strong-incapable of undertaking any offen-
sive operations. The present situation is exceptionally trying,
because of the successes of Wellington, and thc deplorable
effect on Spanish public opinion of the recent annexation
[Catalonia], the arbitrary government of the generals, and the
famine which has lately prevailed. The discontent thereby
engendered has led to the enormous increase in the number
of the gucrrillero bunds. It has also encouraged the govcrn·
ment at Cadiz to multiply its levies and its military energy.
(2) It is not yet certain whether the Emperor intends the
Army of the North to be at the King's disposal. General
Dorsennc rduses to send in reports or to 1l(.'Cept orders. But
since its recent reduction in numbers [by the departure of the
Imperial Guard, and the transfer of Souhl'l.m's and Bonnet's
divisions to the Army of Portugal] it is believed that it has not
more than 48,000 mcn under arms, and it appears to be a fact
that it can do no more than hold down the wide regions com-
mitted to its charge, and guard the line of communications
with France. Even if placed at the King's disposition, it can
furnish no important reinforcements to other armies. Never-
theless it should be put under his control, as it might under
certain circumstances be called upon to lend a moderate force
for a short time.
(3) As la t.hc Army of Aragon [GO,OOO men, including the
divisions in Catalonia]; the King was informed that Marshal
Suchet was placed under his command, and that if he needed
reinforccments he might draw 011 the troops in Valencia. Hc
therefore [during the .siege of lladajoz] ordered the :Marshal
to send a division to join the Army of the Centre for an indis·
pensable operation I. The Marshal sent a Cormal declaration in
reply, to the effect that he could not execute this order, and
that he was even about to withdraw from Cuenca the regiment
that he had placed there, as its absence imperilled the safety
of Valencia. He says that the Emperor hos placed Catalonia
under his charge, and that he is authorized to employ his
, i. e. for the collection of troops in the valley of Ule Tagus, to join Foy
and operutc for the relief of Badajoz.
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whole force for the protection of the provinces entrusted to him.
Apparently, thcn, the Army of Aragoll cannot co-operate in
opcratiolls outside its own sphere, and the 1olarshal's speeial
instructions place him in an exceptional position. His relations
with the King consist in a polite cxchange of views, not in the
giving and taking of ordcrs-his Majcsty's control over tlill
army is purely illusory. .,
(4) As to the Army of the South, Marshal Soult has about
54,000 men efCeetive [not including Juramemados, &e.]. The
Cadiz Lines nnd the garrisons pin down a large force to fi....ed
stations. The Marshal has also to keep a considerable flying
column in hand, to hunt Ballasteros and other partisans. For
operations outside the bounds of Andalusia he can only collect
a field-force of 24,000 men; this is the total figure of the corps
that tried to relieve Badajoz, and in its absence Seville was
nearly lost. The posts in the Sierra l\Iorena were called in at
that time, and have never come back: correspondence with
the Army of the South is therefore precarious and slow.
(5) The Army of Portugal has 52,000 men effecti"·e. It holds
the lront line against Wellington; its divisions are much
scattered, because it hns to live on the country, and has also
to furnish several important garrisons. One division of 6,000
men is fIXcd down in the Asturias by the Emperor's speeial
orders. The garrisons of Astorga, Valladolid, Salamanca, Leon,
Palencia, &c., absorb 6,000 or 7,000 men more. Only 29,000
infantry [or a total of 35,000 of all arms] are available as
a field-force to use against the English, if they attack Oil the
front of the 'l'ormes. If Marshal l\Iarmont has to march out of
his own sphere, to join in a combincd operation against Welling-
ton [e. g. in Estremadura), he can bring a still smaller lorce-
say 25,000 men. The Army of Portugal is many months in
arrear of its pay, and has hardly any transport or magazines:
the troops have become terrible marauders-largely from
necessity.
(6) Lastly wc comc to the Army of thc Centre. It consists of
9,500 men borne on the Imperial muster-rolls, and 5,800 troops
belonging to the King [his Guards and Hugo's Jurameniados,
horse and loot). Therc axe also at present in :Madrid 8,200 drafts
lor the Army of the South, temporarily retained-so that the
Oll.lB. v x
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whole makes up 18,500 men. But only 15,000 are effective,
thc remainder consisting of dCpOts, dismounted cavalry,
train, &C. Having to hold down the extensive provinces oC
Madrid, Segovia, Guadalajara, Toledo, La l\1ancha, and Cuenea,
this force is a mere" army of occupation." It can provide no
troops for expeditions outside its own territory, and is spread
so thin that even Madrid would be in danger without the
Royal Guards. The pay is eight months in mrenr.
(7) Civil administration is still locn.lized: the commanders
of the annies levy their own taxes, and nothing comes to
ltladrid. The King has to feed the Army of the Centre, and to
maintain his civil service, from the revenues of New Castile
alone. None of the marshnls will help another with money or
stores. The claim oC the King to rule all Spain seems absurd
to the people, so long as he cannot exercise any civil control
outside the aTt"Qndissement oC the Army of the Centre.
(8) Conclusion. All oHensive operations are impossible, as
long as the imperial armies have to hold down the entirety
oC the occupied provinces. It Lord Wellington concentrates
all his forces, he can march with 60,000 men [not including
Spaniards] ngainst either the Army of Portugal or the Army
of the South. Neither of them can assemble a sufficient fore<:
to resist him, unless they abandon whole provinces. The
King has ordered Soult and Mannon!; to march to eaeh other's
aid if either is attacked. But they have to unite, coming from
remote bases, while the enemy can place himself between them
and strike at one or the other. The lines of conununieation
be!;ween them are long and circuitous. It is easily conceh'able
that one of them may be attacked and beaten before the other
is even aware oC the danger. A catastrophe is quite possible if
Lord Wellington should throw himself suddenly, with his whole
force, upon either the Army of Portugal or that of the South.
The only possible way of dealing with this danger is to collect
a central reserve of 20,000 men at Madrid, which can be
promptly trnnsfcrrcd to right or ldt, to join either Soult or
Mnrmont as the conditions of the moment dictate. The Army
of the Centre cannot serve this purpose-it is not a field-force,
but an immovable army of occupation. It the Emperor could
send a new corps of this size from l~rance, Mnrmont could be
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reinforced up to a strength sufficient to eno.ble him to face
Wellington, and to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo.
But the present posture of European affairs [the Russian war]
probably makes it impossible to draw such a corps from France.
This being so, the central reserve must be obtained from troops
already existing in the Peninsula. The only way to find them
is lor the Emperor to consent to the evacuation of Andalusia.
Thirty thousand men of thc Army of the South clln thcn be
placed to cover Madrid, in La l\Iancha: this force would be
ample against any Spanish levies that might come up to the
Sierra Morcna from Cadiz and elscwhcrc. Thc rcmaindcr 01
the Army of the South must form the ccntrnJ. reserve, and
prepare to reinforce Marmont. The Army of Portugal would
then be so strong that Wellington could not dare to take the
offensive-he would be hopelcssly outnumbcred. If this
scheme is approved by the Emperor, hc may be certain that,
when he comes back from Poland, his Spanish armies will be
in the same secure defensive position in which he leaves them
now. The right wing rcsts on thc Bay of Biscay in the Asturias:
the left on the Mediterranean in Valencia.
·When Andalusia is evacuated, the remaining provinces in
French occupation will not be able to payor !eed the 5',000 men
of the Army of thc South, in addition to the armies already
stationed in them; a liberal subsidy from Paris will be neces-
sary. In addition the King must, for thc sake of his prcstige,
be given reo.l civil authority ovcr 0.11 thc provinccs.
It will only be when all authority, civil, military, and adminis-
trative, is concentrated in one hand, that of thc ]{jng, and
when His Mo.jesty sho.ll have received Cram the Emperor instruc-
tions suiting the prescnt posture of affairs, that he can be
fully responsible tor Spain.'
On the whole this is a very well-rcasoncd document. It was
perfectly truc that the offensive power of the l''rench in the
Peninsula had shrunk to nothing, because no province could
be held down without 0. large garrison. If leCt unoccupicd, it
would burst into revolt and raise an anny. '.rhis was the
incvitable ncmcsis for a War of annexation directed against
a proud and patriotic people. There were 230,000 French troops
in Spain; but so many o! thcm were tied down to occupation
x2
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duty, that only about 50,000 or 60,000 could be collected to
curb Wellington, unless some large province were evacuated.
Either Andalusia or elsc Valcncia must bc aballdonc(l The
former was thc larger a.nd the more wealthy; but it was
more remote from the strategical centre of operations in Madrid,
much more infested by the bands of the patriots, and it lay
close to the sphere of operations of Wellington-the great
disturbing element in French calculations. ~forCQver its
evacuation would set free 0. mueh larger field army. Against
this was to be set the ad\'crse balance in loss of prestige: as long
as Cadiz appeared to be beleaguered, the national government
of Spain looked like a handful of refugees in a forlorn island.
To abandon the immense lines in front of it, with their depen-
dcnt flotilla (which must be burnt, since it could not be removed),
would be a conclusive proof to all Europe that the main frontal
offensive against the Spanish patriots had failed. Seville and
Granada, great lowns of world-wide fame, would also have to
be abandoned. AndaJusia was full of Ajra11£esados, who must
either be shepherded to Madrid, or left to the venge3.nce of their
countrymen.
But to weigh prestige against solid military advantage,
though it might appeal to Napoleon-whose reputation as
universal conqueror was part of his political stoek-in·trade-
did not occur to the common-sense intellect oC Jourdan. He
voted for the evacuation of Andalusia: so did his frie"nd and
master, King Joseph. Possibly their decision was not rendered
morc unwelcome by the fact that it would certainly be most
distasteful to Soult, whom they both eordially detested. The
Viceroy should pay at last for the selfish policy of the General:
his rcalm, for thc last two years, had been administered with
much profit llnd glory to himself, but with little advantage
to the King at Madrid, or the general prosperity of the French
cause in Spain. Whether personal motives entered into the
decision of Joseph and Jourdnn we need not trouble to considcr :
it was certainly the correct one to take.
Pcrmission to evacuate Andalusia was therefore demanded
from the Emperor: King Joscph did not dll.1'e to authorize it
on his own responsibility. Meanwhilc, long beforc the Memoire
oC May 1812 had been completed or sent off, to :Napoleon, he
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issued the orders which he thought himself justified in giving
in the interim, to act as a stop-gap till the permission should be
granted. l\Iarmont was told to fall back Oil his own old policy
of keeping n In.rgc detachment in the Tagus valley, in order
that he might get into toueh with Drouet and Soult's Estrema-
duran corps of observation. He was directed to send two
divisions of illfulltry and Il brigade of light cavalry to join Foy,
who was still in the direction of Almaraz and 'falavcra. 'l'hey
were to be ready to act as the advance of the Army of Portugal
lor a march on Truxillo and l'tlerida, if Wellington's next move
should turn out to be an attack on Smut in Andalusia. In
n corresponding fashion, Soult was ordered to reinforce Drouct
up to a force of 20,000 mell, and to push him fonvard to his
old position abdut Almendralcjo, Zalamea, Merida, and l'tlcdellin,
in order that he might march via Truxillo to join the Army of
})ortugal, in case the Anglo-Portuguese army should choose
Salamanca, not Seville, as its next objective. The small part
of the Army oC the Centre that could be fOl'mcd into a Held-
force-three battalions and two cll.valry regiments, under
General d'Armagnac-was directed to move to 'l'alavera, to
relieve Fay there if hc should, be called to move either north
to join l\larmont on the Tonnes, or south to join Soult on the
'Guadiana 1. 'fo replace these troops, drawn from the provinces
of Cuenca and La Mancha, Joseph-as we have already seen 2_
requested Suchet to send' a good divisioll' from Valencia by
Cuenca, on to Ocai'ill in La Mancha 3. In this way the King
and Jourdan thought they would provide lor active CCH>pera-
lion between the Armies of Porlugal and Andalusia, whether
Wellington should make his next move to the South or the
North.
It is curious, but perhaps not surprising, to find that these
orders, the first-Cmits of Joseph's new commission as ComM
mander-in-Chief, were obeyed neither by Suchet, by Soult, nor
by l\1armont.
The former, as we have already seen, when analysing Jour-
dan's Mhnoire of May 1812, not only refused to send a division
, See Jourdllo to Berthler of Allril a, 1812,
, Sce Jourdao's lJfbllf.Jirt, quoted above, p. 304.
• Jourdall to Suehct, April 9, 1812.
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to Oenoa, but stated that he should be obliged to withdraw
the regiment that he was keeping at Cuenca. because he was
authorized by the Emperor to reserve all his own troops for the
defence 01 his own sphere 01 action, in Valencia, Aragon. and
Catalonia. Soult declnred that it was impossible for him to
reinforce Drouet-' he could not keep 20,000 men all the
Guadiana unless he received large reinforcements: all that he
could promise was that the force in Estrcmadura should move
up again to :Mcdcllin and Villalranca, possibly even to Mcridu,
if 'Wellington boo renlly gone northward with his main army.
Dronet, with his la,OOOor 12,000 men, might serve to U contain"
Hill and the British detachment in Estremadura, and his
position would prevent the enemy from making any important
movement in the valley of the 'ragus. Meanwhile he him-
self must, as an absolute necessity, lay siege to Tarifa for the
second time, and make an end of Ballasteros: no more troops,
therefore, could be sent to Drouct: but when Tarifa and
Ballasteros had been finished off, the siege of Cndiz should be
pressed with vigour.' 1'his reply is not only a blank refusal to
obey the King's orders, but amounts to a definite statement
that the local affain; of Andalusia are more important than the
general co-operation of the )i'reneh annies in Spain. As we
shall presently see, Soult was ready to formulate this startling
thesis in the plainest terms-he was, ere long, to propose that
the King and the Army of the Centre should evacuate Madrid
and retire upon Andalusia, when things went wrong with the
Army of Portugal.
As to Marmont, his reply to King Joseph's dispatch was
couched in terms of less open disobedience, but it was by no
means satisf~ctory. He wrote from Salamanca, on April 29th,
after his return from the raid to Sabugal and Guarda, that he
had now learnt (what he did not know ten days before), that
Wellington had been pursuing him ,"vith five divisions. This
force was still in the Beira, and the British general himself had
been at Ciudad Rodrigo on the 26th. It was, therefore, quite
clear that Soult had not 'the whole English army on his
shoulders.' This being so, it was not necessary to send into the
valley of the Tagus such a large force as was asked. But onc
division should move to Avila at once, and could drop down
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on to 'l'alavera in two days, if it turned out to be necessary.
Two more shpuld be cantoncd about Arevalo and the Pass of
Picdrahita [20 miles north-west of Avila) respectively, points
from which they could be transferred to the valley of the '1'agus
in a few days. lIIarmont then proceeded to warn Jourdan
8{,rainst any scheme for concentrating any considerable force
in the direction of La Mancha, urging that he must be able to
collect as many of his divisions opposite Wellington as possible,
in case of an advance by the Anglo-Portuguese army towards
the Tormes. All that wus necessary on the Tagus was to have
the forts at Almaraz well garrisoned and provided 'with stores,
so that troops dropping down from Avila on a southward march
should find a base and magazines ready for them. Summing
up, he ends with a dictum that ' if wc defend Andalusia by
sacrificing the Anny of Portugal, we may save that province
for the moment, but the North will be in danger: if a disaster
occurs there, Andalusia will soon be lost also. If, on the
contrary, we make its defence in the North, the South may be
lost, but the North still remains secure.' By these somewhat
cryptic words, Marmont seems to meau that,looking at the affairs
of Spain at large, Andalusia may be lost without any shock to
the imperial domination in Lean and Old Castile. But a disaster
in Lean or Old Castile entails inevitably the loss of Andalusia
also. This was true enough, though Soult refused to sce it.
But the result of Marmont's very partial fulfilment of Joseph's
orders, and of Soult's and Suchet's entire neglect of them, was
that Jourdan's main design of providing lor close and speedy
co-operation between the Armies of Portugal llnd Andalusia
was completely foiled. When, on May 17th-19th, Hill made
his celebrated irruption into the valley of the Tagus, with the
object of destroying the bridge and forts of Almuxaz, the point
where the interests of Soult and Marmont were linked together,
he found no French troops within filty miles of his objective,
snve the single division of Fay and D'Armagnac's 8,000 men
from the Army of the Centre. Marmont's nearest division in
support was at AvHa, Soult's in the Sierra Morena; both lay
so far off from Almaraz that Hill could not only deliver his
blow, but could depart at leisure when it was struck, without
any risk of being beset by superior forces. If King Joseph's
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orders of April had been carried out, Wellington's stroke in
May would havc been impossible-or risky to the verge of
rashness. Indeed we may be certain, on ·Wellington's record,
that he would not have made it, if three li'rench divisions,
instead of one, had been about Talavera and Alr.naraz. We may
add that his seU-rcliance during the Salamanca campaign
rested largely on the fact that Soult could not succour Marmont,
within any reasonable space of time, C\'en if he wished to do
so, because the bridge of Almaraz was broken. Wherefore
Jourdall and King Joseph must be pronounced to have been
. wise in their foresight, and the Dukes of Rngusn. and Dalmatia
highly blameworthy for their disregard of the orders given
them. They looked eaeh to their own local interests, not to the
general strategic necessities of thc French position in Spain,
which the King and his Chief-of-the-Staff were keeping in mind.
So far their precautions were wise: to blame them for not
taking the tremendous step of evacuating Andalusia without
the Emperor's leave, and concentrating such a force in central
Spain as would have paralysed Wellington's offensivc, would·
be unjust. They dared not have given such an order-and
if they had, Soult would have disobeyed it.
Napoleon himself, indeed, would have a".ureed with Soult at
this time. For not long after Jourdan's Mbnoire of May 1812,
with its request for leave to abandon Andalusia, had started 011
its journey for Dresden, there alTivcd at Madrid a dispatch from
Berthier, setting forth the final instructions left by the Emperor
before he started from Paris on May 9lh. It was of a nature
to strike dismay into the heart of the level-headed and rather
despondent Jourdnn; for it ignored all the difficulties which his
recently dispatched appeal set forth with such clearness. The
King was directed to keep a grip on all thc cOllquert.'11 provinces
of Spain, and to extend their limits till the enemy should be
extirpated. The conquest of Portugal might be postponed till
'les cVCllcmcnts dctcrmineraiellt absolument cette mesure.'
The region to which the Emperor devoted most attention was
the sphere of the Army of the North. 'This is the part on
which it is indispensable to keep a firm hold, never to allow
the enemy to establish himself there, or to threnten the line
of communications. Wherefore a most active war must be
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waged upon the .. Brigands" [Mina, Porlier, Louga, &c.]:
it is of no use to hunt and scntter them, leaving them power
to reunite and to renew their incursions. As to the English, the
present situation seems rather to require a defensive posture:
but it is necessary to maintain an imposing attitude in face
of them, so that thcy may not takc any advantage of our
position. The strength of the forces at the King's disposition
enables him to do, in this respect, all that circumstances may
demand. Such are the principal ideas which the Emperor,
bclorc departing, has expresscd on thc Spanish problem.'
This was a heart-breaking document. Just when the King
and Jourdan had demonstrated that they had no available
field army left to hold back Wellington, they were informed
that thcir forccs wcre ample for the pUl'pose. When they had
asked leave to evacuate Andalusia they are told to 'conserver
Ies conquetes et les etendre successivcment.' They had been
wishing to concentrate at all costs a central reserve-now they
were directed to spread the already scattered army of occupa-
tion over a still greater surface-presumably the Emperor's
phrase meant that he wished to see Mureia, the Catalonian
inland, the whole of the Asturias, and the Condado de Niebla
garrisoned, in addition to all that was held already. The one
central problem to Joseph and .Jourdan was how to face
Wellington's expected onslaught by making the armies co-
operate-the Emperor forbids concentration, and recommends
• the assumption of an imposing attitude!' As if Wellington,
whose knowledge of the movements and plans of his adversaries
was beginning to appear almost uncallUY to them, was to be
contained by , attitudes,' imposing or otherwise.
The unhappy Commander-in-Chief and Chief-of-the-Staff of
the united armies of Spain were reduced to a sort of apathetic
despair by the Emperor's memorandum. Jourdan, in his
Ml:moircs, appears to shrug the shoulders of resignation in
commenting on its effect_ • If only instead of "hold all you
have, and conquer the rest bit by bit," we had been told that
wc might evacuate some provinces and eOllcelltratc the troops,
there would have been mnch good in the instructions. The
King might have dared to abandon the South in order to keep
down the North, if he bad not received this dispatch. But he
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could not take that portentous step without the imperial
permission. All that he could now do, wns to reiterate his
directions to Soult and Marmont that they must so place their
troops as to be able to succour each other. Wc shall see how
they obeyed those orders 1.'
So, by the specinl and deliberate directions of the Emperor,
the 230,000 effective men' present under arms,' forming the
five imperial armies of Spain, were placed at the mercy of
Lord Wellington and his modest force of eight divisions of
Anglo-Portuguese. In a flight of angry rhetoric, Bcrthicr,
writing under Napoleon's dictation, hOO once nsked whether
it was reasonable' que 'quarallle miUe Angla,is galent toutes lea
affairea d'Espagne.' The reply of the fates was to be that
such a contingency was perfectly possible, under the system
which the Emperor had instituted, and with the directions
which he persisted in giving.
• Jourdan's Z1UmQire8, pp. 395--0.
SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER II
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ON April 2,Uh Wellington halted his pursuing army at
Fucure Guinaldo and Sabugal. on hearing that Marmont had
escaped him by a margin of twenty-four hours. The French
were in full march for Salamanca, and it was impossible to
pursue them any further, firstly because the allied army needed
a few days of rest after the forced march from Badajoz, and
secondly because its train had dropped behind, food was nearly
out, and convoys had to be brought up from Lamego and
Sao Jooo de Pesqueira. There W8.'i, of course, nothing to be
got Qut or the unhappy region in which MaJ:mout's locusts had
just been spread abroad. The only fortunate thing was that
the Duke of Ragusa had turned his mid against the Beim
Baixa, and left the great dcp6ts on the Douro unmolested.
F.rom thcm ample sustenance could be got Up. in a week, to
the positions behind the Agueda and Con where the army had
halted.
Wellington, as it will be remembered, had contemplated an
attack on Andalusia after Dadajoz fell. But the necessity for
seeing to the relief and revictualling of Almeida and Ciudad
Rodrigo had brought him up to the frontiers of Leon with the
main body of his host. In the position where he now lay. he
was well placed for an advance on Salamanca, and an attack
on the Army of Portugal. To return to Estremadur(l. would
involve a long and weary countermarch. Moreover there was
no doubt that operations in Leon would be more decisive than
operations in Andalusia. As l\Iarmont was to write to Berthier
a few days later, a victory of the allies in the North would
involve the evacuation of the South by Soult, while a victory in
Andalusia would leave the French power in the valleys of the
Donro and Tagus unshaken 1. Advancing from the line of the
1 See above, p. 311.
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Agueda against Salamanca and Valladolid, Wellington would
have his base and his main line of communications in his dired
reur, safe against any flank attack. A raid against Andalusia,
even if successful, would separate him Crom Lisbon, and compel
him to take up a new b3se at Cadiz-a doubtful expedient. But
what seems, in the end, to have been the main cause for Welling.
ton's choosing Lean rather than Alldalusia as his next sphere
01 operations, wns that Marmont (as he judged) had the larger
available army for field movements outside his own ground.
Soull; was morc pinned down to his viceroyalty by local needs:
he would not raise the siege of Cadiz or evacuate Granada and
Cordova. Therefore he could not collect (us his movement at the
time of the fall of Badajoz had shown) more than 24,000 men
for an offensive operation. This was the absolute limit of his
power to aid l\farmont. But the latter, if he chose to evacuate
Asturias and othcr outlying regions, could bring a much larger
force to help Soult. Therefore an attack on Andalusia would
enable the enemy to concentrate a more numerous defensive
force than an attack on Leon. • Of the two armies opposed to
us that of Portugal can produce the huger number oC men for
a distant operation. Marmont has nothing to attend to but
the British army, as he has been repeatedly told in [intercepted]
letters from Berthier. By abandoning Castillc and Lean for
a short time he may lose }iome plunder and contributions, but
he loses nothing that can permanently affect his situation, or
which he could not regain as soon as he has a superiority,
particularly of cavalry, in the open plains oC Caslillc. l'tlarmont's,
then, being what may be called of the two the operating army,
the movement which I might make into Andalusia. would
enable the enemy to bring the largest body of men to act together
on one point. It would be a fnlse movement, and this must by
all means be avoided 1.'
This decision was not made immediately 011 l'tfarmont's
retreat of April 24th: for some days aCter the British head-
quarters settled down at }~uenteGuinaldo, Wellington had not
quite made up his mind between the two. operations : his letters
to Lord Liverpool, to Hill, and Graham, arc lull of the needs
of the moment, and do not lay down any general strategical
, Dispulches, ix. 1" 17:1.
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plan. The staff, in their discussions with each other, can-
vassed the situation. • While Marmont remains in Old Castile
he [Wellington] must leave a certain force near the frontier
of the Beira. But leaving the 3rd, 4th, 5th Divisions, and
Pack's and BradCord's Portuguese (perhaps 18,000 men) for
that purpose, he can move upon Andalusia, if he wishes, with
the 1st, 6th, 7th, and Light Divisions, afterwards picking up
Power's Portuguese brigade and all General Hill's carps tI'annl:e
-perhaps 86,000 infantry. This would do.' So wrote D'Urban
the chief of the Portuguese staff in his private diary, on l\Iay 5,
evidently after discussion with Bcresford, and others of those
who wcrc nearest thc centre oC decision. 'Vellington, however,
was pondering over alternatives; he eould not move for a week
or two at the best, for he had to replenish his stores at the front,
and to see that thc repairs and revietualling of Almeida and
Rodrigo were completed, before he could start on llny offensive
movement. In that time, too, he would be able to learn how
J\larmont was disposing of his army, and whether Soult was
showing any tendency to reinforce D1'Ouct's force in Estrcmadura.
It seems that an insight into his enemies' purposes was
made specially easy for Wellington at this moment by the
successive capture oC a grcat dcal of French correspondence.
When l\Iarmont was in Portugal, between the 1st and 23rd of
April, three of the duplicates of his dispatches were captured,
one by Portuguese Ordcnam;a, the others by Julian Sanchez
between Rodrigo and Salamanca. 1. They were all in cipher,
but the ingenuity of Captain ScoveU, the cipher-secretary at
bead-quarters, was capablc o( dealing with them, and (rom
thcm could be madc out a grcat dcal about the strcngth of the
Marshal's army, and his general vicws on the campaign. If
they had bccn taken and sent in a little earlier, they might have
enabled Wellington to complete that surprise and dispersion of
the French cxpeditionary force which had becn in his mind.
I The cipher-originals IU'i: all in the $covell lwpers, worked out into
their interpretation by that ingenious officer: Wellingtoll only kept the
lair copies for himself. The dispatches are dated Sabugal, 11 April (to
Drennier about the Agueda bridge); Sabugal, April 16 (to Bcrthier); Fuente
Guinaldo, April 22 (to Derthicr). The last two are full of tlle most acri-
monious criticism of Napoleon's orders for tlle invasion of Deira. Scovell
made out much, but 1I0t all, of the contents of these letters.
318 THE BRIDGE OF ALMARAZ [MAY 1
But though they arrived too late for this purpose, they were
valuable, as shmving iUarmont's dislike of the imperial orders
that he had been sent to carry out, and his preference for his
own schemes. They wefe also full of bitter complaints of the
neglect in which the Army of Portugal wus left as to pay. stores,
and transport. Wellington might reasonably deduce from
them that any reconcentration of that army would be slow,
and that if it had to march to reinforce Soult in the South. the
drOit would be a severe one.
But shortly after :Mnrmont's return to Salamanca, his
adversary got an even more valuable insight into his plans.
The guerrilleros carried oIr, between Salamanca and Valladolid,
an officer bearing five dispatches, dated April 28 and April 30th.
One was directed to Dorsenne, two to Berthier, one to Jourdun,
the fifth contained the parole to Bayonne of the great scout,
Colquhoun Grant I. The first, couched in very peremptory
terms, asked Cor food-the Army of Portugal must absolutely
receive 8,000 quintaIs of wheat, once promised, without delay-
it was in a state of danger and penury, and could not keep
concentrated to facc the British. Of the lctters to Berthier
onc announced that Bonnet's division was duly in march (or
the Asturias, and that without it the Marshal thought his own
strength dangerously low. The other asked for 4,000,000 francs
owing to thc Army o( Portugal for pay and sustenance, and
declared that, unless money came to hand at once, it was impos-
sible to see how the troops were to be kept alive in the two
months still remaining before harvest. A postscript asked for
a sicge·train to be sent on at all costs-the Marshal had heard
that onc was on the way from Dayonne: but nothing was
known about it at Burgos. The letter to Jourdan was the
most importunt of ull :>.: it was thc docwnent, already quoted
in the previous chapter, in whieh the Marshal detailed his
intentions as to the dispersion of his arm}', protested against
being obliged to send too many men into the valley 01 the
Tagus, and explained the importance of the bridge-forts and
magazines at Almaraz, by which his troops at Avila, &c., would
l All the Origillllls are in the Seovelll>apcrs .
• It is the one printed in DUCMSC'S COIT(sp<>nd(ncc of King JoseJlh, viii.
pp. 413-17.
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deboueh southward whcnever thcy were ordered to concentrate
for a junction witb Soult. 'On ne pent agir que par Lugar
Nuevo (the name by which Marrnont always dcsignates the
Almaraz forts] ... il faut bien se gardcr de jcter trap de
troupes sur le Tage, et se contenter de bien assurer une detense
de huit jours pour les forts de Lugar Nuevo et Mirabete, temps
sufnsant pour que les troupes rasscmblCcs u Avila debouchcnt•
. . . Un depot de 400 a 500 mille fanegas (qui n'est pas au dela.
de ce quc Madrid et La Manche peuvent foumir) donnerait les
moyens d'agir sans compromcttrc la subsistancc des troupes.'
Undoubtedly it was the deciphering of the greater pa.rt of this
letter, which set forth so clearly the importance of the Almaraz
bridge, and showed at the same time that only one French
division [Foy's at 'l'alavera] was anywhere near it, that deter-
mined Wellington to make the sudden stroke at that central
strategical point which he had thought of in February 1. At
that time he had refused to try it, because there were three
French divisions on the 'l'agus. Now there was only one at
Talavera, two marches from Almaraz, and the nearest reinforce-
ments at Avila were two very long marches from Talavera.
The possibility presented itself that a column might strike at
Almaraz from somewhere on the Portuguese frontier, and take
the place by a coup-dc-main, with or without first beating Foy,
whose strength of 5,000 men was perfectly known to Wellington.
Hill could count on two or three days of undisturbed opera-
tions before the nearest reinforcing division, that of Fay, could
reach Almaraz; on four or five more, before troops from Avila
could come up. It must be noted that everything would depend
on the absolute secrecy that could be preserved as to the start
of the expedition; but on this Wellington thought that he
could eount. The Spanish peasantry seldom or never betrayed
him; the French had no outlying posts beyond Almaraz which
might give them warning. The garrison was in a normal state
of blockade by gucl'TiUero bands hauntiug the Sierra de
GuadaJupc.
It may be added that a blow at Almaraz was just as
useful as ll. means for keeping Soult from joining Marmont
w> lIIarmont from joining Soult. It would be profitable
, See above, p. 20'.!.
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if Wellington's final decision should be given in favour
of an Andalusian expedition. But his mind was by now
leaning towards an attack on Leon rather than on the South.
The flnal inclination may have been given by the receipt of
another intercepted disputch-5oult's to Jourdun of April 17"
sent in by guerrilleros who had probably captured the bearer
in the Sierra Morena about April 20th. This document, which
we have already had occasion to quote for another purpose 2,
wus full of angry denunciations of l\IarmOllt for letting Badajoz
fall unaided, and served to show that, if Soult had to help the
Army of Portugal, he would do so with no good will to its
commander. Moreover it was largely occupied by proposals
for the circumventing of Ballasteros and the siege of Tarifa-
movements which would disperse the Army of the South even
more than it was already dispersed, and would clearly prevent it
from succouring l\farmont within any reasonable space of time.
The decision that Hill should make his long-deferred coup-
de-main upon Almaraz nrst appears in Wellington's dispatches
on May 4th 3, but Hill had been warned that the operation was
likely to be sanctioned some days earlier, on April 24, and again
more definitely on April 30th.t. That the final judgement of
Wellington was now leaning in favour of the advance on
Salamanca rather than the Andalusian raid appears to emerge
from a note of D'Urban dated May 6th-' The retirement of
Marmont within a given distance-the slow progress of the
Spaniards at Rodrigo, which renders it unsafe to leave that
place and this frontier-the retiring altogether of Soult, and
the state of his army not making him dangerous now-these
and other combining reasons determine Lord Wellington to
make his offensive operation north of the Tagus, and to
move upon Marmont. All Ileeessnry preparations making, but
secretly: it will be very feasible to keep the movement unfore-
seen till it begins. Meanwhile General Hill is to move upon
and destroy everything at Almaraz 5.'
• Original ill the SeoveH PapeI'!l. Place of capture uncertain, but clearly
taken by guerrilleros between Seville and Mrnlrid.
• See above, pp. 209-70.
• Wellington to GralHun, Fuente Guinnldo, May 4, ~pokl1ell, ix. p. 114.
• Ibid., p. 101. • D'Urban'6 unpublished diary, under May 6.
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The orders for Hill's move were given out on May 7th. He
was to march from his head-quarters at Almclldralejo with two
British brigades (Howard's and Wilson's) of the 2nd Division,
and the Portuguese brigade attached to the division (Ash-
worth's), one British cavalry regiment (13th Light Dragoons),
and to cross the Guadiana at l\Ierida. Beyond the Guadiana he
would piek up CampbeU's Portuguese cavalry brigade, whieh
was lying at Arroyo dos Molinos. The march was then to be
as rapid as possible, via Juraicejo and Miruvetc. The expedi-
tionary force made up 7,000 men in all.
There were left in Estremadura to 'contain' Drouet the
two English cavalrybrigadcs of Hill's forcc(Sladc's and Long's)1,
one British infantry brigade (Byng's) of the 2nd Division,
Hamilton's Portuguese division, and Power's unattached
Portuguese brigade (latc the garrison of Elvas, and more
reeently aeting as that of Budajoz). The whole would mu.ke
up 11,000 men. llower, or at least some of his regiments, was
now disposable, because the Spaniards destined to hold Badajoz
had bcgun to arrive, and more were daily expected 2.
]Jut this was not the only precaution taken against Drouet,
who had recently been reported as a little inclined to move
northward from Fucntc Ovcjuna-detaehments of his cavalry
had been seen as far north as Zalamea a. Wellington determined
to move down towards the Guadialla the southern or right
wing of bis main army-the 1st llnd 6th Divisions under
Gmh3.m. First one and then the other were filed across the
bridge of Villa Velha and sent to Portalegre. Here they would
be in a position to support the force Ielt in front of Drouet, if
Soult should unexpectedly reinforce his Estremaduran corps.
Wellington acknowledged that he disliked this wide extension
of his !lImy, but justified himseU by observing that, if he had
now his left wing almost touehing the Douro, and his right wing
almost touching the Sierra Morcna, he might risk the situation,
because he was fully infonncd as to 1\f[ll'mont's similar disper·
sion. The Army of Portugal was scattered from the Asturias to
1 Minus, or course, the 13th Light Dragoons.
. • El'Skinc WIIS the senior officer left with the corps--a dangerous cxperi~
ment. One marvels that 'Vcllington risked it nfter !lrevious experience.
• Wellington to Grahllm, May 7, Dupatchtg, ix. p. 12&.
OllU.lf. v y
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Talavcra, and Irom its want or magazines and transport, which
Marmont's intercepted dispatches made evident, would be
unable to concentrate as quickly as he himself could.
'l'he movement of Graham's two divisions from the Castello
BeaneD region to south of the Tagus had an additional advan-
tage. U reported to the French it would tend to make them
believe that the next offensive operation of the allied army
would be in the direction of Andalusia, not towards the Tonnes.
If SOlUt. heard of it, he would begin to prepare to defend his
own borders, and would not dream that Marmont was really
the enemy at whom Wellington was about to strike; while
Macmont, on the other hand, thinking that Soult wns to be the
object of Wellington's attentions, might be less careful of his
own front. The expedition to Almaraz would not undeecive
either of them, since it was well suited for n preliminary move
in an attack on Andalusia, no less than for one directed against
Leon.
Hill's column reached Merida on May 12th, but was delayed
there for some hOUIS, because the bridge, broken in April, had
not yet been repaired, as had been expected, the officers sent
there having contented themselves with organizing a. service
of boats Ior the passage. The bridge was hastily finished, but
the troops only passed late in the dny; they picked up in
the town the artillery and engineers told oU for the expedition,
Glubb.'s British and Arriaga's Portuguese companies of artillery,
who brought with them six 24-poundcr howitzers, a pontoon
train, and wagons carrying some 30-foot ladders for escalading
work. The importance attached to the raid by Wellington is
shown by the fact that he placed Alexander Dickson, his most
trusted artillery officer, in charge of tins trifling detachment,
which came up by the rond north of the Guadiann by Badajoz
and Montijo to join the main column.
Once over the Guadiana, Hill reached Truxillo in three
rapid marches [May 15], and there left all his baggage-train,
save onc mule for each company with the camp-kettles. The
most difficult part of the route had now been reached, three
successive mountain ranges separating Truxillo from the Tagus.
On the 16th, having crossed the first of them, the column
reached Jaraicejo: at dawn on the 17th, having made a night
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march, it was nearing the Pass of Miravete, the last defile
abovc the river. Here, as Hill was aware, the French had
outlying works, an old castle and two small "forts, on very
commanding ground, overlooking the whole defile. in such
a way that guns and wagons could not possibly pass them.
The British general's original intention was to storm the
Miravete works at dawn, on the 17th, and at the same time to
attack with a separate column the forts at the bridge. With
this purpose he divided his troops into three detachments.
Ashworth's Portuguese and the artillery were to keep to the
chaussce, and make Il. demonstration of frontal attack on
the Castle: General Tilson-Chowne (interim commander of the
2nd Division at the moment 1J was, with Wilson's brigade and
the 6th Ca~adores, to make a detour in the hills to the left and
to endeavour to storm the Castle from its rear side. General
Howard, with the other British brigade, was to follow a similar
bridle path to the right, and to descend on to the river and
attack the forts by the bridge.
A miscalculation had been made-the by-paths which the
flanking columns were to take proved so far more steep and
difficult than had been expected, that by dawn neither of them
had got anywhere near its destination. Hill ordered them to
halt, and put off the assault. This was fortunate, for by
a long and close reconnaissance in daylight it was recognized
that the Castle of Miravete and its dependent outworks, Fort."
Colbert and Senarmont, were so placed on a precipitous conical
hill that they appeared impregnable save by regular siege
operations, for which the expeditionary force had no time to
spare. The most vexatious thing was that the garrison had
discovered the main column on the cha'US$ce, and it could not
be doubted that intelligence must have been sent down to the
lower forts, and most certainly to Foy at TaIavera also.
After a thorough inspection of the ground, Hill concluded that
he could not hope to master Miravete, and, while it was held
against him, his guns could not get through the pass which it
so effectively commanded. It remained to be seen what could
be done with the forts at the bridge.
The Almaraz forts crowned two hills on eaeh side of thc
I This was the Tilson of 1809 : he had lengthened his name.y,
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Tagus. The stronger, Fort Napoleon, occupied thc cnd of a long
rising ground, about 100 yards from the water's cdgc; below
it, and eOlUlccting with it, was 1\ masonry tete-de-pCnlt covering
the end of the pontoon-bridge. The weaker work, Fort Ragusa,
was on an isolated knoll on the north bank, supporting the
othcr cnd of thc bridge. Fort Napoleon mounted nine guns,
had tl. good but unpalisadcd ditch around its bastioncd front~
and a second retre'nchment, well palisaded, with a loopholed
stone tower within. }~ort Ragusa was an oblong earthwork
mounting six guns, and also provided with a central tower.
It hud as outwork 0. jUehe or lunette, commanding the north
end of the bridge. The small tete-de-ponl mOWlted three guns
more. Half a mile up-stream was the ruined masonry bridge
which had formed thc old crossing, with the village of Almaraz
on the north bank behind it. Between thct fte-de-pont and
the old bridge were the magazines and storehouses in the
village of Lugar Nuevo.
The garrison of the works consisted of a depleted foreign
corps, the Tegiment de PTW;se or 4th Etrangcr, mustering under
400 bayonets, of a battalion of the French 89th of the Line,
and of two companies of the 6th Leger, from Foy's division,
with a company of artillery and another of sappers. The
whole may have amounted to 1,000 mcn, of whom 800 were
isolated in the high-lying Castle of Miravete, five miles from
the bridge-head. The governor, a. Piedmontese officer named
Aubert, had manned Fort Napoleon with two companies of
thc 6th and 89th. Thc foreign corps and onc company of the
6th were ill Fort HaguStl. alld the bridge-bead; l\1iravete was
h~ld by the centre companies of the 39th.
Though delay after the French had got the alarm was
dangerous, Hill spent the whole 01 the 17th in making fruitless
explorations for vantage-ground, from which Miravete might
be attacked. None was found, and on the 18th he made up his
mind to adopt a scheme hazardous beyond his original inten-
tion. It would be possible to mask the Castle by a false attack,
in whieh aU his artillery should join, and to lead part of his
infantry over the hills to the right, by a gorge called the Pass
01 La Cueva, for a direct attack by escalade, without the help
of guns, upon the Almaraz forts.
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The detachment seleetcd for this purpose was Howard's
brigade (1/5oth, J/71st, J,!92nd), strengthened by the 6th
Portuguese Line from Ashworth's brigade, and accompanied by • ,
20 artillerymen in charge of the ladders. So rough was the
ground to be covered, that the long Bo-foot ladders had to be
sa.wn in two, being unwieldy on slopes and angles, as was
soon discovered when they were taken orr the carts for carriage
by hand. The route that had to be followed was very circuitous,
and though the forts were only five miles, as the crow flies,
from the place where the column left the road, it took the whole
night to reach them. An cyc·witncss 1 describes it as a mnzy
sheep-walk among high brushwood, which could not have been
used without the help of the experienced peasant-guide who
led the mareh. The men had to pass in Indian file over many
of its stretches, and it resulted from long walking in the darkness
that the rear dropped far behind. the van, and nearly lost touch
with it. Just before dawn thc eolumn reached the hamlet of
Romangordo. a mile from the forts, and rested there for some
time before resuming its march.
The sun was well up when, at 6 o'clock, the lending company,
coming to the edge of a thicket, suddenly saw Fort Napoleon
only 300 yards in their front. The French had been warned
that a column had crossed the hills, and had caught some
glimpse of it, but had lost sight of its latest move: many of
the garrison eould be seen standing on the ramparts, and
watching the puBs of smoke round the Castle of Miravete.
whieh shov..·ed that the false attaek on that high-lying strong-
hold hud begun. Gcneml Tilson·Chownc was making a noisy
demonstration before it, using his artillery with much ostenta-
tion, and pushing up skirmishers among the boulders on the
sides of the castle-hill 2.
Hill was amdous to assault at once, before the sun should
risc higher, or the garrison of the forts catch sight of him. But
some time had to be spent to allow a sufficient force to accumu-
late in the cover where the head of the eolumn was hiding. So
t
, Cnlltnin MncCnrthy or thc 50th.
• Thc l1tntemcllt in .Tones's ,SiegM, i. p. 259, that the enemy were
Utlll.Wllre or the turning colullIn is disproved by the offieial reports of the
6urviving Freneh olll<''Cl"8 Scve uml Teppe.
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slowly did the companies straggle in, that the General at last
resolved to escalade at once with the 50th and the right wing
of the 7lst, all that had yet come up. Orders were left behind
that the left wing of the 7lst and the 92nd should attack the
bridge-head entrenchment when they arriv<,-d, and the 6th Portu-
guese support where they Were needed.
At a little after 6 o'clock the 900 men available, in three
columns of a half-battalion each, headed by ladder parties,
started up out of the brake on the crest of the hillside nearest
Fort Napoleon, and raced for three separate points of its
enceinte. 'fhe :French, though taken by surprise, had all their
preparations ready, and a furious fire broke out upon the
stormers both from cannon and musketry. Nevertheless all three
parties reached the goal without any vcry overwhelming losses,
jumped into the ditch, and began to apply their ladders to such
points of the rampart as lay nearest to them. The assault was
a very daring one-the work was intact, the garrison adequate
in numbers, the assailants had no advantagc from darkness,
for the sun was well up and every man was visible. All that
was in their favour was the suddenness of their onslaught, the
number of separate points at which it was launched, and their
own splendid dash and decision. lIIauy men fell in the first
few minutes, and there was a. check when it was discovered
that the ladders were over-short, owing to their having been
sawn up before thc start. But thc rumpart had a rather broad
bcrm I, a fault of construction, and the stormers, discovering
this, climbed up on it, and dragging some of the ladders with
them, relaid them against the upper section of the defences,
which thcy easily overtopped. By tllis unexpected device
a footing was established on the ramparts at several points
simultaneously-Captain Candler of the 50th is said to have
been the first man over the parapet: he was pierced by several
balls as he sprang down, and fell dcad inside. Thc garrison had
kept up a furious fire till the moment when they sa.w the
, The benn is tlle line where the scarp of the ditch meetll the slope of
the rampart: the scarp should be perpendicular, the rarnpllrt-slope tends
backward, hence there is a clUlllge on this line hom the vertiClll to the
obtuse ill the profile of the work. The lJcrm should hove been only a toot
or so wide ulld wus Ulrce.
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assailants swarm over the paxapet-then, however, there can
be no doubt that most of them flinched 1: the governor tried
to lead a counter-charge, but found few to follow him; he was
surrounded, and, refusing to surrender and striking at those
who bade him yield, was piked by a sergeant of the 50th and
mortally wounded. So closely were the British and French
mixed that the latter got no chance of manning the inner work, or
the loopholed tower whieh should have served as their rallying-
point. Many of the garrison threw down their arms, but the
majority rushed out of the rear gate of the fort towards the
neighbouring redoubt at the bridge-head. They were so closely
followed that pursuers Md pursued went in n mixed mass into
that work, whose gunners were unable to fire because their
balls would have gone straight into their own flying friends.
The foreign garrison of the Wle-de-pcn/t made little attempt to
resist, and lied over the bridge 2. It is probable that the British
would have reached the other side along with them if the
centre pontoons had not been sunk: some say that they were
struck by a round-shot from Fort Ragusa, which had opened
a fire upon the lost works; others declarc that somc of the
fugitives broke them, whether by design or by mischance of
overcrowding 3.
Tlus ought to have been the cnd of Hill's sudden success,
sinee passage across the Tngus was now denied him. But the
enemy were panic-stricken; and when the guns of Fort
Napoleon were trained upon Fort Ragusa by Lieutenant Love
and the twenty gunners who had accompanied Hill's column,
the garrison evacuated it, and went off with the rest of the
fugitives in a disorderly flight towards Naval 1\Ioral. The
formidable works of Almaraz had fallen before the assault of
1 The official report of the Freneh enptnin, Sf-ve of the 6th Uger, accuses
the grenadiers of the 39th of giving way and bolting at the critical moment,
and this is confirmed by the report of the chef de balaillon Tepre of the
39th, an unwilling witness.
• According to Teppe's narrative they left the walls, and many hid in
the bakehouses, while most of the offieers headed the rush for the bridge•
• Foy says that the centre link of the bridge was not a regular pontoon
but a river boat, which could be drawn out when the garrison wanted to
open the bridge for llny purpose, and being light it collapsed under the
fcct of the lIying erowd (p. 163).
828 THE BRIDGE OF ALl\IARAZ [MAY 10
000 men-tor the tail of Hill's eolwnn arrived on the scene to
find all over 1. Four grenadiers 01 the D2nd, wishing to do
something if they had been disappointed of the expected day's
work, stripped, swam the river, and brought back several boats
which had been left moored under Fort Ragusa. By mcans 01
these communication between the two bunks was re-csto.blished,
and the fort beyond the river was occupied 2•
. The loss of the Yi~rors was very moderate-it lell mostly on
the 50th and 7lst, for Chowne's demonstration against l\firavete
had been almost bJoodless---only one ensign and onc private of
the 6th Ca~adorcswere wounded. But thc 50th lost one captain
and 20 men killed, ancl seven ollicers ancl 93 men wounded,
while the half·battalion of the 71st had five killed and five
officers and 47 men wounded 3. The 92nd had two wounded.
Thus thc rotaI of ensualties was 180.
Of the garrison the 4th Etrallger was pretty well destroycd-
those who were neither killed nor taken mostly deserted, and
its numbers had gone down from 866 in the return of May 15
to 88 in that of July 1. The companies of the 89th and 6th
Leger also suffered heavily, sinee they had furnished the whole
of the unlucky garrison of Fort Napoleon. Hill reports 17
offteers and 262 men taken prisoners, including the mortally
wounded governor and a chef de bataiUan of the 39th 4. It is
probable that the whole loss of the French was at least 400.
The trophies taken consisted of a colour of the 4th Etranger,
18 guns mounted in the works, an immense store of powder and
round-shot, 120,000 musket cartridges, the 20 large pontoons
forming the bridge, with a store of rope, timhers, anchors,
carriages, &c., kept for its rcpair, somewell·furnished workshops,
, The 02nd and the right win~ of the 71st reached tile Ute·de·pQllt just
as the fugitives from Fort Napoleon entcred it, and SW~Jlt away the
garrison. 'I'hey only lost two wounded.
• Gardyne's llistory or Ule 1J2nd gives the names of two or these gallant
men, Cuuld und Somcrville.
• Hill's totul of Cllsllalties is 2 ofllccrs and 31 men killed: 13 ofllccrs
und 143wollndcd. The sccolld olIieer killed was Lieutcnant '.l'hiele of the
Artillery of the K.C.L., accidenmlly blown up by Il mine on the dllyof
the cVllcuation. But two of the wounded offiecrs died.
• Tcppe by name, whose narrative, writtcn in captivity, is our best
source for the I'·reneh side. It is fI. frank confcssion of misbclmviour
by the troops-particularly the 40th Etranger.
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and a large miscellaneous magazine of food and other stores.
All tills was destroyed, the pontoons, &c., being burnt, while
the powder was used to lay many mines in the forts and bridge-
head, which were blown up very successIully on the morning
of the 20th, so that hardly a trace of them remained. Thielc of
the Gennan artillery, the officer charged with carrying out the
explosions, was unfortunately killcd by accident: a minc had
apparently failed; hc went back to sce to its match, but it
blew up just us he was inspccting it.
Having accomplished his purpose with complete success, lfill
moved oH without delay, and by two forced marches reached
'l'ruxillo and his baggage on the 21st. Here he wa.<; quite safe:
Foy, being too weak to pursue Illm to any crfect, followed
cautiously, and only reached Miravete (whose garrison he
relieved) on the 23rd and Truxillo on the 25th, from whence he
turned back, being altogether too late. Hc had received ncws
of Hill's movement rathcr late on thc 17th, had been misin-
formed as to his strength, which report made 15,000 men instead
of the real 7,000, and so had been disposed to act cautiously.
He had ordered a battalion of the 6th Leger rrom Naval
Moral to join the garrison of Almaraz, but it a.rrived on
the aftcrnoon of the 19th, only in time to hear from fugitives
of the disaster 1. He himscll was eonfidcnt that the Carts
could hold out eight days even against artillery, which was also
I\larmont's calculation. Hence their fall witllln 48 hours of
Hill's appearance was a distressing surprise: Foy had caleu·
latcd on being helped not only by D'Armagnac from Talavera
but by the division of Clauscl from Avila, before moving to fight
Hill and relieve them.
Wellington appears to have been under the impression that
this expedition, which Hill had executed with such admirablc
celcrity and dispntch, might havc been made evcn more
decisive, by the capture of the castle of Miravete, if untoward
circumstances had not intervcllcd. In a letter to Lord Liver-
pool, written on May 28 2, he expresses the opinion that Tilson-
Chownc might have taken it on the night or the 16th-which
I D'Armagnac also sent the bnttlllion 01 Frllnklort 10r the same purpose,
which arrived late with leSll excuse. Scc Foy, p. 375.
• Dispalches, ix. p. 189.
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must appear a hazardous decision to those who look at the
precipitous position of the place and the strength of its defences.
He also says that Hill might have stopped at Almaraz for a
few days more, and have bombarded l'tfiravcte with Dickson's
heavy howitzers, if he had not rCL'Cived false news from Sir
William Erskine as to Drouct's movements in Estrcmadura.
There can be no doubt, as we shaH see, about the false intelli-
gence: but whether the bombardment would have been
succcsslul is another thing. Probably Wellington considered
that the gnrrison would have been demoralized after what had
happened at Almaraz.
As to Drouet's movements, having received rather tardy
notice of Hill's northward murch from Merida, he had resolved
to make a push to asccrtain what was left in his front. Lalle-
mand's dragoons, therefore, pressed out in the direction of Zafra,
where they came into contact with Slade's outposts and drove
them in. At thc same time Drouct himself, with an infantry
division and some light cavalry, advanced as far as Don Benito,
near Medellin, on the 17th May, from whence he pushed patrols
across thc Guadiana. as far as Miajadas. This movement, madc
to ascertain whether Hill had departed with his whole corps,
or whether a large force had been Jelt in Estremadura, was
reported to Sir William Erskinc, the commander of the 2nd
cavalry divisioll, along with rumours that Soult was across the
Sierra Morena and closely supporting Drouet. Erskine sent
on the news to Graham at Portalegre, and to Hill, who was then
before Miravete, with assertions that Soult was certainly
approaching. This, as Wellington knew, was unlikely, for the
Marshal had been before Cadiz on the 11th, and could not
possibly havc crossed the Sierra Morena by the 17th. As
a matter of fact he only learnt on the 19th, at Chielana, that
Hill had started, and Drouet's move was made purely to gain
information and on his own responsibility. But Graham,
naturally unaware of this, brought up his two divisiolls to
Badajoz, as he had been directed to do if Estremadura were
attacked during Hill's absence. ll.nd Hill himself was certainly
induced to return promptly from Almaraz by Erskine's letter,
though it is doubtful whether he would have lingered to besiege
l\Iiravetc even if he had not received it. For Foy might have
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been reinforced by D'Armugnac and the Avila division up to
a strength which would have made Hill's longer stay on the
Tagus undesirable.
Drouct did no more; indeed, with his own force he was
quite helpless against Hill, since when he discovered that there
was a large body of allied troops left in Estremadura, and that
more were coming up, it would have been mad for him to move
on Merida, or take any other method of molesting the return of
the expedition from ..\.lmaraz. Though Soult spoke of coming
with a division to his aid, the succours must be many days on
the way, while he himself could only act effectively by marching
northward at once. But if he had taken his own division he
would have bcen heIpless against Hill, who could have beaten
such a force; while if he had crossed the Guadiana with his
whole 12,000 men, he would have been cut oH from Soult by
the' uncontained ' allied force left in Estremadura, which he
knew to be considerable.
But to move upon Almaraz on his own responsibility, and
without Soult's orders, would have been beyond Drouet's power:
he was a man under authority, who dared not take such a step.
And when Soult's dispatches reached him, they directed him
not to lose touch with Andalusia, but to demonstrate enough
to bring Hill back. The :Marshal did not intend to let Dronet
get out of touch with him, by bidding him march toward the
Tngus.
Hill's column, then, was never in any danger. But Wellington,
who had for a moment some anxiety in his behalf, was deeply
vexed by Erskine's false intelligence, which had given rise to
that feeling, and wrote in wrath to HenryWellesley and Graharn 1
concerning the mischief that this very incapable officer had done.
He wus particularly chagrined that Graham had bcen drawn
down to Badajoz by the needless alarm, as he was intending
to bring him back to join the main army within a short time,
and the movement to Badajoz had removed him three marches
from Portalegre. so that six days in all would be wasted in
bringing him back to his original starting-point. It is curious
that Wellington did not harden his heart to get rid of Erskine
, To both on June 1. Di$patcllc8, ix. (l.197. Erskine'sllame is the blank
to be filled up.
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after this mishap: but though he wrote bitterly about his
subordinate's incapacity, he did not remove him. 'Influence'
at home was apparently the key to his long endurance: it will
be remembered that this was by no means the first of Erskine's
mistakes 1.
The fall of the Almo.raz forts, as might have been expected,
was interpreted by Marmont and Soult each from his o'wn point
of view. The former, rightly as it turned out, wrote to Foy
that he must be prepared to return to Leon at short notice, and
that the Army of the Centre and Drouet must guard the
valley of the Tagus on his departure 2. SouIt, on the other
hand, having heard of Graham's arrival at Badajoz and Hill's
return to Merida, argued that the allics were massing on the
Guadiana for Rn advance into Andalusia. He made bitter
complaints to Jourdan that he had violated the rules of military
subordination by sending a lctter to Drouet warning him that
he might be called up to thc Tagus. It was unheard of, hc said,
to communicate directly with a snbordinate, who ought to be
written to only through the channel of his immediate superior.
He evcn threatened to resign the command ot the Army at the
South 3_but when Joseph showed no signs of being terrified by
this menace, no more was heard of it. The viceroyalty of
Andalusia was not a thing to be lightly given up.
It soon became evident to Wellington that the surprise of
AJmaraz was not to be resented by the enemy in any practical
form. Foy was not reinforced, nor was Drouct brought up to
thc Tagus: it was clear that the French were too weak to take
the offensive either in the North or the South, even under
such provocation. They could not even rebuild the lost bridge:
the transport from Madrid or u new pontoon train as a substitute
for the lost boats was beyond King Joseph's power. One or
two boats were finally got to Almaraz-but nothing that could
serve as a bridge. Nor were thc lost magazines ever replaced.
It was at this same time that Wellington took in hand
a scheme for facilitating his communications north and south,
which was to hayc a high strategical importance. As long as
Ciudad Rodrigo and Biidajoz were in the enemy's hands, the
I Sce vol. iv. jlp. 133 and 191. I Marmont to Foy, June 1.
I Scc Jourdan's .MbIlQires, pp. 399-400.
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Illost eastern crossing of the Tagus practicable for the Anglo-
Portuguese army was the boat-bridge of Villa Vclha. But when
these two fortresses were regained, it was possible to open up
a line farther cast, whieh had not been available for two years.
Sinec Mayne blew up the ancient Roman bridge of Alcantnra in
June 1809 1, the :Middle Tagus had been impassable for both sides.
The allies had usually been in possession of both banks of the
Tagus in this direction, but so intcrmittently that it had never
been worth their whilc to restore the passoge, which would
have been lost to them whenever the French (as not unEre-
quently happened) extended their operations into the Coria-
Zurza Mayor country on the north bunk, or the Caycres-Albu-
querque country on the other. liut when the enemy had lost
both Badajoz and Rodrigo, and had no posts nearer to Alcantara
than the Upper TorlUcs, the IOJ:ts of Miruvctc, and Zalumeu,
when, moreover, he had adopted a distinctly defensive attitude
for many months, Wellington thought it worth while to recover
possession of a passage which would shorten the route from
Estremadura to the frontiers of Leon by a hundred miles, and
would therefore give him an advantage of six marches over
the enemy in transferring troops from north to south. Whether
Almaraz wcrc again scized and reoccupicd by thc Frcneh
mattered little: the restoration of Alcantnra would be safe and
profitable.
Accordingly, on May 24th, Colonel Sturgeon 2 and :Major
'I'odd of the Royal Staff Corps were sent to Alcantara to report
on the practicability of restoring the brokcn arch, which,
owing to the immense depth 01 the eanon of the Tagus, overhung
the river by no less than 140 feet. It was intcndcd that if the
cngincering problem should prove too hard, a flying bridge of
rafts, boats, or pontoons should be established at the water
level 3. But Sturgeon and Todd did more than Wellington
had expected, and succeeded in a very few days in establishing
a sort or suspension-bridge of rope.!:! betwccn the two shattercd
1 See vol. ii. p. 444.
I An offieer probably better remcmbered by the general reader as the
husbnnd of 5amh Curran, Robert Emmet's sometime fiane~, tban as tbe
executor of some of WelIillglon's most importunt cngineering works. He
fcll before Bayonne in 1814.
I Sce Wellington to Gralu:un, 23rdnnd 24tb Mny. Dilipa/cl,eg, ix. pp.IOa-5.
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piers of Trajan's great structure. The system adopted was
that of placing at each end of the broken roadway a very
large and solid beam, clamped to the Roman stones, by being
sunk in channels cut in them. These beams being made
absolutely adhesive to the original work, served as solid bases
from which a series of eighteen cables were stretched over the
gap. Eight more beams, with notches cut in them to receivc
the cables, wcre laid at right angles across the parallel ropes,
and lashed tight to them. The long cables werc strained taut
with winches; a network of rope yarn for tl. flooring was laid
between the eight beams, and on this planks were placed,
while a screen of tarpaulins supported 011 guide-ropes acted as
parapets. The structure Wtl.S sound enough to carry not only
infantry and horses, hut heavy artillery, yet could always be
broken up in a short time if. an enemy had ever appeared in
the neighbourhood 1. Several times it was rolled up, and then
replaced.
When the completion of the repairs of Alcantara and the
destruction of the French bridge of Almaraz are taken together,
it must be concluded that Wellington's work in :May gave him
an' advantage over the French of at least ten or twclve marches
in moving troops from north to south or vice versa. For the
route from Ciudad Rodrigo to Merida, now open to him, had
at least that superiority over the only itinerary of the enemy,
which would be that by AvHa, TaJavera, Toledo, and the
eastern passes of the Sierra Morena. Though the narrow bridge
of Arzobispo 011 the Middle Tugus still remained iu French
hands, it did not lead on to lIny good road to Estremaduru. or
Andalusia, but on to the defiles of the Mesa d'Ibol' and the
ravines of the Sierra de Guadalupe. No large force could
march or feed in those solitudcs.
All was now ready for the advance upon the Tormes, which
Wellington had made up his mind to execute.
• The best and most elaborate account or this is in Leith nay, i.
pp. 300-1.
SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER III
WELLINGTON'S ADVANCE INTO LEON
IT was not till June 13th that Wellington crossed the Agueda
and began his march upon Salamanca, the first great offensive
movement against the main flg'hting army oC· the French
since the advance to 'l'alavera in 1809. But lor many days
beforehand his troops were converging on Fuente Guinaldo
and Ciudad Rodrigo from their widely-spread cantonments.
Graham's divisions quitted Portalegrc on May 30th, and some
of the other troops, which had been left on the western side of
the Beira, had also to make an early start. Every available
infantry unit of the Anglo-Portuguese army had b<"'Cll drawn
in, save the 2nd Division and Hamilton's Portuguese-Jelt as
usual with Hill in Estremadura-and Power's ncw Portuguese
brigade-once the garrisons of Elvas and Abrantes-whieh had
become available for the field since the fall of Badajoz made
it possible to place those fortresses in cha.rge of militia. Its
arrival made Hill stronger by 2,000 in infantry than he had ever
been before, and he was also left the three brigades (Long's and
Slade's British and John Campbell's Portuguese) of Erskine's
cavalry division. The total was 18,000 men. Wellington's own
main army, consisting of the seven other infantry divisions,
Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese brigades, and the cavalry of
Anson, Dock, Le M:archant, and Victor Alten, made up a force
of 48,000 men, of which 3,500 were cavalry: there were only
eight British and onc Portuguese batteries with the army-a
short allowance of 54 guns.
But though these 48,000 men constituted the striking force,
which was to deal the great blow, their action was to be sup·
ported by a very elaborate and -complicated system of diver-
sions, which were intended to prevent the French armies of the
South, North, Centre, and Aragon from sending any help to
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Marmont, the loe whom Wellington was set on demolishing.
It is ncccssary to cxplain thc concentric scheme by which it
was intended that pressure should be brought to bear on all
the outlying French armies, at the same moment at which the
Anglo-Portuguese main body crossed the Agueda.
Soult had the largest force----over 50,000 men, as a recently
captured morning-state revealed to his adversary 1. But he
could not assemble more than some 2'].,000 men. unless he
abandoned the siege of Cadiz and the kingdom 01 Granada-
hall his army was pilUled down to occupation-work. 'Wherefore
WeIlillgton judged that his field-force could be < contained' by
lIill, if only means were found of preventing him from reinforc-
ing Drouct's divisions in Estremadura by any appreciable
succours. This means lay to hand in the roving army of
ll311asteros, whose random schemes of camp3ign were often
irrational, but had the solitary advantage of being quite
inscrutable. He might do anything-and so was a most
tiresome adversary for Soult to deal ",;th, since his actions
could not be foreseen. At this moment Wellington had urged the
Cadiz Regency to stir up Dallastcros to activity, and had
promised that, if Soult concentrated Ilgainst him, Hill should
press in upon Drouet, and so call ort the Marshal's attention.
Similarly if Soult concentrated against Hill, Ballasteros was to
demonstrate against Seville, or the rear of the Cadi:t; Lincs.
There was lllwa.ys the possibility that the Spanish general
might refuse to obe)' the orders of his Government, or that he
might commit himself to some rash enterprise and get badly
beaten. Both these chances had to be risked. The onc that
occurred was that Dallasteros took up the idea desired, but
acted too early and too incautiously. and sustained a severe
check at the battle of Bornos (June 1). Fortunately he WDS
• scotched but not slain,' and kept together a force large enough
to give Soult much lurther trouble, though he did not prevent
the Marshal from sending l'cinforccments to Drouet und
putting lIiIl upon the defensive. Of this more in its due place.
So much for the diversion against Soult. On the other flank
Wellington had prepared a similar plan for molesting the
• See Wellington to Henry WcUeslcy at Cndiz, June 7. DislJalcllts, ix.
p. 219.
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French in the Asturias, and threatening Marmont's flank and
rear, at the same moment that his front was to be assailed. The
force here available was Abadia's Army of Galicia, which
nominally counted over 24,000 men, but had 6,000 of them
shut up in the garrisons of Corunna, Ferrol, and Vigo. About
16,000 could be put into thc field by un dIort, if only Abadia
were stirred up.to activity. Dut there were many hindro.nces:
this general was (like most of his predecessors) at strife with
the Calieian Junta. He was also vcry jealous of Sir Howard
Douglas, the British Commissioner at Corunna, who was in
favour with the .Junta and people, and was inclined to resent
any advice offered by him 1. His army was not only (as in
1810-11) very short of eavalry~therc were only about 400
effective sabres~but also of n.rtillery. For the Cndiz govern-
ment, searching for troops to send against the rebels of South
America, had recently drafted off several batteries, as well as
severnl foot regiments, to the New ",rorId. The most effective
units had been taken, to the \\1.ld indignation of the Galicians,
who wanted to keep the troops that they had raised for their
own protection. There were only about 500 trained artillery-
men left in Galicia, and when deduction was made for the
garrisons of Ferrol, Vigo, and Corunna, very few remained for
the active army. Abadia had, thcrclorc, many cxcuscs to offcr
for taking the field late, and with insufficient equipment 2. It
was fortunate that his superior, Castanos, who commanded (as
Captain-General both of Estremadura and Galicia) all thc troops
in western Spain, fell in completely with Wellington's plan,
and brought pressure to bear upon his subordinate, coming up
to Santiago in person to expedite matters.
The part which the Army ot Galicia was to play in the
general scheme wns that of marching upon Astorga, and laying
siege to the considerable French garrison which was isolated
in that rather advanced position. It Marmont should attcmpt
to succour it, he would be left weak in front of the oncoming
1 An extn\.on!inury ease of Abudia·s ill will occurred in this spring:
Il. dll.mngcd transport, currying British troops to Lisbon, having IJUt in to
Corunlla to repl.ir, penni!j!jion WI\.\! rduood fOf thc men to lund: apparently
it was suspected that they were trying to garrison Corunna•
• For all this Galici!m btl"incs~ 3Ce the Life of SiT lllYlvard Dollgla8.
pp. 120-60.
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British invasion. If he did not, its fall would turn and expose
his right flank, and throw all the plains of northern Leon into
the powc:c of the allies. A move in foree upon Astorga would
also have some cffect on the position of General Bonnet in the
Asturias, and ought certainly to keep him uneasy, if not to
draw him away from his conquests.
It will be remembered that Bonnet had been directed to
reoccupy the Asturias by Napoleon's special command, lLnd by
no means to Marmont's liking 1. He marched from Lean on
May 15, by the road. across the pass of Pajarcs, which he had
so oCtcn taken before on similar expeditions. The Asturians
madc no serious resistance, and on May 17-18 Bonnet seized
Oviedo and its port of Gijon. But, as in 1811, when he had
accomplished this much, and planted some detachments in the
coast towns, his division of 0,000 men was mainly immobilized,
and beeame a string of garrisons rather than a field-force. It
was observed by Porlier's Cantabrian bands on its right hand,
and by Castafion's division of the Army of Galieia on its left,
and was not strong enough to hWlt them down, though it could
prevent them from showing themselves anywhere in the
neighbourhood of Oviedo.
But if thc Gulicians should lay siege to Astorga, und push
advanced guards beyond it, in the direction of the city of
Leon, it was elear that Bonnet's position would be threatened,
llnd his communications with his chicC, Marmont, imperilled.
Wellington, who knew from intercepted dispatches the impor-
tance attached by the Emperor to the retention of the Asturias,
judged that Bonnet would not evacuate it, but would spend
his energy in an attempt to hold back the Galicians llnd keep
open his connexion with Lean. He thus hoped that the French
division at Oviedo would never appear near Salamanca-an
expectation in which he was to be deceived, for ::Marmont
(disregarding his master's instructions) ordered the evacuation
of the Asturias the moment that he discovered the strength of
the attack that wus being directed against his front 011 the
'l'ormes. Hence WeUington's advance cleared the Asturias
of the encmy, and enabled the Galicians to besiege Astorga
unmolested (or two months-good results in themselves, but
, See above, p. 210.
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not the precise benefits that he had hoped to secure by putting
the GoJiciull army in motion.
No item of assistance being too small to be taken into con-
sideration, Wellington also directed Silveira to advance fr~m
thc Tras·os·loIontes, with the Cour militia regiments of that
province \ to cross the Spanish frontier and blockadc Zamora,
the outlying J"rench garrison on the Douro, which covered
Marmont's flank, as Astorga did his rear. To enable this not
too trLcitwOl'thy irregular forec to guard itscU from sudden
attacks, Wellington lent it a full brigade of regular cavalry 2,
which was entrusted to General D'Urban, who dropped the
post of Chicl·of·the·Stall to Beresford to take up this small
but responsible charge. His duty was to wateh the country
on each side of the Douro in Silveira's front, so as to prevent
him from being surprised, and generally to keep Wellington
informed about Marmont's right wing, when he should begin
to concentrate. Toro, only 20 miles farther up the Domo than
Zamora, was another French garrison, and a likely place for
the Marshal to use as oue oC his minor bases. Silvcirn. being
as rash as he WM enterprising, it WM D'Urban's task to sce
that he should be warned betimes, and not allowed to get into
trouble. He wus to retreat on Carvajales and the mountains
beyond the Esla if he were attacked by a superior force.
A much more serious diversion was prepared to distract
the free movement of the French Army of thc North, from
which Caffarelli might naturally be expected to send henvy
detachments for l\farmont's assistance, when the British
striking-force should advance on Salamanca. CaUarelli's old
enemies were the patriot bands of Cantabria and Navarre, who
had given his predece~sor, Dorsenne, so much trouble earlier
in the year. Mina, on the borders of Navarre, Aragon, and Old
Castile, was very far away, and not easy to communicate with
or to bring into the general plan, though his spirit was excellent.
But the so-called' Sevcnth Army,' under Melldizabal, was near
enough to be treated as a serious factor in the general scheme.
This force consisted of the two large bands under Porlier in
1 Chaves, Brogan1.:l, Miranda. VitJa Real.
• Silveira already had Nos. II and J2, D'Urban brought up No. 1, which
had not hitherto operated on this frontier.
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Cantabria, and Longa. in the mountains a.bove Sa-ntander, each
of which was several thousands strong: these were supposed
to be regular divisions, though their training left much to be
desired: in addition there were several considerable guerrilla
• partidas' under Merino, Salazar, Saornil, and other chiefs,
who lived a hunted liIe in the provinces of Burgos, Palencia,
and Avila, and were in theory morc or less dependent on
Mendizabal. The chief of the Seventh Army was requested to
do all that he could to keep CafCarelli employcd during the
month of June-a task that quite fell in with his ideas-he
exccuted scveral very daring raids into Old Castile, one of which
put the garrison of Burgos in great terror, as it was surprised
at a moment when ull its better items chanced to be absent,
and nothing was left in the place but depOts and convalescents I.
But the main distraction contrived to occupy the French
Army of thc North was one for which Wellington was not
primarily responsible, though he approved of it when the
scheme was laid before him. This was a naval expedition to
attack the coast-forts of Cantabria and Biscay, and open up
direct communication with Mcndizabal's hands from the side
of the sea. The idea was apparently started by Sir I-Ioward
Douglas and Sir Home Popham, the former of whom was
a great believer in the guerrillcro8, and the latter a strong
advocate of the striking power oC the nnv)'. Nothing serious
had been done on the Biscay coast since the two expeditions of
1810, of which the former had been very successful, but the
lattcr had ended in the disastrous tempest which wrecked
Renovales's flotilln on thnt rocky shore 2. Lord Liverpool con-
sented to give Popham two battalions of marines and a company
oC artillery, to add to the force provided by the crews 01 the
Venerable, his flagship, five frigates (Surveillante, Rhin, Isis,
Diadem, Medusa), and several smaller vesscls. The plan was to
procecd eastward along the coast from Gijon, to call down
LongB nnd Porlier to blockade each isolated French garrison
from the land sidc, and to batter it with heavy ship guns from
the water. Thc opportunity was to be takcn at the samc time
of making over to the Cantabrian bands a large store of muskets
and munitions which had been prepared for them. The arrange-
, See Thiebault, MtIIloirea, v. p. !.i01, , Sce vol. iii. pp. 480-7.
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ments were made in May, and Popham's squadron was ready
to move precisely ot the same moment that Wellington crossed
the Agueda. Its first descent was made on June 17th, a day
exactly suitable ror alarming the Army of the North at the
same time that Marmont's firi:lt appeali:i for help werc likely to
reach Caffarelli. The plan, :l.S we shall see, worked exceedingly
well, and the fact that the Army of Portngal got no reinforce·
ments from Burgos or Biscay was due entirely to the dismay
caused to CaHarcl1i by this unexpected descent on his rear.
He conceived that the squadron carried a huge landing force,
and that he was about to sce Biscay slip out of his hands. The
talc of this useful diversion will be told in its due place.
There was yet one more item in the long list of outlying
distractions on which Wellington relied for the vexing of the
French. He was strongly of opinion that Suchet would spare
troops to rcinIorcc King Joseph at Madrid, if his own invasion
of Leon had a prosperous start. Indeed, he somewhat over·
valued the Duke of Albufera's will and power to interfere in
central Spain, his idea being that King Joseph had a much
more direct control over the Valencian and Aragonesc armies
than was really the case. One of the king's intercepted dis·
patches, directing Suehet to send troops into La }'fancha, had
fallen into his hands, and he was unaware that the MUNhul
had refused to obey it, and had found plausible reasons to
cloak his disobedience 1.
The opportunity of fmding means to harass Suchet depended
on the general posture of affairs in the Mediterranean caused
by the outbreak of the Russian war. As long as Napoleon
kept a large army in Itttly, there was always a possibility that
he might some day try a descent on Sicily, where the authority
of King Ferdinand rested on the bayonets of a strong British
garrison. There were a dO'.oIen rcd-colltcd battalions ttlways
ready in Sicily, beside the rather inefficient Corces of King
Ferdinand. In September 1810 Murat had massed a Franco·
Neapolitan army at Reggio, and tried an actual invasion, which
ended ignominiously in the capture of the only two battalions
tha.t succeeded in landing. But by the early spring of 1812 it
was known that nearly all the French troops in Italy had been
• See above, p. 304. The intercepted cipher is in the Scovcll Papers.
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moved northward, and a great part of l\Iurat's Neapolitan
army with them. By April, indeed, there was only one French
division left in the whole Peninsula, nearly all the old' Army
of Italy' having marched across the Alps. Lord Willium
Bentinek, the commander of the British forces in Sicily, had
early notice of these movements, and being a. man of action and
enterprising mind, though too much given to wavering councils
and rapid changes of purpose, was anxious to turn the new
situation to account. He wus divided between two ideas-
the one which appealed 0 him most was to make a bold descent
on the under-garrisoned Italian peninsula, either to stir up
trouble in Calabria-where the ruthless government of Murat's
military satrnps had barely succeeded in keeping down rebellion,
but had not crushed its spirit--or, farther away, in the former
dominions of the Pope and the small dukes of the Austrian
eonnexion. But the memory of the fruitless attempt against
the Italian mainland in 1809 under Sir John Stuart survived
as a warning; it was doubtful whetber the occasional adven-
turers who came to Palermo to promise insurrection in northern
Italy had any backing 1, and though Calabria was a more
promising field, it was to be remembered that such troops
as the enemy still retained were mainly concentrated there.
Thus it came to pass that Lord WilIiam Bcntinek at times
despaired of all Italian expeditions, and thought of sending
a force to Catalonia or Valencia to harass Suehet. < I can-
not but imagine,' he wrote, 'that the occasional discmbarlru-
tion at different points of a large regular forec must considerably
annoy the enemy, and crcate an important diversion for other
Spanisb operations 2.' But when he wrote this, early in the
year, he was hankering after descents on Elba lInd Corsiea-
the latter a most wild inspiration! These schemes the ministry
very wisely condemned: Lord Liverpool wrote in reply that
, though there might be a considerable degree of dissatisfaction,
and even of ferment, per....ading the greater part of Italy,' there
was no evidence of any systematic conspiracy to shake oft the
yoke of France. Corsica und Elba, even it conquered, would
I Sce Lord \Vellesley to Lord W. Bentinek, December 27, 1811, in
Wellington's SUl,pfcl/lt:/ltary Di.'JHlIcIu:s, vii. p. 240.
, Bentinck to Lord LiverpOOl, January 25, 1812, ibid., pp. 200-1.
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only be of secondary importancc. A diversion to be made upon
t.he cast coast of Spain would be far the best way in whieh the
disposnble force in Sicily could be employed. ·Wellington had
been informed of the proposal, and might probably be able
to lend part of thc garrison of Cadiz, to make the expedition
more formidable. Sir Edward Pellew, the admiral commanding
on the Mediterranean station, would be able to give advice, and
arrange for the co-operation of the fleet J. Lord Liverpool
wrote on the next day (March 4) to inform Wellington of the
answer that had been made to Bentinek, but pointed out that
probably the aid could only be given from May to October, as
the expedition would depend on the lIed, and naval mcn
thought that it would be impossible to keep a large squadron
in attendance on the Sicilian foree during the winter months.
The troops would probably have to return to their old quarters
at the close of autumn 2. ~
Wellington, as it chanced, was already in communication
with Bentinck, for the latter had sent his brother, Lord
Fl'cderiek, to Lisbon, with a dispatch for the Commander-in·
Chief in Portugal, in which he stated that he leaned himself
to the Corsican scheme, but that if the home government
disliked it, he would be prepared to send in April or May an
expedition of 10,000 men to operate against Suchet 8. The
letter from London reached Wellington first, about Mareh 20th "',
and was a source of great joy to him, as he saw that the Cabinet
intended to prohibit the Italia.n diversion, and wished to direct
Dentinck's men towards Spain. He wrote to London and to
Palermo, to state that a descent upon the coast of Catalonia
seemed to him' the most essential object.' It should be aimed
at Barcelona or Tarragona: it might not succeed so far as its
immediate object was concerned, but it would have the infallible
rcsult of forcing 51lchct to come up ,,;th all his available forces
from Valencia, and would prevent him from interfering in the
• Liverpool to Bcntinck, March 4. Wellington's Supplementary Dis-
pate/lcs, vii. p. 300.
• Liverpool to Wellington, Ma.rch 5, ibid., p. 301.
I llentinek to Wellington, Febrnary 23, ibid., p. 206.
• 'rhe answer to Lord Liverpool went off on March 20, that to Bcntinck
on bbreh 24th.
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affairs of western and central Spain during the next campaign.
Ten thousand men, even with such aid as Lacy and the Catalan
army might give, werc probably insufficient to deal with a place
of such strength as Barcelona; but Tarragona, which was
weakly gnrrisoned, might well be taken. Even if it were not,
a great point would be gained in opening up communication
with the Catalans, and throwing all the affairs of the French
in eastern Spain into confusion. Bcntinek was advised in the
strongest terms to land north of the Ebro, and not in Valencia:
an attack on Catalonia would draw Suchet out of Valencia,
which would then fall of its own accord. Wellington added,
writing to Lord Liverpool only, not to Bcntinck, that he did
not see how any appreciable aid could be got from the Cadiz
garrison, or those of Tarifa or Cartagena 1: the British regi-
ments there had been cut down to a necessary minimum, but
there werc 1,400 Portuguese and two foreign regiments, of
whom some might possibly be spared. 1.'he government must
give him a definite order to detach such and such battalions,
and it should be done-the responsibility being their own. Lord
Frederiek Bentinck arri\'ed from Palermo at Badajoz just after
that place fell: Wellington charged him with additional advices
for his brother, to the cfCect that he would send him a siege-
train and offIcers and gunners to work it, which might serve
to batter Tarragona, if that proved possible. 'l'hough he could
himself spare no British troops, the Spanish Regency should
be urged to lend, lor an expedition to Catalonia, two divisions,
one under Roche at Alieante, the other under Whittingham in
Majorca, which consisted each of 3,000 men recently entrusted
for training to those British officers. Their aid was hardly likely
to be refused, and they had been better trained, fed, and clothed
oC late than other Spanish troops. Wellington was not deceived
in this expectation, the Regency very handsomely offered to
place both divisions at Bcntinck's disposition 2, and they
1 Whither the 2/(j7th, 11. company of artillery, and five companies of
De \Vatleville's Swiss regiment had been sent, on the news of Blake'.
disnsters before Valencin. Dispatches, viii. p. 44.8•
• The best !lOurce of information about tJlese subllidi1.ed corps is the lite
of Sir Stl1nfon! WhittinglHlITl, who rnised llnd disciplined one or them in
Majorca, OIL the skcletons or the old regimcnts of Cortlovu, Burgos, uuu
5th Grtll\nderos Provincillles. He had onl)'1,500 lIIen 011 Jllnllnl')' 1, 1812,
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turned out to have swelled in numbers of laLe, owing to vigorous
recruiting of dispersed men from Blake's defunct army. The
available figure was far over the 6,000 of whieh Wellington
had spoken.
There seemed, therefore, in May to be every probability that
a force of some 17,000 men might be available for the descent
on Catalonia which Welliubrton advised: and both Admiral
Pellew and Roche and Whittinghllm made active preparations
to be found in perfect readiness when Lord WilIiam llentinck
should start off the nucleus of the expeditionary force from
Palermo 1. Wellington had flxed the third week in J unc as the
date at which the appen.rance of the diversion would be most
effective 2. On June 5th he was able to state that two separate
divisions of transporLs had already been sent off from Lisbon,
Olle to Alicantc and onc to Majorca, to piek up the two Spanish
divisions.
Now, however, came a deplorable check to the plan, which
only became known to Wellington when hc had already corn·
mitted himself to his cumpaign against Mnrmont. Dentinck
could never get out of his head the original idea of Italian
conquest which he had laid before the Cabinet in January.
'there was no doubt that it had been discouraged by thc home
government, and that he had received very distinct instructions
that Spain was to be the sphere of his activity, and that he was
to take Wellington into his councils. But Lord Liverpool's
dispatch had contained the unfortunate phrase that • unless
the project or resistance to the French power in Italy should
appear to rest upon much bctter grounds than those of which
we are at present apprised,' the diversion to Catalonia was the
and 2,200 on February 21, but had worked thcm up to ovcr 3,000 by April.
Roche, who had to work on the cadres of ConariuM, AliCll.nt.e, Chinchilla,
Volunt.nrios dc Arngon, 2nd of Mureia, and Corona, hOO 5,500 IlICIl ready
Oil Mnrch 1, IInd more by May. Whitlinghnllllllninlillns thnt his battalions
alwllyll did their duty fur better than other divisions, cOJlllllanded by
olJicel'!l wit!. unhappy traditions or dcfent, and attributes the Ilrevious
miscmhle history or U.e !\Iurcian army to incapacity and Iloor ijpirit in
high plllces.
1 Hcnry Wcllesley to 'Wcllington. Supplemelltary Dispatches, vii. p. 320.
• Scc as evidence of cngcrncllS Whittingham'lI letter to Pellcw or lIIny 28
In the formcr's ]llemoirs. p. 161.
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obvious course 1.' 'fhis gave a discrctionary pOWC1' to Bentinck,
if he should judge that evidence of discontent 'in Italy had
cropped up in unexpected quantity and quality since March. It
does not appear, to the unprejudiced observer, that such
evidence was forthcoming in May. But Bentinck, with his
original prejudice in favour of a descent on Italy running in his
brain, chose to take certain secret correspondence received from
the Austrian general Nugent, and other sources, as justification
for holding back from thc immediate action in eastern Spain,
on which Wellington had been led to rely. No troops sailed
!ram Palermo or Messina till the very end of June, and thcn the
numbers scnt were much lcss than had becn promiscd, and
the directions given to l\faitland, the gencra! entrusted with the
command, were by no means satisfactory 2. The underlying
fact would appcar to be that, since March, Bentinek had begun
to be alarmed at thc intrigues of the Qucen of Sicily, and feared
to send away British troops so far afield as Spain. That
notorio4s princess and her incapable spouse had been deprived
in thc prcceding autumn of their ancicnt status as absolute
sovereigns, and t\ Sicilian constitution and parliament, some·
what on the British model, had been called into being. For
some time it had been supposed that Caroline, though incensed,
was powerless to do harm, and the native Sicilians were un-
doubtedly gratified by the change. But Bentinck presently
detected traces of a conspiracy fostered by the Quecn among
the Italian and merCCllUl'y troops cmployed by the Sicilian
government: and, what was more surprising, it was suspected
(and proved later on) that the court had actually opened up
negotiations with Napoleon and evcn with ?tlurat, in order to
get rid of the English from Sicily at all costs s. In view of the
1 Liverpool to :Bcntinek, 4th Marcll, quoted above.
I See Wellington to Lord W. :Bcntinek in Dispu.fche', ix. pp. 60-1•
• That veritable' stormy petrel oC politics,' Sir Robcrt Wilson, was
passing through Sicily in May, and SCCITlS to have aeted a mischievous part
in visiting the Queen, and allowing her to set before him all her grievances
against Dentillck, and the' Jacobin Parlillment' that he WllS setting up.
She told Wilson that Bentinck' went to jails and took evidence of miserable
wretches, actual malefactors or suspects, inducing them to say what he
wished for his plans, and acting without any substantiating facts.' As
to the army Wilson gn.UlCred that' the Neapolil.:ln soldiery hate us to
a man, the Germans would adhere to us, the native Sicilians at least !lot
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fact tha.t there were 8,000 Halinn and foreign troops of doubtful
disposition quartered in Sicily, Benbnek was seized with
quahns at thc idca of scnding away a large expcdition, mainly
composed of British regiments. In the end he compromised, by
detaching only three British and two German Legion battalions,
along with a misccllancous collection of fractions of scvcral
foreign corps, making 7,000 men in aU 1. They only arrived
off the coast of Catalonia on July 31st, and J\laitland's freedom
of operations was humpCl'cd by instructions to the eUcct that
, the division of the Sieilian army detached has for its first
object the safety of Sicily; its employment 011 the Spanish
coast is temporary.' He WIIS told that hc was liablc to be
withdrawn at any moment, if complications arose in Sicily or
Italy, and was not to consider himsclf a permanent part of the
British army in Spain. Yet at the same time that Bentinck
had given these orders, the homc government had told Welling-
ton to regard the expeditionary force as placed at his disposal,
and authorized him to send directions to it.
All this worked out less unhappily than might have been
expected; for though Wellington got little practical military
help from the Sicilian corps, and though Maitlalld's operations
were most disappointing and started far too late, yet the know-
ledge that great transport squadrons were at Alicante and
Majorca, and the rumour that a large force was coming from
Sicily, most certainly kept Suchet in lL state of alarm, and
prevented him from helping Soult or King Joseph. It is
interesting to find from his correspondence 2 that in the earliest
days of July he was anxiously watching the ships at Alieante,
and expecting a descent eithcr on Valencia or on Catalonia,
though Maitlnnd WllS yet far away, and did not appear off
net uguinst liS.' But there were only 2,000 Sicilinns und 1,900 Germans.
and 8,000 Neul'0litung and other ltlllil"lS, emincllUy untrustworU,)'. [So
untrustworthy were they, indeed. that the Italian oorpll !lent lo Spain in the
autumn deserted by hundred~ to the Freueh.] See ,"Vi/sou's Private Diary,
1812-15, pp. 35-62.
, For details, see table in Appendix no. XHI.
• Suchct's eorresponrlecll('() (in the Archives of lhe French 'War l\linistry)
begins to be anxious from ,luly n onwnrd. On that dnte hll henrs I1mt ships
are ut Alicante to lake Roche on board, who is to jOill 10 ,·ery large English
forcc, ond 15,000 (I) men hom l\Tujoreu. On July I:Hh he 11cars that
Moitlund is to have 17,000 men. lhough only :1,000 British fecgulllrs.
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Palamos till July 31. The fear of the descent was an admirable
help to Wellington-perhaps more useful than its actual
appearance at an early date might have been, since the expe-
ditionary troops were decidedly less in numbers than Wellington
had hoped or Suchet had feared. At the same time the
news that the Sicilian for<.'C had not sailcd, and perhaps might
never appear, reachcd Salamanca at ouc of the most critical
moments of the campaign, and filled Wellington with fears
that the Army of Valencia might already be detaching troops
against him, while he had calculated upon its being entirely
distractcd by the projected dcmonstration I. The news that
Maitland had sailcd at last, only came to hand some time
after the battle of Salamanca had been won, when the whole
position in Spain had assumed a new and more satisfactory
ll.!>pect.
Such were the subsidiary schemes with whieh ,",Yellington
supported his main design of a direct advance against Mar-
mont's army. Some of them worked well-Hill, Home
Popham, and Mcndizabal did all, and more than all, that had
been expected of them, in the way of containing large French
forces. Others accomplished all that could in reason have
been hoped-such was the case with Silveira and Ballasteros.
Others fell far below the amount of usefulness that hud been
reckoned upon-both the Gallcinn army and the Sicilian army
proved most disappointing in the timing of their movements
and the sum of their achievements. But on the whole the
plan worked~the French generals in aU parts of Spain were
distracted, and Ma.rmont got little help from without.
It is certa.in that, at the moment of Wellington's starting Oil
his oUensivc campaign, the thing that gave him most trouble
and anxiety was not the timing or efficacy of the various diver-
1 Wellington to Lord Batllurst, July 14: '1 have this day received
a letter from Lord W. Bentinck of the 9th of June, from whieh I am
concerned to observe thut his Lordship does not intend to carry into
execution the operation on the east coost of the Peninsula, until be shall
bave tried the success of another plan on the coast of Italy. I am appre·
hensive that this determination may bring upon us additional forces of the
Army of Aragon: but I sUn hope tlmt I shall be able to retain at tllC close
or this campaign the acquisitions made at ita commencement.' Dispatcllt1,
ix. p. 285.
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sions that be had planned, but a purely financial problem. It
was now a matter of years sinee the money due for the pay and
maintenance of the army had been coming in with terrible
unpunctuality. Officers and men had grown to regard it as
normal that their pay should be four or six months in arrears :
the muleteers and camp followers were in evcn worse easc.
And the orders for payment (vales as they werc called) issued
by the commissariat to the peasantry, were so tardily settled
in cash. that the recipients would often sell thcm for hal! or two-
thirds of their face value to speculators in Lisbon. who could
afford to wait many months for the money.
This state of things was deplorable: but it did not proceed,
as Napier usually hints. and as Wellington himself seems somcM
times to have felt, from perversity on the part of the home
government. It was not the case that there was gold or silver
in London, and that the ministers did not send it with sufficient
promptness. No one can be so simple as to suppose that
Lord Liverpool. Mr. Perceval. the Marquess of Wellesley. or
Lord Castlcrcagh. did not undcn;tand tllat the Army of Portugal
must have cash, or it would lose that mobility which was its
great strength. Still less would they wittingly starvc it, when
the fortunes of the ministry wcre bound up with the successful
conduct of the Wat.
But the years 1811-12. as has been already pointed out in
the last volume o( this work, were those of the greatest stringency
in the cash-market of Great Britain. The country was abso-
lutely drained dry of metallic currency in the precious metals:
no silver had been coined at the :Mint since the Revolutionary
war began: no guineas since 1798. England was transacting
all her internal business on bank-notes, and gold was a rare
commodity, only to be got by high prices and much searching.
'l'hii> wa.<; the time when the .Tewi> of llortsmouth used to board
cvery home-coming transport, to offer convalescents or sailors
278.• or even more, in paper for every guinea that they had on
them. The Spanish dollar, though weighing much less than an
English fivc-shilling pieee (whcn that vnluable antiquity could
be found 1), readil}' passed for six shillings in paper. And even
, No sih'er crowns had been coined since 1760 allhe )Iint. They weighed
463 grains: the Spanish dollar only 415 grains.
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this coin could not now be got so ca.'iil)' as in 1809 or 1810,
for the growing state of disturbance in the Spanish~American
colonies was beginning to aIfect the annual import oI silver
Irom the mines of :Mexico and Peru, which had Ior II long time
been the main source from which bullion for Europe was
procured. To buy dollars at Cadiz with bills on London was
becoming a much more difficult business. In May 1812 a special
complication was introduced-Lord William Bcntillek wishing
to provide Spanish coin for the expedition which was about to
sail for Catalonia, sent agents to Gibraltar, who bought with
Sicilian gold all the dollars that they could procure, giving a
reckless priec lor them, equivalent to over six shillings a dollar,
and competing with Wellington's regular correspondents who
were at the same moment oUering only 5s. 4d. or 5s. 6d. for the
coin. Of l.'Oursc the higher orrer secured the cash, and Wellington
made bitter complaints that the market had been spoilt, and
that he suddenly found himself shut out from a supply on
which he had hitherto reckoned with security 1. But the
competition was only transient, though very tiresome at
a moment when silver eoin was specially wanted for payments
in Leon. For, as Wellington remarked, the people about
Salamanca had never seen the British army before, and would
be wanting to do business on a prompt eash basis, not being
accustomed to credit, as were the Portuguese.
The army started upon the campaign with a military chest
in the most deplorable state of depletion. 'Wc arc absolutely
bankrupt,' wrote Wellington," the troops arc now five months
in arrears instead of one month in advance. The staff have
not been paid sincc February; the muletcers not since June
1811! and wc are in debt in all parts of the eountry. I urn
obliged to take money sent me by my brother [Henry \-Vellesley,
British Minister at Cadiz] for the Spaniards, in order to gi ....e
my own troops a fortnight's pay, who are really suUering for
want of money 2: Some weeks before this last complaint
Wellington had sounded an even louder note of alarm. 'We
owe not less than 5,000,000 dollars. The Portuguese troops
and establishments arc likewise in the greatest distress, and
1 See Wellington to Lord Uathurst. Dispakhrs, vii. p. 370.
• Ibid., vii. p. 319.
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it is my opinion, us well as that of Marshal BeresIord, that wc
must disband part of tha.t army, unless I can increase the
monthly payments of the subsidy. 'The Commissary-General
has this day informed me that he is very apprehensive that he
wiD not be able to make good his engagements Cor the payment
for the meat for the troops. If we are obliged to stop that
payment, your Lordship may as well prepare to recall the army,
Ior it will be impossible to ctlrry up salt mCltt (as well as brcad)
to the troops trom the sea-const.... It is not improbable that
we may not be able to take advantage of the enemy's compara-
tive weakness in this eampaignJor sheer want ofmollcy 1.' One
almost leels that Wellington is here painting the position of
the army in the blaekcst possible colours, in order to bring
pressure on his correspondent at home. But this dismal
picture was certainly reflected in the language of his stall at the
time; a letter from his aide-de-camp, Colin Camphell, speaks
(all May 30) oC the depleted state of the military chest being
a possible curb to the campaign; • Lord 'Wo cannot take
supplies with him to enable him to do more than demon-
strate towards Valladolid, when so good an opportunity
offers, and an inconsidcrable addition would suffice. Thc
harvest is ripening, the country round Salamanca is full
of all requisite supplies, but they are not procurable without
cash z:
Yct it is hard to be over-censorious of the home government.
They were in the most bitter straits for money. Gold and
silver were simply not to be got in the quantities that
Wellington required. The amount actually sent was very large;
it would have been lar~rcr if economic conditions had not been
desperate. The rupture with the United States of America
which took place in June (fortunately too late to serve
Napoleon's purpose), had just added a new sourcc oC anxiety
to the troubles of the Cahinet; both money and men were now
wanted for Canada. There can be no doubt that when Lord
Bathurst wrote, in the middle of the Salamanca campaign, that
•£100,000 in cash, chiefly gold, had been sent off,' and that
, Wellington to Lord Liverpool, April 22. Supplemenwry DWpalches, vii.
p. 318.
. • Cllmpbcll to Shawc. Supplemetlrory Dispatches, vii. p. 362.
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'I wish to God we could assist you more in money,' he was
writing quite honestly, and amid most adverse financial circum·
stances. Great Britain was at the most exhausting point of her
long struggle with Napoleon. The Russian war had begun-
but there was no sign as yet that it wus to be the ruin of the
Emperor: his armies seemed to be penetrating towards .Moscow
in the old triumphant style: many politicians spoke of a
humiliating peace dictated to Czar Alexander in the autumn
as the probable end of the campaign, and speculated on
Napoleon's appearance at fI.{adrid in 1813 as a possible event.
Wheat had risen in this spring to 130s. the quarter. The out·
break of the long-threatened but long-averted American war
looked like the last blow that was to break down the British
Empire. It was no wonder that the national credit was low in
.Tune 1812. There was nothing to revive it till Wellington's
Salamanca triumph in July: nor did anyone understand that
Napoleon's star had passed its zenith, till the news of the
disasters of the Moscow retreat began to drift westward in
November and December.
Meanwhile, il the financial outlook was gloomy, the actual
military situation was more promising than it had ever heen
before. Well aware, from intercepted dispatches, of the
quarrels of his adversaries, and perfectly informed as to their
numbers and thcir cantonments, Wellington considered with
justice that he had such a game in his hands as he had ne....er
before had set before him. On June 13th he crossed the Agueda
with his army in three parallel columns. The IcCt was under
charge of Pieton, and consisted of the Srd Division, Pack's
and Bradford's Portuguese, and Le Marehant's brigade .of
heavy dragoons. The centre, which Beresford conducted, was
composed of the Light, 4th, and 5th Divisions. It was preceded
by Alten's German hussars, and accompanied by Bock's
dragoons. The right column, under Graham, had the lst, 6th,
und 7th Divisions, with a regiment of Anson's horse for purposes
of exploration. It is to be noted that both Pieton and Graham
were destined to remain only a few weeks with the army: the
£ormer had taken the field ere his Badajoz wound was properly
healed: it broke open again, he fell into a high fever, and had
to be sent to the rear. Wellington's brother~in·law,Pakenham,
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took over chargc of the Brd Division on June 28th. Graham
had been suffering for some months from an affection of the eyes,
which the physicians told him might at any time grow worse
and threaten his sight. He persisted on staying with the army
till the last possible moment, but became more blind eaeh day,
and was compelled to throw up his command on July 6th and
to return to England for skilled medical advice. Thus, during
the greater part of the Salamanca campaign, Wellington was
working without his best-tr~ted lieutenunts-Cra.Wurd was
dead, both Picton and Gra-ham invalided. In consequence of
Graham's departurc a very difficult point was raised. If some
illness or wound should disable the Commander-in-Chief, to
whom would the charge of operations faU 1? Wellington con-
sidered that Beresford was entitled to expect the sll-ccession,
and deprecated the sending out of somc senior officcr from
Englund with a commission to net as second in command. He
observed that no one coming fresh from home would have a real
grasp of the conditions of the war: that he would probably
start with a priori views, and have to ullleart~ them in a time
of imminent danger. Moreover, a second-in-eommand was,
when his superior was in good health, either an unnecessary
person or else a tiresome onc, if he presumed on his position
to offer advice or remonstrances. Fortunately the question
remained a wholly academic onc, since Wellington's iron
physique, and unbroken luck when bullets were flying, never
failed him. An understudy turned out to be superfluous.
The three columns of the allied army advanced on a very
narrow front o( not more than tcn miles, though the cavalry
spread out considerably to the flanks. On the 13th the columns
bivouacked on the Guadapcro river, in front o( Ciudad Rodrigo,
between Santi Espiritus and '.rellcbron. On the 14th they
advanced (our leagues to the I1uebra, and camped on each side
of San MUl10z, with head-quarters at Cabrillas. On the 15th a
rather longer march took them to Matilla and Cayos. Nothing
had yet been seen of any enemy. It was only on the 16th, in
the morning, that the advanced cavalry of the centre column,
after crossing the Valmusa river, came into contact with two
squadrons of French chasseuTs, not more than two leagues
, Wellington to Bathurst. Di8patChaJ, ix. p. <J:'f7.
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outside of Salamanca. These outposts gave way when pushed,
and retired across the Tormcs. The British army bivouaeked
in sight of Salamanca that night, and received the information
that l\foxmont had alrendy evacuated the city, save for a garrison
left in its three new forts 1.
The Anny of Portugal had been caught, just as Wellington
had hoped, in a condition of wide dispersion. It was not that
l\farmont did not expect the attack, but that, till the day
when it should be actually delivered, he dared not concentrate,
because of his want of magazines and the paucity of transport.
Hc had resolved that he must be content to abandon all the
land west of Salamanca, in order that his point o( concentration
should be out of reaeh of his enemy's first stroke. It was fixed
at Bleines and Fuente Sauco, twenty miles north of Salamanca
on the road to Toro. On the morning o( the 14th, when the
news that 'Vcllington was over the Agueda first reu.ched him,
the Marshal issued orders to all his divisions to march ou this
point, not even excepting that of Bonnet in the Asturias. For,
despite o( the Emperor's wish to keep a hold upou that province,
Marmont held, and rightly, that it was marc important to place
in front of thc Anglo-Portuguese every possible bayonet, and
he could not spare a solid division o( 6,500 men. Unfortunately
for him, however, it was clear that Bonnet could not arrive (or
fifteen or twenty days. The other seven divisions werc coneen·
trated by the fifth night from the giving of the alarm 2. They
formed a mass of 36,000 infantry, with 80 guns, but only 2,800
horse. This total does not include either Bonnet, uor three
battalions of Thomieces's division left to hold Astorga, not
small garrisons placed in Toro, Zamora, the Salamanca forts,
• Tile itinerary of this march in detail may be found in Ule excellent
Diary of 1'omkinson of the 10th Light Dragoons.
• Foy, who han beel\ nrawn awny from the TaRns Mter the arrair nt
Almnm~, Imd lo mareh from Avila, Clausel from Peiial'lllldll, Ferey from
Vulln.dolid, Sarrut from Toro, ]\fullcune and Brelluier had been at Sa[u-
mallcn, 'l'homi~rC6calllC trom Zallloru. HOyCr'H dragoons wcre lit Toro IInd
Bennvenw, Curto's light cuvlllry division bad been with lIIo.ucune Ilnd
llrelUlicr lit SalamanC8. Valladolid, Avila, und Benaventc wcre the most
distant points: but the troops from them were all Ill) by the IDth. Nor
was it pOl;siblc for \\'cllington to interfere with tIlC concentration, though
possibly hc might have forced ~'oy Crom A\ila to make a detour, if he hud
followed Marmont very close.
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and certain other posts farther east I, Nor does it take aCCQunt
of a depOt of 3,000 men, including many dismounted dragoons,
at Valladolid. The total of the field army, including artillery,
sappers, &c., was about 40,000 of all arms.
This force wus distinctly inferior in number to that of the
Anglo-Portuguese, who, without counting three infantry
battalions on their way to the front from Lisbon, or D'Urban's
Portuguese horse on the side of Zamora, hud some 40,000
infantry in line, and 3,500 excellent cavalry, in which arm
Wellington, for the first time in his life, had a slight advantage
over the enemy. Carlos de Espafia was also approaching, with
the 3,000 Spanish infantry that were available after the garrison
of Ciudad llodrigo had been completed, and in all the allied
army must have had 48,000 men at the front 'J. The balance
of numbers, of which each general was pretty well informed,
was slleh as to make both sides careful-l\larrnont was 8,000
men short of his adversary's power, and was particularly
depressed by the knowledge of his inferiority in cavalry, an
arm on which the French had hitherto felied with confidence.
But the horse of the Army of Portugal had never recovered
from the consequences of Masscna's retrcat in thc last spring,
and all the regiments '''ere very weak: while 'Wellington WIlS
at last profiting from the liberal way in which the home govern·
ment had reinforced his mounted arm during the autulllll of
1811. He had ten British regiments with him. whereas at
:Fuentes de Onoro he had owned but four.
On the other hand 'Wcllington, among his 48,000 men, had
only 28.000 British; there wefe ]7,000 Portuguese and 8,000
Spaniards with him. and excellent though the conduct of the
fOfmer had becn during the late campaign, it would be hypocrisy
to pretend that their commander could rely upon thcm under
all circulDstances, as hc would have done upon a corresponding
number of British infantry. He wns ready to give battle, but
it must be a battle under favourable conditions. Marmont
felt mueh the same: it wai:l necessary to beat Wellington if the
French domination in Spain was to be preserved. But it would
, Nor do we nx:kon the regiment or Snrrllt's division (130th) pcrlllullcntly
dctllehed lit Sllntllnder.
• Sce lables of the urmies of both sides iu Ule Appendix no. IX.
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be rash to attack him in one of his favourite defensive positions:
there must be no more Bussacos. And every available man
must be gathered in, before a gcncral action was riskcd. The
only justification Cor instant battle would be the unlikely chance
of catching the Angle-Portuguese army in a state of dispersion
or some other unlucky posture-and Wellington's known
caution did not make such a chance very probable.
i\Iarmont's main purpose, indeed, was to hold 'Vcllington
• contained' till he should havc succeeded in bringing up
Bonnet, and also reinforcements from the Armies of the North
and Ccntre-if not even from some distant forces. On Bonnet's
c\'cntual arrival he could rely-but not on any flXcd date for
his appearance, [or it was difficult to get orders promptly to
the Asturias, and there might be many unforeseen delays in
their execution. But Marmont was also counting on aid from
Cartarelli, which would presumably reach him even before
Bonnet appeured. In expectation of Wellingtou's advance, he
had written to the Commander of the Army of the North on
May 24th and 3mb, and again all June 5th, asking for assurances
of help, and reminding hii) colleague of the Emperor's dircetiom.
The answers received wcre, on the whole, satisfactory: the last
of them, dated at Vittoria on .June 14th, said that the disposable
field-force \'I'as 8,000 men, including a brigade of light cavalry
and 22 guns. Thcy should march from Vittoria as soon as some
troops of Abbe's division a.rrived from Pampeluna. to replace
them, and they should be echeloned along the high-road from
Burgos to Valladolid ready to movc up whcll called upon 1. It
must be remembered that on this date Caffarclli was answering
a hypothetical inquiry as to his exact power to help, not
a definite demand for mcn, since WellillgtOl.l had only crossed
the Agueda on the }lrevious day, and nothing was known at
Vittoria of his actual start. But the dispatch was encouraging,
us it seemed to show a good spirit, and named the exact force
available, and the route that it would take. l\1armont received
it upon the 19th, just as he had completed his own concentration
at Fuente Sauco. It seemed to justify him in believing that
before July 1 he would have 8,000 mcn from Cartarclli at
, See Caffarelli to Marmollt of June 10 and June 14th ill Marmont's
AIel/wires, iv. IIp. 40$-10.
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his disposition, including, what was specially valuable, 1,000
horse.
The dispatches from King Joscph and Jourdan were less
satisfactol'Y. At this moment they wcre in a state or hesitation
caused by contrudictory intelligence. 'Your letter of June 6th,'
wrote Jourdan to Marmont, 'says that Wellington will soon fall
upon you. But we have similar letters from Soult, declaring
that the blow is to be delivered against him: he encloses two
notes of June 2nd and 5th from General Darieau in Estrema.·
dura, declaring that 60,000 of the allies are just about to begin
an invasion of Andalusia. We arc too tar of! trom the seeue of
operations to determine whether it is you or the Duke of
Dalmatia who is deceived. We can only tell you, meanwhile,
not to be misled by demonstrations, and to be ready to start off
three division:; to SOlut's heIp without a moment's dcluy, if
Lord Wellington's real objective is Andalusia. Similarly we
have sent Soult express orders that he shall move Drouet to
the north bank of the Tagus, if Wellington has called up Hill
to join him, and is making the true attack on you. Calfnrelli has
stringent orders to support you with what troops he can collect,
when you arc able to tell him defUlitely that you arc the person
threatened, not Soult 1.'
It is clear that the hallucinations of the Duke of Dalmatia
were most valuable to Wellington, who had foreseen them
long ago by a study of intercepted dispatches. Whatever
happened, Soult could not reCrain Crom believing that he had
the great r61c to play, and that his Alldalusian viceroyalty was
the centre of 0.11 things. At this moment his picture of Welling-
ton about to movc on Cordova with 60,000 men seems to have
been a belated conccption caused by Graham's march to
Elvas on May 20. He had not yet realized that ten days
later Graham's corps had gone northward again, and had
joined Wellington on the Agueda about the timc that he was
writing his alarmist letters. There was nothing in front of
him save Hill's 18,000 men: but he rdused to sce the facts, and
deceived Joseph and Jourdo.n for some days by the definite and
authoritative restatement of absolutely erroneous intelligence.
Hence it was not till Marmont was "bIc to say, without uny
l Jourdnn to lI111rOlollt, JUIle 14th, in l\U11Iciru. iv. pp. 411-12.
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possible chance of error, that Wellington was aeross the Agueda,
and had advanced to Salamanca at the head of at least 40,000
men, that the King and his Chief-ol-the-Staff at 1¥t I~...rogiljzed
the true seat of danger. Long after they had detected it, they
continued (as we shall sce) to receive preposterous dispatches
£ram Soult, still maintaining that they were mistaken, and still
discovering excuses for not obeying the peremptory orders that
they sent him.
SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER IV
THE SALAMAi."iCA FORTS. ']'lli~ DAYS OF 1'tIA.:.~<EUVRES.
JUNE 2OTn-3OTrr. 1812
. 'WELLINGTON'S conduct on reaching Salamanca was not that
which might have b~n expected. Whcn a general has. by
a careful and well-arranged concentration, collected all his own
troops into one solid mass, and then by a rapid advance has
thrown himself into the midst of the scattered cantonments
of an enemy who has no superiority to him in numbers, it is
natural for him to press his pursuit vigorously. Far the most
effective way of opening the campaign would have been to cut
up the two divisions which Marmont had just led out o[ SaJa-
manca, or at least to follow them so closely that they could
be brought to action before nll the outlying divisions hud come
in. This would certainly have been Napoleon's method.
Wellington, however, wan~ed to fight a battle in onc of his
favourite defensive positions, and he thought that he had
a menDS of compelling l\Iarmont to attaek him, by Jaying siege
to the Salamanca forts. After Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz,
no French marshal would like to scc a third important post
captured" under his nose.' The British general judged that
Marmont would fight him, in order to save his prestige and
his garrison. And since he believed that Bonnet would not
evacuate the Asturias, and that Caffarelli would scnd help late,
if at all, he thought that he eould count upon a superiority of
numbers whieh rendered victory certain.
This seems to be the only rational way of explaining Welling-
ton's conduct ou June 17th. On arriving in front of Salamanca
his n.rmy made a majestic encircling movement, Picton's
column crossing the Tormes by the fords of El Canto below the
city, Bcrcsford's and Graham's by those of Santa Murta above
it. 'rhe use of the unbroken town-bridge was made impossible
by Marmont's forts. The heads of the two columns met on the
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north side, and they then moved three miles on, and took up
a long position below the heights oC San Cristobal, which lie
outside Salamanca on its northern and eastern front. These
formed the chosen defensive fighting-ground which Wellington
had already in his mind.
Only the 14th Light Dragoons and ~Clinton's infantry of the
6th Division turned into Salamanca by the Toro gate, and
acted as Wellington's escort, while he was received by the
municipality and made his arrangements for the attack on the
forts, which, though they commanded the bridge, had no
outlook on the spacious arcaded Pla~ Mayor, where the
reception took place. It was a lively scene. 'Wc wefe received
with shouts and vivas,' writes an eye-witness. 'The inhabitants
were out of their senses at ha.ving got rid of the French, and
nearly pulled Lord Wellington off his horse. The ladies were
the most violent, many coming up to him and embracing him.
He kcpt writing orders upon his sabretash, !lnd was interrupted
three or four times by them. What with the joy of the people,
and the feeling accompanying troops about to attack a fortress,
it W81; 11 half-hour of suspensc and anxicl)', and a sccne of such
interest as I never before witnessed 1.'
Head-quarters were established that night in the city, and
Clinton's division invested the forts, which lookcd formidable
enough to require close study before they were attacked. The
rest of the army took up its bivouacs, with the cavalry out
in front, and remained practically without movement on the
ground now selected, tor lhe lIext two da)'s, till MlU'mont
came to pay his expected visit.
The three Salamanca forts were built on high ground in the
south-west corner of the city, which overlooks the long Roman
bridge. To make them l\larmont had destroyed a great part of
the old University quarter of the place, levelling the majority
of the colleges-for Salamanca, till 1808, had been a university
of thc English rather than the usual eontinentallypc, and had
owned a score of such institutions. Nearly all the buildings on
the slopes had been pulled down, leaving: a widc open glacis
round three massive convents, whieh hud been transformed into
places of strength. San Vincente occupied the crest of the knoll
, Tomkinson's Diary, p. 162.
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overlooking the river, and lay in the extreme angle of the old
city wall, which enclosed it on two sides. The smaner strong-
holds, San Cayetano and La l\tereed, were separated from San
Villccnte by a narrow but steep ravine, und lay close together
on another rising-ground of about the same height. The three
formed a triangle with crossing fires, each to a large extent
commanding the ground over whieh the others would have to
be approached. The south and west sides of San Vineente and
La Merced overhung precipitous slopes above the river, and
wcrc almost inaccessible. The north sides of San Cayetano and
San Vincente were the only fronts that looked promising for
attack, and in each elaborate preparations had been made in
view or that fact. l\farmont had originally intended to enclose
all three forts and many buildings more-such as the Town
Hospital, the convent of San Francisco, and the colleges of
Ireland and Cucnca, in an outer enceinte, to scrve as a large
citadel which would contain several thousand men and all his
magazines. But money and time had failed, and on the slopes
below the forts, several convents and colleges, haU\pulk:d to
pieces, were still standing, and offered cover for besiegers at
a distance of some 250 yards from the works. 'I'he garrison
consisted of six flank-companies Irom the 15th, 65th, 82nd, and
86th of the line :md the 17th Leg-er, :md of n company of
artillery, under the chefde bataillon Duchemin of the 65th. They
made up a total of 800 mcn, and had thirty-six gUlls in position,
of which, however, the greater part were only light field-pieces:
two gUlls (commanding the bridge) were in La Merced, four in
San Cayetauo, the remaining thirty in San Vincente, the most
formidable of the three.
Wellington had come prepared to besiege • three fortified
convents,' a.nd had been sent a confused sketch of them drawn
by an amateur's hand 1. They turned out much stronger than
he had been led to expect, owing to the immense amount of
hewn stone from the demolished colleges and other buildings
that was available to build them up. The walls had been
doubled in thickness, the windows stopped, and scarps and
counterscarps with solid masonry had been thrown around them.
Thc roofs of the two minor lorts hud been taken oU, und the
1 JOlles, Sieges, i. p. 209.
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upper stories casematcd, by massive oak beams with a thick
coating of earth laid upon them. This surface was so strong
that guns, protected by sandbag embrnsures, had been mounted
on it at some points. There was also an ample provision of
palisades, made from strong oak and chestnut beams. Alto-
gether it was clear that the works would require a systematic
battering, and were not mere patched-up mediaeval monasteries,
35 had been expected.
It was, therefore, most vexatious to find that the very small
battering-train which Wellington had brought with him from
Ciudad Rodrigo was obviously insufficient for the task bcloTe
it; there were no more than fOUf iron IS'pounder guns, with
only 100 rounds of shot each, at the front; though six 24-pound
howitzers, from the train that had taken Badajoz, were on their
way from Elvas to join, and were due on the 20th. It was not,
however, howitzers so much as more heavy 18- or 24~pounder8
that were required for battering, and the lack of them at the
moment was made all the more irksome by the known fact
that there were plenty of both sorts at Rodrigo and Almcida,
five or six marches away. The mistake was precisely the same
that was to be made again at Burgos in the autumn-under·
valuation of the means required to deal with works of third·
class importance. Whether Wellington himself or his artillery
and engineer advisers were primarily responsible is not clear I.
The responsibility for the working out of the little siege with
inadequate means fell on Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne, as senior
engineer (he had with him only two other officers of that corps
and nine military artificers !), and Lieut.-Colonel May, R.A., who
was in charge of the four IS-pounders. The latter borrowed
three howitzers from field~batteries to supplement his miser-
able means, and afterwards two 6·pounder field-guns, which, of
L'Ourse, were only (or annoying the garrison, not lor battering.
It looked at first us if the only practicable scheme was to
build a battery for the IS-pounders on the nearest available
ground, 250 yards from San Vinecntc to the north, and lower
down the knoll on which that fort stood. There was good cover
from ruined buildings up to this distance (rom the French
, At any rate Diekson was not, as he was with the hov.itzers that wele
coming up (Iom Elvas, and had not stalted from RodJigo with the almy.
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works. On the night of the occupation of Sa.la.manca 400 work-
men of the 6th Division commenced a battery on the selected
spot and approaches leading to it from the cover in the ruins.
The work done was not satisractory: it was nearly rull moon,
the night was short, and the enemy (who knew well enough
where the attack must begin), kept up a lively fire of artillery
and musketry all night. Unrortunately the 6th Division
workmen had no experience of sieges-they had never used
piek or shovel before, and there were only two engineer offieers
and nine artificers to instruct them. 'Great difficulty was
found in keeping the men to work under the fire: the Portuguese
in particular absolutely went on hands and knees, dragging
I their baskets along the ground 1,' By daylight the projected
line of the battery was only knec-high, and gave no cover, so
that the men had to be withdrawn till dusk. An attempt had
been made during the night to ascertain whether it were
possible to creep forward to the ditch, and lay mines there, to
blow in the counterscarp. But the party who tried to reach
the ditch were detected by the barking of a dog, who alarmed
the French out-picket, and the explorers had to retire with
several men wounded.
Seeing that the firc o[ the garrison was so eIreetive, the
officers in charge of the siege asked for, and obtained from
Wellington, three hundred marksmen to keep down the tiraillade.
They were taken from the Light Brigade of the King's German
Legion, und spread among the ruins to fire at the cmbrnsurcs
and loopholes of the French. They also hoisted, with some
difficulty, two field-guns on to the ftrSt fioor or the convent of
San Bernardo, which lies north·west of San Vincente, and kept
up a lively discharge' out of the drawing-room window, so to
speak. Wc fired [or some hours at each other, during which
time an unlucky shot went as completely through my captain's
(EligC's) heart as possible. But considering how near we were,
I om much surprised that our loss was so slight-one killed and
one wounded at my own gun 2.' But the fire of the San Vineente
artillery was by no means silenced.
1 Burgayne's dinry in his T.i/t, i. p. 102.
• l.cttcr ofF. Momo, R.A., lent me by his representative. See Fortlliglllly
Un,:iew for July 1D12.
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On the night of June 18th-19th the working party of the
6th Division succeeded in finishing the battery which was to
breach the main lort, and also commenced two smaller batteries,
to right and left, in places among the ruins, onc by the College
of Cuenca, the other below San Bernardo 1. On the morning of
the 19th the four IB·pounders and three howitzers opened,
and brought down the upper courses of the masonry of that
part of San Vincente on which they were trained. But they
could not move its lower part, or reach the countcrscarp.
Wherefore two howitzers were put into the second battery,
near the College of Cuenca, which could command the counter-
scarp. The play of these guns proved insufficient, however, to
shake it, and the garrison concentrated sueh a fire upon them,
mainly from musketry at loopholes. that twenty gunners were
killed or hurt while working the two howitzers.
Next morning Dickson's six howitzers from Elvas came up,
and served to replace those borrowed from the field companies,
wherefore there was only an addition of three pieces net to the
battering-train. Two of the IS-pounders were moved round
to the battery (No. 2) which had been so hard hit on the pre-
ceding day: their fire proved much more effective than that of
the howitzers, and brought down an anglc of the upper wall
of San Vineente and part of its roof, which fell on and crushed
many of the French.
But on the 21st it was impossible to continue the battering,
for the ignominious reason that there were hardly any more
shot left to fire. Only sixty balls remained in store for the
IS-pounders, and a little over one hundred for the howitzers 2.
The calculations of the besiegers had been so erroncous that they
had used up their stock just as the critical moment had arrived.
On the previous day Wellington, seeing what was coming, had
sent a hurried message to Almeida for more shot and powder-
but the convoy, though urged on with all possible speed, did
not arrive at Salamanca till the 26th.
Meanwhile the general engagement for which Wellington
• Nos. 2 and 3 in the map respectively.
• Of course a few tounds more fOt the howitzers could have been bOt-
rowed from the fleld-battetics witb the divisions. Fot the IS.pounders, the
really impottant guns, there was no such resource rOt borrowing.
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had prepared himsell seemed likely to come off. Marmont
had all his army, save Bonnet alone, collected by the 19th, at
l~uente Saueo. On the following day he came boldly forward
and drove in the British cavalry vedettes. He showed three
columns moving on a parallel front, whieh observers estimated
at 18,000 foot and 2,000 horse-but there were more behind,
still invisible. At four in the afternoon he was drawing so close
that Wellington assumed his battle position. :Five divisions
and the two independent Portuguese brigades formed the
fighting-line, from San Cristobal southward to Cabrerizos on the
bank of the 'l'ormes: the order was (from right to left) 'lst-7th-
4th-Light-3rd-Pack and Bradford. The reserve was com·
posed of the 5th Division, of Hulse's brigade of the 6th (of which
the remainder was left to blockade the Salamanca forts), and
of Carlos de Espaiia's 3,000 Spaniards. Alten's cavalry covered
•the British right, Ponsonby'sl the left, Bock's and Le .Marchant's
heavy squadrons were ill reserve.
It looked at first as though Marmont intended to force on
the battle that Wellington desired. Moving with great order
and decision, his three columns deployed opposite the heights,
and advanced to within a very moderate distance of them-
not more than 800 yards at one point. They were extremely
visible, as the whole country-side below the British position
was a fine plain covered witb ripening wheat. The only breaks
in the surface were the infrequent villages-in this part of
Spain they are all large a:nd far apar~-and a few dry water~
courses, whose line could be detected winding amid the inter-
minable cornfields. Warning to keep of! the position was given
to the French by long-range fire from several of the British
batteries on salient points of the line. The enemy replied
noisily and with many guns: Wellington's officers judged
that he was doing his best to make his approach audible to the
garrison of the besieged forts.
At dusk the French occupied the village of CasteIIanos de
l\Iorisco, in front of the right centre of the heights, and then
advanced a regiment to attack l\Iorisco, which was absolutely
at the foot of them, and had been occupied by Wellington as an
advanced post. It was held by the 68th regiment from the
1 Acting vice G. Anson, absent.
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7th Division, a battalion which had come out from England
in the preceding autumn, but had, by chance, never been
engaged before. It made a fine defence, and beat off three
attacks upon the village: but after dark Wellington called it
back uphill to the line of the position, abandoning l\Iorisco 1.
Apparently he was glad to scc the French pressing in close,
and looked for an attack upon his position next morning.
Standing on the sky-line above Caste11anos at dusk, with
a. map in his hand, he demonstrated to all the assembled
generals commanding divisions the exact part which they were
to play, till several French round-shot compelled him to i)hift
his position it little further back~. The whole UJ'my slept that
night in order of battle, with strong pickets pushed down to
the foot of the slopes.
There was, however, no attaek at dawn. Marmont's two
rear divisions (those of Fay and Thomieres) 31ld u. brigade of
dragoons were not yet on the ground, and only got up in the
course of the afternoon: hence he was na~urally unwilling to
move, as he had a certain knowledge that he was outnumbered.
It would seem that Wellington had, that morning, an oppor-
tunity of crushing his enemy, whieh he must havc regretted to
have lost on many subscquentdays of the campaign. Marmont's
position was onc of vcry great risk: hc had pushed in so elose
to the British heights, that hc might have been attacked and
brought to action in half an hour, and could not have got away
without fighting. His position was visible from cnd to end-
it had no flank protection, and its only strong points were the
two villages of Morisco and Castel1anos de Moriseo on its left
centre. Behind was an undulating sea of cornfields extending
to the horizon. Wellington (after deducting the two missing
brigades of the 6th Division) {.'Ould have come down in a general
charge from his heights, with 37,000 Anglo-Portuguese infantry,
and 3,500 horse-not to speak of Carlos de Espafia's 3,000
Spaniards. l\larmont had only five divisions of infantry (about
28,000 bayonets) on the growld at daybreak, and less than 2,000
, 'rhe 68th lost rour officers IInd 46 men killed and wounded, und onc
officer tuke" llrisoner. "'or u good Ul,"(:ount or the fight 1>(.'<: the Memoirs
or Grecn or the 68th, pp. 89-90.
• Sce Tomkinson's DWnJ. p. 165.
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horse. He was in a thoroughly dominated position, and it is
hard to sce what he could have done, had Wellington strength~
ened his left wing with all his cavalry and delivered a vigorous
downhill assault on the unprotected French right. The
opportunity for an attack was so favourable that Wellington's
staff discussed with curiosity the reasons that might be pre~
venting it, and formed varying hypotheses to account for his
holding back 1. As a matter of fact, as his dispatch to Lord
Liverpool explains 2, the British Commander-in-Chief was still
hoping for a second Bussaco. He saw that Marmont was not
going to attack till his rear hOod come up, but hoped that hc
might do so that afternoon or next morning, when he had aU
his men in hand. The daring way in which the Marshal con-
tinued to hold on to un untenable position, within cannon
shot of his enemy's line, seemed to argue an ultimate intention
to bring on an action.
Nor was Wellington very far out in his ideas: Marmont was
in a state of indecision. \Vhen the missing 10,000 men came
up he called a coun"cil of war-the regular resort of generals in
a difficulty. We have concerning it only the evidence of Foy,
who wrote as follows in his diary.
• At dusk on the 21st therc was a grand discussion, on the
problem as to whether we should or should not give battle to
the English. The Marshal seemed to have a desire to do so,
but a feeble nod hesitating desire. Remembering Vimeiro,
Corunna, and Bussaco, I thought that it would be difficult to
beat the English, our superiors ill number, on such a compact
position as that which they were occupying. I had not the first
word: I allowed Maucune, Ferey 3, and La l\Iartinicrc to
express their views, before I let them see what I thought. Then
Clausel having protestcd strongly against fighting, I supported
his opinion. Because wc had leIt a small garrison in thc
Salamanca forts, we were not bound to lose 6,000 killed and
wounded, and risk the honour 01 the army, in order to deliver
them. The troops were in good spirits, and that is excellent for
the fIrst assault: but here we should have a long tough struggle :
, Tomkinson's DianJ, IJ. 166.
I \Vellington to Liverpool, Sulanmllcll, June 25, in DispmdUJS, ix. p. 252.
• The first two were grout fire-eaters, ulld IIlwu)"S urged action.
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"I doubted whether wc had breath enough to keep it up to the
end. In short, I saw more chances of defeat than victory.
I urged that we ought to keep close to the English, "contain"
them, and wait for our reinforcements; this could be done by
manceuvring along the left bank of the Tormes above and
below Salamanca. Clausel and I set forth this policy from
every aspect. The Marshal was displeased: he fancied that
his generals were plotting to wreck his plan: he wanted to
redeem the blunder which he saw that he had made in leaving
a garrison in Salamanca: he dreads the Emperor and the public
opinion of the nrmy. Hc would have liked a battle, but he
had not del;crmination enough to persist in forcing it on 1.'
It seems. therefore. certain that Wellington nearly obtained
the defensive general action that he had desired and expected,
and was only disappointed because l\Iarmont was talked down
by his two best divisional generals. If the Marshal had made
his attack, it is denr t.hat his disaster would have been on n far
more complete and awful scale than the defeat which he was
actually to endure 011 July 22. For he would have had behind
him when repulsed (as he must have been) no friendly shelter
of woods and hills, such as then saved the wrecks of his army,
but a boundless rolling plain, in which routed troops would
have becn at the mercy of a cavalry which exceeded their own
in the proportion of seven to five (or slightly more).
On the morning of the 22nd, the British general, who had now
kept his army in position for thirty-six hours on end, began to
guess that he was not to be attacked. 'Was it worth while to
advance, since the enemy refused to do so? 'rhe conditions were
by no means so favourable as at the dawn of the 21st, when
l\Iarmont had been short ol 10,000 men. But the allied army
still possessed a perceptible superiority in numbers, a stronger
cavalry, and a dominating position, from which it would be
easy to deliver a downhill attack under cover of their
artillery.
Wellington, however, made no decisivc movement: he threw
up some jiCches to cover the batteries in front of the 1st and
7th Divisions, of which the latter was pushed a little nearer
to the Tormes. He brought up the six heavy howitzers whieh
, Foy's Vie militaire, cd. Girod de l'Ain, pp. 105-6.
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had been used against the forts, and placed them on this
same right wing of his position. Then he commenced a partial
offensive movement, which was apparcntly designed to draw
Mnrmont into a serious bickering, if he were ready to stand.
1'he 7th Division began to make an advance to'vards Morisco :
the skirmishcrs of the Light Brigade of the King's German
Legion moved down, and began to press in the pickcts oplX'sitc
them, their battalions supporting. Soon after the 5]st and 68th,
from the other brigade of the division, that of De Berncwitz,
were ordered to storm a knoll inUllcdiatcly above Morisco,
which formcd the most advanced point of the enemy's line.
Wellington directed Graham to support them with the whole
1st and Light Divisions, if the enemy should bring up reinforce~
ments and show fight. But' nothing of the kind happened:
the two battalions curried the knoll with a single vigorous rush,
losilig some 30 killed and wounded 1. But the French made
no attempt to recapture it, drew back their skirmishing line,
and retired to the village, only 200 yards behind, where they
stood fIrm, evidently expecting a general attack. It was not
delivered: Wellington had been willing to draw Marmont into
a fight, but was not intending to order an advance of the whole
line, and to precipitate a general offensive battle.
There was no more fighting that day, and next morning the
whole French army had disappeared save some cavalry vedettes.
These being pressed in by Alten's hussars, it \V'as discovered
that Marmont had gOlle back six miles, to a line of heights
behind the village of AldeaHubia, and was there in a defensive
position, with his left wing nearly touching the Tormes near
the fords of Hucrta. 'Wellington made no pursuit: only his
cavalry reconnoitred the new l~rench position. He kept his
army on the San Cristobal heights, only moving down Ansoll's
brigade of the 4th Division to hold Castellallos, and Halkett's
of the 7th Division to hold Morisco. Hulse's brigade of the
6th Division WI\.S scnt back to Salamanca, I\.S were also Dieksou's
six howit:r.ers, and Clinton was directed to press the siege of
, The 51st lost 3 killed and ao officcr and 20 men wounded: the 68th
2 killed and 6 wounded, the K.G.L. Light Battalions 8 killed and 3 officer!:!
and 17 men wounded. Thcre are oarruthrc!J of the combat in the Mcmoir!:l
of Green of the 68th, and Major Riee llnd l'rivate Wheeler of the .5Jst.
o!U-'1. v B b
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the forts-notwithstanding the unhappy fact that there was
scarcely any ammunition lelt in the batteries.
Marmont had undoubtedly been let off easily by Wellington:
yet he hardly realized it, so filled was his mind with the idea
that his adversary would never take the oUensive. His report
to King Joseph shows a sublime ignorance of his late danger.
As the document has never been published and is very short,
it may be worth quoting.
• Having concentrated the greater part of this army on the
evening of the 19th, I marched on Salamanca the same day.
I seized some outlying posts of the enemy, and my army
bivouacked within halI cannon-shot of the English. Their army
was very weD posted, and I did not think it right to attack
yesterday (June 21) without making a reconnaissance of it.
The result of my observations has convinced me that as long
as my own numbers are not at least equal to theirs, I must
temporize, and gain time lor thc arrival 01 the troops from the
Army of the North, which General CaUarelli has promised me.
n they arrive I shall be strong enough to take an enterprising
course. 'rill thcn I shall manreuvre round Salamanca, so as
to try to get the enemy to divide his army, or to move it out 01
its position, whieh will be to my advantage. The Salamanca
forts are making an honourable defence. Since we came up
thc enemy has ceased to attack them, so that I have gained
time, and can put oU a general adion for some days if I think
proper 1.'
Marmont's plan for • manceuvring around Sn.lamanca'
proved (as we shall see) quite ineUeetivc, and ended within
a fcw days in a dcfinite retrcat, whcn hc found that the succours
promised by Caffarelli were not about to appear.
Meanwhile the siege of the Salamanca forts had recommenced,
on the 2iJrd, under the depressing' conditions that the artillery
had only 60 rounds (15 apiecc I) lor the four heavy is-poundcrs,
which were their eft,ective weapons, and 160 for the six howitzers,
which had hitherto proved almost useless. The two light field-
guns (6-pounders) wcrc also replaccd all the first floor of San
Dernardo to shell the cnemy'sloopholes-thcy wcreno good at aD
, Marmont to Joseph, night of the 22nd June, from bivouac before
SaD Cristobal. Intercepted dispatch in the ScoveU Papers.
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for battering. This time the besiegers placed one of their heavy
guns in thc right flanking battery near San Bemardo, to get an
oblique enfilading fire against the gorge of the San Cayetuno fort.
The new idea was to leave San Vincentc alone, as too hard
a nut to crack with the small supply of shot available, and to
batter the lesser fort from flank and rear with the few rounds
remaining. The entire stock, together with a hundred rounds
of shell, was used up by the afternoon, when no practicable
brcaeh htld been made, though the palisadcs of San Cayctano
had been battered down, and its parapet much injured. Never·
thcless Wellington ordered an attempt to storm (or rather to
escalade) the minor fort at 10 p.m. Oll the same evening. It was
to be carried out by the six light companies of Bowes's and
Hulse's brigades of the 6th Division, a force of between 800 and
400 filCH. • The undertaking was difficult, and the mcn seemed
to feel it,' observes the oHicial historian of the Peninsular
sieges 1. The major of one of the regiments engaged remarks,
, the re~mltwas precisely such !l.':i most of thc officers anticipated
-(I. failure attended with severe loss of life.' The storming-
column, starting from the ruins near the left flanking battery,
had to charge for the gorge of San Cayetuno, not ouly undcr the
tire of that work, but with musketry and nrtillery from Siln
Vincente taking them in the rear. The casualties from the first
moment were very heavy-many men ncver got near the
objective, and only two Indders Ollt of twenty were planted
against the fort 2. No one tried to ascend them-the project
being obviously useless, and thc stormcrs run buck under cover
after having lost six olIicers and 120 men, just a third of their
numbers 3, Among the killed was Gcneral Bowes, commanding
the second brigude of the division, who had insisted on going
forward with his light companies-though this was evidently
not brigadier's work. Apparently he thought that his personal
influence might enable his men to accomplish the imlXlssible.
He was hit slightly as the column started, but bound up his
• Jones, i. p. 281.
• The regimental history of the 53rd sa)'s that the ladders were so badly
made, of green wood, that many of them earne to pieces in the hands at
their earricrs long before they got near the tort.
• The loss has got exaggerated in many reports, because the casualties
ill tlie 7th Division at Morisco 011 the preceding day are added to the total.
Bb 2
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wound. and wcnt Corward a second timc, only to be killed at
the very Coot oC the ladders, just as his lUen hI'oke and retired.
This. as all engaged in it agreed, was tl very unjustifiable
enterprise; the escalade was impracticable so long as Sail
Vincente was intact, and able to cover the gorge oC San Cayetano
with an effective fire Crom the rear. The siege now had a second
period oC lethargy, all the shot having been used up. It was only
on the morning of the 2Gth, three da)'S later, that thc convoy
from Almcida. ordered up on the 20th by Wellington, arrived
with 1,000 rounds carried by mules, and cnablcd the battering
to begin OIl<:C more.
Meanwhilc :Marmont had been making persistent but inerrec~
tive diversions against Wellington. The advantage of the
position to which he had withdrawn was that it commanded
the great bend. or elbow, of the Tonnes, where (at the ford ol
Huertn) that river turns its general course from northward to
westward. Troops sent across the river here could threaten
Salamanca from the south. and, if in sufficient strength, might
force Wellington to evacuate purt of the San Cristobal position,
in order to provide a containing force to prevent them from
communicating with and relieving the besieged forts. The
Marshal's own statement of his intention 1 was that he hoped.
by manccuvring, to get Wellington either to divide his army or
to leave his strong ground, or both. He aimed, no doubt, at
obtaining t.he opport.unity for a successful action with some
isolated part of Wellington's force, but was still too much
convinced of the danger of fighting u. generul action to be ready
to risk much. Moreover he WIlS expecting, [rom day to day,
the 8,000 men of the Army of the North whom CafIarelli had
promised him: and it would be reckless to give battle before
\, they arrived-if only they were really coming.
Wellington could see, by his own eyes no less than by the
map, for he rode along l'IIarmont's new front on the 23rd, that
the French position gave good possibilities for a passage of the
elbow of the Tormcs ut Huerta: wherefore he detached Bock's
brigade of German Dragoons to the south of 'the river, with
orders to wateh the roads debouching from the fords, and to
act as a detaining force if any hostile cavalry crossed them. He
I See above. p. lno.
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also threw forward Alten's hussars to Aldea Lengua, n. village
and ford half-way between Cabrerizos and Aldea Rubia, with
the object oC keeping a similar close watch on any attempt of
Marmont's to move north oC the river. One brigade of the
Light Division camc forward to support Alten-the other was
cchcloncd a little back, on hills above AldeR Lengua.
On the late evening of the 28rd l\farmont sent a squadron or
two across the Huerta fords, which turned back after running
into Boek's vcdcttes. This was merely nn exploring party to
test the practicability of the passage; but next morning, in
a heavy fog, skirmishing fire and occasional reports of cannon
told \VcllingtoIl that somc marc important detachment was
across the '1'ormes, and engaged with the Germans. The
British head-quarters stafl rode to the hill above Aldea Lengua,
which commands a wide view over the south bank, and, when
the morning vapours rolled up at 7 o'clock, saw Bock retiring
across the rolling plain in very good order, pressed by a heavy
foree oC all urms-two divisions oC inCantry headed by a light
cavalry brigade with a horse artillCJ'y battery, which was doing
some harm to the two dragoon regiments as they retired in
alternate echelons ueross the slopes.
Fortunately there was cxcdlent ddensi\'e fighting-ground
south of the Tormes, in prolongation of the San Cristobal
position north of it. The ravine and brook l called thc Ribera dc
Pelagarcia with wooded heights above them, :run in front of
Santa Marta and its ford, for some miles southward from the
'l'ormes. There was a similar line of high ground facing it, with
the villages of Pelabravo and Calvarisa de Ariba on its top,
which the French might occupy, but on passing down from them
they would run against a formidable position. Along these
hills, indeed, Wellington's first linc oC defence was to be formed
a month later, on the day of the battle of Salamanca. On
seeing Back's careful retreat in progress, tbe Commander-in-
Chief ordered Gruhum to cross the Tonnes at Sallta Marta with
the 1st and 7th Divisions, and to occupy the ground in front of
him. This was a short move, and easily neeomplished while the
French detachment was pushing the German dragoons slowly
1 I find the namc UilJera dc l'elngnreill only in WIC lIlore modcrn
Spanish maps: contemporary plans do lIot give it.
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backward. The 4th and 5th Divisions moved down to the
north bank of the 'formes, ready to foUow if Marmont should
support his advanced guard, by sending more men over the
Huerta fords. Le Marchallt's hca\'y brigade crossed the river
with a horse artillery battery, and wcnt to reinforce Bock,
whom the French could now only push in by bringing forward
infantry. Their advance continued as far as the village of
Calvarisu de Aba.xo, and a little beyond, where the wholc 9,000
or 10,000 mcn deployed, as if intending to attack Graham.
But just ns observers on the AideR Lengun heights were begin-
ning to think that serious fighting was probable \ the whole
fell back into colunm of march, and, retiring to Hucrta covered
by their chasseurs, rccrossed the river.
The state of aHairs at nightfall was just what it had been
at dawn. Graham ~llld Le Marehant went baek to their old
ground north of the river, and south or it cavalry alone was
left-this time Altcn's brigade, for Bock's had hud a heavy
day, and needed rest. So cnded a spectacular but almost
bloodless manreuvre-the German dragoons lost three killed
and two wounded: the French light horse probably 110 more.
In a dispatch written the same night l\Iarmont fmnkly owns
that he was foiled by 'Wellington's counter-move. This hitherto
unpublished document is worth quoting. It is addressed to
General Caffarelli, and runs as follows 2. 'The movcment
which I have made toward Salamanca has caused the enemy
to suspend his attack on the torts of that town. [An error,
as it was not the movement but the lack of ammunition which
stopped the bombardment.] This consideration, and the way
in which I found him posted to keep me off, and not least your
assurance that your powerful reinforcements would reach me
very soon, have determined me to suspend the attack which
I was about to deliver against him. I stOJl here with the object
of gaining time, and in the expectation of your arrivaL' From
this it is clear that it Graham had not been found so well posted,
, TomJ.inson, p. ]70: 'Just before they began to retire, I thought that
their a(lvflnee looked "Crious. Dur position wn~ good, and if they had
rOllght wiLl, what Imrl crOllscd, our rorce wOllld have been the greater.'
• This is one of the ,unny cipher dispntehes in the Scovell Papers, which
I have found 80 ilIll1nin"ting in lll'eriod when Mnrmont's writings, printed
or in the French llrchives, IlI'C very few.
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in a position where he could readily be reinforced from San
Cristobal, .l\larmont would have followed up his advanced
guard with the rest 01 his army, and have struck at Salamanca
from the South. But finding the ground on the left hank of
the river just as unfavourable to him as that on the north, he
gave up the game and retired. He risked a serious check, for
Wellington might have ordered Graham to Collow und attack
the retreating divisions, who would have had great difficulty
in recrossing the Tormes without loss, if they had been pursued
and attacked while jammed at the fords. But Wellington Was
still in his defensi vc mood, and took no l;sks, contented to
have foiled most cffcctively his enemy's manreuvrc.
On thc 25th l\larmont remained stationary, waiting for
further advices from Caffarelli, which fn.iled to come to hand.
Nor did Wellington make any move, save that of sending orders
that the siege of the forls was to be pressed as early and as
vigorously as possible. The guns were back in their batteries,
waiting lor the ammunition which was yet to appear. All that
could be done without shot was to push forward n trench along
the bottom of the ravine between San Vincente and the other
two forts, to cut art communication between thcm. The French
fired fiercely at the workers, where they could look down into
the ravine, and killed some of them. But there was mueh
'dcad ground' which could not be reached from any point in
the forts, and by dawn on the 26th the treneh was far advanced,
and a picket was lodged safely in it, close under the gorge of
San Cayetano.
On the morning of the 26th the convoy of powder and shot
from Almeida reached the front, and at threc in the afternoon
the besiegers recommenced their fire. This time no guns were
placed in the original battery opposite the north front of San
Vineente; the four IS-pounders all went into the right flank
attack, and were concentrated on the gorge of San Cayetano.
Four of the howitzer.; were placed in the left flank battery,
nenr the College of Cuencn, and directed to fire red-bot shot
into the roof and upper story of San Vincente. The field-guns
in San Bernardo, aided by one hO'·vitzer, took up their old work
of trying to keep down the fire of the forts.
The battering in 01 the gorge of San Cnyetano mnde considcr-
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able progres's, but the most effective work was that of the red-
hot shot, whieh before night had set the tower of San Vineente
and scveral points of its roof in flames. By heroic exertions the
garrison succeeded in extinguishing them, but the besiegers'
fire was kept up all night, and from time to time new conflagra-
tions burst out. 'fhe governor afterwards informed the British
engineers that eighteen separate outbreaks were kept down
within the twenty-four hours before his surrender \ The fort
was ...·cry inflammablc, owing to thc immense amount of timber
that had been used for en.semating, tro.verses, barricades, and
parapets, inside its walls. Still it was holding out at day-
break, though the garrison was nearly exhausted: the governor
signalled to l\1armont that hc eould not resist for marc than
three days-a sad over-estimate of his power, as wus to be
shown in a few hours. As a subsidiary aid to, the work of the
guns two mines were commenced, one from the ravine, destined
to burrow under San Cayetano, the other from the cliff by the
river, intended to reach La Merced. But neither was fated to
be used, other means sufficing.
After four hours' pounding on the morning of the 27th, the
gorge of San Cayetano had been hattered into a real and very
pmctieablc breach, while a new fifc had broken out in San
Vincente, larger than anyone which had preceded it. It
reached the main store of gabions and planks within the
fort, and threatened the powder magazine. 'fhe garrison were
evidently flinching from their guns, as the counter-fire from
the place, hitherto very lively, began to flag, and the whole
building was wrapped in smoke.
Thereupon Wellington ordered San Cayetano to be stormed
for the second time. 'fhe column charged with the operation
crept forward along the trench at the bottom of the ravine,
fairly well covered till it had reached the spot immediately
below the gorge of the fort. Just as the forlorn hope was
about to start out of the trench, a white flag was shown from
thc breach. 'fhc captain commanding in San Cayetano asked
for two hours' truce, to enable him to communicate with his
chief in San Vincente, promising to sUIrendcr at the end of that
time. Wellington offered him five minutes to march out, if he
1 JOIlCS, Sieges Qftlw l>eni,l8Uw, i. p. 286.
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wished to· preserve his garrison's lives and baggage. As the
Frenchmen continued to haggle and argue, he was told to take
down his white flag, as the assault was about to be delivered.
When the stormers ran in, San Cayetano made practically no
defence, though a few shots were fired, which caused six
casualties in the assaulting column: the greater part of the
garrison threw down their muskets and made no resistance.
At the same moment the white flag went up on San Vipcente
also: herc the eonAagration was now burning up so fiercely
that the French had been able to spare no attention for the
storming-party that captured San Cayctano. The governor,
Duchemin, asked for three hours' suspension of arms, and
made a proposal of terms of surrender. 'Wellington, here as at
the smaller fort, refused to grant time, as he thought that the
fire would be subdued and the defence prolonged, if be allowed
hours to be wasted in negotiations. He sent in the same ulti-
matum as at San Cayctano-five minutes for the garrison to
march out, and they should have all the' honours of war' and
their baggage intact. Duchemin, like his subordinate, returned
a dilatory message, but while his white flag was still flying, the
!)th Cal;adores pushed up out of the ravine and entered the
battery on the east side of the work. They were not fired on,
no one in San Vincente being prepared to continue the defence,
l.Uld the French standt~rd came down without further resistance.
Not quite 600 unwounded men of the garrison were captured.
They had lost just 200 during the siege, including 14 officers I.
The cnsualties among the British were, as might have been
expected, much heavier, largely owing to the unjustifiable
assault of June 28rd. They amounted to 5 offit'efS and 94 men
killed, and 29 officers and 302 men wounded. A considerable
store of clothing, much powder, and 36 guns of all sorts were
found ill the thrcc forts. The powder was mude over to CarIos
de Espafla, one of whose ofJicers, having moved it into the
town on the 7th July, conlrivcd to explode many barrels, which
, The tolal given by the governor to Wnrre ur Bel'e!'lrord'" litnIT (!SCe hili
ut/ers, cd. Dr. Warre, p. 270) were a oflleel'!l und.w men killed, 11 omct:r~
nnd 1.1.0 men wounded. Martinlell',1isl;s lihow 12 officers hit,S in tbe tlat:.h,
2 eaeh in Um 15th nnd 17th ~er, J each in 86th, artillery, nlld cngiuccrs.
But these admirable lis\1l11.re not quite complete.
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killed several soldiers and twenty citizens, besides wrecking some
houses 1. The three forts were destroyed with care, when they
had been stripped of all their contents.
The fall of the Salamanca forts happened just in time to
prevent Marmont from committing himseU to a serious offensive
operation for their succour. It will be remembered that, on
June 24th, he had used the plea that Caffarelli's troops must
be with him, ere many days had passed, as a justification for not
pushing on to attack the British divisions in front of Santa
Mana. And this expectation was reasonable, in view of that
general's last dispatch from Vitjoria of June 14th 2, which
spoke of his appearance with 8,000 men as certain and imminent.
On the 26th, however, the Marshal received another letter from
the Army of the North, couched in a very different tone, which
upset all his plans. Caftarelli, writing ou the 20th, reporLed
the sudden arrival on the Biscay coast of Sir Home Pophll111's
fleet, whose strength he much exaggerated. In co-operation
with the English, Lollga, Rcnovalcs, and Porlier had all come
down from their mountains, and Bilbao we..:; in danger from
their lmexpected and simultaneous appearance. It would
probably be necessary to march todrive off the' 7th Army' and
the British expedition without delay. At any rate the trans-
ference of any infantry towards the Douro for the succour of
the Army of Portugal had become impossible for the moment.
The brigade of light cavalry and the guns might still be sent,
but thc infantry division had become indispensable elsewhere.
, I am sorry,' ended CaHarelli, ' but I could not have foreseen
this development, and when I spoke of marching towards you
I was far from suspecting that it could arise.'
This epistle changed the whole aspect of affairs: if the
infantry division from Vitioria had been diverted into Biscay
for an indefinite period, and if even the cavalry and guns (an
insignificant force so far as numbers went, yet useful to an
army short of horse) had not even started on June 20th, it
was elear that not a single man would be available from the
North for many days. Meanwhile the governor of the forts
, This ill said to llave been the result or the escort's smoking round
the store!
• l'rint.cd in Mnrmont's MbllmrlJ8, iv. p. 410.
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signalled at dawn on the 27th that seventy-two hours was the
limit of his power of resistance. Thereupon Marmont came to
the desperate resolve to attempt the relief of San Vi~centewith
no more than his own 40,000 men. He tells us that he intended
to move by the south side of the Tormes, crossing not at
Buerta (as on the 24th) but at Alba de Tormes, seven miles
higher up, where he had a small garrison in the old castle, which
protected the bridge. This move would have brought him
precisely on to the ground where he ultimately fought the
disastrous battle of July 22nd. He would have met Wellington
with 7,000 men less than he brought to the actual battle
that was yet to come, while the Anglo-Portuguese army was
practically the same in July as it was in June I. The result
could not have been doubtful-and Marmont knew that he was
taking a serious risk. But he did not fathom its full danger,
since he was filled with an unjustifiable confidence ill his
adversary's aversion to battle, and thought that he might be
manreuvred and bullied out of his position, by a move against
his communications 2. He would have found out his error in
front of the Arapiles on June 29th if he had persevered.
But he did not persevere: in the morning of June 27 the
firing at Salamanca ceased, and a few hours later it was known
that the forts had fallen. Having now no longer any reason
for taking risks, the Marshal changed his whole-plan, and
resolved to remove himself in haste from Wellington's neigh-
bourhood, and to take up a defensive position till he should
receive reinforcements. Two courses were open to him-the
first was to retire due eastward toward .4.rcvalo, and put himself
in communication, by Avila and Segovia, with the Army of the
Centre and Madrid. The second was to retire north-eastward
toward Valladolid, and to go behind the strong defensive line
of the Douro. Taking this line the Marshal would sacrifice his
touch with 1tIll.dl'id and the South, but would be certain of
picking up the reinforcement under Bonnet which he was
, If i\larmont had marched for Alba de Tormes 011 the 28th, all he
intended to do, Wellington would have hud the 6th Divillioll ill hand, as
weU all tile rest of his troopll, lOt 11 battle 011 the 29th: lor tilC forts fell early
011 tile 27th June.
• Sec his explanation or his intentions ill l'l1eIllQircs, iv. pp. 210-20.
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~xpe~ting from the Asturias, and would also be able torecei ....e
with sceurity whatever succour CaITarelli might scnd-cven if
it turned out to be no more than cavalry and guns.
This alternative he chose, proba.bly with wisdom, for in 11
position on the Douro he threatened Wellington's flank if he
should advance farther eastward, and protected thc centrul
parts of the kingdom of Lean froUl being overrun by the Army
of Galida and Silveira's Portuguese, who would have had no
containing force whatever in front of them if he had kept
south of the Douro and linked himself with Madrid. His
retreat, commenced before daybreak on the 28th, took him
behind the Guarena. river that night: on the 29th he crossed the
Trabancos, and restcd for a day after two forced marches. 011
the 30th he passed the Zapardiel, and reached Rueda, close to
~he Douro, on the following morning. From thence he wrote
to King Joseph a dispatch which explains sufficiently well all
his designs: it is all the more valuable because its details do
not. entirely bear out the version of his plans which hc gives
in his i1femoires.
• The Salamanca forts,' he said, • having surrendered, there
was 110 reason for lingering on thc Tormes; it was better to
fall bn.ck on his reinforcements. If he had not done so, he would
have been himself attacked, for Wellington was preparing to
strike, and pursued promptly. He had detached one di vision
[Foy) towards Toro and the Lower Douro to keep off Silveira,
who had passed that river at Zamora. Moreover the Galici3ns
had blockaded Astorga, and crossed the Orbigo. He felt that
he <:Quld defend the line of the Douro with confidence, being
aided by the line of fortified posts along it-Zamora, Toro, and
'l'ordesillas. Dut to take the oUensive against Wellington he
must have 1,500 more cavalry and 7,000 more infantry than
he actually had in hand-since the Anglo-Portuguesc army
was nearly 50,000 strong, and included 5,000 English horse.'
This reinforcement was precisely what Cn.ffarelli had promised,
but by the 28th not onc mun of the Army of the North hud
reached Valladolid. • If the general can trump up some valid
excuse for not sending me the infantry, there is none for
keeping back the cavalry-which is useless among his moun-
tains---or the artillery, which lies idle at Durgos.' Would it
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not be possible Cor the Army of the Centre to lend the Army of
Portugal 'l'reillard's division of dragoons from the valley of the
Tagus, since Caffarelli sent nothing? If only the necessary
reinforcements, 1,500 horse and 7,000 foot, came to hand, the
Army of Portugal could take the offensive with a certainty of
success 1; in eight days Wellington's designs could be foiled,
and Sulamanca could be rceovcrcd. But without that succour
the Marshal must keep to the defensive behind the Douro-
'I CAll combat the eourse of events, but cannot master them 2.'
Tlus interesting dispatch explains all that followed. Mar~
mont WllS IJrcpared to fight whenever he could show a rough
numerical equality with Wellington's army. He obtained it
a few days later, by the arrival of Bonnet with his 6,500 inIantry,
and the increase oC his Cllvuiry by 800 or 900 sabres owing to
measures hereafter to be described. On July 15th he had got
together nearly 50,000 mcn oC all arms, and at once took the
offensive, according to the programme which he had laid down.
It is, therefore, unfair to him to say that he declared himself
unable to fight till he should have got reinforcements either
from Caffarelli or from 1<:ln.drid, and then (in despite oC his
declaration) attacked Wellington without having received
them. He may have been presumptuous in acting as he did,
but at least he gave his Commander-in-Chief fair notice, ll. fort-
night beforehand, as to his intentions. It was the misfortune
of the French that somc oC their dispatches miscarricd, owing
to the activity of the guerrilleros, while othcrs came to hund
very late. I'Ifarmont and King Joseph-as we shall see-were
very impcdcetly and intcrmittcntly inform(,."{} as to cach other's
doings. Dut the Marshal c..""l-unot reasonably be accused of
• In this dispatch and that of July (l following, Murmont seems to under-
state his own force at the moment, saying that he can dispose of only
30,000 infantry, and 2,000 cavalry or a trifle over. Allowing for the
IIrtUlery, engineers und sappers, gendannerie ~lIld train, wbidl the monthly
return! show, tbi! would give all army of some 35,000 or 36,000 in all.
But the rcturIllJ (sce Appendix) indieate a higher flgure for the infllntry ;
after all deductions for detaebments, garrisons, and siek have been made,
it lookll as if there must have been 33,000 or cven 34,000 available. Generals
with a • point to prove' are IIlways a little easy with their figures .
• 'fhis is again one of the Soovell intercepted cipher-dispatches, captured
and bfflught to Wellington a day or two after it was written. It was
a duplicate, and presumably the other copy reached Madrid.
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betraying or deluding the King out of jealousy or blind ambition.
When he had collected a force very nearly equal to Wellington's
in numbers, and far superior in national homogeneity, he cannot
be blamed over-much tor attacking a foe whose fighting spirit
and initiative he much undervalued. That his conception of
Wellington's character and capacity was hopelessly wrong
cannot be denied: the estimate was to prove his rwn. But it
had not been tarmed without much observation and experiment:
after what he had seen on the eaya, and at Aldcn da l)ontc,
and recently on the heights of San Cristobal, he thought he
could take liberties with his opponent. lIe was to be unde-
ceived in a vcry rude fashion before July was out.
•SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER V
MARMONT TAKES THE OFF'EJ."ilSIVE. JULY 1812
ON July 2nd Wellington had arrived at the cnd of the first
stage of his campaign. He had cleared the French out of the
whole of southern Lean as lar as the Douro, had taken the
Salamancn forts, and had beaten off with case Marmont's
attempts to meddle with him. All this had been accomplished
with the loss of less than 500 men. But the success, though
marked, was not decisive, siuce the enemy's army had not been
beaten in the open field, but only manreuvrcd out of the
considerable region that it had evacuated. The most tangible
advantage secured wus that Marmont had been cut oU from
Madrid and the Army of the Centre: he could now communi·
cate with King Joscph only by the circuitous line through
Segovia. All the guerrilleros of Castile, especially the bands of
Saornil and Prineipe, were thrown on the Segovia and Avila
roads, where they served Wellington excellently, for they
captured most of the dispatchcs which were passing between
King Joseph and Marmont, who were really out of touch with
each other after the Marshal's retreat from the 'j'ormes on
June 27th.
But till l\Iarrnont had been beatcn in action nothing was
settletI, and Wellington had been disappointed of his hope that
the Army of Portugal would attack him in position, and allow
him to deal with it in the style of Bussaco. The lIIarshal had
rctired behind the Douro with his host intact: it WllS certain
that he would be joined there by Bonnet's division from the
Asturias, and very possible that he might also receive succour
from the Army of the North. The junction of Bonnet would
give him a pra<..tical equality in numbers with the British army:
any considerable reinforcement from CaUarclli would make
him superior in force. And there was still a chance that other
Freneh armies might intervene, though hitherto there were
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no signs of it. For it was only during the first fortnight of the
campaign that Wellington could reckon on having to deal
with his immediate adversary alone. He was bound to have
that much start, owing to the wide dispersion of the French,
and their difficulty in cOlIununicating with each other. But
us the weeks wore on, and the enemy became morc able to grasp
the situation, there was a growing possibility that outlying
fOrces might be brought up towards the Douro. If Marmont
had only been defeated on June 21st this would have mattered
little: and 'Vellington must have regretted more and more
each day that he had not taken the obvious opportunity. and
attacked the Army of Portugal when it placed itsel1. incom-
plete and in a poor position, beneath the heights of San Cristobal.
Now, howcvcr, sincc l\Iarmont had got away intact, cvcry-
thing depcnded on the working of the various divcrsions which
had been prepared to distract the other French armies. Oue
of them, Sir Home Popham's, had succeeded to admiration,
and had so scared CaCCarelli that not a man of the Army of the
North was yet in motion toward the Douro. And tllis fortunate
cxpedition was to continue effective: for another three weeks
Marmont got no succours from the army that was supposed
to constitute his supporting Con.oe by the instructions oC the
Emperor and oC JGug Joscph. But Wellington-not having
the gift of prophecy, though he could sec further into the fog
of war than other men-was unable to rely with certainty
on Cartarelli's continued abstinence from interference. As to
Soult, there were as yet no signs of any trouble from Andalusia.
The Duke of Dalmatia hud somewhat reinforced D'Erlon's
corps in Estrcmadura, but not to such an extent as threatened
any real danger to Hill, who reported that he could keep
D'Erlou in check on the Albuera position, and was not certain
that he might not be able to attack him at advantage-a move
for which he had his chief's permission 1. If only ·Wellington
had been fortunate enough to receive some of Soult's letters
to King Joseph, written in the second half of June, he would
have been much reassured: for the :Marshal was (as we shall
see) refusing in the most insubordinate style to carry out the
I See Wcllington to Lord Livcrpool, June 25. Di$po.lclwl, ix. pp. 253--1,
and to Hill, i:t. pp. 25(;-,7, and again to Lord Liverpool, ix. pp. 201-2.
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orders sent him to move troops northward. Two minor pieces
of intelligence from the South were of no primary importance-
though vexatious enough-one was that Ballasteros bad
ventured all a battle at Bornos all June I, and got well beaten:
but his army was not destroyed. The second was that General
Slade had s.ulfered a discreditable eheekat Maguilla on June 11th
in a cavalry combat with Lallcmand's dragoons. But neither
01 these events had much influence on Soult's general conduct
at the time, as we shall show in the proper place.
There remained one quarter from which Wellington had
received information that WllS somewhnt disturbing. An
intercepted letter from King Joseph to D'Erlon showed that
the latter bad been directed to move towards the Tagus, and
that the King himself was evidently thinking of bringing
succour to Marmont, so far as his modest means allowed 1. But
since this projected operation seemed to depend on assistance
being granted by Soult, and since it was doubtful in the highest
degree whether Soult would give it, Wellington was not with-
out hopes that it might come to nothing. ' I have requested
the Empecinado,' he writes to Lord Liverpool, 'to alarm the
King for the safety of his situation about l\(adrid, and I hope
that Marshal Soult will nnd ample employment for his troops
in the blockade of Cadiz, the continued operations of General
Balla."teros, and those in Estremadura of Lieut.-General
Hill, whose attention I have called to the probable march of
this corps of the Army of the South through Estremadurn.' "As
a matter of fact Soult prevented D'Erlon from giving any help
to thc King 01" Marmont; but a contingency was to arise of
which Wellington, on July 1st, could have no expectation-viz.
that, though refused all help from the South, Joseph might
come to the desperate but most soldier-like determination to
march with his own little army alone to the Douro, in order to
bring to bear such influence as he possessed on what was
obviously a critical moment in the war. The King and Jourdan
• See Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 18. Di8polc1mt, ix. p. 241, and
JIUle $, p. $8. There Wll.ll also ill Wellington's hands an intercepted
letter 01 Joseph to Soult of May 26, distinctly saying thu.t if Matmont is
attacked in June, D'Erlou lIIust IllIS\! the Tl1gus ami go 10 his l,clp. 'l'hia
is in the Scovell cijlheu.
0111"0\:.'. v cc
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were the only men in Spain who showed a true apprecia.tion of
the crisis: but they made their move too late: the fault was
undoubtedly Soult's alone. However, on July 1st, Wellington
was justified in doubting whether uny danger would arise all
the side of Madrid. Joseph could not move the Army of the
Centre to the Douro, without risking his capital and abandoning
all New Castile. As late as July 11th Wellington suspected
that he would not make this extreme sacrifice, but would
rather push a demonstration down the '1'agus to alarm central
Portugal, a. hypothesis whieh did not much alarm him 1. The
King and Jourdan knew better than to make this indeci-
sive move, and marched where their 14,000 men might have
turned the whole course of the campaign-but marched too
late.
There was still a chance that Suchet might be helping the
King-this depended entirely on an unknown factor in the
game, the diversion which Lord William Bcntinck had promised
to execute on the coast of Catalonia. If it had begun to work,
as it should have done, by the second half of June, there was
little chance that any troops Irom the eaStern side o[ Spain
would interfere in the struggle on the Douro. But no informa-
tion of recent date was yet Iorthcoming : it was not till July 14th
that the vexatious news arrived that Lord William was faltering
in his purpose, and thinking of plans for diverting his expe-
ditionary force to Italy.
The situation, therefore, WhCll l\larmont wcnt behind the
Douro on July 1st, had many uncertain points: there were
several dangerous possibilities, but nothing had yet happened
to m.ake ultimate success improbable. On the whole thc most
disappointing factor was the conduct of the Army of Galicia. Ct
will be remembered that Wellington had arranged for a double
diversion on Marmont's flank and renr. Silveira, with the
militia of the Tras-os-Montes and D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry
brigade, was to cross the Esla and besiege Zamora. Santocildcs,
with the Army of Galieia, bad been directed to attack Astorga
with part of his force, but to bring the main body forward to
1 Wellington to Hill, July 11. .Di.spCltchcs, ix. p. 281. The idea thll~
Joscph might operate on his own Il.CCOIUlt begins to emcrge in the corre-
spondence on thc Utlt. DUl'atdle3, Ix. p. 283.
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the Esla. and overrun the plains of northern Leon. Silveira
bad but a trifling torce, and the task allotted to him was small :
hut on July 1st he had not yet reached Zamora with his in1autry,
and was only at Carvajales on the Esla I, On the other hand
D'Urban's cavalry had pushed boldly forward in (ront of him,
had swept the whole north bank of the Douro as (ar as Toro,
and reported that 1Il1 the French garrisons save Astorga,
7..amora, and 'l'oro had been drawn in-that llenavente, Leon,
and all the northern plain were unoccupied. On July 2 D'Vrban
was at Castronucvo, north of Toro, right in the reaf of Mar·
mont's flank-a very useful position, since it enabled him to
keep up communication between Silveira and the Galicians, as
well as to report any movement of the Freneh right. Moreover,
though his force was very small, only 800 sabres, it was enongh
to prevent any foraging parties from l\farmont's rear from
exploiting the resources of the north bank of the Douro. Some
such appeared, but were driven in at once, so that the Marshal
ho.d to live on his magazines and the \'iIlages actually within
his lines: in the end these resources would be exhausted, and
the old choice-starvation or dispersion-would once more be
presented to the Army of Portugal 2.
But os a military body neither D'Urban's 800 horse nor
Silveira's 4,000 militia had any threatening power ngainst
Marmont's rear. They might almost be neglected, while the
real pressure which Wellington had intended to apply in tlLis
quarter was not forthcoming. He had hoped that, by the time
that he and Marmont were at close quarters, the Army of
Galiciu. would have been taking !l uscIul purt in the campaign.
It was not that he intended to use it as a fighting force: but if
it eould have appeared in the French rear 15,000 strong, it would
haye eompelled Marmont to make sueh a large detachment
1 By no fault of his own, according to D'Urban. The orders for him to
move were, by some delay at head-quarters, only forthcoming on June 8U1.
Only two of the rOut Tras·QS·Montes militia regiments were then mobilized,
and it took a long time to collect Ule rest and the transport needed ror
moving across the frontier,
• D'Urban's manQ:uvres on both sides of the Douro nre detailed ut grent
length in his very interesting diary, and his official correspondence, both
of which have been placed at Ill)' disposal. He worked on bolh sides or the
ThJuro, but went definitely north or it after July I,
e ,2
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for the purpose of • containing' it, that he would have been,
left in a marked numerical inferiority on the Douro.
Unfortunately the Galieians moved late, in small numbers,
Rnd with marked timidity. They exercised no influence what-
ever on the course of the campaign, either in June or in July,
Yet after Bonnet evacuated the Asturias and went ort eastward
on June 15th, the Army of Galicia had no field-force of UIl)'
kind in front of it. The only French left in its neighbourhood
were the 1,500 men 1 who formed the garrison of Astorga.
Castaiios, who had moved up to Santiago ill June, and assumed
command, did not take the field himself, but handed over the
charge of the troops at the front to Santoeildes. 'fhe latter
sat down in front of Astorga with his main body, and only
pushed forward a weak division under Cabrera to Benaveute,
where it was still too remote from MaJ:mont to cause him any
disquiet. The siege of Astorga wos only a blockade till July
2nd, as no battering-train was brought up till that date.
Fir!>t Abadia, and later Castaiio!> had pleaded that they had
no meo.ns for 0. regular siege, nnd it wns not till Sir Howard
Douglas pointed out a sufficient store of heavy guns in the
arsenal of Corunna, that Castafios began to scrape together the
battering-train that ultimately reached Astorga 2. But this
was not so much the weak point in the operations of the
Galician army, as the fact that, of 15,000 men brought together
on the Orbigo, only 3,800 were pushed forward to the Esla,
while the unnccessarily large remainder conducted a leisurely
siege of the small garrison of Astorga. Wellington had reckoned
on having an appreciable force, 10,000 or 12,000 men, at the
front, molesting Marmont's flank: tbis would have forced the
Marshal to make CL large detachment to keep it off. But not
a man appeared on the east bank of the Esla, and the operations
of D'Urban's small brigade were of far more service to the main
army than that of the whole of the Galicians. Marmont
ignored the presence of the few thousand men pushed forward
to Bcnavente, und was justified in so doing. 1tlcanwhile Santo-
1 Two battalions of 28rd Uger Bnd one of 1st Line from ThOJl\i~reB's
division.
I For the curiOIl~ story of Uleir ignomnce of lhcir own r"sour"t,s see
Sir Hownru Douglas's Lift, pp. ]56--7.
1812J SIEGE OF ASTORGA 389
cildes, with an optimism that proved whoUy unjustifiable, sent
messages that Astorgawould be taken within a fewdays, and that
be would then move forward with his main body. As a matter
of fact the place held out till the 18th of August.
Wellington, therefore, was building on a false hypothesis when
he wrote to Lord Bathurst, on July 7, that hc was surveying
all thc fords of the Douro, and waiting till thc rivcr should
have follen 0. little and mo.de thcm morc practicable. • By that
time I hope that the Army of Galicia under General Santocildes
will have been able to advance, thc siege of Astorga having
been brought to a conclusion 1.' Two days later he added, ' it
would not answer to cross the river at aU in its present state,
unless we should be certain of having the co-operation of the
Galician troops 2: His delay in making an attempt to force the
line of the Douro, therefore, may be attributed in the main
to the tiresome conduct of Santoeildes, who played to him
mueh the same part that CaJfarelli played to l\iarmont.
While remaining in this waiting posture, Wellington placed
his troops opposite the vnrious passages of the Domo, on 0. line
of Imme fifteen miles. His left, ~onsisting of the Srd Division,
Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese, and CarIos de Espai'ia's
Spaniards, with Le :Marchant's and Bock's heavy dragoons, lay
near the point where the Trabancos falls into the Douro, holding
the ford of Pollos, where the favourable configuration of the
ground enabled them to be sure of the passage, the enemy's line
being perforce drawn back to some distance on the north bank.
It was always open to Wellington to use this ford, when he
should determine on a general advance. The Light, 4th, 5th,
and 6th DivisiolUi, rorming the right wing, lay opposite Torde-
sillas, with Rueda and La Seca behind them. Their front was
covered by Alten's cavalry brigade, their right (or outer) flank
by Ansoll's. The reserve was formed by the 1st and 7th
Dh.-isions quartered at Medina del Campo, ten miles to the rear.
The whole could be assembled for an offensive or a defensive
move in a day's march.
l\Iarmont was drawn up, to face the attack that he expected, in
an almost equally close and concentrated formation: his front,
extending from the junction of the Pisuerga with the Douro
1 Dispatches, Ix. p. 274. • Ib!d., ix. Il. 276.
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near Simancas on his left, to the ground opposite the lord
of PolIos on his right, was very thickly held 1; but on the 5th
he rightly conceived doubts as to whether it would not be
easy for Wellington to turn his western flank, by using the ford
of Castro Nuilo and other passages down-stream from Pollos.
He then detached Fay's division to Toro and the neighbourhood,
to guard against such a danger: but this was still an insufficient
provision, since Toro is fifteen miles from Pollos, and a single
division of 5,000 men would have to watch rather than delend
sllch a length of river-line, if it were attacked in force. Therefore
when Bonnet, so long expected in vain, arrived from the North
on July 7th, Marmont placed him in this portion of his line, for
the assistance of Foy. He still retained six di visions massed
around Tordesillas, whose unbroken bridge gave him a secure
access to the southern bank of the Douro. With this mass of
35,000 mcn in hand, hc could mcct 'Wellington with a solid body,
if the latter crossed the Douro at or below Pollos. Or he might
equally well take the more daring step of assuming a counter·
offensive, and marching from Tordcsillas on Salamanca against
his adversary's communications, if the allies threatened his own
by passing the river and moving on Valladolid.
A word to explain the tardiness of Bonnet's arrival in com-
parison with the carlincss of his sturt is perhaps required. Hc
had evacuated Ovicdo and Gijon and his other posts in the
Asturias as early as June 14th, the actual day on whieh Welling-
ton l.'ornmcnced his offensive campaign. This hc did not in
consequence of l\farmont's orders, which only reached him when
he had begun to move, but on his own responsibility. He
had received correet information as to the massing of the allied
army round Ciudad Rodrigo, and of the forward movement
of the Galieians towards Astorga. He knew of the dispersed
state of Marmollt's host, and SaW the danger to himself. Should
the Marshal concentrate about Salamanca, he eould never
join 'him, if the whole Army of Galicia threw itself between.
Wherefore not only did he resolvc to retreat at once, hut he did
1 An interesting dispatch from D'Urhlln to Beres!ord describe!! the
information he hod got on the tith by n daring rc(:onnaissallce along
MarmOTlt'R rellr: there WllS not Umt morning ony French force west of
Monte de Cubillos, six miles down·strcllln !rom Pollos.
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not move by the pass of Pajares and Leon-the obvious route
to rejoin the Army of Portugal. For fear that he might be
intercepted, he took the coast-road, picking up the small
garrisons that he had plaeed in one or two small ports, He
reached Santundcr on the 22nd, not molested so mueh as he
might have been by the bands of Porlier and 1.ong3. (whose
haunts he was passing), because the bulk of them had gone off
to help in Sir Home Popham's raid on Biscay. From Santander
he turned inland, passed Reynosa, in the heart of the Cantabrian
Sierras, on the 24th June, and arrived at Aguilar del Campo,
the first town in the provincc or Palencia, on the 29th. From
thence he had a long march of seven days in the plnins, beforc
he reached Valladolid on the 6th, and reported himself at
Marmont's head-quarters on thc 7th or July. He brought with
him a strong division of 0,500 infantry, a light field-battery, und
a singlc squadron of ChMseurs--even 100 sabres 1 were a wel-
come reinforcement to l\farmont's under-horsed army. It was
an odd fuct that Bonnet's division had never before met the
English in battle, though onc or its regiments had seen them
during the last days of Sir John Moore's retreat in January
1809 2, For the thrce years since that datc they had always
been employed in the Astnrias.
The arrival or Bonnet brought up the total of Marmont's
infantry to 43,000 men, and his guns to 78. The cavalry still
remained the weak point: but by a high-handed and unpopular
measure thc Marshal succeeded, during his stay on the Douro, in
procuring nearly 1,000 horses for the dismounted dragoons who
were encumbering his depOt at Valladolid. In the French, as
in the British, Peninsular army it had beeome common for
many of thc junior officers of the infantry to provide themselves
with a riding-horse; most captains and many lieutenants had
them. And their seniors, chefs de bataillon and colonels,
habitually had several horscs more than they were entitled to.
Marmont took the heroic measure of proclaiming that he should
enforce the regulations, and that all unauthorizcd horses werc
, Ninety.rour to be exnct. See 28th Chasseurs in whle or i'llu.rmont's
army in Appeudix.
I The 122lld Line Imd been in Mermet's division, in .Tllnullry 1809, but
they lJoo been in I'ellCrve ut Cormlllll, und hud nut fired 0. shot in Umt buttle.
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confiscated. He paid, however, a valuation for each beast on a
moderate scale--otherwise the act would have been intolerable.
In this way. including some mounts requisitioned from doctors,
commissaries, and suttlers, about 1,000 horses in all were
procured. The number of cavalry fit for the field had gone up
by July 15th from about 2,200 to a,200-a total which was only
800 less than Wellington's full strength of British sabres. It
occurs to the casual observer that the horses, having never been
trained to squadron drill or to act in mass, must have been
difficult to manage, even though the riders were competent
horsemen. This may have something to do with the very
ineffective part played by the French cavalry in the next fort-
night's campaigning.
A quaint anecdote of the time shows us General Taupin, an
old Revolutionary veteran, with all the officers of his brigade
called together in a village church" 'He ascended the pulpit
and thundered against the abuse of horses in the infantry: he
would make an end of all baggage carried on mules or asses, but
most especially of the officers' riding-horses. .. Gentlemen," he
cried, "in 1708 wc were allowed a havcrsack as our only baggage,
a stone as our only pillow." Well-it was a Jong time since
1793: wc were in 1812, and the speaker, this old and gallant
soldier, hud sia: baggage mules himseI1 1.'
During the first ten days after the deadlock on the Douro
began, the French were much puzzled by WclHngton's refusal
to eontinue his advance. Foy, the ablest of l.hcm, noted in his
diary that he must conclude either that the enemy was not
numerous enough to take the offensive-his strength might
have been over-valued--or else that he was waiting for Hill to
bring up his corps from Estremadur!~. This last idea, indced,
was running in the brains of many }~reneh strategists: it
obsessed Jourdan and IGng Joscph at Madrid, who were well
aware that Hill, marching by Alcantnra l\Ild thc passcs of the
Sierra de Gata, could have got to the Douro in half the time
that it would have taken his opponent, D'Erlon, who would
have had to move by Toledo, Madrid, and Segovia. But the
simple explanation is to be found in Wellington's dispatch to
Lord "Bathurst of July 13. 'It is obvious that we could not
, lIUnIQirC8 or Lemollnier·Ddarosse or the 31st U:gcr, pp. 17"7-8.
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cross the Douro without sustaining great loss, and could not
fight a general action under circumstances of greater disad-
vantage.... The enemy's numbers are equal, if not superior,
to ours: they have in their position thrice the amount of
artillery that we have, and we arc superior in cavalry alone-
which arm (it is probable) could not be used in the sort of
attack we should have to make 1.' Hc thcn proceeds to demon-
strate the absolute necessity of bringing forward the Army of
Gallcia against l\tarmont's renr. Its absence wns the real cause
of the deadlock in which he found himself involved. All
offensivc opcrations wcre postponcd-mcanwhilc the enemy
might receive reinforcements and attack, since he had not been
attacked. 'Dut I still hope that I l'ihall be able to retain, at the
close of this campaign, those acquisitions which we made at its
commencement. '
Meanwhile Marmont, having had a. fortnight to take stock
of his position, and having received reinforcements which very
nearly reached the figure that he had numed to King Joseph
as the minimum which would enable him to take the offensive,
was beginning to get restless. He had now realiu:d that he
would get no practical assistance from Caffarelli, who still kept
sending him letters exaggerating the terrors of Sir Home
Popham's raid on Biscay. They said that there were six ships
of the line engaged in it, and that there was a landing-force
of British regulars: Bonnet's evacuation of the Asturias had
allowed aU the bands of Cantabria to turn themselves loose on
Biscay-Bilbao was being attacked-and so forth. This being
so, it was only possible to send u. brigade of cavalry and a horse
artillery battery-anything more was useless to ask 2. This
was written on June 26th, but by July 11th not even the
cavalry brigade had started from Vittoria, ns was explained
by a subsequent letter, which only reached l\Iarmont after he
had already started on an oflcnsh'c campaign 3. As a matter
of ftlet, Calfnrelli's meagre contribution of 750 sabres 4 and onc
, Wellington to Bl\tllUrst. Dispurehu, ix. p. 284.
• Ca/Fu.relli to Mannont, in the latter'lIl1Jbooiru, iv.p. 417.
• Ibid., pp. 421-2.
• He SCllt finally only two rcgimcuts. not lhr(:e 11.'1 he had originally
promised.
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battery actually got oIl on July 16th I, l\iarmont may be
pardoned for having believed that it would never start at all,
\'I'hen it is remembered that a month had elapsed since he first
asked for aid, and that every two days he had been receiving
dispatches of excuse, but no reinforcements. He had no
adequate reason for thinking that even the triHing force which
did in the end start out would ever arrive.
Nor, as he demonstrates clearly enough in his defence of his
operations, had he any more ground for believing that Joseph
and Jourdan would bring him help from Madrid. They resolved
to do so in the end, and made a vigorous effort to collect as large
a force as was possible. Dut the announcement of their inten-
tion was made too late to profit Marmont. 'fhe dispatch
conveying it was sent orr from Madrid only all July 9th 2, and
never reached the Marshal at aU, for the two copies of it, sent
by separate messengers~ were both captured by guerrilleros
between Madrid and Valladolid, and came into Wellington's
instead of into Marmont's hands. This wns a consequence of
the insecurity of the communication via Segovia, the only one
route open when the Army of Portugal retired behind the Douro.
On July 12th thc last pic(.'C of intelligence from Madrid which
Marmont had received was a dispatch from Jourdan dated
June 30th-it had taken twelve days to get 150 miles, whieh
shows the shifts to which its bearer hud been exposed. This
letter is so important, as showing what the King and Jourdan
opined at the moment, that its gist is worth giving.
Jourdan begins by complaining that on Junc 30 the IllSt
dispatch from the Army of Portugal to hand was sixteen days
old, of the date of June 14th. It is clear, then, that no copies of
thc reports sent by Marmont on June 22 and Junc 24 had got
to l'iIadrid-a circumstance to be explained by the fact that
Wellington had them instead of their destined recipient 3.
Jourdan then proceeds to say that he is informed that Welling-
ton hllS 50,000 men, but only 18,000 of them British. 'The
King thinks that if this is so, you arc strong enough to beat his
I eaffarelli to Marmont, io tile latter's 111tnwir/JS, iv. p. 425, 1I11noulIcillg
their departure.
, Originul is in the Soovcll ciphers. It seems to be unpublished .
• They nre both in tilC Scovell ciphcrs, and qllot.cd llUove, p. 370.
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army, and would like to know the motives which have prevented
you from taking the offensive. He charges me to invite you to
explain them by express messenger.' In the South it was known
that Hill, with 18,000 mcn, was advancing on Junc 18th against
D'Erlon. That officer was to be reinforced from Seville, and
was probably at close quarters with Hill. The King had sent
orders thtlt D'Erlon was to move northward into the valley of thc
Tagus, if Hill marched up to join Wellington. But, it being
probable that the order would not be very promptly executed,
'his Majesty would like you to take advantage of the moment,
when Wellington hus not all his forces in hand, to fight him.
The King has asked for troops from Marshal Suchet, but thcy
will never be sent. All that His Majesty can uo at present is
to reinforce the garrison of Segovia, and order its governor,
General Espert, to help the garrison of Avila, if necessary, and
to supply it with food.'
This letter, which clearly gives no hope of immediate help
for the Army of Portugal from Madrid, and which might be
taken as a direct incitemcnt to bring Wellington to action at
once, must be read in conjunction with thc last epistle that
Marmont had reccived from the sfl.me quartcr. This was
a lcttcr of the King's dated June 18. The important paragraph
of it runs as follows ;-
'If Gencral Hill has remained with his 18,000 men on the
left (south) bank of the Tagus, you ought to be strong enough
to beat the English army, more especially if you havc rceeived
~my reinforcements from the. Army of the North. You must
choose your battlefield, and make your best dispositions. But if
Hill joins the main English army, I fancy they arc too strong
for you. In that case you must rnanceuvre to gain timc.
r should not hesitate to give you a positive order to defer
fighting, if I wcrc ccrtain that Count D'Erlon and his 15,000
men, a.nd a division from the Army of Aragon, were on their
way to you: for on their arrival the English army would be
seriously compromised. But being wholly uncertain about
them, I must repeat to you that if General Hill is still on the
south side of the Tagus, you should choose a good position and
give battle with all your troops united: but if General Hill
joins Lord Wellington, you must avoid an action as long as
390 MARMONT TAKES THE OFFEKSIVE [JULY
possible, in order to pick up the reinforcements which will
certainly reach you in the end 1.'
I think that there can be no doubt in the mind of any honest
critic that on the strength of these two dispatches from his
Commander-in-Chief, Marmont was justificd in taking the
otfcnsive against Wellington, without waiting for that help
from :Madrid which the King had not offcred him. Hill being
far away, and Wellington having no more than his own seven
divisions of Anglo-Portuguese, Marmont is decidedly authorized
to bring him to action. The sole factor which the seeoud
Madrid dispatch states wrongly, is the proportion of llritish
troops in the allied army: ·Jourdan guesses that there are 50,000
men, but only 18,000 British. As a matter of fact there werc
49,000 men at the moment 2, but about 30,000 were British.
This maae a difference, no doubt, and l\Iarmont, if he had been
determined to avoid a battlc, might have pleaded it as his
justification. But he was not sct on any such timid policy:
he had wellnigh attacked Wellington at San Cristobal on
June 21st, when he had not yet received his own reinforce-
ments. 'When Bonnet had come up, and the British had
obtained no corresponding addition to thcir strcngth, he was
eager to take the offensive, and Joseph's and Jourdan's dis-
patches distinctly authorized him to do so.
Art,er the disaster or Salamanca, Napoleon drew .up an
indictment of l\1armont, of which the thrce chief hends werc:
(I) He took the offensive without waiting for reinforcements
which were to join him.
(2) He delivered ?uttle without the authorization of his
Commander-in-Chief.
(3) He might, by waiting only two days longer, before he cOIn-
mitted himself to a general llctioli, have receivcd at least the
cavalry and guns which he knew that Carrarclli had sent him 3.
The very complete answer to these charges is that:
(1) Whcn the :Marshal took the offensivc he had no reasoll
, Joscph to Man"ont, June 18, in Dllcussc'a CQrrespondance, ix. pp. 28-39.
• Two battnlions, the 1/88 and ]/5th, joined betore the battle ot the
22nd, bringing up the total force by 1,500 bayonets more.
• See the letter ot C1arke to Marmont enclosing the Empcror'a indictment,
in )Iarmollt'~ i\UIIWirml, Iv. pp. 453-4.
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to suppose that !lny reinCoxccmcnh were coming. Cartarelli
had excused himself: the King had promised succour only if
Hill joined Wellington, not otherwise. Hill had never appeared :
therefore no help was likely to come from the southward.
(2) He had clear permission from Joscph to givc battle,
unless Hill should have joined Wellington.
(3) The succours from Caffarelli, a weak cavalry brigade and
oue battery, wcre so small that their arrival would havc mad~
no practical differcncc to the strength of thc army. But to
have waited two days for them, after the campaign had com-
menced, would ha vc given 'Wellington the opportunity of
conccntrating, and taking up a good position. It was only
after the manreuvring had begun [July 15th] that this little
brigade started from Vityoria, on July 16th. The Army of
Portugal had already committed itseIC to offensive operations,
and could not halt for two days in the midst of them, without
losing the initiative.
From his own point of view, then, J\furmont was entirely
justified in reerossing the Douro and assuming the offensive.
He had got all the reinforcements that he could count upon: they
made his army pl'Uctically equal to Wellington's in numbers:
in homogeneity it was far superior. If he had waited a little
longer, be might have found 12,000 men of the Army of Galicia
at his pack, setting all Old Castile and Leon uflame. !'t[oreover
Astorga was only victualled up to August 1st, and might fall
any day. Re eould not have foreseen King Joseph's unex-
pce~cd march to his aid, which no dispatch received bc10re
July 12th rendered likely. His misfortune (or fault) was that
he undervalued the capacity of Wellington to manreuvre, his
readiness to force on an olIcnsive battle, and (most 01 all) thc
fighting value of the Anglo-Portuguese army.
It cannot be denied that l'tIarmont's method of taking the
offcnsivc against Wellington was neat and c1feetive. It con-
sisted in a feint against his a.dversary's left wing, followed by
a suddcn countermarch and a real attack upon his right wing.
On July 15th Fay a.nd Bonnet, with the two divisions
forming the French right, received orders to restore the bridge
of Toro, to drive in 'Vellington's cavalry screen in front of it,
and to cross to the south bunk of the Douro. At the same time
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the divisions of the French centre, opposite the fords of PolIos,
made an ostentatious move down·stream towards Toro, accom·
panied by the Marshal himseU, and those on the lett, lIear Torde-
sillns, shifted themselves towards Pollos. Almost t.he whole
French army wns clearly seen marching westward, and the two
leading divisions were actuallyacross the river next morning, and
seemed to be hcading straight for Salamanca by thc Toro road.
Wellington was deceived, exaetly as MtU'ffiont had intended.
He drew the obvious conclusion that his adversary was about
to turn his left flank, and to strike at Salamanca and his line
of communications. It would have been in his power to make
tl. corresponding move against Valladolid, Murmont's base. But
his own line of communications meant much more to him than
did lIarmont's. ~herc was a great diCfcrence between the posi-
tion of an army living by transport and magazines, and that
of an army living on the country by plunder, like that oC the
French marshal. Wellington had always been jealous of his
left wing, and as early as July 12 had drawn up an elaborate
order of march, llroviding Cor the contingency oC the enemy
crossing the Douro at Toro and the ford of Castro Nufio. If
his entire force seemed on the move, the whole British army
would make a corresponding shift westward-if only a division
or two, the mass transferred would be less in similar proportion.
He had no idea of defending the actual course of the river: in
a letter written a Cew days luter to Lord Bathurst, he remarked
that 'it was totally out of my power to prevent the enemy
from crossing the Douro at any point at which he might think
it expedient, as he had in his possession tdl the bridges {Toro
nnd '1'ordesillas] and many oC the fords 1., His plan WItS to
concentrate against the crossing force, and fight a defensh'e
action against it, wherever a good position might be available.
There were two reasons for which Wellington regarded
a genuine offensive move oC lIrIarmont hy Toro and Castro
Nwio as probable. The nrst was that he had received King
Joseph's dispatch of July 9th, captured by guerrilleros, which
gave him the startling news that the King had resolved to
evacua.te all New Castile save Madrid and Toledo, a.nd to
march with his field-force of some 14,000 men to join the Army
, See SUpplelflt1ltaTy Dispatchts, xiv. p. 68.
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of Portugal 1. 'Yellington wrote to Grnhnm (who was now on his
way home) early on the 16th, that either the Galicians' approach
on his rear had induced Marmont to collect his troops near
Toro, or he had heard that Joseph was gathering the Army of
the Centre at Madrid, and was threatening the allied left' in
order to prevent us from molesting the King.' It was clear that
if Wellington had to shirt westward to protect his line of
communications, he could make no detachment to ' contain'
lGng .Joseph, who would be approaching from the south-east.
Another letter, written an hour or so latcr, says, ' thesc movc·
ments or Marmont are certainly intended to divert our attention
from the Army of the Centre (which is collecting at Madrid), if
he knows of this circumstance, which I doubt 2.' The doubt was
well grounded.
That the whole movement on TOTO was a feint did not occur
to Wellington, but his orders of the 16th, given in the evening,
after hc had heard that two Frcnch divisions were actually
across the DOUTO on his left, provide for the possibility that
some serious force may still remain at 'l'ordesillas and may
rcquire observation.
The orders direct the transference of the great bulk of the
allied army to a position which will cover the road Toro--
Salamanca. Thcy wcre issued in the evening to the following
effect. 'fhe reserve (1st and 7th Divisions) was to march from
Medina del Campo to Alaejos beyond the 'l'rabancos river, and
subsequently to Canizal and Fuente la Peiia behilld the Guarena
river. The left wing, which was watching the fords of Pollos
(Brd Division, Bock's cavalry, Bradford's and Carlos de Espaf\a's
infantry), to CastriIJo 011 the Guarclla. OI the I'ight wing the
6th Division and two regiments of Le Mnrchant's horse were
to move on Fuente la lleiia, the 5th Division on CanizaI.
Altcn's cavalry brigade was to follow the 1st Division. This
left the 4th and Light Divisions and Anson's cnvnlry still
unaccounted for. They were set aside to net as a sort of rear-
guard, being directed to move westward only as far as Castrejon
on the l'rabancos river, ten miles short of the concentration·
point on the Toro road, to which the rest or the army was
I See Dispatches. ix. p. 294.
1 Wellington to Clinton, July 16, 7 a,m. Dispalches, ix. p. 291.
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ordered to proceed. It is clear (though Wellington does not
say SO) that they would serve as n containing force, if the enemy
had left any troops at Tordesillas, and brought them over the
Douro there, or at the Iords of PolIos.
All these moves were duly executed, and on the morning of
the 17th Wellington's army was getting ioto position to with-
stand the expected ad\'ance of the enemy on Salamanca by
the Toro road. This attack, however, failed to make itscU
felt, and presently news came that the two divisions of Foy
and Bonnet, which had crossed the Douro at Toro, had gone
behind it again, and destroyed their bridge. What Marmont
had done during the night 01 the 16th-17th was to reverse the
marching order of Iris whole army, the rear suddcnly becoming
the hend, and the head the rear. The divisions to the eastward,
which had not yct got near Toro, countermarched on Tarde-
sillas, and crossed its bridge, with thc light cavalry at their
head. Those which had reached Toro brought up the rcar,
and followed, with Foy and Donnet, at the tail of the column.
This was a most fatiguing march for all concerned, the distance
from Toro to Tordcsillas being about twenty miles, and thc
operation being carried out in the night hours. Dut it was
completely successful-during the morning of the 17th the
vanguard, consisting of Clausel's and l\faucune's divisions and
Curto's cha$setlrs a cheval, was pouring over the bridge of
Tordesillas and occupying nueda and La Seen, which the
British had evacuated fifteen hours before. The rest followed,
the two rear divisions cutting a Corncl', and saving u. few miles,
by crossing the ford of Pollos. 'fhis was a safe move, when the
cavalry had discovered that there were none of Wellington's
troops left cast of the Trabaneos river. By night on the 11th
the bulk of the l''rcnch army was concentrated at Navll. del Hey,
ten miles south-west of Tordesillas. In the afternoon Welling-
ton's rearguard, the 4th and Light Divi.sions, and Anson's
cavalry had been discovered in position at Castrejon, where
their commander had halted them, when he discovered that he
had been dcceived as to his adversary's purpose. The rest of
the Dritish army had concentrated, according to orders, in the
triangle Canizal-Castrillo-Fucnte la Pena, behind the Guarena
ri vcr and in front of thc Toro-Salamanca road.
!, , !
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Wellington's first task was to drawback his rearguard to
join his main body, without allowing it to become seriously
engaged with thc great mass of French in its front. This he
undertook in tx:rson, marching ut dU)'ligbt with all his dis·
posable cavalry, the brigades of Dock and J~e Marchant, to join
the force at Castrejon, while he threw out the 5th Division to
Torrecilla dc la Orden to act as a supporting echelon on thc
flank of the retiring detachment. The remaining di visions
(1st, 3rd, 6th, 7th) took up a position in line of battle on the
heights above the Guarcna, ready to receivc their comrades
whcll thcy should appear.
The charge of the rearguard this day was in the hands of
Stapleton Cotton, the senior cavalry officer with the army, who
outranked Cole and Charlcs Alten, the commanders of the
4th and Light Divisions. He had received no orders during
the night, and his last, those of the preceding afternoon, had
directed him to halt, till his chief should have discovered the
true position and aim of the Freneh army. Wellington ex·
plained, in his next dispatch home, that the various details of
intelligence, which enabled him to grasp l\Iarmont's whole plan,
did not reaeh him till so late on the 17th that it was useless
to send Cotton orders to start. 'fhey could only be carried
out at dawn, and he himself intended to be present with the
rearguard before the SUII was far above the horizon. He
arrived at seven o'clock in the morning, in time to find his
lieutenant already engaged with the French van, but not
committed to any dangerous close fighting. Cotton had,
very wisely, sent out patrols before daylight to discover
exactly what was in lront of him; if it was only a trifling
bod)' he intended to drive it in, and advancc towards La
Nava and llucda 1; if Marmont was in force he would take
up a delensive position at Castrejon, and wait Ior further
orders.
The patrols soon ran into French cavalry advancing in
force, and were driven back upon Anson's brigade, which was
drawn up on a long front in advance of the village of Castrejoll.
On seeing it, the enemy brought up two batteries of horse
1 See rejlort oC one or the officers commanding' patrols, Tomkinson or the
16th L.D. in Ule latter's lUemoir.!, p. 180.
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artillery, and began to play UpOIl the scattered squadrons.
Bull's and Ross's troops I were ordered out to reply, and did
so with effect, but the total strength of the French cavalry was
too great, and Anson's regiments had presently to give way,
though not so much owing to the pressure on their front as
to the sight of a large column of Freneh infantry turning thc
left of their line, and marching on Alaejos, with the obvious
intention of getting round to their left rear and molesting their
retreat towards the Guarena, where the main body of the British
army was awaiting them.
Wellington was involved in person in the end of the cavalry
bickering, and in no very pleasant fashion. He and Beresford,
with their staffs, had arrived 011 the field about seven o'clock,
in advRm:e of the two heavy cavalry brigades, who were coming
up to reinforce Cotton. He rode forward to the left of the
skirmishing line, where two squadrons, one of the 11 th and onc
of the 12th Light Dragoons, were supporting two guns of
Ross's troop, on high ground abovc the ravine of the Trahaneos
river. Just as the Commander-in-Chief came on the scene,
a squadron of French cavalry, striking in from the flank, rode
at the guns, not apparently seeing the supporting troops.
They met and broke thc squadron of the 12th Light Dragoons,
which came up the hill to intercept them. 'Some of Marshal
Beresford's staIt, seeing this, and conceiving the guns to be in
danger, rode up to the retiring squadl'On calling "Threes
about 2 1", This unfortunately was heard by the supporting
squadron of the 11th, who, imagining the order to be directed
to themselves, went about and retired, instead oC advancing to
relieve their broken comrades above. Therefore the mass of
pursuers and pursued from the combat on the flank, came
hurtling down on the guns, and on the head-quarters staff just
bebind them. Wellington nnd Deresford and their followers
were swept away in the rout, and had to draw their swords
to dcCend themselves. Fortunately the misdirected squadron
of the 11th soon saw their mistake; they halted and turned,
and falling on the scattered and exhausted French dragqons
drove them back with great loss; few, it is said, except their
, Belonging onc to the <;&valry, tbc other to the Light Division.
I Tomkinson, p. 188,
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chef d'escadron, who showed uncommon gallantry, got away 1.
It was a dangerous moment for the allied army-a chance
thrust in the melee might have killed or disabled Wellington,
and havc thrown the command into the hands of Beresford or
Stapleton Cotton.
Wellington had no sooner detected the flank movement of
Mnrmont's infantry towards Ala.ejos, than he ordered the 4th
and Light Divisions to retire towards the Guarcna, covered
by G. Anson's brigade, while Bock's and Le :1'IIarchant's he3\'Y
dragoons, farther to the left, drew up in front of the infantry
of the turning column, and detained it, retiring, when pressed,
by alternate brigades. 1oIarmont's whole army was now visible,
moving on in two long columns, of which the more southern
followed the Hh and Light Divisions, in the direction of Torre-
cilia de la Orden, and tried to come up with their rear, while
the othcr, passing through Alacjos, madc by the high-road for
Castrillo on the Guarcna, where the British reserves were
posted.
Thcre was a long bickering fight across the eight miles of
rolling ground between the Trabaneos and the Guarcna, not
without some exciting moments for Wellington's rearguard.
After passing Torrccilla de la Orden, and picking up there the
5th Division, which had been waiting as a supporting echelon
to cover their southern !lank, all the British infantry had to
march very hard, for troops diYcrging from the northern
French column got close in upon their right, and, moving
pMallel with them, bid fair to reach the Guarcna first. In the
retreat the 4th Division moved on the right, and was therefore
most exposed, the Light Division ne."Xt them, the 5th Division
farther south and more distant from the turning column of the
French. The cavalry pursuit in the rear of the retreating force
was never really dangerous; it was held off by Le Marchant's
Heavy and Anson's Light Dragoons without any great difficulty,
and the 5th and Light Divisions only suUercd from some
distant shelling by the J;'rench horse artillery. But the 4th
I Compare ·.romkinson's nllrrulive or thi~ incident (pp. 180-1) with
Napiers vhrid and well·told talc (iv. pp. 254-5). Both agree t1rnt the
French were interior ill lIumbers to the two squadrons. 11lld Umt there was
deplorable eon!nsion.
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Division, though covered from the pursuit in their direct rear
by Bock's German squadrons, found a dangerous point about
a mile on the near side of the Guarenn, where two batteries from
the Freneh turning column had galloped forward to a knoll,
commanding the ground over which they had to pass, and
opencd a teasing fire upon the flank of the brigades as they
marched by. General Cole, however, threw out his divisional
battery and all his light companies to form a screen against
their attack, and movcd on, protectcd by their firc, without
turning from his route. The covering force fcll in to thc rcar
when the defiling WIlS over, and the division ~u[fercd smullloss
from its uncomfortable march 1.
Wellington allowed all the three retrcating divisions to halt
lor a momeut on the farther side ol the stream, at the bottom
of the trough in which it runs. 'The halt near the watcr,
short as it was, gave refreshment and rest to the troops, alter
a rapid march over an arid country in extremely hot weather 2.'
But it could 1I0t be allowed to last lor more than a very lew
minutes, for the pursuing enemy soon appeared in force at
several points on the heights above the eastern bank of the
Guarena, and many batteries opened successively on the three
divisions, who were o[ necessity compelled to resume their march
up the slope to the crest, on their own side of the water.
Here thcy fell into position on Wellington's ehoscn defensive
fighting·ground, the 4th Division forming the cxtreme northern
section of the battle array, by the village of Castrillo, the Light
and 5th Divisions falling in to the line of troops already drawn
up in front of Canizal, while the 1st and 7th Divisions were
extended to the south, to form thc new right wing, und took
their place on the heights of VaJlesa, above the village and ford
ol El Olmo.
Some anxious hours had been spent while thc retreat was in
progress, but WeUington was now safe, with cvery man concen-
1 Sce Vere's M(.rcflf8 mill Movem.ents of l/ie 4th Divisum, p. 28. N(lpier·~
statement thnt UlC Light Divi8ion W/I.lI more exposed tJlun the 4U, or 5th
duriug the retreat, lOCems to be dillCol1nted by the fuct that it hud not one
mall killed or wounded-the 5th Division h!ld only two (in tILe 3rd n.o)~ll
Scots), the 4th Division over 200; !Ind though most ot them tell in the
last charge, a good number were hit in the retreat.
• Vere·s j\1archell a'ld },1QVe11U:'11s of the 4th Division, p. 28.
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trated on an excellent position, where he was prepared to accept
the defensive battle for whieh be had been waiting for the last
month. It seemed likely at first that his wish might be granted,
for the French made a vigorous attack upon his left wing, almost
be!ore it had got settled down into its appointed ground. It
would appear that General Clausel, who commanded the more
northerly of the two great columns in which the French. army
was advancing (while Marmont himseH was with the other),
thought that he saw his chance of carrying the heights above
Castrillo and turning the allied left, if he attacked at once,
before the 4th Division had been granted time to array itself
at leisure. Accordingly, without wasting time by sending to
ask permission from his chief, he directed a brigade of dragoons
to outflank Cole's Idt by crossing the Cuarena down-stream,
while Brennier's division passed it at Castrillo and assailed the
front of the 4th Division. Clausel's own division advanced in
support o! Brennicr's.
1'his move brought on very sharp fighting: the turning
movement of the French dragoons was promptly met by. Victor
Alten's brigade [14th Light Dragoons, 1st Hussars K.C.L.],
whose squadrons had been watching the lower fords of the
Guarena all day. Alten allowed the hostile cavalry to cross the
river and come up the slope, and then charged suddenly, in
echelon of squadrons, the lclt squadron of the Ist Hussars
K.G.L. leading I. The enemy had only begun to deploy when
he was attacked, Altcn's advance having been too rapid for
him. Thc two French regiments (15th and 25th Dragoons) were,
after a. stiff fight, completely routed and driven downhill with
great loss, till they finally found refuge behind a half-battery
and an infantry battalion which formed their supports. General
Cllfrif:' commanding the two regiments, was taken prisoner by
a Gennan hussar, haYing got cut off from his men in the flight.
The French lost in all 8 officers and more than 150 men,
of whom 94 were prisoners-mostly wounded. How sharp the
, Brotllcrton ot the 14th L.D. says with the rigllt echelon IIllvanood
(Hllmilton's llislrmJ of lite 14''', p. 107), but I t",lcy Ihut the Germun
HU5SIlrs' version that thc ~ft eehcloll Icd is corrcct, u.s the right squadron
of their regiment would hu.ve l.Jeen in the middle or the brigude, nol 011
a nank. Sec lll\rrntive in SchwcrUeger, LIlI). 308-9.
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clash was may be seen from the fact that Alten's victorious
brigade had not mueh fewer casualties-the 14th Light
Dragoons lost 75 killed and wounded, the German hussars 60 1.
But no doubt some of these losses were suIrcred not in the
cavalry combat, but a little later in thcday, when Altcn charged
thc French infantry 2.
While this lively fight was in progress on the flank, nrennier's
division had crossed the Guarena in a mass, and on a yery short
front, apparcntly in three columns of regiments, battalion
behind battalion. They wcre ascending the lower slopes below
Cole's position: whell 'Vellingtoll, who was present here in
person, suddenly took the offensive against them, sending
W. Anson's brigade (3/27th and 1/40th) against them in line,
with Stubbs's Portuguese (11th and 2ard regiments) supporting,
in colwnns of quarter distance. The French division halted,
tl.pparcntly "ith the intention of deploying-but there was no
time for this. 'rhe linc of Anson's brigade enveloped both the
hostile flanks with its superior frontage, and opencd fire; after
n short resistance the French ga....e way in great disorder, and
streamed down to the Gunrena. As they fled Alten let loose
palt of his brigade against their flank; the horsemen rode in
dcep among the fugitives, and cut oft 6 offieers and 240 men as
prisoners. Clauscl had to bring up a regiment of his own
division to cover the broken troops as they repllssed the river; it
suffered severely from Cole's artillery, losing 6 officers killed and
wounded; and many men 3.
'rhe attempt to take liberties with Wellington's army, when
it had assumed the defensive on favourable ground, ho.d thus
failed in the most lamentable style, and with very heavy loss-
at least 700 men had been killed, wounded, or taken in 1\Iar-
mont's army that dny, and all but a few scores belonged to the
four infantry and two cavn.lry regiments which Clausel sent to
1 These are the olfieilll returns. The regimental histories give only 45
and 56 respectively.
Martinien's lists show six casualties in officers in the two French regi-
ments, and two more were taken prisoners, Geneml Carri6 and a lieutenant
of the 25th Dragoons.
• Brotherton says that the first two squadrons which charged the French
dragoous made no imprelision, and that it was the impact of the third, led
by himself, which broke them. • This was the 25th LegeI'.
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attack thc hcights by Castrillo 1. Thc corl'csponding British
loss that day was 525, including about 50 stragglers taken
prisoners during the retreat from the Trabancos to the Guarena,
because they had lallcn behind their regimcnts-Ioot·sore
inlantry, or troopers whose horses had been shot. The cavalry,
which had so successfully covered the long march across the
open, had a certain amount of casualties, but the only units
that had suffered heavily were the lour regiments-horse and
foot-that dealt with Clauscl's attack, who lost 276 men between
them.
Wellington must have felt much disappointment at seeing
Clausel's offensive move at eastriBo unsupported by the rest
of the French divisions, who were lining the farther bank of
the Guarena parallel with thc whole of his front. But l\farmont,
unlike his venturesome subordinate, nourished no illusions
about the advisability of attacking a British army in position.
He made no move in thc afternoon; in his memoirs he points
out that the infantry was absolutely exhausted, having been
continuously on the march for three days and one night.
This day had becn u disappointing onc for the French marshal
also. He had failed to cut off Wellington's two detached
divisions, so that all the advantage which he had obtained by his
marches and countermarches between Toro and Tordesillas was
now exhausted. The allied army had succeeded in concentrating,
and was now drawn up in his front, covering Salamanca and
. its own linc of eommunicutions in !l. very tenable position.
Napier tmly remarks that, since the attempt to isolate and
destroy Cotton's detachment had miscarried, lIIarmont had
gained no more by his eluborate feint and forced marches than
he would have obtained by continuing his original advance
across Toro bridge on the 16th. He had got the whole Anglo-
Portuguese army arrayed in n defensive position in front of
him, on the line of the Guarena, instead of somewhere in the
neighbourhood 01 Fucllte Saueo, a lew miles larther east.
I The exact figures, save for officers, are as usual missing. But Mar-
tinien's invaluable lists show that of 41 Fteneh officers killed, wounded, or
taken that day, 35 belonged to the four infantry regiments (17th and 25th
User, 22nd and 65th Line) and the two cavalr~' regiments (15tll and 25th
Dragoons) which fought at CastriIIo.
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On the morning of the ]9th July it seemed as if a new
deadlock was to bring the campaign to a standstill, for the
two armies continued to Cace each other across the Guarena,
Wellington hoping rather than expecting to be attacked,
Mannont looking in vain for a weak point between Castrillo and
'Vallesa, where it would be worth while to try a forward thrust.
While he was reconnoitring, his weary infantry got a much-
needed rest. At about lour o'clock in the aCtcrnoon, however,
the whole French army was seen falling into column, and
presently edged off southward till it lay between 'I'arazona and
Cantalapiedra. Wellington thereupon made a corresponding
movement, evacuating Castrillo to the north, and extending his
line of battle beyond Vallesa to the south. There was a little
distant cannonading across the valley of the Guarena, and
some of the shells set fire to the vast fields of ripe wheat which
covered the whole country-side in this region. The conflagration
went rolling on for a long way across the plain, leaving a trail 01
smoke behind.
The situation on this evening had nothing decisive about it.
It was clear that neither side intended to fight save at an
advantage. Marmont had shown himseU more cautious than
had been expected. Wellington had at this moment every
motive for risking nothing, unless the enemy proved more
obliging than he had shown himselt hitherto. He had reasons
Cor selt·restraint at this moment or which his advcrsary knew
nothing. The first was that he was aware (Crom intercepted
dispatches) of lGng Joseph's intention to march from Madrid
to join the Army of Portugal: with a possible ]5,000 men
about to appear on his flunk, he must look to the future with
care. 'I'he second was that he had received a few days beCore
the untoward news that Lord WilIiam Bentinck's long-promised
expedition to Catalonia might not ever take place. The
Commandcr-in-Chief in Sicily wrote that he had found new
opportunities in Italy, which it might be his duty to seize.
His troops had been embarked, but they were not to be expected
for the prescnt orc the coast of Spain. This was 0. disheartening
piece of intelligence: Wellington had been told to count upon
this support both by Bentinck himsclC and by the Home
Government. If it should Cail, Marshal Suchet, lelt undisturbed
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by this diversion, might send considerable Teinforcements to
:Madrid 1.
As a matter of fact he did not-being, like Soult, a general of
much too self·centred 0. type of mind to help a neighbour if he
could avoid it. Only one regiment of the Valencian army ever
got to :Madrid, and that came too late for King Joseph's purpose.
But so far as Wcllington could gucss on July 19, it was quite
possihle that Suchet might find 10,000 men, to add to the
disposable 15,000 a! the Army o( the Centre.
There was also the possibility that D'Erlon, obeying the
orders which King Joseph kept sending to him, might make
up his mind to CTOSS the Guadiana and Tagus, and comc north
by Arzobispo and Madrid. If so, Hill was to makc a parallel
march by Alcantara, and would certainly arrive many days
before D'ETlon. This was a mere possibility; there were good
reasons (or holding that Soult might (orbid any such movc;
and till D'Erlon started northward, Hill must remain behind to
contain him. The problem was not pressing: it could not
dc'velop for many days 2.
On the other hand there was news that the Galicians were
at last on the move. Santocildes had been prevailed upon to
leavc a smaller (orce to besiege Astorga, l.lIld had come down
with a second division to join Cabrera at Beutlvcnte. This
force, advancing up the Douro valley, would find absolutely no
cnemy in front o( it, and must obviously disturb l\farmont's
operations, since it might be at the gates of Valladolid, his base
and storehouse, in a few days. He would then be forced to
dctach a division or so to savc his depots, and he could not sparc
even a brigade if he wished to continue on the offensive. Certain
intelligence that there was not a Frenchman left behind on the
Douro, save the trilling garrisons or Toro, Zamora, and Torde-
sillas, had been brought in by General D'Urban. '1'hat officer,
after conducting a very daring exploration round the rear of
Murmont's army, almost to the gatcs orValladolid, had rcerossed
the Douro by Wellington's orders at the ford of .l"resno de
• For dismay e,,;pressed by \Vellington at this news see dispatches to
Henry Wellesley duted Rueda, .Tuly 15, and to Lord Bathuf!lt (Di8patchu,
ix. !Jp. 285 "lid 287).
• See \Vellington to Hill, J)isputeh"", i.". 1" 2f)O.
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Ribera, and fell in upon thc left flank of the allied army near
Fuente Sauco on, July 18th 1, For the rest of the co.mpaign
his 700 sabres were at Wellington's disposal 2. His report
showed that l'IIarmont's rear was absolutely undefended, and
that the Galicians could march up the Douro, if desired, without
finding o.ny opponents: it would be perfectly possible for them
to cut all Marmont's communications with Valladolid and
Burgos, without being in any danger unless the Marshal
detached men against them.
The 20th of July proved to be a most interesting day of man·
reuvring, but still brought no decisivc results. Early in the
morning the whole .French army was seen in march, with its head
pointing southward, continuing the movement that it had begun
on the previous day. Marmont had made up his mind to proceed
with thc hithcrto unsuccessful scheme for turning his advcrsary's
right wing 3, in the hope of either cutting him off from his
communication with Salamanca, or of catching him with his
army strung out on too long a line from continuous and rapid
movement, The character of this day's murch differed from
that of the 19th, because the single well-marked Guarcna
valley ceased after a time to separate the two hostile armies.
That little ri \'er is formed by three tributaries which meet
at llnd abovc the villuge or El Olmo: each of them is 1\ paltry
brook, and their courses lie along trifling irregularities of the
broad tableland from which they descend. It is only after their
junction that they flow in a deep well-marked valley, and
form a real military obstacle. Of the thrce brooks, that whicb
keeps the name of Guarena lies most to the east: up its right
bank and towards its source l\Iarmont's march was directed.
Wellington's parallel movement southward, 011 thc other hand,
I Not July 17th, as Nllpier sa3·s. D'Urban's diary proves that he
reerossed the Douro on the 18th.
• He left one squadron near Znmora, to serve as covering cavalry for
Sllvclra's militia, who remained wlliting for Santoeildes's advance, which
they were to observe and support, His force WAS therefore reduced to
700 men.
I He adds in his Mtmoires, iv. pp. 251-2, t]lnt if he hoo not suooeeded in
getting nheod of Wellington's van, he had ll. counter-project o! trying to
get round his rear, hut the British marched 00 exucUy paMlllel with him
UlIlt he gal no chance of this.
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was directed ulong the Idt bank of the Porcda, the middle
brook of the three. Between them there was at first a narrow
triangular plateau, on which neither party trespassed save
with cavalry scouts.
After a few miles of marching MarmonL ordered his ndvn.nced
guard to cross the Guarena, which they could do with ease, no
British being near, save a few cavalry vedettes. lIe then
turned the head of his column south-westward, instead of
keeping to his original direction due south. Having crossed the
Guarcna he came in sight of the British column marching on
the othcr side of the Porcda brook trom Vallcsu. The move-
ments of the two armies tended to converge, the point on which
both were moving being the village of Cantalpino. It seemed
likely that the heads of the marching columns must collide,
and that a combat, if not a gencral action, would ensuc. Each
army was marching in an order that could be converted into
a battle line by simply lacing the men to right or to left respec-
tively. Wellington had his troops in three parallel columns, the
first one, that nearest to thc French, being composed of the
1st, 4th, 5th, and Light Divisions, the second, which would
have formed the supporting Iinc if the army had fronted and
gone into action, contained the 6th and 7th and Pack's and
Bradford's brigades: the 3rd Division and Espaila's Spaniards
formed a reserve, moving farthest from the enemy. The light
cavalry were marching ahead of the column, the heavy cavalry
and D'Urban's Portuguese brought up their rear. l\t:armont
was clcarly seen to be moving in a similar formation, of two
columns each composed of four infantry divisions, with Curto's
cllasseuTs ahead, and Boyer's dragoons at the tail of the line
of march 1.
The day was warm but clouded, so that the sun did not shine
with full July strength, or the long march which both armies
carried out would have becn brought to UIl cnd by exhaustion
at a much earlier hour than was actnally the ease. As the
lOllS' morning wore on, the two hostile forces gradually grew
closer to eaeh other, owing to the new westward turn which
• l'tIarmont describes the formation (MC1/loirt8. iv. p. 252) aa ' gauche en
tHe, pIU' peloton, u distance enti~re: les deux ligncs pOllvaient Hre form(:ea
en un insmnt par d droilt etl b(ll(lil~.·
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l\larmont had given to his van. At last they were within long
artillery range; but for some time no shot was fired, neither
party being willing to take the responsibility of attacking an
enemy in perlcct order and well closed up for battle. Either
general could have brought on a fight, by simply fronting to
flank, in ten minutes; but neither did so. Marmont remarks in
his Memoires that in his long military service he never, before
or after, saw such a magnificent spectacle as this parallel march
of two bodies of over 40,000 men each, at such close quarters.
Both sides kept the most ndmirnble order, no gaps occurred in
either line, nor was the country one that offered advant.age
to either: it was very nearly flat, and the depression of the
Poreda brook became at last so slight and invisible that it was
crossed without being noticed. The growld, however, on which
the French were moving was a little higher than that on which
the allies marched 1.
The converging lines of advance at la.st almost touched each
other at the village of Cantalpino: the light cavalry and thc
Ist Division, at the hcad of Wellington's front (or eastern)
column of march had just passed through it, when Mannont
halted several batteries on a roll oC the ground a Cew hundred
yards oCC, and began to shcll the leading battalions of the
4th Division, which WfiS following closely· behind the Ist.
Wellington ordered Cole not to halt and reply, nor to attack,
but to avoid the village ana the French HIe by a slight wflsterly
turn, to which the other divisions conCormcd, both those in
the first and those in the second line 2. This amounted to the
refusing of battle, and many officers wondered that the challenge
of Marmont had been refused: for the army was in perfect order
COl' fighting, and in excellent spirits. But Wellington was taking
no risks that day.
The slight swerve from the direct southerly direction at
Cantalpino made by the allied army,distillctlyhclpcd Marmont's
plan for tu.rning its right, since by drawing back from its
original line of movement it nllowed the enemy to push still
I There is nn excellent desc:ription or the pnrullelmnrcll in Leith Hny,
ii. IIp. 3840, U~ wellll!l in NU!Jier.
• This swerve ilul! iUl consequcnce ure best stutt.oU ill Verc's 1I1urcllell ul 11~
41" J)iuj.~jlJll, 1" 30.
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farther westward than his original line of march had indicated.
This meant that he was gradually getting south of Wellington's
vanguard, and would, if not checked, ultimately arrive at the
Tormes river, near the fords of Huerta, from which he would
have been edged off, if both armies had continued in their
original direction. During the early afternoon the parallel
move continued, with a little skirmishing bet.ween cavalry
vedettes, and an occasional outbreak of artillery fire, but no
further developments. The baggage in the English rear began
to trail behind somewhat, owing to the long continuance of thc
forced marching, and D'Urban's }'ortuguese, who shepherded
the stragglers, had great difficulty in keeping them on the
move. A few score sick and foot-son,:: men, and some exhausted
sumpter-beasts, feU behind altogether, and were a.bandoned to
the French 1.
Late in the afternoon the armies fell further apart, and all
save the outlying vedcttes lost sight of each other. This was
due to the fact that Wellington had made up his mind to settle
down for the night on the heights of Cabeza Vcllosa and Aldea
Rubin, where l\lannont had taken up his position a month
before, when he retired f.rom before San Cristobal. This was
good fighting-ground, on which it was improbable that the
French would dare to deliver an attack. Thc oth Division and
Alten's cavalry brigade werc detached to the rear, and occupied
Aldea Lengua and its Cords.
This had been Il. most fatiguing day-the British army had
marched, practically in battle formation, not less than (our
Spanish leagues, the French, by an extraordinary effort, more
than fivc. When thc camp-fires were lighted up at night, it
was seen that the leading divisions of the enemy were as far
south as Babila Fuente, quite close to the Tormes and the fords
of Huerta: the main body lay about Villunlcla, opposite the
British bivouacs at Aldea Rubia and Cabeza Vellosa. An
untoward incident terminated an unsatisfactory day: D'Urban's
Portuguese horse coming in very late from their duty of eovcring
, Mrlrluont says that if he had po&sessed a superior cavalry he could have
made great captures. but h.e dared attempt nothing for want of sufllcient
numbers: he alleges thRt he took 800 strugglers-certainly ,m eXllggemtioll
as the British. returns show very few' missing.' .Uemoirc8, iv. p. 233.
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the baggage-train, were mistaken for prowling French cavalry
by the 3rd Division, and shelled by its battery, with some little
loss of men and horses. The mistake was caused by a certain
similarity in their uniform to that of French dragoons-the tall
helmets with crests being worn by no other allied troops 1.
Thc net rcsult of the long parallel march of July 20th was
that Marmont had practically turned Wellington's extreme
right, and was in a position to cross the Upper Tormes, if he
should choose, in prolongation of his prcviolls movement. 'fhe
allied army was still covering Salamanca, and could do so for
onc day morc, i! the marching continued: but after that limit
of time it would be forced either to fight or to abandon Sala-
manca, the main trophy of its earlier campaign. There remained
the chance of falling upon Marmont's rear, when his Rrmyshould
be occupied in crossing the Tormes, and forcing him to fight
with his forces divided by the river. If this offensive move were
not taken, and the parallel march were allowed to continue, the
next day would sce the armies both across the 'l'ormes, in
the position where Graham and Marmont had demonstrated
against each other on June 24th. Wellington could not,
however, begin his southward move till he was certain that
the enemy was about to continue his manceuvre on the same
plan as that of the last two days. If he started too early,
Marmont might attack the San Cristobal position whell it
wus only held by a reurguard, und capture Snlamanca. Till
an appreciable fraction of the French were seen passing the
Tormes it was necessary to wait.
It appeared to 'Wellington that his adversary's most probable
move would be the passage of, the Tormes by the fords at and
just above Huerta. That he would abandon his previous tactics,
and attack the British anuy, was inconsistent with the caution
that he had hitherto displayed. That he would continue his
march southward, and cross the river higher up, was unlikely;
for the obvious passage in this direction, by the bridge of Alba
l 'l'he heavy cavalry in the British army wcre still wearing the old
cocked hIlt, the new,plltlerll helmet with c~st was not served out till J8111.
The light drngoons were still wearing the black-japanned leather head.
dress with the low fur crest: in 1818 they got shakos, much loo like thlliSC
or French clw8seuTs.
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de Tormes, was commanded by the castle of that town, which
had been for some time occupied by a battalion detached from
CarIos de Espaila's division. Wellington looked upon this
route as completely barred to the French: he was unaware
that the Spanish general had withdrawn his detachment
without orders on the preceding afternoon. This astonishing
move of his subordinate was madc all the worse by the fact
that he never informed his chief that he had taken upon
himself to remove the battalion. Indeed Wellington only
heard of its disappearance on the 28rd, when it was too late
to remedy the fault. He acted on the 21st and 22nd as if Alba
de 'l'ormes were securely held. It would appear that Carlos de
Espaiia thought the castle too weak to be held by a small force,
and moved his men, in order to secure them [rom being cut off
[rom the main army, as they clearly might be when the French
had reached Babila Fuente. But the importance of his" mis·
placed act was not to cmergc till after the battlc o[ Salamanca
had been fought, ___
At dawn on the 21st Wellington withdrew his whole army
on to the Sall Cristobal position \ and waited for further
developments, having the fords of Aldea LCllgua and Santa
Marta conveniently close if Marmont should be seen crossing
the Tormcs, This indeed was the move to which the Marshal
committed himself. Having discovcrcd at on cMIy hour that
Alba de Tormcs was empty, and that there was no allied force
observing the river bank below it, he began to cross in two
columns, one at the fords of lIuertn, the other three miles
higher up-stream at the ford of La Encina. Lest Wellington
should sally out upon his rear, whcn thc greater part of his army
had got beyond the Tormes, he left a eovcring force of two
divisions in position between Babila Fuente and lIuerts, This,
us thc oay worc on, he finally reduced to onc division 2 and some
artiller,Y. As long as this detachment remained opposite him,
, NUJlier suys thnt this move WflII made Oil UIC night of the 20th, undcr
covcr of Ule ~~lIoke or Lhe already_lighted Cllmp-flres of the anny. '1'hi8 is
contradicted by Vere's jouruul of march or the 4th Division, by Leith Hay's
Journlll [' ut duylight wc murehed to thc Height!! or Sun CristovlIl 'I, by
Tomkinsoll'8 diary, and D'UrbUIl, Gt:o. Simollds, Hmi mUlly others who
speak of tlle movc as being carly on the 21st.
, '.I.'his wa~ the division o' Sarrut.
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Wellington could not be sure that the French might not attack
him on both sides of the Tormes.
The defile of the French army across the fords naturally
took a long time, and Wellington was able to allow his weary
infantry some hours of much-needed rest in the morning.
Only cavalry was sent forward at once, to form a screen in
front of the hostile force that was gradually accumulating on
the near side of the fords. In the afternoon, however, when the
greater part of the French were over the water, nearl)' the
whole allied army received orders to cross the Tormes, and
occupy the heights to the south of it. It moved practically in
battle order, in two lines, of which the front passed by the ford
of Cabrcrizos, the second by that of Santa Marta. Only a
reserve, now consisting of the Brd Division nnd D'Urban's
Portuguese horse, remained on the north side of the river near
Cabrerizos, to contain the l?rench force which was still visible
at dusk on the slopes by Babila Fuente. Till this detach-
ment had disappeared, Wellington was obliged to leave a
corresponding proportion of his men to cont..'\in it, lest the
enemy might try a dash at Salamanca by the north bank.
Marmont made no such attempt, and in the morning it was
obvious that this rcal'guard was lollowing the rest of his army
across the Tonncs.
During the night the French advanced cavalry were holding
Calvarisa de Ariba on their left and l\1achacon on their right:
the inlantry wcrc bivouacked in a concentrated position in the
wooded country south of those villages. The British cavalry
screen held Calvi'isa de Abaxo 1, Pelabravo, and the height of
Nuestra Senora de la Peiia, close in to the corresponding front
line of the encmy's vedettes. 'rite infantry were encamped in
two lines behind the Uibera de Pclagarcia, the ravine, whieh
runs north from Nuestra Senora de la Peiia to thc 'formes,
between Santa :Marta and Cabrerizos. This was Graham's old
position of June 24th, and excellent for defencc. The right was
, That the British Cl.\valry were still at dawn so far forward as Calvarisa
de Abaxo is shown by Tomkillson's wo.ry(p.181», the bcrt possible authority
for light cavalry matters. Tile 4th Division camped in the wood jurt v;est
of Nuestra Senom de la Vena (Vere, p. 31), the 5th OD high ground in rear of
Calvurisa de Aribl~ (Leith Huy, p. 4.'5). the nh a little farlher south, also
in woody ground (diary of Wheeler of the 51st).
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on well-marked high ground, the centre was covered by woods.
Only the left, near Santa Mluta, WAS on lower slopes.
About an hour after nightfall the hiDs where French and
English lay opposite each other were visited by an appalling
tempest. 'The rain fell in torrents accompanied by vivid
flashes of lightning, and succeeded by instantaneous peals of
thundcr:' writes one annalist: 'a. more violcnt crash of the
elements has seldom been witnessed: its effects W(!re soon
apparent. Le Marchant's brigade of cavalry had lltllted to
our lett: thc men, dismounted, were either seated or lying on
the ground, holding their horses' bridles. Alarmed by thc
thunder, the beasts started with a sudden violence, and many
of them breaking loose galloped across thc country in all
directions. The fl'ightened horses, in a state of wildness,
passing by without riders, added to the awful effeet of the
tempest 1.' The 5th Dragoon Guards suCfered most by the
stumpcde----cightccn men were hurt, and thirty-one horses were
not to be found. Another diarist speaks of the splendid effect
of the lightning reflected on the musket-barrels of belated
infantry columns, which wcre just marching to their cltJIlping-
ground. Before midnight the storm had passed over-the
later hours of sleep were undisturbed, and next morning
1I. brilliant sun rose into a. cloudless sky 2. The last day of
manceuvring was begun, and the battle which both sides had
so long avoided was at last to come.
1 Leith Hay, ii. p. ,~n. , Diary of Gr<:Cll of the 06th, p. 98.
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SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER VI
THE BATTLE OF SALA.\IANCA, JULY 22, 1812. 'fUE
EARLY STAGES
TilE decisi,,-c moment of the campaign of 1812 had now been
reached-though l\tarmont wus wholly unaware or it, and was
proposing merely to continue his manreuvring of the last
ftve days, and though Wellington hardly expected that the
22nd of July WQuld turn out more eventful than the 2]st.
Both of them have left record of their intentions on the fateful
morning. The Duke of Ragusa wrote to Bcrthicr as follows:
'My object was, in taking up this position, to prolong my
movement to the left, in order to dislodge the enemy from the
neighbourhood of Salamanca, and to fight him at a greater
advantage. I calculated all taking up a good dcCcnsivc position,
against which the enemy could make no offensive move, and
intended to press near enough to him to be able to profit from
the first fault that he might make, and to attaek him with
vigolU' 1.' He adds in another document, • I considered that
our respective positions would bring on 110t II battle, but nn
advantageous rearguard action, in which, using my full force
latc in the day, with a part only of the British army left in
front of me, I should probably score a point 2.' It is clear that
he reckoned that his adversary would continue his policy of the
last five days; Wellington, if his flank were once more turned,
would move 011 as before-always parrying the thrusts made
at him, but not tnking the oftensive himself.
Nor was he altogether wrong in his expectation. Writing
tu Lord Bathurst on the evening of July 21st, the British
Commander-in-Chief summed up his intentions in these words.
, I have determined to cross the Tormes, if the enemy should:
to cover Salamanca as long as I can; and above all not to give
up our communicntion with Ciudad Rodrigo; and not to fight
, Mllrmont to Derthicr, July 31, printed in J\Umoir€s, iv. p. 443 .
• JUarmOllt, iUlmoir€s. iv. p. 237.
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all action unless under very advantageous circumstances, or
iC it should become absolutely necessary 1.' This determination
is re-stlLted in a dispatch which Wellington wrote three days
later, in a very different Crame oC mind. 'I had determincd
that if circumstanccs should not permit me to attack him on
the 22nd, I should move toward Ciudad Rodrigo without
Curther loss of time z.' Wellington was therefore, it is clear,
intending simply to continue hi!:! retreat without delivcring
battlc, unless Marmont should givc him an oppol'tlUlity of
striking a heavy blow, by putting himself in some dangerous
posture. He desired to fight, but only if he could fight at
advantage. Had 1\!armont continued to turn his flank by
cautious movements made at a discreet distance, and with an
anny always ready to form an orderly line of battle, Wellington
would have sacrificed Salamanca, and moved baek toward the
Agueda. He was not prepared to waste men in indecisive
combats, which would not put the enemy out of action even if
they went off well. 'It is better that a battle should not be
Caught, wllcss under such favourable circumstances that there
would be reason to hope that the allied army would be able
to maintain the field, while that of the enemy would not 3,'
For iC the }~rcnch \IIere only checked, alld not completely
knocked to pieces, Wellington knew that they would be
reinCorced within a Cew days by the 14,000 men whom King
Joscph (unknown to Marmont) was bringing up lrom Madrid.
Retreat would then again become necessary, since the encmy
would be superior in numbers to B. hopeless extent. Wellington
added that the 22nd was his bcst da)' o[ advantage. since
within thirty-six bours Marmont would have been reinforced
by the cavalry brigade under General Chauvel, which Callarelli
hud at lust sellt Corward from Burgos. It had rcachcd the
])ouro at Valladolid all the 20th, and would be up at the front
on the 23rd; this he well knew, and somewhat overrated its
strength 4.
l Di3patchtll, ix. p. 290, July 21st.
I Wellington to Bnthurst, July 24. Dispafches, ix. 1'. 300.
• Agllin from dispatch to Bllthurst, July 21st. DWpalcllc3, ix. p. 2!16•
• Supposing it, apparently, to be over 1,000 ,trong, while it was reully
not 800 sabrt:!<.
Ec2
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But though ready to tuke his udvllntage, i[ it werc otrered
him, Wellington evidently lcaned to the idca that it would not
be given. He prepared [or retreat, by sending off his whole
baggage-train on the Ciudad Rodrigo road at dawn, escorted
by one of D'Urban's three Portuguese cavalry regiments.
Tltis was a clear expression of his intention to movc oft. So is
his letter oC July 24 to Graham in which, writing in confidcncc
to a trusted subordinate, he remarks, 'l\Iormont ought to have
given me a pont d'or, and then he would have made a handsome
operation of it,' Instead of furnishing the proverbial bridge of
gold to the yielding adversary, the Marshal pressed in upon him
in a threatening fashion, yet with his troops so scattered and
strung out on n. long front, that hc was not rendy [or a decisive
action when Wellington at last saw his opportunity and dl\Shed
in upon ltim.
At dawn on the 22nd cach party had to diseover"the cxact
position o[ his adversary, for the country-side was both wooded
and undulating. Wellington's army, on the line of heights
I'eaehing southward from Santa Marta, was almost entirely
masked, partly by the woods in the centre o[ his position, but
still morc by his having placed all the divisions lar haek from
the sky-line on the reverse slope of the plateau. 'fhe lront
wa... about three miles long, but little was visible upon it. Fay,
whose division was ahead of the rest of the French army,
describes what hc saw as lollows :-
• The position of San Cristobal had been almost stripped
of troops: we could see one English division in a sparsely-
planted wood within cannon-shot of Calvarisa de Ariba, on the
Sal~nanearoad: vcry Iar behind a thin colunlll was ascending
the heights of Tejares: nothing mOre could be mn.de out of
Wellington's arm)': all the rest was hidden from us by the
chain of heights whieh runs from north to south, and ends in
the high and precipitous knolls of the Arapiles. Wellington
was on this chain, sufficiently near for us to recognize by means
of the staU surrounding him 1.'
All, then, that Foy, and Marmont who was riding near him,
actually saw, was the 7th Division in the wood opposite Nuestra
Senora de Iu Pefia, and the distant baggl1gc-cohurl1l already
I Vie milifaire, edited by Girod de l'Ain, p. 173.
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filing aY on the Ciudad Rodl'igo road, which ascends the heights
beyond Aldea Tejada four miles to the rear.
The French IHmy was a little more visible to Wellington, who
could not only make out Fay's division behind Calvarisa de
Ariba, but severul other masses farther south and cast, in
front of the long belt of woods which extends on e/Wh side of
the village of Utrera for some two miles Ol' more. It was
impossible to sce how Car thc French ldt reached among thc
dense trees: but the right was 'refused:' no troops were
opposite Wellington's left or northern wing, and the villages of
Pelabravo and Calvarisa de Abaxo, Car in advance of it, were
still held by British cavalry voocttes. In short, only the allied
right and centre had enemies in front of them. This indicated
what Wellington had expected-an attempt of Marmont to
continue his old policy of outflanking his adversary's extreme
right: clearly the British left was not in danger.
?rarmont, as his exculpatory dispatch to Berthicr acknow-
ledges, was convinced that 'Vellington would retire once marc
the moment that his flank was threatened. 'Everything led
me to believe,' he writes, 'that the enemy intended to occupy
the position of Tejarcs [across the Zurgain] which lay a league
behind him, while at present he was a league and a Im\( in front
of Salamanca 1.' :Foy's diary completely bears out this view
of Marmont's conception of the situation. 'The Marshal had
no defmite plan: he thought that the English urmy was
already gone off, or at least that it was going on, to t(l,ke
position on the heights of Tejares on the IcCt [or farther] bank
of the river Zurguin. Hc was tempted to make an attack on the
one visible English division, with which n skirmishing fire had
already begun. He was fearing that this division might get out
of his reach! How little did he foresee thc hapless lot of his
own army that day! The wily 'Wellington was ready to give
battle-the greater part of his host was collected, but masked
behind the line of heights: he was showing nothing on the
Cl'Cst, lest his intention should be divined: he was waiting for
our movement 2.'
'fhe skirmish to which Foy alludes was one begun by the
1 Correspondence in Mtmoiul;, iv. p. 254.
I 1"0)', p. 174.
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voltigeurs of his own division, whom Marmont had ordered
forward, to push baek the English pickets on the height of
Nuestra Senora de la Pena. These belonged to the nh Division,
whieh was occupying the wood behind. Not wishiug his
position to be'too closely examined, Wellington sent out two
whole battalions, the 68th and the 2nd Cac;adores, who formed
a very powerful screen of light troops, and pushed baek the
French from the hill and the ruined chapel on top of it. :Mar-
mont then strengthened his firing line, and brought up a battery,
whieh checked the further advance of the allied skirmishers.
The two screens continued to exchange shots for several hours,
half a mile in front of Wellington's position. The tiraillade had
many episodes, in Olle of which General Victor Alten, leading
a squadron of his hussars to proteet the flank of the British
skirmishers, received a ball in the knee, whieh put him out of
action, and threw the command of his brigade into the hands
of Al'entsehildt, colonel of the 1st Hussars K.G.L. After
~ueh bickering, and when noon had long passed, the 68th
and Cllljadores werc relieved by some companies of the 95th
from the Light Division, as Wellington wished to employ the
7th Division elsewhere. He had at frrst thought it possible
that Marmont was about to make a serious attack on this part
of his front; but the notion died away when it was seen that the
Marshal did not send up any forml.'<1 battalions to support his
voltigeurs, and allowed the light troops of the allies to cling
to the westcrn half of the slopes of Nucstra Senora de la Pena.
lt was soon evident that the Frcnch were-as so oftcn before
during the last six days-about to extend thcir lelt wing. The
right or southern flank of 'Wellington's line rested on the rocky
knoll, 400 feet high, which is known as tbe ' Lesser Arapilc.'
Six hundrcd yards from it, and outside the allied wne of
occupation, lay the' Greater Arapile,' which is 11 few feet higher
and much longer than its fellow. These two curious hills,
sometimes called the 'Hermanitos' or 'littlc brothers,' are
the Illost striking natural feature in the country-side. They
rise a hundred and fifty feet above the valley which lies between
them, and a hundred fect above the heights on either side.
Their gcneral appearance somewhat recalls that of Dartmoor
I Tors,' rough rock breaking out through the soil. But thcir
THf. GREATER (Ol~ FRENCH) AR;\PILE SEEN FROM
THE fOOT OF TilE LESSER ARAPIlE
GENERAL VIEW Of THE BRITISH AND fRENCH
POSITIONS, TAKEN FROM THE REAR OF THE
fORMER, THE NEARER HILI. WAS THE POSITION
OF THE 5TH DIVISION. THE VILI.,\GE OF ARAPILES
TO THE tEfT, THE DISTANT 1~lllGF.. i\I.ONG WHICH
SMOKE IS ROl.LING. IS THE fl~£NClI POSITIO,\'.
,Ft<llll I'hot0l:"aphs by Mr. (.; Ar",strong.
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shapes differ: the Greater Arapile shows crags at each end,
but has a comparatively smooth ascent to its centre on its
northern front-so smooth that steep ploughed fields have been
laid out upon it, und extend almost to the crest. The Lesser
Arapile is precipitous on its southern front, where it faces its
twin, but is joined at its back (or northern) side by a gentle
slope to thc main line of the heights whel'(; \Vellillgtoll's army
lay. It is in short an integral part of them, though it rises far
above their level. The Greater Arapilc, on the other hand, is
un isolated height, not bclonging to the system of much lower
knolls whieh lies to its south. These, three-quarters of a mile
away, are c:;overed with wood, and form part of the long forest
which reaches as far as the neighbourhood of Alba de Tormes.
Wellington had left the Greater Arapile outside his position,
partly because it was completely separated from the other
heights that he held, partly (it is said) because he had surveyed
the ground in the dusk, and bad judged tbe knoll Carthel' Crom
the Lesser Arapile than was actually the case j they were
within easy cannon-shot from each other I. At about eight
o'clock, French skirmishers were observed breaking out Irom
the woods to the south of the Arapile and pushing rapidly
toward it. They were followed by supporting columns in
strength-indeed l\lurmont had directed the whole or Bonnet's
division to move, under cover of the trees, to the point where
the woods approach nearest to the hill, :lnd from thence to
carry it if possible. Wellington, now judging t1mt it was
uncomfortably near to his right flank, ordered the 7th Cayudores
-from the 4th Division, the unit that lay nearest-to race
hard for the Greater Arapile and try to seize it before the
f·'rench had arrived. They made good speed but failed: the
enemy was on the crest first, and repulsed them with some loss,
They had to fall bo.ek to behind the Lesser Aro.pile, which wus
held by the first British brigade of their division (W. Ansoll's).
Marmont had seized the Greater Arapile, us he tells us, to
form a strong advanced post, behind which he could move his
main body westward, in pursuance of his old design of turning
Wellington's right. It was to be the 'pivot on which the
flanking movement should be made,' the < point d'appui of the
I So suys Vcre, ill his AJarcllell of Ihe 41h DivillilJII, I', 31,
'rIlE BArfLE OF SALAMANCA r.Tur,\" 22
right of his army' when it should reaeh its new position 1.
Bonnet's troops being firmly established on and behind it, he
began to mo\'e his divisions to their left. On his original
ground, thc plateau of Calval'isa de Ariba, he left Foy's division
in £Tont line-still bickering with the skirmishing line of the
allies-Ferey's division in support, and Doyer's dragoons to
cover the flank against any possible attack from the British
cavalry, who were in force on Wellington's left, and still had
detuclunents out on the plateau by Pclabruvo, beyond Foy's
extreme right. lIaving made this provision against any
possible attempt toattaek him in the rear while he was executing
his great mana:uvre, Marmont marched his five remaining
divisions 2, under cover oC Bonnet's advanced position, to the
edge of the wooded hills in rear of the Great Arapile, where
they remained for some time in a threatening mass, without
lurther movement.
·Wellington, clearly diseel'lling from the summit oC the Lesser
Arapile this general shift of the enemy to the ldt, now made
great alterations in the arrangement of his troops, and adopted
what may bc called his second battle-position. Thc 4th
Division, ll.bolit and around that height, was placed so ns to
serve Cor the allied army the sa me purpose that Bonnet was
ca.rrying out fol' the French on the other Herma.nito. Of Cole's
thrce brigades, that of Anson occupied the Arapile-tlJe 3/27th
on the summit, the 1/4Oth in support on the rear slope. Pack's
independent POT'tugucse brigade was placed beside Anson. The
Fusilier brigade (under Ellis of the IJ23rd) and Stubbs's Portu-
guese, the remaining units of the 4th Division, were formed up
to the right of the hill, extending as far as the village which
tukes its name of Arapiles from the two strange knolls. Two
guns oC eole's divisional battery (that of Symphcr 3) were
hoisted up with some difficulty to the level of the 3/27th. The
other four were leCt with the Fusiliers netl.r the vilhge'. Thus
the little Arapile bccllme the obtuse angle of a formution
, ?Iarmont, 1\lbllf~ius, iv. p. 255.
• Clausel, Drennier, l'oIaucune, Thomi~res, and Sarrut also, when the
latter anived late from Dabila I'uentc, and joined tllC main body.
• A U:.G.L. unit-the only German artillery present at Salamanca.
• All this from Verc's Marche$ of tile 4fllDivi9ioll, p. :J2.
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• CII potence,' with Puck and two brigades or the 4th Division on
its right, and the 7th Division (still engaged at a distance with
Foy) and thc 1st and Light Divisions on its ldt. At the same
timc Wellington mo\'ed dowll the troops which hud oi'iginnlly
fonned his left wing (5th and 6th Divisions, Espaiia's Spaniards,
and Bradford's Portuguese) to a supporting position behind his
centre, :>omewhcrc near the vjlluge of Lus Torres, where they
could reinforce either his right or his left, M might prove
necessary in the end. As a further general reserve G. Anson's
and Le Marchant's cavalry brigades, and the grcater part of
Victor Alten's, were brought away from the original left, and
placed in reserve near the 6th Division; but Back and two
of Victor Alten's squadrons 1 remained on the left, opposite
Boyer's drugoons.
In eonnexion with this same general move, Wellington sent
a most important order to the troops whieh he had ldt till this
moment on the north bank 01 the Tormes, covering Salamanca,
in the position by Cabrerizos. Thesc consisted of the 3rd
Division-which was wIder the tcmporary command of Edward
Pllkenhalll ('Vellington's brother-in-law) during Pieton's sick·
ness-and the 500 sabres that remained of D'Urban's }>ortu-
guese horse, after one regiment had been scnt off on escort·
duty with the baggage-train. 'I'hesc corps were directed to
march over the town-bridge of Salamanca, and take lip a
position between Aldea Tejada and La llenilla, to the cast
of the high-road to Ciudad Rodrigo. There placed, they were
available either as a reserve to the newly-formed right wing,
or as a supporting echelon, if the whole army should ultimately
fall back for n retrent along the high-road, or as a detnched
force placed so far to the right that it could outflank or throw
itseH in front of any French troops which might {.'olllinue
1tlarmont's advance from the Arapiles westward. It is probable
that Wellington, at the moment when he gavc the orders, would
have been quite unable to say which of these three duties
would fall to Pakenham's share. The 3rd Divi.sion marched
from Cabrerizos at noon, passing through the city, which WM at
this moment full of alarms and excursions. For the sight of
Marmont elose at hand, and of the British baggage-train
1 l;'rom the Hth Light Dragoons.
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moving DU hastily toward Rodrigo, had mlcd the inhabitants
with dismay. Some were hiding their more valuable pl'Opcrty,
others (who had compromised themselves by their friendly
reception of the allied army) were preparing for hasty flight.
Some used bitter language of complaint-the English were
retreating without a. battle dter betraying their friends.
Pakenluun and D'Urban reached their appointed stntion by
two o'clock,l and halted in a dip in the ground, well screened by
trees, between La Penilla and Aldca Tcjuda, where they could
barely be seen ll'Offi the highest slopes of Wellingoon's position,
and not at all from any other point. For some time they were
left undisturbed, listening to a growing noise of artillery fire to
their left hont, where matters were evidently coming to a head.
At about eleven o'clock MarmOllt had climbed to the swnmit
of the French Al'apile. from whence he obtained for the first
time a partial view into the British position; for looking up
the dip in the ground between the Lesser Arapile and the
heights occupied by the Fusilier brigade of the 4th Division,
he could eatch a glimpse of some of the movements that were
going on at the back of Wellington's first line. Apparently
he saw the 1st and Light Divisions behind the crest of their
destined fighting position, and the 5th und 6th and Bradford's
Portuguese taking ground to their right. Pack's Portuguese
on the flank and rear of the British Arapilc must also have been
visible at least in part. The conclusion to which he came was
that his adversary was accumulating forces behind the Lesser
Arapile with the object of sallying out against Bonnet, whose
post was very far advanced in front of the rest of the l~re~ch
army, and against Foy and Fcrcy, who ')lere left in a somewhat
isolated position on the plateau by Calvarisa, when the main
body of the army had moved so far to the west.
Some such intention seems for a moment to have been in
Wellington's mind, though he says nothing of it ill his dispatch.
, About twelve o'clock,' writes one of the most trustworthy
British diarists, 'the troops were ordered to attack, and the
1st Division moved forward to gain the other Arnpile, wllich
the :French had taken.... There was something singular,
I think, in Lord Wellington's ordering the 1st and Light
, The hours me taken from D'Urban's diary.
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Divisions to attack early in the day, and then counter·ordering
them after they had begun to move. Marshal BeresCord, no
doubt, was the cause oC the alteratioll, by what he urged.
Yet at the same time Lord W. is so little influenced (or indeed
allows any person to say a word) that his attending to the
Marshal wus considered singular. From all I could collect and
observe" the Peer" was a little nervous: it was the first time
he had ever attacked. When he did finally determine on the
attack it was well done, in the most decidcd manllcr. There
was possibly some little trou~le in arriving at that decision 1.'
Oddly enough this contemporary note is exactly borne out by
Marmont's statement in his Mi'11wires, that meeting \Vcllington
years after, be inquired about the point, and was fraukly told
that an attack had been projected at this moment, but that it
had been put off in consequence of the representation of
Beresford, who had counselled delay 2. There was a heavy mass
of troops available behind the Lesser Arapile and to both sides
of it-the 4th Division, Pack's Portuguese, und the 1st, 7th,
and Light Divisions, with the 5th and 6th and Bradford ftnd
the cavalry in reserve. The blow might have succeeded-but
undoubtedly that delivered foW' hours later was much more
effective.
The idea of an attack at noon having been fmally rejected
Wellington turned his mind to another possibility. I! Mu,l'1uollt
should commit IlO blundcrs, and should continue his turning
movcment at ll. sale distance, and with his whole army well
concentrated, it WllS quite possible that a retreat might become
necessary. The Commander-ill-Chief ealled up Colonel Delancey,
then acting as Adjutant.GencraI 3, and directed him to dralt
a comprehensive scheme for the order in which the troops
should be withdrawn, and the route which each division would
take in the event of an evacuation of the position. The next
stand was to be made, as Marmont had supposed, on the heights
above Aldea Tejada, bchind the river Zurgain 4• Sueh a move
• Tomkinson's Diary, pp. 187-9. • Mnrrnont, Jl1tmoires, iv. p. 250.
• Chatles Stewart (Lord Londonderry), who had held the post (or the
last three years had just gone !lome, :;md his successor llad lIot yet oome
out to Spain.
• The note oonccming Dclnncc)' is from Vere's Mardles olllle 4111 Division,
IJ·31.
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would have involved the abandolUncnt of the city of Salamanca
to the French. The news spread from the staff rowld the
commanding otlicers ol divisions, and so downwards to the
ranks, where it caused immense discontent. Everyone was
, spoiling for a fight,' and the cautious tactics of the last six
days had been causing munnurs. which were only kept from
becoming acute by the lOllg-trictI confidence that the army felt
in its cluc!.
At this vcry moment Marmont began to act in the fashion that
Wellington most desired, by making an altogether dangerous
extension of his left wing, and at the same time pressing' in so
close to his adversary that he could not nvoid a battle if it were
thrust upon him. His own explanation is that he took the
putting off of Wellington's tentative movement against Bonnet
as a sign that the allied army was actually commencing its
retreat. • Wellington rcnoUIU,'Cd his intcntion of fighting, and
from that moment he had to prepare to draw away, for if he
had remained in his present position I should from the next
day have threatened his communications, by marching on to my
left. His withdrawal commenced at midday.... He had to
retreat by his right, and consequently he had to begin by
strengthening his right. lIe therefore weakened his left, and
accumulated troops on his right. Then his more distant units
and his reserves commenced to move, and in succession drew
orr towards Tcjares [Aldeo. Tejada]. His intention was easy
to discern.... The enemy having carried oU the bulk of his
force to his right, I had to reinforce my left, so as to be able to
act with promptness and vigour, without having to make new
arrangements, when the moment should arri\'c for falling upon
the English rearguard 1.'
It is clear that the Duke of Ragusa had drawn his conclusion
that Wellington wus ubout to retreat at once, IHId hud urgucU,
[ram llartly-seen motions in his adversary's rear, that the whole
allied anny was moving off. But this was not yet the case :
Wellington was taking precautions, but he was stillllot without
hope that theF'reneh would commit themselves to some
unwise and premature movement. He had still every man 'in
hand, und the supposed general retreat on Aldea Tejuda, which
, llItmQires, iv. p. 257.
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the Marshnl thought thnt he saw, wus in reality only the shifting
of reserves more to the right.
Unwitting of this, Marmont, a little before hvo o'clock, began
his cxtcnsion to thc lelt. To the wcstward of the woods ph
whose edge the five divisions composing his main body were
massed, is a long plateau facing the village of Arapiles und
the heights behind it. It is about ducc-quarters of 0. mile
broad and three miles long, gently undulating and well suited
for marching: in 1812 it seems to have been open waste: to-day
it is mainly under the plough. Its front or northern side slopes
gently down, toward the bottom in which lies the village of
Arapiles: at its back, which is stecper, arc woods, outlying
parts of the great forest which extends to Alba de Tormes. It
ends suddenly in a knoll with an outcrop of rock, called the
Pica de Mirl.l.llda., abovc the hamlct of Miranda dc Azan, from
which it dro.ws its name. Along this plateau was the obvious
and easy route for a force marching to turn Wellington's right.
It was a very tempting piccc of ground, with a glacis-likc slope
towards the English heights, which made it very defensible--:-
a better artillery position against a force advancing from the
village of Arapiles and the ridges behind it could not be eon-
cci\·ed. The onI)' danger connected with it seemed to be that
it was over·long-it had more tha.n two miles of front, and a very
large force would be required to hold it securely 1rom end to
end. From the Pico de Miranda, if th~ French sho\dd extend
so far, to Foy's right wing by Calvarisa de Ariba was a distance
of six miles in all-fur too mueh for an army 0148,000 men in
the battle-arra)' of the Napoleonic period.
Marmont says that his first intention was only to occupy the
nearer end of the plateau, that part of it which faces the village
of Arapilc~. In his apologetic dispatch to Berthicr, hc declares
that he wished to get a lodgement upon it., lest Wellington
might seize it before him, and so block his way westward. 'It
was indispensable to occupy it, seeing that the enemy had just
strengthened hifl centre, from whence he could push out enmasse
on to this plateau, and commence un attack by taking posscssion
of this important ground. Accordingly 1 ordered the 5th
Division (l\Iaucune) to move out and form up on the right end
of the. plateau, where his fire would link on perfectly with that.
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from the [Great] Arapile: the 7th Division [Thomieres] was
to place itself in second line as a support, the 2nd Division
(Cluuscl) to act as a reserve to the nh, The 6th Division
(Brennier) was to occupy the high ground in front of the wood,
where a large number of my guns were still stationed, I ordered
General Bonnet at the SRme time to occupy with the 122nd
regiment a knoll intermediate between the plateau and the hill
of the [Great] Arapilc, which blocks the exit from the village of
the same name. Finally, I directed General Boyer to leave only
onc regiment of his dragoons to watch Fay's right, and to come
round with the other three to the front of the wood, beside the
2nd Division. The object of this was that, supposing the enemy
should attack the plateau, Boyer could charge in on their right
flank, while my light cavalry could charge in on their left flank 1,'
All this reads very plausibly and ingeniously, but unfortu-
nately it squares in neither with the psychology of the moment,
nor with the manccuvrcs which l\[aucunc, Thomiercs, and
Clauscl executed, under the Marshal's eye and without his
interference. He had forgotten when he dict..'\ted tins paragraph
-and not unnaturally, for he wrote sorely wounded, on his sick-
bed, in pain, and with his head not too clear-that he had just
bcIorc stated that Wellington was obviously retreating, and
had begun to withdraw towards Aldea Tejada. If this was so,
how eould he possibly have conceived at the moment that his
adversary, far from retreating, was preparing an offensive move-
ment en lI/Mse against the left flank or the French position?
The two conceptions cannot be reconciled, The fact was,
undoubtedly, that he thought that Wellington was moving orf,
and pushed forward ~raueune, Thomieres, and Clause!, with the
object of molesting and detaining what he supposed to be
the rearguard of his adversary. The real idea of the moment
was the one which appears in the paragraph of his Memmres,
already quotcd 011 Illl earlier page: 'I hoped that our respective
positions would bring on not a battle but an advantageous rear-
guard action, in which, using my full force late in the day, with
a part only of the British Ilrmy lcCt in hont of mc, I should
probably score a point.' Jourdan, a severe critic of his colleague,
puts the matter with perfect frankness in his Guerrc d'Espagne.
• Dispatch to BerLhier, MtllllJiU8, iv. pp. 445--6.
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After quoting Marmont's insincere dispatch at lcngth, he adds,
, it is evident that the Marshal, in order to menace the point of
retreat of the allies, extended his left much too far l .' Napoleon,
after reading l\Iarmont's dispatch in a Russian bivouac 2,
pronowlCed that all bis reasons and explanations for the
position into which he got himself had' as much complicated
stuffing as thc inside of a clock, and not a word of truth as
to the real state of things.'
What happened under the eyes of ·Marmont, as he took
a long-delayed lunch on the top of the Greater Arapile 3, was
as follows. i\!aueune, with his strong division of nine battalions
or 5,200 men, after breaking out from the position in front of
the woods where the French main body was massed, marched
across the open ground for about a mile 01' more, till he had
got \vell on to the central part of the plateau which he was
directed to occupy. He thcn drew up opposite the village of
Arapilcs, and sent out his voltigeur companies to work dowll
the slope toward that place, which lay well in front of the
British line. The position whieh he took up was on that part
of the plateau which sweeps forward nearest to lhe opposite
heights, and is littlc morc than half a mile from them. A fierce
artillery engagement then set in; l\1aucunc's divisional battery
began to shell the village of Arapiles. Sympher's battery,
belonging to the 4th Division, replied {Tom the slope behind the
village and from two guns on the Lesser Arapile. The French
pieces which had bcen dragged up on to the Greater Arapile
then started shC"lling the Lesser, and silenced the two guns
there, which were drawn ocr, and scnt to rejoin thc rest of the
batter)', on a less exposed position. The 8/27th on the hilltop
had to take cover behind rocks as best it could. Soon after
at least two more French batteries, lrom thc artillery reserve,
took ground to the right of Maucune, and joined in the shelling
01 the village of Arapilcs. Wellington presently supported
Sympher's ba.ttery with that of Lawson, belonging to tIle
I .Jourdan's lIUmoiTIl,wT la GflCTTIl rl'l';I<]>Qgllll, p. 418.
t 'n y a plus de fatras et de rOllages que dans une horloge, et pas IIn
mot qui rnsse connnitre l'etnt r{-e.! des ehoses.' For more lmrd words see
Napoleon to C!nrke, Ghi"t?;, September 2.
• See Memoirs of P"rquin, who oommanded his escort, p.209. But he
states the 110ur f\.S II o'clock, mueh too enrly.
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5th Division, which turned on to shcll Mauculle's supporting
columns from ground 011 the lower slopes, not far to thc right
of Sympher's position. i'he effect was good, and the columns
shifted sideways to get out of range. But one (or perhaps two]
of the French batteries then shifted their position, and began to
play upon Lawson diagonally from thc le£t, so enfilading him that
he was ordered to limber up and move higher Oil the hill behind
the village, from whence he resumed his fire. Wellington also,
a little later, brought up the horse-artillery troop belonging to
the 7th Division [' E', Macdonald's troop] and placed it on the
Lesser Arapilc-two guns on the summit, four. on the lower
slopes near the Ij40th of W. Anson's brigade, The British fire
all along th~ heights was erCective and accurate, but quite
unable to eope with that of the French, who had apparently
six batteries in action against three. Marmont, indeed, had all
along his line an immense superiority of guns, having 78 pict.'Cs
with him against Wellington's 54. His artillery-reserve con-
sisted of four batteries-that of his adversary of one only-
Arriaga's Portuguesc 24-pounder howitzcrs 1.
While Maucune and the French artillery were making a very
noisy demonstration against the British line between the
Lesser Arapile and the village of the same name, which looked
like the preliminaries of a serious attack, morc troops emcrged
from the woods of Marmont's centre, and began to file along the
plateau, under cover of l\Iancune's deployed line. These were
Thomicres's division, succceded after a long interval by that of
Clausel. 'During the cannonade column followed column in
quick and continued succession along the heights occupied by
the cncmy: Marmont was moving his army in baltlc-order
along his position, and gaining ground rapidly to his left 2.'
According to the Marshal's own account of his intentions, he
had proposed to place l\faueune on thc (French) right cnd of thc
plateau, Thomieres and Clausel in support of him. What
happened, however, was that Maucune went weH forward on to
• For this artillery bllsinc6ll see especially the six narratives of artillery
officers printed by Major I.eslie in bis Dick,wll PaperB, it. pp;085-9r. Also
for doings of the 5th Division battery (Lawson's), Leith Hay, H. pp. 41-8,
nnd of the ,~th Division battery (Sympller's), "ere's Marc1ws of Ille 411.
Divisioll, pp, 334.
I "ere's llfarclles 0/ t/ie <1./1. Division, p. 33,
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the right-centre of the plateau, and that Thomieres marched
along past l\lauculle'S rear, and continued moving in a westerly
direction along the summit of the plateau, though Clausel soon
halted: bcforeThomicres stoppedhc had gone nearly three miles.
It is clear that if l\larmont had chosen, he could have checked
the manreuvres of his subordinates, the moment that they
passed the limit which he alleges that he had set them. An
aidc-de-cump sent down from the baek of the Greater Arupilc
could have told Maueune not to press forward toward the
English position, or Thomieres to stop his march, within a
matter of twenty minutes or hall an hour. No such countcr-
orders were sent-and the reason clearly was that Murmont
was satisfied with the movements that he saw proceeding before
him, until the moment when he suddenly realized with dismay
that Wellington was about to deliver 11 cOWltcr-stroke in full
force.
We must now turn to the movements of the allied army.
The instant that l\!uueullc deployed on the plateau in Iront of
the village of Arapiles, and that the cannonade began, Welling-
ton judged that he was about to be attacked-the thing that
hc most desired. A very few orders put his army in a defensive
battle-position. The 5th Division was sent from the rear side
of the heights to occupy the crest, continuing the line of the
4th Division. The 6th Division was brought up from the rear
to a position behind the 4th. The 7th Division, abandoning
the long bickering with l~oy in whieh its light troops had been
engaged, was drawn hack from the left wing, and took post
in second lille parallel to the 6th and in rear of the 5th Division.
The place of its skirmishers on the slopes in front of Nuestra.
Seiiora dc la Peiia was taken by some companies of the 95th,
sent out from the Light Di,tision. That unit and the 1st Division
now formed the total of the allied left wing, with Bock's heavy
dragoons covering their flank. They were • <.'Ontuinillg' an
equivalent French force-Fay's and Ferey's infantry divisions,
and the single regiment of Boyer's dragoons which Marmont
hOO left in this quarter. /
There still remained in reserve, near the village of Las Toues,
Bradford's Portuguese and Espaiia's Spanish battalions, with
the bulk of the allied cavalry-all Anson's and Le Mareho.nt's
O)l~. v F f
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and the greater part of Arentschildt's squadrons, and in addition
Pakenham and D'Urban were available a little farther to the
right, near Aldea Tcjadu. Ilthc l~reneh were going to attack
the heights on each side of the village of Arapiles, as seemed
probable at the moment, all these remoter reserves could be
used as should seem most profitable.
But the battle did not go exactly as Wellington expected.
The cannonade continued, and Maueune's skirmishing line
pushed very boldly forward, and actually attacked the village
of Arapiles, which was defended by the light companies of the
Guards' brigade of the 1st Division and ot the Fusilier brigade
of the 4th Division. The voltigeuYs twiee seized the southern
outlying houses of the straggling village, and were twice driven
out. But the battalions in support of them did not eomc
forward, nor did Bonnet attack 011 thc l·jght of them, nor
Thomieres on the left. The former remained stationary, 011 and
about the Great Arapile: the latter continued to march west·
ward along the plateau: a perceptible gap began to appear
betwecn him and Maueunc.
Wellington at this moment was toward the right rear of his
own line---occupied according to some authorities in snatching
a late and hasty lunch 1 while matters were developing, but not
yet developed-according to others in giving orders concerning
the cavalry to Stapleton Cotton, near Las 'forres-when he
received an urgent message from Leith. It said that Maucune
had eeased to advance, but that the French cxtremc left was
still in match westward. • On being made acquainted with
the posture of affairs,' writes the officer who bore Leith's
1 The trnditiollnl story may lJe found in Greville's .1l1etlloirs, ii. p. 30.
Wellington is said to huve IJeen in the courtyard of a farmhouse, where
sOllle food hnd been I(lid out for him, • Slumping about uud munching,' and
tukiug ocCllsionnl peellS through his telescope. Presently came tile nide-de·
CUlllJl with Leilh'll mel:l8uge. Wellington look 'Lllother long look through
Ilis glass, llnd cried, •By God ! that wilt do !' his mouth still full. He then
sprung on his horse nud rode off, tile slnff following. Another version llll'y
lJe foulld in Gmtlall, PI" 239-40: • Lord W. 11l1d given his glnss to llll Il.ide-
ueo(:alllll, while he himself sut down to eat u. few mouthfuls of colt.! beef.
Presently lhe omcer reported that the enelUy wcre still extending to tlleir
lett_ "The devil they are I give me the gluss (luiekly." 8lJ.id his lord·
ship---(md then, after u long inspection, "111i8 will do nt ]ntit, J Ulink-
ride ofT." ,
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report 1, •Lord Wellington declared his intention of riding to
the spot and directed me to accompany him. When he arrived
at the gl"Ound of the 5thDivision~nowunder arllls and perfectly
prepared to receive the attack, his Lordship found the enemy
still in the same formation, but not displaying any intention
of trying his fortune, by crossing the valley at that point. He
soon became satisfied that no operation of consequence was
intended against this part of the line. He again galloped off
toward the right, whieh at tlus time became thc most interesting
and important scene of action.'
The critical moment of the day was the short space of time
when Wellington was surveying the French army. from the
height where Leith's men were lying prostrate behind the
crest, above the village of Arapiles, under EL distant but not
very clfectivc artillery fire. The whole plateau opposite was
vcry visiblc: :Maueune could be seen halted and in line, with
much artillery on Ius flank, but no infantry force near~there
was half a mile between him and Bonnet. 'l'homiercs was still
pushing away to his left, already separated by some distanec
from :Muueune. Cluusel had apparently halted aHcr the cnd
of his march out of the woods. Foy and l~ereywere at least two
miles off to the French right. The enemy, in short, were in no
solid battle order, and were seuttered on an immense arc, wluch
enveloped on both sides the obtuse angle en pote'nee formed
by the main body of the allied army. From Foy"!> right to
Thomicrcs's lelt there was length but no depth. The only
reserves were the troops imperfectIy visible in the woods behind
the Great Arapilc-where lay Drennier in first line, and Sarrut
who was now neuring Marmollt's u.rtillery~park aud baggage.
Their strength might be guessed from the fact that Mannont
was known to have eight infantry divisions, and that six
were clearly visible elsewherc. Wellington's determination was
suddenly taken, to turn what had been intended for a defensive
into an offensive battle. Seeing the enemy so scattered, and so
entirely out of regular formation, he would attack him with the
whole force that he hadin positionwest ofthelittleArapile, before
:i\Iarmont could get into order. Leith, Cole, and Pack in front
• His nephew, Leith FI:1y, whose memoir I have so often had to quote,
here H. 1'. 4U.
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line, supported by the 6th and 7th Divisions in second line, and
with Bradford, Espai'ia, and Stapleton Cotton's cavalry covering
. their right flank in a protective echelon, should cross the valley
and fall upon Bonnet, Maucune, Clauscl, and Thomicrcs.
Meanwhile Pakcnham and D'Urball, being in a bidden position
from which they copld easily outflank Thomieres. should
ascend the western end of the plateau, get across the head of
his marching column, and drive it in upon Maucunc, whom
Leith would be assailing at the same moment. Pakenham's
turning movement was the most delicate part or the plan;
wherefore Wellington resolved to start it himself. Hc rode
like the wind across the ground behind the heights, past Las
Torres and Penilla, and appeared all alone before D'Urban's
Portuguese squu.drons. It wus only some time later that first
Colonel Delancey and then others of his staff, quite outdistanced,
came dropping in with blown horscs. The orders to D'Urban
were short and clear: Pakenham was about to attack the
western cnd of the plateau where Thomicrcs was moving-near
the Pica de .Minmda. It would be D'Urban's duty to cover
his right flank 1. A minute later Wellington was before the Brd
Division, which had just received orders to stand to its arms.
• The offieers had not taken their places in the eolwnn, but
were in a group together, in front of it. As Lord Wellington
rode up to Pakenham every eye was turned towards him. He
looked paler than usual; but, notwithstanding the sudden
ebo.nge he ho.d just made in the disposition of his o.rmy, he was
quite unruffled in his manner, as if the battle to be fought was
nothing but a field·day. His words were few and his orders
brief. Tapping Pakenham on the shoulder, he said, .. Edward,
move on with the 3rd Division, take those heights in your
front-and drive everything before you." .. 1 will, my lord,"
was the laconic reply of the gallant Sir Edwnrd. A moment
after, Lord Wellington was galloping on to the next division,
to give (I suppose) orders to the same erreet, and in less than
half an hour the battle had commenced 2,' The time was about
Il quarter to four in the afternoon.
1 D'Urban's unpublisllcd diary gives the fact that hc got his ordcr from
Wellington personally before Pakcnham was reached.
I Grattan'& With the ConnauJ:ht Rangtf'B, pp. 241-2.
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Having set Pllkenham and D'Urban in motion, Wellington
rode baek to the ground of the 5th Division, sending on his
way orders for Arentschildt to leave the cavalry reserve, and
join D'Urban with the five squadrons that remained of Victor
Alten's brigade 1. Bradford, Espafia, and Cotton at the sume
time were directed to come forward to Leith's right flank. On
reaching the hilltop behind the village of Arapiles, the Corn·
mander-ill-Chief gave his orders to Leith: the 5th Division
was to advance downhill and attack l\laucune across the
valley, as soon as Bradford's Portuguese should be close up to
support his right, and as Pakenham's distant movement should
become visible. Wellington then rode on to give the corre-
sponding orders to Cole, more to the left lI.
The 5th Division thereupon sent out its light companies ill
skirmishing line, and came up to the crest: the two neighbour-
ing brigades of the 4th Division followed suit, and then Pack's
Portuguese, opposite the Greater Arapilc. Considerable loss
was suffered in all these corps from the French artillery fire,
when the battalions rose from their lying posture behind the
crest and became visible. Some thirty or forty minutes elapsed
between 'Vellington's arrival on the scene and thc commencc-
ment of the advnnee: the delay was caused by the necessity
for waiting for Bradford, who was coming up as fast as possible
from Las Torres. The attack did not begin till about 4.40 p.m.
By the time that Leith and Cole came into action the Freneh
anny had been deprived of its chief. Somewhere between
three and four o'clock in the afternoonS, and certainly nearer
the latter than the former hour, Marmont had been severely
wounded. According to his own narrative he had begun to be
troubled by seeing 1t(aueunc pressing ill too close to the village
of Arapiles, nnd 'l'homieres passing on too fnr to the left, and
had been roused to considerable vexation by getting a message
1 Two of 14th Light Dragoons, three of 1st HUSSllrs K.G.I..
I All this trom Leith Hay, ii. pp. 51-2 .
• MlIrmont Sl~ys that it wus • ellviron trois ,"curea du soir.' But I Ulink
tlll.t nbout 3.45 slJOuld bc givcn ILS thc hour, since MUIICUllC only left the
woods ut 2 o'clock, lOud had to Illllreh on to the plaleall, to I.uke lIl) his
position, to scnd out his valtigellrB, und to get them clO/;e in to Arupilell
before he would llUVC sent such II IllCllSllge to his chief. Fo)' sUYll ' between
3 and 4 p.m.'
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from the former that he observed tha.t the troops in lront of
him were retiring, and therefore would ask leave to support
his voltigeur.~ and attack the British position with his whole
division. Marmont says that it was his wish to stop Maucunc
from closing that induced him to prepare to depart from his eyrie
on the Creat Arapilc, and to descend to take charge of his left
wing. De this as it may, there is no doubt that he was starting
to climb down and mount his horse, when a shell from one of
Dyncluy's two guns on the British Arapilc burst near him, and
flung him to the ground with a lacerated right arm, and a wound
in his side which broke two ribs 1. He himself says that there
was nothing irremediable in the state of his army at the moment
that hc was disabled. His critic, Fay, held otherwise. 'The
Duke oC Ragusa,' he wrote, , insinuated that the battle or the
22nd was lost because, alter his own wounding, there was a gap .
in the command, anarchy, and disorder. But it was the Duke
who rorced on the battlc, and that contrary to the advice of
General Clause!. His left was already beatcn when he was
disa.bled: olready it was imp~ssible either to refuse a battle
or to give it a good turn. It was only possible to attenuate the
disaster-and that was what Clausel did 2.' Foy also insinuates
that Maueune's advance, at least in its early stages, was conso-
nant with Marmont's intentions. 'He had made his arrange~
ments for a decisive blow: when the English were seen to take
up their position, the heads of the columns were turned to the
left, so as to occupy the elevations which dominate the plain,
and swell up one after another. The occupation of one led to
the temptation to seize the next, and so by advance after
advance the village or Arapilcs wns at last reached. Maucune's
di\·jsion actually held it for some minutes. Nevertheless wc
had not yet made up our minds to deliver battle, and the
necessary dispositions for onc had lIot been made. 1\1y division
WfiS stilI occupying the plateau of Calvarisa, with the 31'£1 and
4th Divisions (Fere)' and Sa1'rut) and the dragoons supporting
1 Many years after, when l\IurmOllt, nolV a subject or Louis XVIII, was
inspecting some Dritish artillery, an officer had the maladroit idea of intl"1)o
ducing to him the sergeant who lmd pointed the gun-the effect of the shot
in the middle of the French staff had been noticed on the British Arapile.
• Vit mililairt de Foy, p. 177.
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me in the rear. Here, then, was a whole section of the army
quite out of the fight: and the other divisions were not well
linked together, and could be beaten onc after the other.'
Fay is certainly correct in asserting that, at the moment of the
j\[arshal's wound, he himself and l~erey were too Car off to be
brought up in time to save Maueune, and tIJat Bonnet, l\Iaueune,
Clausel, and Thomieres were in no solid eonnexion with each
other. This indeed was what made 'Wellington deliver his
attack. It is probable that the Marshal's wound occurred just
about the moment (3.45) when Pakenham and D'Urban were
being directed by Wellington to advance. Even if it Cell a trifle
earlier, the French lett wing was already too dislocated to have
time to get into a good position before it was attacked. Mar-
mont, it must be confessed, rather gave away his case"'When, in
his reply to Napoleon's angry qucry why he had fought a battle
on the 22nd, he answered that he had not intended to deliver
a general action at nil-it had been forced on him by 'Welling-
ton 1. If so, he was responsible fOr being caught by his adversary
with his army strung out in such a Cashion that it had a very
poor chance or avoiding disaster. If it be granted that the
unlucky shell had never struck him, it would not have been
in' a quarter of an hour z , (as he himself pretends), nor even
in a whole hour, that he could have rearranged a line six miles
long 3, though he might have stopped Maucune's attack and
Thomieres's Rank march in a much shorter time .
• Marmont to Bcrthicr, Memoirts, iv. p. 468.
I Ibid., ' la gauche cut eh\ formee en moills d'un quart d'heufC ' !
• The exaet moinent oC Marmont's wound is very difHeult to fix, as also
that of 'Vellington's attMk. The Marshal himself (as mentioned above,
p. 4:.l8) says that he was hit 'environles trois heures,' and that Leith and Cole
advanced' peu apr~, sur !cs quatre beures.' Foy plaees the wound merely
, between 3 and'" p.m.' Parquin, who commanded Marmont's escort of
chasscurs, says that the Marshal had been carried back to Alba de Tormes
by 4. o'clock-impossibly early. On the other hand Napkr gives too late
all hour, when saying that Marmont was wounded only at the moment
when Leith and Cole advanc«l, 4.'~5 or so, and was running down (rom
the Arapile beeause of their movement. This is, I imagine, much too late.
But it is supported by Vicwirc$ et COtlqucUS, sometimes a well-documented
work but often illnceurate, whieh plaees the unlucky shot at 4.30. Grnttan
places the order to the British inf:l1lUy (Leith nod Cole) to prepare to
attack at 4.2o--Leith Hay at 'at lenst an hour after 3 o'clock.' Gornm,
on the other hand, makes Wellington move' at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.'
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On l\farmont's fall, the command of the army of llortugal
fell to Bonnet, the senior general of division. He was within
u. few yards of his wounded chief, since his division was holding
the Great Arapile, and took up the charge at once. But it was
an extraordinary piece of ill-luck for the French that Bonnet
also was wounded within an hour, so that the command passed
to Clausel before six o'clock. As Foy remarks, however, no
onc coula have saved the compromised left wing-Marmont
had let it get into a thoroughly vicious position before he was
disabled.
Since the main clash of the battle of Salamanca started at
the western end of the field, it will be best to begin the narrativc
of thc British advance with the doings of Pakcnham and
D'Urball. These two officers had some two milcs of rough ground
to cover between the point where Wellington had parted from
them, and the point which had now been reached by the head
of thc Frcnch advance. They were ordered to move in four
• columns of lines,' with D'Urball's cavalry Corming the two
outcr or right-hand columns, the third c<lmposed of \VaHace's
brigade (1!,t-5th, 1/88th, 74th) and of Power's Portuguese
(9th and 21st Line and 12th Cac;adorcs), while the Courth <:011-
sisted of Campbcll's brigade (1/5th, 2/5th, 94th, 2/83rd). The
object of this formation was that the division, when it came
into action, should be able to deploy into two lines, without
the delay that would havc been causcd if the third brigade
had followed in the wake of the other two 1.
The wa)' in which the two sides came into collision was
rather peculiar. Thomicres's column was aC<:Qmpllnied by the
whole, or nearly the whole, of Curto's light cavalry division,
which, as one would have supposed, would naturally have
been keeping a squadron or so in advall(.'C to explore the way,
Tomkinson (usually very accurate) places Pakcllham's and Leith's success
at 'about 5 p.m.' D'Urban thinks t-hat he met Lord Wellington and
received his orders ofter .. p.m.-probably he is ha\( an hour too late in
his estimate.
I Wellingtol' ill his dispatch (ix. p. 302) speaks or the four CQlumlls,
D'Urbnn makes it clcar that his own squadrons fonned the outcr two, but
the fact that Power's Portuguelie followed Wallace in the 8«1 column
only emerges In the Regimental History of the 45th (Dalbiac), p. 103.
This is quite consistent with the other intorm.'\tiOll.
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as well as others on the flanks to cover the infantry. But it
appears that this simple precaution was not taken, for Paken~
ham and D'Urban mct no Freneh cavalry at all, till they had
got wcll in touch with the hostile infantry. Curto, we must
supposc, was marching parallel with the centre, not certainly
with the head, of Thomieres's division, without any vedeUes
or exploring partics in front. For D'Urban describes the first
meeting as follows :-
'The enemy was marching by his left along the wooded
heights, which form the southcrn boundary of the valley of the
Arapiles, and the western extremity of which closes in a lower
fall, which descends upon the little stream of the Azan, near
the village of ~Iiranda. As the head of our column approachcd
this lower fall, or hill, skirting it near its base, and baving it
on our left, we became aware that we were close to the enemy,
though wc could not scc them owing to the trees, the dust, and
the peculiar configuration of the ground. Anxious, therefore,
to ascertain their exaet whereabouts I had ridden out a little in
front, having with me, I think, only my brigade-major Flangini
and Du Camara, when upon clcll.l'ing the verge of a small clump
of trees, a short way up the slope, I cnme suddenly upon the
head of a French column of infantry, having about a company
in front, and marching vcry fast by its left. It was at once
obvious that, as the columns of the Brd Division were marching
on our left, the French must be already beyond their right, and
consequently I ought to attack at once I,'
This was apparently the lcading battalion of the French
10lst, marching with its front absolutely uncovered by either
cavalry vcdeltcs or any exploring parties of its own. D'Urball
galloped back, unseen by thc enemy, and wheeled his leading
regiment, thc 1st Portuguesc dragoons-three weak squadrons
of little over 200 sabres-into line, with orders to charge the
French battalion, before it should take the alarm and form
square. The 11th Portuguesc, and two squadrons of thc British
14th Light Dragoons, which had only just arrived on the
ground, being the forcmost part of Arentschildt's brigade,
followed ill support. The ehargc was successful-the French
were so much t..'\ken by surprise that the only manceuvre they
, All thi~ from D'Urball'~ unpublishcd narrative in thc D'Urban papCI'll.
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were able to perform was to close their second company upon
the first, so that their front was six deep. The two squadrons
of the Portuguese which attacked frontally suffercd severe loss,
their colonel, Watson, falling severely wounded among the
French bayonets. But the right-hand squadron, which over-
lapped the French left, broke in almost unopposed on the
ullformed flank o[ thc battalion, which thcn wcnt to pieces,
nnd was chased uphill by the whole of the Portuguese horse·
men, losing many prisoners 1.
This sudden assault on his leading unit, which seems to have
been acting as an advanced guard, and was considerably ahead
of the next, must have been sufficiently startling to Thomiercs,
who was taken wholly unawares. But the next moment brought
worse trouble: the first brigade of the 3rd Division-Wallaee's
--emerged almost simultaneously with the cavalry charge from
the scattered trees which had hitherto eovcred its advancc,
and was seen coming uphill in beautiful order against him.
He was caught in a long column-battalion marching behind
battalion, with considerable intervals between the regiments,
of which there were three (10Ist, threc battalions; 6,2nd,
two battalions; 1st, three battalions) 2. If: he was able to
sce Pakenham's supporting lines, which is a little doubtful,
Thomicrcs must have known that he was considerably out-
numbered: the British division had 5,800 men against his
'~,500, while Curto's 1,800 light cavnlry were not forthcoming
at the critical moment to save the situation.
Thc spacc between the advancing line or WuUa(:c's brigade
and the head of the French column, when they eame in sight of
eaeh other, was about 1,000 yards-the time tha.t it took to
bring them into collision just suffieed to enable Thomieres to
make some sort of basty disposition of his battalions: those in
the rear pushed out on to the flanks of the leading regiment,
• All this is from D'Uroull's uurrnt;vc, Ull,] lcttcrs from Colonel Wlltl!on
to D'Urban. The coloucl bittcrly resented Napicr's account or the eharge
(PellinSlIlar War, iv. p. 268).
• The division was marelling left in front, so that the senior regiment
was in the rear. 'rile fourth unit of the division (23rd Ugcr) was absent,
garrisoning Astorga, as was also the 2nd battalion of the 1st, which WtIIl
a vcry strong four-battalion corps. Hence there were only 8 battalions
out of 11 present, or ,,",tlOO men out of G,200.
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and made an irregular line of columns badly spaced. The
vQltigeurs of each battalion had time to run to the front: 'their
light troops,' says a. witness from the Conna.ught Rangers,
, hoping to take advantage of the time which our deploying
from column into line would take, ran down the face of the hill
in n. state of great excitement.' Pnkenham appears to have
sent out against them his three companies of the 5/60th and
the whole of the 12th Cac;adores, a skirmishing line of superior
strength. ''Vallaee's three battalions fonned line from open
column without halting, when they had got to within 250 yards
of the enemy: 'the different companies, by throwing forward
their right shoulders, were in line without the slow manCCllvre
of a deployment.' The French fire is said to have been rather
ineffective, because delivered downhill. The most serious loss
was that caused by Thomieres's divisional battery, which got
up and into action very promptly. Itwas answered by Douglas's
battery, the divisional artillery of the Brd Division, whieh
unlimbered on a knoll at the edge of the wood, and sent a raking
tlischarge uphill, against the right of the French di\'isioll,
shelling it over the heads of the brigade advancing up the slope.
The two Portuguese line regiments, from the rear of Wallaee's
brigade, formed in support of him: Campbcll's brigade followed
as a third line.
The main body of the French 1 stood in a group, rather than
a line, of battalion columns near the brow of the hill, while
Wallaee's brigade continued to press upwards with a front
which outflanked the enemy at both ends. 'Regardless of tile
fire of the tiraillcur8, and the shower of grape and canister, the
brigade continued to press onward. The centre (88th regiment)
suffered, but still advanced, the right and left (Ij45th and 74th}
continued to go forward at a more rapid pace, ,and as the
wings inclined forward and outstripped the centre, the brigade
assumed the form of a crescent 2.' They were nearly at the
brow, when Thomieres directed the French columns to charge
down in SUppOl·t of his tiraillturl? The mass, with drums
beating and loud shouts of Vive l'E1npereur, ran forward, and
1 It is not certain tJmt the wbole of the roar regimcnt (thc 1st Line) WIUl
in tJle group: possibly onc or two or its battalions were not yet 011 the
grouud. • Grattan, p. 245.
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the leading files delivered a heavy fire, which told severely on the
88th. But on coming under fire in retUnl the French halted, and
then wavered: 'their second discharge was unlike the first-it
was irregular and ill-directed, the men acted without concert or
method: many fired in the air.' The three British battalions
then cheered and advanced, when the enemy, his columns
already in much confusion and mixed with the wrecks of his
tirailleurs, gave way completely, and went of{ in confusion
nlong the top of the plateau.
Just at this moment Curto's chasscurs at last appeared-where
they had been up to this moment does not appear, but certainly
not in their proper place. Now, however, six or seven squadrons
of them came trotting up on the outer flank of the broken
division, of whom some charged the two battalions which
formed the right 01 Pakellham's first and third lines-the Ij45th
and Ij5th respectively. The lormer, leebly attacked, threw
back some companies en pO!eMe nnd beat off their assailants
easily. The latter fell back some little way, and had many
men cut up, but finally rallied in a clump and were not broken t.
Their assailants disappeared a moment alter, being driven off
by Arentschildt, who had just eome up on Pakenham's right
with the five squadrons of the 1st Hussars K.G.L. and 14th
Light Dragoons 1>.. D'Urban's Portuguese were now a little to
the rear, rallying after their successful charge aod collecting
prisoners: their commander says in his narrative of this part
of the battle that he never saw any French cavalry till later in
I 'rile 1/5tll lost 120 men, morc than any othcr Srd Division regiment
except the 88th. Sergeant Morley of the 5th, its only Salamanca diarist,
writes (I'. 113): 'There Wll.S a pause-a hcsitntion. Here I blush-hut
I should blush more if 1 were guilty of a ralsehood. Wc retired-slowly, in
good order, not rar, nnt 100 paces. Genel'31 Pakellham approuched, lint!
vcry good-lu,turCllly said ,. re_form," nnd aftcr" momenl .. UUYllnC(>--there
thcy lire, my huls--Iet thcm fccl the temper of your bUyOllCts." We
udVl1nced_nllher slowly nt liMit, n regiment of drugoons which tmd .....-ti~d
with us lignin IIccolllpllnying ... !lud took our retribution tor ollr repulse.'
The drub'<Jon regilllcnt wus Ilresumahly purt or ITUrhnu'!> hrigu.dc.
• Thi~ (.'Orncs.rrom the rCJlort of Arcntschildt on UUl doillb'S of his hrib'lluc:
it is not lnl:ntlon(.·(J by NUllicr, nor is there nnythiug nbout it in Wellington's
disl)utch. '1'ilc time is flxed by Arelltschilut spClLking of it liS 'durillg the
nttuek Oil the first hill.' Hc snys that he elosed with the main body oflile
French horse and drovc it off.
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the day, but does not dispute that the 5th may have been
attacked by them without his knowledge.
Curlo's cavalry being driven oU, the anI Division and its
attendunt squudrons pursued the broken l~reneh division of
infantry along the top of the plateau, and very nearly annihi-
latcd it. Thomicrcs was killcd, his divisional battery was
captured whole; of his two leading regiments the 101st Line
lost 1,031 men out of 1,.H9 present: its colonel and eagle were
both taken with many hundrcd unwounded prisoners: the
02nd Line lost 868 men out of 1,123. The rear regiment, the
1st Line, got off with the comparatively trifling casualty-list
of 231 out of 1,743: it was possibly not up in time to take part
in resisting Pakenham's first attack, and may perhaps have
done no more than cover the retreat of the wrecks of the two
leading regiments. Thc whole division was out of action as
a fighting body lor the rest of the day, having lost 2,180 men
out of a little over 4,500.1 The victorious British Srd Division,
whose casualties had not amounted to more than 500 of all
ranks, continued to press the [ugitivcs belore it, till it had gone
11 mile, and came in on the flank of l\1aucune's division, the next
unit in the French line; D'Urban's cavalry accompanied it
close on its right flank, Arcntschildt's squadrons lay larthcr
out, watching Cuxto's defeated first brigade of chasseuTs, which
rallied upon a reserve, his second brigade, and made head once
more against the pursuers, just about the sa.me time that
Pakenham's infantry began again to mcet with resistance.
1 The losses in officers or the three regiments were, taking killed nnd
wounded onl)', not unwoundcd prisoners, 25 ror the 101st, 15 rOT Ule 02nd,
~ ror the lit, by Mnrtinien's lists. 'fhe British retnrns of prisoners sent
to England, ut the Record Office, show 6 officcrn from the ]UIst, 2 from
the 62nd, and 1 frOlll the 1st, received uIter the battle. J presume thllt
IIcurly ull the wounded, both ofllccrn Hnd runk IInd file, count IIIlIong the
Ilri80Uel'll. The 1st entered in its regimentl.1 report 176 luts QU priB, 22
Wessts, 211 dispurwl: here the only people who got /lWfly would IJe t1w
22 blt!lsts. The regimentul return nr the JOIst shows 31 officers wlInling_
which seems to correspond to the 25 killed IInd wounded plus the 6 prif;QIllH'"
6Cl1t to Eugland.
SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER VIT
THE DATrI.E OF SALAMANCA: THE MAIN ENGAGEfI~NT
WE must now turn from the exploits of Pakellhum and the
Srd Division to deal with the great central attuck of Wellington's
frontal striking force, the 5th and 4th Divisions, under Leith and
Cole, upon the French left centre. They had been told to move
on when Bradford's Portuguese brigade should be sufficiently
near to cover the right flank of the 5th Division, and the
necessity of waiting for this support caused their attack to be
delivered perceptibly latcr than that of Pakcnham. Leith had
drawn out his division in two lines, the Hrst consisting of
Grcville's brigade (3/1st, 1/9th, and both battalions of the
38th) and the first battalion of the 4th, brought up from the
rear brigade (Pringlc's) to equalize the front of the two lines:
the second consisted of the rest of that brigade (the second
battalion of the 4th, the 2/80th, and 2/44th) and the Portuguese
of Spry (3rd and 15th Line). There was it heavy skirmishing
line in front, composed of all the British light companies and
the 8th Ca(fadores 1. Cole had u smaller force, as his left brigade
(Anson's) had bccn told off to the defence of the British Arapile:
the 3/27th was holding.that rocky knoll, the 1/40th was at its
foot in support. Only therefore the Fusilier brigade (under
Ellis of the 28rd) and Stubbs's Portuguese formed the attack-
ing force. 'fhey were in a single line of seven battalions, with
a heavy skirmishing screen composed of lour light companies
a.nd the whole 01 the 7th CU(fadores 2. The Fusilier brigade of
the 4th Division went through the cnd of the village of Ara-piles,
which it did by fJ.les from the right of companies, the companies
forming up again on thc east side 01 the place, upon their
• All this from Leith Hay, it. p. 53. The 1/38th had joincd from Lisbon
only twclvc hours back.
I This ill provcd by the narrative of thc Brunswick captain, \Vachholz,
who commanded the company oftllat corps attacllcd to the Fusilier brigadc.
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sergeants regularly sent out us markers. This defile delayed
the advance of the division, which therefore attacked decidedly
later than Leith's men, thc joint movement being in an echelon,
with the l'ight leading and the lelt considerably refused. It was
obvious that when the 4th Division drew near to the French
line on the plateau, it would be exposing its left flank to the
hostile division (BOImet's) which wus massed on and Dear the
Greater Arapile. Wellington had noted this, and had given
special discretionary orders to Pack, directing him to use his
independent brigade lor the sole purpose 01 protecting the near
flank of the 4th Division; he might attaek the Arapile, as the
best means of holding back Bonnet from descending against
Cole's line, or might malla:U\TC below the knoll lor the same
purpose. When the dangerous moment came, Pack, as we
shall see, took the bull by the horns, and assailed the precipitous
height in front with his wholc 2,000 men.
In the rear of the 4th Division the 6th was now coming up
the back slope of the hill behind the Arapile in second line:
similarly the 7th Division was following the 5th. To the right
01 the 7th, Stapleton Cotton was moving up from Las Torres
with the cavalry reserve, now consisting only of the six regi-
mcnts of Le Marehant and G. 1\.nson. Bradford, morc to the
right still, und not yet in line with Leith und Cole, moved with
Espai'ia.'s small Spanish division behind- him.
Of Wellington's front line Leith with the 5th Division had
Maucune in front of him: Cole would have to deal with Clause!,
who had arrived late on the ground, and was 9n1y just taking
up his position on the extreme right cnd of the Freneh plateau.
Pack and W. Anson's detached brigade from the 4th Division,
with the Lesser Arapile in their power, looked aeross the valle}'
at Bonnet, massed around its greater twin-hill. The British
attacking line was amply provided with reserves: the defensive
line of the French was still very thin, though Brennier's division
was hurrying up from thc head of the wood to support l\laucunc.
Sarrut's division was still invisible in the forest far to the rear:
Ferey's was better seen-it was hastening up across the open
ground on its WU}' from the extreme Je'rellch right, but must
obviously be too late to join in meeting Wellington's first
attack.
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The roar of the cannon and musketry away in the direction of
the Pica de Miranda had been announcing for some time that
Pakcnham was at close grips with Thomiercs, bclare Leith
marched down from his heights to cross the valley that separated
him from Maucune's position. Soon after five, however, the
5th Division was in close contact with the enemy, having
suUered a considerable amount of casualties in reaching him,
mainly from the very superior French artillery fire, which swept
every yard of the glncis-like slope that ascends from the bottom
of the Arapiles valley to the brow of the plateau that forms
its southern limit.
• The ground,' writes Leith Hay, 'between the advancing
force and that which it was to assail was crowded by the light
troops of both sides in extended order, carrying on a very
incessant tiraillade. 'fhe general desired me to ride forward, to
make our light infantry prcss up thc heights to cover his line of
march, and to bid thcm, if practicable, make a rush at the
enemy's guns. Our light troops soon drove in those opposed
to them: the cannon were removed to the rear: everyobstruc-
tion to the general advance of our line vanished. In front of
the centre of that beautifu1linc rode Gcneral Leith, directing its
movements. Occasionally every soldier was visible, the sun
shining bright upon their arms, though at intervals all were
enveloped in a deuse eloud of dust, from whence at times issued
the animating cheer of thc British infantry.
'The Ji'reneh columns, retired from the erest of the heights,
were formed in squares, about fifty yards behind the line at
which, when arrived, the British regiments would become
visible. Their artillery, although placed more to the rear, still
poured its fire upon our advancing troops. We were now near
the summit of the ridge. The men marched with the same
orderly steadU1Css llS at the first: no advance in line ut a review
was ever more correctly executed: the dressing was admirable,
and the gaps caused by casualties were fIlled up with the most
perfect regulnrity. General Leith and the officers of his staff,
being on horseback, first perceived the enemy, and had time
to observe his formation, before our infantry line beeame so
visible as to induce him to commence firing. He was drawn
up in contiguous squares, the front rank kneeling, and prepared
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to fire when the drum should beat. All was still and quiet in
thes<.: squares: not a musket was discharged wltil the whole
opened. Nearly at the same inst.'lnt General Leith ordered our
line to fire and charge. At' tins moment the last thing
1 saw through the smoke was the plunge of the horse of Colonel
Greville, commanding the leading brigade, who, shot through
the head, reared and fell baek on his rider. In an instant every
individual present was enveloped in smoke and obscurity. No
serious struggle for ascend~mcy followcd, for the "French squares
were penetrated, broken, and discomfited, and the victorious
5th Division prcssed rOf\VI~rd no longer against tl'OOpS Cormed
up, but against a mass of disorganized men flying in all direc-
tions .... When elose to the enemy's squares Leith had been
severely wounded and reluctantly forced to quit the field; at
the same moment I was hit myself, and my horse killed by
a niusket-ball; thus removed, I cannot detail the further
movements of the division 1,'
In this clear and simple narrative the most remarkable point
is Leith Hay's distinct statement that the French received the
charge or the 5th Division in a line of squares, a most strange
formation to adopt against infantry advancing deployed, even
when it was supplemented by a strong screen oC tirailleurs,
and flanked by several batteries of artillery. It is possible that
Maucune adopted it because, from his commanding position
on the plateau, he could sce a considerable body of cavalry
coming up on Leith's right rear. This was composed of the
brigades of Le Marehant and G. Anson, which Stapleton
Cotton was bringing up to the front by Wellington's orders.
While Leith was advancing they pressed forward, Le 1\Iarehant
leading, and passed up the hill in the interval between the
5th Division and Pakenham's front-leaving behind them
Bradford, who had crossed the valley parallel to, but much
behind, the right of Leith. Brndford had no solid body of
troops in front of him, being outside Maueune's extreme left, and
suUcrcd practically no loss-the total casualty list of his brigade
that day was only seventeen men. This contrasts marvellously
with the loss of Leith's front line, where Greville's brigade in
thcir triumphant advance lost 350 men-mainly from the
1 Leith Hay, H. pp. 57-8.
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artillery fire endured while the long slope of the .French plateau
was being mounted: for there were at least four batteries
aligned on Maucullc'S right, and their guns had been worked
till the last possible miuute.
Whatever was the cause of the formation in square adopted
by the I"tench division, it would have been fortunate if only
it could have preserved that formation a little longer; for
precisely when it had lost its order, and fallen back before kith's
shattering volleys of musketry, Le Marchant's heavy dragoons
arrived upon the crest of the plateau. No better opportunity
for the use of cavalry could have been conceived, than that
which existed at this moment. Infantry already engaged with,
and worsted by, other infantry is thc dcstincd prey of cavalry
coming on the scene from the flank in unbroken order. Le
Marchnnt had received his instructions directly from \Yellington,
who had told him to ' charge in at all hazards J,' when he" saw
the French battalions on the plateau hotly engaged. He had
formed his 1,000 sabres in two lines, the 5th Dragoon Guards
and 4th Dragoons in front, the Srd Dragoons in support, and
had come over the sky·line and trotted down into the valley just
as Leith's division got to close quarters with Maueunc. Passing
Bradford on his right, he eame to the crest to find all confusion
in front of him. The squares that Leith had just broken were
rolling back in disorder": directly behind a new division
(Brennicr's), only just arriving upon the field, was beginning
to form up, to covcr and support the shaken battalions. Some
distance to their Ielt rear the remains or Thomicrcs's division,
in a disorderly crowd, were falling baek in front of the trium~
phant advance of Pakenham.
Le Marchant charged in diagonally upon the flank of Mau·
cune's left brigade, and caught the two battnlions of the
66th regiment fIl.lIing back from the crest. The l;'renehmen
were courageous enough to make a desperate attempt to club
themselves together in a solid mass: their rear ranks faced
about Rnd opened a heavy fhe upon the advancing squadrons.
But it was given with uncertain aim and trifling errect, and
berore they could reload the dragoons were among them.
I See Le ~llIwhant's Lift, from notes supplied by his SOli, in Cole's
Penin3ular Generals, ii, p. 281.
1812J LE l\fARCHANT'S CHARGE 451
A desperate minority attempted to resist with the bayonet,
and were sabred: some hundreds east down their muskets,
raised their hands, and asked quarter. The rear ranks scattered
and Hed southwnrd across the plnteau. Leaving the gathering
up of the prisoners to the infantry of Leith, Le Marehant led
his brigade, so soon as some order could be restored, against
the next regiment of l\laueune's division, the 15th Line j they
were better prepared for resistance than the 66th, which had
been caught quite unawares, they showed a regular front, and
gave a more effective fire. Many of the dragoons fell; but
nevertheless their impetus carried them through the mass,
which went to pieces [\!ld dispersed into a disorderly crowd:
it fled in the same direction as the wrecks of the 66th. --
Le l\Iarehant's brigade had now lost its formatioIl, • the
three regiments had become mixed together, the officers rode
where they could find places: but a good front, without
intervals, was still maintained, and there was no confusion 1.,
In front of them there was now a fresh enemy-the 22nd Line,
the leading regiment oC the division of Brennier, which had
just arrived on the Held, and was getting into order to save and
support l\faueune's routed batt.'1.lions. It would seem that in
the midst oC the dust and smoke, and surrounded and interfered
with by the fugitives of the broken regiments, the 22nd had
either no time or no good opportunity for forming squares :
they were found in COlmllle serree, in good order, partly covered
by a clump of trees, un outlying thicket from the great forest
to their rear. They reserved their fire, with great composure,
till the dragoons were within ten yards distance, and poured
ll. volley so close and well aimed upon the leading squadron
[5th Dragoon Guards] that nearly a fourth of them Cell. Tremen·
dous as was the effect of the discharge, the dragoons were not
arrested: they broke in through the opposing bayonets, and
plunged into the dense masses oC the enemy. In the combat
which ensued, broadsword and bayonet were llsed against eaeh
other with various results: the French, hewn down and
trampled under the horses' feet, offered all the resistunce that
brave mcn could make. Le lI,larchant himself had some narrow
escapes-he Cought like a private, and had to cut down more
• Lift! of Lt! Mr.ITChaut. p. 285.
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than onc of the enemy. It was only after a fieree struggle th:1t
the French yielded, and he had the satisfaction of seeing them
fly before him in helpless confusion. The brigade had now lost
all order: the dragoons, excited by the struggle, vied with
ench other in the pursuit, and galloped recklessly into the
crowd of fugiti\'cs, sabring thosc who came within thcir rcach.
To restrain them at such a moment was beyond the power of
their offiecrs 1.' .
Lc l\lal'ehant endeavoured to keep a few men in hand, in
order to guard against any attempt of the French to rally, but
he had only about half a squadron of the 4th Dragoons with
him, when be came upon some companies which were beginning
to re-form in the edgc of the grcat wood. He led his party
against them, and drovc them back among the trees, where they
dispersed. But at the moment of contuct he was shot dead,
by a ball which entered his groin and broke his spine. Thus
fcll an officer of whom great things had bccn expected by all
who knew him, in the momcnt when hc had just obtained and
used to the full his first chance of leading his brigade in a general
action. Onc of the lew scientific soldicrs in thc cavalry ann
whom the British army owned, Le l\Iarehnnt had been mainly
known as the lounder and administrator of the Uoyal Military
College at High Wycombe. which was already beginning to
send to the front many young officers trained as their prede-
cessors had ncvcr been. He was the author of many military
pamphlets, and of 3 new system of sword cxcreise which had
latcly been adopted for the cnval ry 2. On his promotion to
the rank of Major-General, in 1811, he had been unexpectedly
scnt to thc Pcninsula in command of the heavy brigade, which
reinforced 'Vcllington during that autumn. As an executive
commander in the field he had given the first proofs of his
ability at thc combat of Villagarcia 3_but this was a small
allair-at Salamanca. he pl'Oved himself Do born commandcr
of cavalry, and his services would have been invaluablc to
1 l.ife of r,e Marr.!/(wl. pp. 286--7•
• Le i\111rchunt WIIS ulso 'Ill admirable "rList in wute.r colours. I SIIW
many of his pleasing sketehes ot Pcuinsular landscapes whell his gr{lnd'iOll,
Sir Henry Le iUareh.ant, allowed me to look through his L'Qrl'Cllpomlenee and
notes.
I See p. 277 above.
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Wellington III later fields but for the disastrous shot thot
ended his career. He was n. man of a lofty and religious spirit,
ill to be spared by his country 1.
Le l\Iurchallt's ehnrge made n complete wreck of the left
wing of the l"rench army. The remnants of the eight battalions
which he had brokcn fled eastward in a confused mass, towards
the edge of the woods, becoming blended with the separate
stream of fugitives from Thomieres's division. The 5th Division
swept in some 1,500 prisoners from them, us also thc eagle of
the 22nd Line, which the heavy brigade had broken iu their last
drort, while five guus were taken by the 4th Dragoons 2, The
French, flying blindly from the pursuit, wCl'e so scattered
that some of thcm actually ran in headlong among D'Urban's
Portuguese horse, on the back side of the plateau. "Vc were
so far in their rear,' writes that officer, ' that u. lllUSS of their
routed infantry (to our astonishment, since we did not know
thc cause) in the wildness of their panic and confusion, and
throwing away their arms, actually roll against our horscs,
where many of them fell down exhausted, and incapable of
further movement.' The same happened in the Iront of the
Brd Division, where, according to n. Ilarrn.tor in the Connaught
Rangers, 'hundreds of men frightfully disfigured, black with
dust, worn out with fatigue, and covered with sabre-cuts !U1d
blood, threw themselves among us for smety.'
, I have tead with tespcct his admirable lettel'll to his family, 'I nevet
go iuto battle,' he said, ' without subjecting rn)'seU to a strict sell-examina_
tion: when, baving (as I hope) humbly made my peace with God, I leave
the result in [lis hauds, with perfect confidencc that Dc will determine
what is best for me.'
• It is vexatious to find that neither the 22nd nor tile G6th was among
the fourteen Salamanca regiments of which detailed casualty lists survive.
The 15th Line returned 15 officers and 359 men as their loss, Martinien's
tables show 2l officers lost in the 22nd, and 17 in the 66th, The deficits
ol these two regiments as shown by the muster-rolls or August 1 were
respectlvely about 750 and 500, but these do not represcnt their tota.l losses,
as all the regiments present at the battle had picked up many men at their
d~pOts at Valladolid, and lrom the small evacuated pOlltS, before August I,
e.g, the 15th had 52 officers prescnt on July 15, lost l(' at Salamanca, but
showed 46 prescnt on August I ; 9 officers must have joined from somewhere
in the itlterim, So the 66th had 38 officers present on July 15, lost 17, but
showed 34 present on August I. Thirteen more must have arrived, and
accompanied of course by the corresponding rank and file.
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The Brd Division had now, in its advance along the plateau,
come in contact with the right flank of the fifth, and both of
them fell into onc line reaching across the whole breadth of
the heights, while in front of them wcre recoiling the wrecks
o( 'l'homicres, Maucune, and Brennicr. The (OUI' French
regimcnts which had not been caught in Le Marchant's charge
were still keeping together, and making occasional attcmpts
at a stand, but were always outflanked on their left by the
Brd Division and Arentschildt's and D'Urban's horsc. Curto's
French light cavalry had !"allied, and picked up their sccond
brigade, nnd were now doing their best to cover the southern
flank of the retreating multitude 1. An officcr of onc of their
regiments speaks in. his memoirs of having charged with
advantage against red dragoons-these must apparcntly haye
been scattered pUlties o( Le Marehunt's brigade, pursuing (ar
and (uriously, since no other red·coated cavalry was in this
pmt of the field 2. But Curto's squadrons had mainly to do
with Arentschildt and D'Urban, both of whom report sharp
fighting with French hor:;c at this moment. The Brd French
Hussars charged the 1st Hussars K.G.L., while the lattcr were
employed in gleaning prisoners from the routed infantry, and
were only driven off after [l severe combat 3. The pursuit then
continued until the disordered Freneh masses were driven off
the plateau, and on to the wooded bills parallel with the Grca.tcr
Arnpile, where Marmont had massed his anny before his fatal
move to the left.
Meanwhile the 4th Division and Pack's Portuguese had
(ought, with much less fortunate results, against the French
divisions of Clausel and Bonnet. There arc good narratives
, The regiments of Mnucune's brigade, which did not get caught ill the
cavalry charge (82nd und 86tl1), lost only 8 und a officens respectively, 1\8
lIgllin~t the 15 (IJ1U 17 lost by the 66th HUU 15th. Of Brennier's division
tile 22nd Line h'ld 21 CllSIlIlII,]Cfj: UlIWllg olli<''Cnl, while the 65th IInd 17th
LCger hud only 3 IInd {l respectively.
• So Pnrquin or the 13th ChUllSCUrS in his il1&moires, p. 302. 'I'he ouly
other red·coated dnlgoons in Wellington·s "rllly, Uock's brigade, were
fllr away to the left.
• Arentschildt reports that his and D'Urban's men were all mixed and
busy with the Freneh infllntry, when thc French hUSSllns charged in, and
that he mllied, to beat them off, a body composed mostly or his own(;errrnms,
but with Portugucse and 14th Light Dragoons umollg them.
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of thcir advance from three officers who took part in it, all so
full and clear that it is impossible to have any doubts about
its details. OnC comcs from thc Assistant Quarter-Master-
General of the 4th Division, Chal'lcs Vere: the second is (rom
the captain commanding one of the fonr light companies of the
Fusilicr brigade, Ludwig von Wachholz of the BrWlswick-Ocls
Jagers: the third is the narrative of Pack's aide-de-camp,
Charles Synge, who was with the front line of the Portuguese
in their vigorous but unsuccessful atlu.ck 011 the Grcater Arapilc.
The three narratives have nothing contradictory in them.
'fhe sequence of events was as follows. After deploying thc
three battalions of the Fusilier brigade (l/7th, 1/231'd, 1/48th)
beyond the end of the village of Arapiles, and Stubbs's Portu-
guese brigade to their ldt, Cole startcd to cross the valley,
having a very strong skirmishing line, composed of the whole
of the 7th Ca9adores and of the four light companies of the
British brigadc. During the first stage of the advancc, which
sturted at 5.'~5\ a perceptible time after that of the 5th Division,
the two brigades suffered severely from French artillery fire,
but had no infantry opposed to them. Their objective was the
division of Clausel, which had by this time come into line on
the extreme eastern end of the plateau occupied by Maueune.
When thc advancing line had reached the trough oC the valley
which separated it from the French heights, Cole saw that his
left front was Caccd by a detached Frcnch Corce 2 on a. low
rocky ridgc half-way between the cnd of thc platcau and thc
Great Arapilc, and also that behind the Arapile, and in a
IXlsition to support tillS detachment, were several other French
battalions. Pack was deploying to: assault the Arapile, but
even if he won a first success there was visible a considerable
mass· of troops behind it. After the valley was crossed Stubbs's
Portugucse brigade, coming first into action, with the ea9adores
in front, attacked thc French regiment on the knoll and dro\'c
it back. It retired towards the Arapile and the bulk of Bonnet's
, The moment is fixed by Wuehholz, who says thnt he looked at his
watch, to Ox the hour.
• This was the 122nd (three battalions), or Bonnet's division, which
i\larmont says (see above, p. 430) that he 1lad placed as a (''QnneeUng-link
hetween thc Arnpilc and the troops on the ph,tClIll.
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division, to which it belongcd. Colc detached his cayudor
battalion to follow it, hoping that Puck might succeed in
, containing' the [cst of the French force in this direction.
The remainder of his line pushed 011, with the light companies
of the Fusilier brigade acting as its screen, and attacked
Clauscl on the plateau. The advance was steady, but cost mUIlY
lives, ond the line was enfiladed by 0 til'csome flank fire from
the French guns on the top of the Great Arapile. Nevertheless
the crest was rcached-on it lay the front line of the French
division-five battalions-which engaged ill a furious frontal
combat of musketr), wilh the Fusiliers and their Portuguese
comrades, but was beaten in it, and fell back some 200 yards
on to its reserves. The impetus of the attack was exhausted,
Cole had just been wounded, so that there was a gap in the
command, and the troops wcre rc-forming and recovering their
breath, when it was seen that things were going very badly
behind and to the left. The attaek on the Arapile had by this
time been delivered, and had failed completely.
Pack had b'TRSpcd the fact that when the ·:Uh Division had
crossed the valley, it would be much at the mercy of Bonnet's
troops in the direction of the Arapile, which were now on its
flank, and would presently be almost in its rear. He therefore
resolved to use the option of attacking that Wellington had
given him. He deployed the 4th Ca9adores as a skimushing
line, gave them as an immediate support the four grenadier
companies of his line regiments, and followed with the rest in
two columns, the 1st Line on the right, the 16th on the left.
The ca9adores went up the comparatively level field which
formed the central slope between the two rocky ends of the
Arapile-it was sown with rye some three feet high that year.
Frcnch skirmishers in small numbers gave way before them,
but the main opposition of the enemy wn.s from his battery
placed on the summit. The skirmishing line got four-fifths of the
way to thc crcst, and thcn found IIIl obstacle bcIore it, a bank
of some four fcet high, where the field ended. It was perpen-
dicular, and men scrambling up it had to sling their muskets, or
to lay them down, so as to be able to use both hands. The ea~a·
dores were just tackling the bank-a few of them were over it-
when the French regiment on top. the 120th, which had been
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waiting till the Portuguese should reach the obstacle, delivered
a shattering volley and chllrged. The ear;adores were quite
helpless, being more engaged in climbing than in using their
arms 1. They were swept off in a moment, and the French,
jumping down into the field, pursued them vigorously, und
overthrew first the supporting grenadier companies, and then
the two regiments, which were caught haIr-way up the slope.
As Napier truly observes, • the Portuguese were scoffed at ror
their failure-but unjustly; no troops eould have withstood
that crash upon such steep gl'Ound, and the propriety or attack-
ing the hill at all seems questionable.' Pack made the attempt
purely because he thought that it was the only way of taking
off the attention of the French from Cole's flank. The brigade
suffered heavily, losing 386 men in ten minutes. It took refuge
at the root or the British Arapile, where it was covered by the
1/40th of Anson's brigade, whieh was standing there in rcscrve.
The French brigadier in command on the Greater Arapile
wisely made little attempt to pursue Pack's fugitives, but
having his front now clear of any danger, sallied out from
behind his hill with three regiments, the 118th and 119th and
the re·formed 122nd, against the flank and rear of the British
4th Division. There was nothing in fl'Ont of him save the
7th Ca~adores, which Cole had detached as a covering force,
when he stormed the heights with the remainder of the brigades
of Ellis and Stubbs. This isolated battalion behaved very well,
it stood its ground in line, but was absolutely overwhelmed
and broken up by the superior numbers converging on it'.
Nenrly (Lt the same moment Clauscl's whole force in column
charged the two brigades of the 4th Division which had carried
the heights. The French were in superior numbers-ten
bnttnlions to seveIl-lI.nd their two reserve regiments were
fresh troops, acting against men who had just won a dearly-
bought success by a great effort. The Anglo-Portuguese line
gave way, from the left first, where the 23rd Portuguese began
the movement. But it spread down the whole front, and the
1 All this from the journal of Chas. Synge, Paek's aide.de.calnp, who
Wa! with the clll,"adores, and Wll! desperately wounded at the bank, in the
first elash. It WIlS printed in the Nitletu'lth Cetlfllry for July 1912.
• See Vere's Marches 01 the 4/h Division, p. 36.
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Fusiliers, no less than Stubbs's brigade, recoiled to the \'cry
Ioot of the plateau 1.
This reverse gave Clausel, who was now in command since
Bonnet's wound, an opportunity that looked unlikely a few
minutes before. He could either withdraw the Army of Portugal
in retreat, covering the three disorganized divisions with those
which were still intact-his own, Bonnet's, and the two reserve
divisions of Ferey and Sarrut, which had just come on the
ground-Foy was far all and otherwise engagcd--or he might
adopt a bolder policy, and attempt to take advantage of the
disaster to Pack and Cole, by bursting into the gap betwccn
Leith and the British Arapile, and trying to break Wellington's
centre. Being an ambitious and resolute man he chose the
latter alternatiVt..'---though it was a dungerous onc when Leith
and Pakenham were bearing in hard upon his routed left wing.
Accordingly he left Sarrut to rail)· and cover the three beaten
divisions, and attacked with his right centre. His own division
followed the retreating brigades of ElJis and Stubbs down the
heights, while the three disposable regiments of BOlUwt came
into line to its right, and Boyer's three regiments of dragoons
advanced down the depression between the Greater Arapile and
the recovered plateau. Ferey was left in second line or reserve
on the crest.
At first the advance had considerable success. Bonnet's
regiments pushed forward on the right, driving in the 1!'Wth 2,
whieh had come forward to cover Pack's routed battalions, and
pressing quite close to the British Arapile, whose battery was
turned upon them with much effect. Clnuscl's own division
pushed the Fusiliers some way down the slope and right into the
valley at its foot. The drago<,?ns charged Stubbs's retreating
Portuguese, and cut up many of them, though the 11th regiment
finally succeeded in forming square with what remained solid
of its companies, and beat off thc main attack. Part of the
Freneh horsemen, however, pushed on, and reached the iront
of WeUington's reserve line, the 6th Division, which bad now
descended the heights to relieve the broken 4th. One battalion
, All this rrom Wnchho]:t., who 'I'M now wi1h the 7th }o~lIsiJiers.
• See Vcrc's Marc/le8 0/ lite 4th Divi8;Oll, 1'. 36. The 3/27th 011 tOil or
the hill was not brought rorwunl, 118 1lO1llC wrongly say.
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of Hulse's brigade, the 2/53rd, was charged by several
squadrons, but formed square in time and repulsed them.
Some little way to the right the Fusiliers awl the Portuguese
2Srd formed a large parti-coloured square, expecting a similar
attack, but it did not come their way 1. "
\VellingLon, thanks Lo his own prescience, had amplc reserves
with whieh to parry Clansel's desperate stroke. Setting aside
the Light Division, which now paired off against Foy on the
extreme left of the field, there were the 1st, 6th, and nh
Divisions, not to speak of Bradford's Portuguese and Espai'ia's
Spaniards, all of them perfectly intact. And of these, such
WaS his strength, only one fresh unit, Clinton's 6th Division,
required to be brought up to turn the day. It was now coming
over the valley where the 4th had preceded it, in a long majestic
line, Bulse's brigade on the right, Hindc's on the left, the
Portuguese of "the Conde de Rezende in second line. The
1st Division, jf it had becn needed, could have supported
Clinton, from its post just to the north of the Lesser Arapile,
but had not yet got under way.
The repulse of the new French attack was eanied out wiLh
no great difficulty, if not without serious fighting. The advance
of Clausel's own division was checked by Marshal Beresford,
who took Spry's Portuguese brigade out of the second line of the
victorious 5th Division, and led it diagonally along the southern
slope of the plateau to fall upon Clause}'s flank. This it did
effectively, {or the French division could not dare to press on
against the Fusiliers, and had to throw back its left, and form
up opposite Spry, with whom it became engaged in a lively
mUSketry fight. It could no longer move forward, and was
immobilized, though it held its own: Beresford was wounded
in the chest and taken to the renr, but Spry's five battalions had
served the desired purpose, and stopped the French advance in
this quarter.
Dnt the decisive check to Clauscl's offensive was given by
Clinton and the 6th Djvision, who advancing straight before
them-over the ground previously tro.versed by Cole-fcll upon,
, This from Wachholz's narrative, ver;y clearly explained. The Fusiliers
were 110/ relieved by the advance of the lj40th and 3/27th, as some
authorities state.
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overlapped at both cnds, and thoroughly discomfited in close
musketry duel the nine battalions of Bonnet's division, which
had pressed forward close to the Lesser Arapile, as if to insert
a wedge in the British line. Unsupported by Boyer's drngoons.
who had shot their bolt too eaTly, and were now rc-forming far
to the rear, this French division was badly cut up. Each of
the three regiments which had taken part ill its advance lost
more than 500 men in the struggle 1: they fell back in disorder
towards the hill behind them, and their rout compelled Clauscl's
division to give way also, since it exposed its flank to the
oncoming line of Bulse's brigade 011 Clinton's right. Morcover
the Great Ampilc hud to be evacuated, for while the routed
troops passed away to its left rear, the 1st British Division
was soon after seen steadily advancing towards its right. The
regiment on the hill (the 120th) was exposed to be cut off and
surrounded, and hastily ran down the back of the mount: while
rctrenting it was much molested by the skil'mishers of the
German Legion llrigade of the 1st Division. It lost heavily,
and the battery that had been on the summit was captured
before it could get away.
Thus Clausel's hl'icl haIr-hour of triumph endcd in complete
disaster, and the two divisions with whieh he hud made his
stroke were filing back ngainst the slope in front of the woods
in their rear, where they took refuge behind the intact division
of Fcrcy, the sole available reservc in this part or thc field. They
were now us .badly beaten us Thomiercs and l\tnuellne had been
earlier in the day 2.
While this lively action was in progress, the 5th and srd
Divisions, supported by the 7th and by Bradtord's Portuguese,
, The 122ml lost 21 ofllccrs uml508 men, the 1I8th find 1I9th probably
IU:l many or moro--the)'lmd respectively 20 nud 26 olllccrs hit. 'I'he 120th,
UIC regiment on thc Great Arupile, lost only 8 oflieers--but 580 men, un
ulmost incxplieablc disproportion. 'I'he 118th claimed to havc taken
a lIag-perhaps OIlC of tIlC 7th Portugucse Ca~adQrcs, who were badly
cut up when Bonnet first advanecd.
• 'I'hc IQsses of threc or Clauscl's four regiments chance to hnvc been
preserved-thc 25th Ugcr lost 16 officers llnd 322 mcn: thc 27th Lignc
7 officers and 159 mcn: the 59th LigllC 17 officers and 253 mcn. 'fhc 50th,
which had 20 olfIcers hit, must havc had more casualties th3l1 ally of the
otIler three, so the total divisional loss must have been wcll OYCr 1,200.
But Bonnet's division, much worsc maulcd, lost at least 2,200.
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in second line, and assisted on their flanks by Arentschildt's,
D'Urban's, and Anson's horse, had been driving in the wreeks
of the Freneh ldt wing towards the woods. There was much
resistance: on Sarrut's intact battalions many of the broken
regiments had rallied. 'These men, besmeared with blood, dust,
and clay, half naked, and some carrying only broken weapons,
fought with a fury not to be surpassed,' says a 3rd Division
narrator of the battle. But the tide of battle was always
moving backward, towards the woods from which the Freneh
had originally issued, and though it sometimes scemed about
to stop for a minute or two, a new outflanking manceuvre by
the troops of Pakenham, D'Urban, and Arentschildt, suffiecd on
each occasion to set it in motion aguin.
'1'he last stnge of the conflict had now been reached: the
French centre was as thoroughly beaten as their left had been
earlier in the day: many of the battalions had gone completely
to }lieees, and were pouring into the woods and making their way
to thcrcar, with no thought except for their personal safety. Of
into.ct troops thcre were only two divisions left, Fercy's ill the
centre, and Foy's on the extreme right near Calvarisa de Ariba.
It was generally considered that Foy ought to have been
overwhelmed by the much superior British force in front of
him, for not only was he opposed by the Light Division, whose
skirmishers had becn bickering with him ull the afternoon, but
the 1st Division became available for usc against him the
moment that it was clear that the French offensive against the
4th Division had been shattered, by the advance of Clinton
and Spry. Wellington, it is said \ dispatched orders for the
1st Division to movc forward and strike in bctween Foy and the
Greater ArapiIe, at the moment thnt he saw that the 6th
Division had broken Bonnet's troops. If so, the order was not
executed, and General Campbell led out his three brigades
mueh too late, and not in time either to cut orf Fay or to
encircle the right of the disordered mass of the enemy now
retiring into the woods. He seems to have acted simply as
a link between the 6th Division on his right, and the Light
Division on his left, for the lattcr alonc pressed Foy vigorously.
l This is stuted by Napicr, iv. p. 273, and seems reasonable. See also
Tomkinson, p. 186.
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The only part 01 CampbeU's division which suHered any
appreciable loss at this time of the day were the light companies
of LOwe's brigade-that which was composed of the King's
German Legion: they fell on the flank of the French regiment
that was evacuating thc Grcatcr Arapilc, and did it considerable
harm 1.
Meanwhile the last and not the least blood)' fighting of the
day was beginning, on the hillside just outside the head of the
lorest, where Marmont had deployed his main body at mid-
day, and where Ferey's division was now standing in reserve,
while the broken troops both from its front and from its flank
were streaming by to the rear. Clausel had given Ferey orders
to cover the retreat at all costs, warning him that unless he could
hold back the advancing enemy for some time the disaster would
be complete. The general to whom this unenviable task was
assigned carried it out with splendid courage, and by his
constancy gave time for the escape of the whole of the confused
mass behind him. He drew out his nine battalions in a single
line, the centre a little advanced to suit thc shape of the hill-
side, the flanks a little thrown back. The extreme battalions
at each end were in square, to guard ngainst possible attacks
by cavalry, but the seven central units were deployed /l'n
balaiUe in three-deep linc, a formation which had not been seen
in the othcl' cpisodes of the battlc, and which made their fire
much more effective than that of regiments fighting in ' column
of di visions,' as most of their comrades had done 2.
Against the orderly front thus disposed Clinton came up with
the 6th Division, pursuing his victorious advance. He was
flanked on the left by the Fusilier brigade of the 4th Division,
which had long ago rallied and come up to the front sinee its
disaster of an hour back. On Clintoll's right were the 5t.h and
Brd Divisions, but both were at the moment re-forming, after
their long struggle with Sarrut and the wrecks of the French
ldt wing. Anson's cavalry had at last got to the front in
I The losses in Campbell's Guards' brignde (GZ men) were in the corn-
Ilaniell which defended the village or Arapiles earlier in the day-those in
his line brigade (Wheatley's) were trifling-Io wounded and no killed. The
K.G.L. brigade lost 60 or so, all in the light companies, during the advance.
• All this from Lemonllier·Delafosse of Ferey's division, pp. 158-9.
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this direction, and replaced D'Urban and Arentsehildt---whose
squadrons were quite worn out-upon the extreme right of the
ullied line.
Clinton, it is said 1, refused to wait till the troops on his
right were rc-formed, and hurried on the attaek: it was
growing dark, and a fcw more minutes of delay would allow
the French to make off under cover of the night. Therefore he
advanced at once, and found himself engaged at once iu a
most desperate musketry contest, whose deadly results recalled
Albucra, so heavy were the losses on both sides. But here the
French had the advantage o[ being deployed, llnd not (as at
Albuera) wedged in deep columns. The ftrst fire of the French
line, as Clinton's brigades closed in, was particularly murderous,
and swept away whole sections of the attacking force. 'The
ground over which wc had to pass,' writes an officer in Hinde's
brigade 2, 'was a remarkably clear slope, like the glaei~ or
a fortress, most favourable for the defcnsive fire of the enemy,
and disadvantageous for the assailant. The craggy ridge, on
whieh the French were drawn up, rose so abruptly that the
rear ranks eould fire over the hends of the front. But we had
approached within two hundred yards before the musketry
began: it was far the heaviest fire that I have ever seen, and
accompanied by eonstantdiseharges of grape. An uninterrupted
blaze was thus maintained, so that the crest of the hill seemed
one long streak of flame. Our men eame down to the charging
position, and commenced firing from that level, at the same
time keeping touch to the right, so that the gaps opened by the
enemy's fire were inst:mtly filled up. At the first volley about
eighty men of our right wing fell to the rear in one group. Our
commanding officer rode up to know the cause, and round that
they were everyone wounded!' But heavy as was the loss of
this regiment (137 out of 600 present), it was trifling compared
to that of its neighbours to the right, in Hulse's brigade, where
the right and centre regiments in the line, the l/llth and
1/61st, lost rcspectivcly 340 men outar 516 and 366 out of 546-
a proportion to which only Albuera could show a parallel. For
, But not on tlle best authority: regimental diaries arc not always sale
to follow on such points.
I Ross Lewin 01 the 32nd, ii. pp. 25-6.
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many minutcs-one observer calls it neaTly an hour, but the
stress of the struggle multiplied time-the two hostile lines
continued blazing at each other in the growing dusk. 'The
glare of light caused by the artillery, the continued fire of
musketry, and by the dry grass which had caught fire, gave the
lace of the hill a terrific appearance: it was one sheet of
flame, and Clintou's men seemed to be nttacking a burning
mountain, whose crater was defended by 0. barrier of shining
steel l .' The French, so far as losses went, probably suffered no
morc, or perhaps less, than their assailants: but their casualties
were nevertheless appalling. And at last they gave way: 'the
cruel fire cost us many lives,' writes an officer of the 31st Legcr,
, and at Inst, slowly, and after having given nearly an hour's
respite to the remainder of the army, Ferey gave back, still
protected by his flanking squares, to the very edge oC the lorest,
where he hvJ.tcd our halt-destroyed division. Formed in line
it still presented a respeetable front, and halted, despite of the
English batteries, which enfiladed us with a thundering fire.
Here Ferey met the form of death whieh the soldier prders to
all others, he was slain outright by a round-shot 2.'
Clinton's English regiments were so disordered and redueed
by the awful fire through which the)' had passed in their
victorious march, that he put into front line for a final assault
on the enemy his Portuguese brigade, that of thc ComIc de
Rezendc, which was still intact, as it had hitherto been in
reser ....e. Its five battalions deployed, and advanced against the
now much contracted line of Fercy's division: they were sup-
ported on the left by the Fusilier brigade of the 4th Division,
on the right by the 5th Division, whieh was now re·formed and
well to the front. Anson's cavalry was also in this direction.
The dying eUort 01 Ferey's division was worthy 01 its previous
hard fighting. 'Formed right up against the trees,' writes the
French officer, whom we ha....e already quoted, ' no longer with
any artillery to help, we saw the encmy marching up against us
• Gmtton, p. 253.
I Lemonnicr-Dclnrosse, p. MD. This note nbout Ferey's being slain
outright does not agree wiUI tlle usual statement that he was mortally
wounded, and died two dnyslater, given by several English diarists. Dut
Lemonnier-Delllfosse is fJI'lit-hand lIuUlOrity.
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in two lines, the first of which was composed of Portuguese.
Our position was critical, but wc waited for the shock: the
two lines moved up toward us; their order was so regular that
in the Portuguese regiment in front of us we eould see the
company intervals, und note the officers behiud keeping the
men in accurate line, by blows with the flat of their swords or
their canes. We fired first, the moment that they got within
rauge: and the volleys which we delivered from our two first
ranks were so heavy and so continuous that, though they tried
to give us baek fire for fire, the whole melted away. The second
line wns coming up behind-this wns English, we should have
tried to receive it in the same way, stilI holding our ground
though under a flank ruc of artillery, when suddenly the left
of our line ceased firing and feU baek into the wood in complcte
disorder. Thc 70th Ligne had found itself turned by cavalry;
it broke; the rout spread down the front to thc 26th and 77th;
only our two battalions of the 31st Leger held firm, under the
fire o[ thc enemy, whieh continued so long as wc showed outside
the edge of the forest. We only gave back as the day ended,
retiring some 250 yards from our original position, and keeping
our volligeur companies still in n. skirmishing line in front 1.'
This vigorous account of the last stand of the li'rench reserve
is not Iar from being accurate. It is quite true that the Portu-
guese brigade of the 6th Division suffered terribly in its attack,
and was completely checked. It lost 487 men during the
flftccn minutes in whieh it wus engaged-the heaviest casualty
list in any of the brigades of its nation, even heavier than that
of Stubbs's troops in the 4th Division. The only point that
requires to be added is that it was not so much n panic eaused
by a partial cavalry charge which broke the 70th Ligne, and
finally dispersed Ferey's regiments 2, as the pressure of the
5th Division upon the whole of the left of their line, which
collapsed almost simultaneously. But they had done their
work-before they dispersed, leaving only the 31st Leger to
1 Lcmonnicr-Dclalosse, pp. 161-2 .
• Ferey'/i lour regiments probably lost somewhat over 1,100 men-the
31st Ugcr had 380 casualties, the 47th Ligne (with 18 officers killed and
wounded) something like 500; the 70th suffered least, it returned only
III casualties; the 26th slightly more, perhaps 150. The whole lonn8
a moderate total, considering the work done.
OloLl..'iI. v H h
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act as a most inadequate rearguard. they had detained the
allies for a half·hour or more, and night had set in. Wellington
ordered the 6th Division to pursue, but it was so much cut up
and fatigued that it only ad vallccd a hundred yards into the
forest, and then halted and settled down for the night. Why
the intact 7th Division was not rather used for the pursuit it is
hard to understand. Still morc so is the fact that no cavalry
was sent forward in this direction: the woods, no doubt, looked
uninviting and dangerous, but the enemy was in a slate of
absolute panic, and ready to disperse at the least pressure.
• But,' says the most intelligent of the British diarists with the
mounted arm, 'the cavalry during the assault on the last hill
was ordered back to the point 011 the lett where wc assembled
before the aUack, leaving the infantry to pursue without us.
Had this not been done (though it might not have been prudent
to pursue with both in the night), yet by their being at hand
there was a greater chance of accomplishing more. The order
came IroiU Sir Stnpleton Cotton himsclI. The infantry moved
in pursuit by moonlight.... 1 have heard froiU an officer in the
6th Division that althongh they had been marching all day,
and were so tired, when ordered to halt for the night, that they
could not possibly have marched much farther, yet they sat up
through the night, talking over the action, each recalling to his
comrade the events that happcned I,'
Some part of the slackncss of thc pursuit is to be cxplained
by an unfortunate misconception by which Wellington (through
no fault of his own) was obsessed that night. He was undcr the
impression that the Castle of Alba dc 'rormes was still held by
thc Spanish garrison which he had lett there, and that the
bridge and the neighbouring ford were therefore unavailable
for the retreat of the Fl'ench, who (as he supposed) must be
retiring by the fords of Hucrta and Villa Gonzalo, which they
hOO used to rcach the field. Unhappily-as has been already
mentioned-Carlos de Espmia had withdrawn the battalion at
Alba without making any mention of the fact to his Commander-
ill-Chid 2. Wellington therefore put more thought to urging the
• Tomkil1lloll (of Anson's brigade), p.181.
• Tomkinson in his diary (p. 188) has a curious story to the effect that
'the Spanish general, before the action, asked if he should not take his
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pursuit in the direction of the Enst than of the South, and it
was not till late in the night, and when nothing but stragglers
had been picked up Oil the Huerta road, that he discovered
what had really occurred.
It remains to relate the unimportant happenings on this
front during the evening. At the mOlDent when the French
attack on Wellington's centre failed, about 7 o'clock or soon
after, Clausel sent to Fay, whose division still lay behind
Calvarisa de Ariba, covering the way to the Huerta lords, the
order to retire. His instructions were to cover the flank of the
line oC retreat of the broken army, and to take up successive
detaining positions on its right, on the enstern side of the brook
and ravine which lie between the two Arapilcs and the village oC
Utrera. These orders Fay carried out skiltully and well. He
fended off the Light Division, whieh had moved out in pursuit
of him, with a heavy rearguard of light troops, always giving
way when pressed. His concern wns almost entirely with this
British unit, for the 1st Division had started too late to get
near him. The Light DiviliioIl and its battery kept him on the
run, but never came up with his main body. • Night alone
saved my division, and the troops that I was covering,' wrote
Foy, • without it I should probably have been crushed, and the
enemy would have arrived at Alba de l'ormes before the 'necks
of our seven routed divisions got thefC. An hour after dark
the English cavalry wns still pushing charges home against my
regiments, which I had placed in alternate chequers of line and
column. I had the luck to keep the division in band till the
last, and to steer it in the right direction, though many routed
battalions kept pressing ill upon my ldt, and threatened to
carry disorder into my ranks. The pursuit ceased near Santa
Maria de Utrera I:
It is difficult to make out what became of the heavy dragoons
of Bock during this long retrograde movement of Foy's division:
they were certainly not the cavalry of which the Freneh
general speaks as charging him during his retreat, for they
troops out or Alba-after he had done it. Lord Wellington replied,
.. Certninly 1I0t," fllld tile Don wn~ llfrnid to tell what he had done, Lord
W. thererore acted, or oourse, as ir the place had been in Ollr Il05sessioll
still,' , Foy, Vu mili/airt, pp. 176-7.
• h2
408 THE BATTLE OF SALAMA..t'JCA
returned no single man or horse killed or wounded that day 1.
Perhaps, far away to the left, they may have been driving in
from position to position, the one regiment of Boyer's dragoons
which had been left to cover Foy's extreme outer flunk. More
probably they may have been pushing their march towards
the fords of Huerta, in the vain hope of finding masses of
disbanded enemies 011 the way, and ultimately cutting them
oU Irom the river. This hypothesis is borne out by the fact
that the bivouac of the hcavy German brigade was that night
in £ront of Pelabravo, much to the north-cast of the resting-
places or the rest oC the army. und in the general direction of
the lords 2.
That the pursuit was misdirected was a most lamentable
chance for Wellington. If it had been urged in the right
direction, the AI'm)' of Portugal would have been annihilated
as n. fighting·body, and would never have been able to make
head again in the autumn. For the forest of Alba de Tormes
was full of nothing but a disorderly crowd, making the best
of its way towards the ,bridge, with no proper rearguard and
no commander in charge of the retreat. Clauscl, wounded in
the foot, was being looked after by the surgeons in Alba, and
was barely able to mount his horse next day. The rout was
complete: 'a shapeless mass of soldiery was rolling down the
road likc a tOlTcllt-infantry, cavalry, artillery, wagons, carts,
baggage·mules, the reserve park of the artillery drawn by oxen,
were all mixed up. The men, shouting, swearing, running, were
out of all order, each onc looking after himscll alone-a
complete stampede. The panic was inexplien.ble to one who,
coming from the extreme rear, knew that there was no pursuit
by thc cnclll)' to justify the terror shown, I had to stand off
fllr from the road, for if I had got nenr it, I should have been
swept off by the torrent in spite of myself 3.. So writes the
officer, already twiee quoted [or the nunative of the cnd of
the battle, whose regiment, still hanging together in the most
I This cavlIlry l/Wy have lK:en the two detllehcd llqulIdrons at the 14th
Light Dragoons, whieh hud not followed the rest of Arcuhehildt's brigade
to tILe right.
• Sec Schwcrtfegcr's llis/rmJ vI l/,e Gcrlllw< LegivII, l. p, 37B •
• Lemonnier·Dclllfossc, p. 1640.
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creditable fashion, brought up the rear of the retreat. It is
clear that nny sort of 0. pursuit would have produced such
a general block at the bridge-head that a disaster like that of
Leipzig must have followed, and the whole of the rear of the
Army of Portugal, brought up against the river Tormes, must
have surrendered en masse.
From eight o'clock at night till three in the morning the
routed army was streaming aeross thc bridge ancI the ford.
Onee covered by the Tormes some regiments regained a eertain
order, but many thousands of fugitives, pressing on ahead in
unthinking panic, were scattered all over the country-side,
and did not come baek to their colours for many days, or
even weeks.
The actual loss of the Army of Portugal would appear to
have been some 14,000 to 15,000 men, not including the
'missing,' who afterwards turned up and eame baek to the
ranks. Marmont in his dispatch had the effrontery to write
that he lost only 6,000 men \ and 9 guns: a statement only
equalled in mendacity by Soult's assertion that Albuera had
cost him but 2,800 casualties 2. No general list of losses by
regiments was ever given to Napoleon, though he demanded
it: but a return proposing to include the casualties not only
of Salamanca but of the minor combats of Castrillo and
Gareia Hernandez was drawn up, giving a total of 12,435 3•
On the whole, however, it would be safe to allow for 14,0~0 men
as the total loss, exclusive of stragglers. Among officers of
rank the Commander·in-Chief wa.<; wounded: Ferey and
Thomicres were killed: the lattcr died inside the English lines
alter the battle. Clausd and BOllllet were both wounded, the
former slightly, the latter severely, so that four of the eight
divisional generals 01 infantry were hit. or the brigadiers,
Desgraviers (division 'fhomicres) was mortally and Mennc
(division Fay) severcly wounded. The trophies lost were
, Marmont. w llcrlhicr, Tlldclu, July 31, in his Mtmoirea, iV.I). 448.
• See vol. iv. p. 295.
• viz. killed or prisoners--omecrs 162, mcn 3,867; wound.."d-omccrs
21J2, mcn 7,529; tro1nard$, 645 men; 12 gllll8 and 2 eagles mining. Tlli8
return i8 in thc Paris arehivcs. It is certainly incomplete: 60 officers
were killed, 137 prisoners, which makes 197 tub! ou pria instead of 162.
And 20 guns were lost.
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2 eagles (those of the 22nd and lOlsL), 6 other colours \ and
20 guns 2, Of these last 12 represented the divisional batteries
of 'fhomiercs and Bonnet, which were taken whole, and the
other 8, as it would seem, pieces captured from the long line
of batteries on l\faucullc'S flank, which was rolled up when
Le Marchant and Leith swept the plateau in their triumphant
advance. Of the eight French divisions those of Thomicrcs and
Bonnet would appear to have lost about 2,200 men apiece,
Maucune nearly 2,000, Clausel, Brennier, and Ferey above
1,200 each, Sarrut perhaps 500: F'oy's very heavy losses
nearly all fell on the next day. The cavalry, with 43 officers
hit, must account for at least 500 more of the total 3, and the
artillery must have lost, along with their 20 guns, fit least 300 or
400 gunners·. Of prisoners (wounded and unwounded), there
were according to \Vcllington's dispatch 137 officers 6 and ncarly
7,000 men.
Wellington returned his loss in the Dritish units as 3,129, in
the Portuguese as 2,038: of Espaiia's Spaniards 2 were killed
and 4 wounded. This makes up the total of 5,178, sent off
immediately after the battle. The separate Portuguese return
forwarded by Beresford to Lisbon gives the loss of the troops
o( that nation as somcwhat Icss-l,6S7 instead of 2,078:
the difference of 441 is partly to be accounted for by the
I A regiment whose 1st battalion was elsewhere carried not an eagle
but a simple standard per battalion instead. Of such regiments, wanting
their senior battalion and therefore thcir eagle, there were with Mannont
three. Two, thc ooth IInd 82nd, were in )Iancune's division, onc, the 26th,
in Ferey's. Thc coloul"S proballly belonged to some of these, of whieh several
were mueh eut lip, especially the Olllh.
I Thc returns or the Army of Portugal show a deficiency of 20 guns
between July 15 !lud August 1, or which 12 repfCscnt the division"l bntleries
of Thomieres nlld Uonnet, whic11 hllve cOlllplelely diSllppeared. Wellil1gtOll
S1lyll, 'ollicial retnrns nccount ror only 11 guns tuken, but it is believed
thnt 2Q have rallen into our lllmd~.' This was correct.
• The deflcicncy in clwalry mnk lUul me shown by the muster rolls
between July J5 and August 1 WI\~ 512.
• Perlmps more: ror the Reservc Artillery und Park nlone Show J,"'O
rank and file 011 July 15 and only 707 Oil August 1.
• Sixty. three onleers arrived in Enghmd as the Sulllmancn 1.1lIteh or
prisoners; or these some were wounded, ror their n"mes oceur both in
Mnrtinien's tnbles as blusts, nnd in the 'l'rnnsport Office returns ot the
Record Office as prisoners shipped orf. The remninder or the 137 were
badly wounded, and came Inter, or died in hospital.
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reappearance of stragglers who were entered as ' missing' in
the first casualty-sheet, but cannot entirely explain itself in
that fashion. Which of the returns is the more accurate it is
hard to bc sure, but a prima facie pretcrence would naturally
be given to the later and more carefully detailed document.
Taking British and Portuguese together, it is clear that the
6th Division, whieh lost 1,500 men, was far the hardest hit. The
8rd and 5th, whieh decided the day on the right, got off easily,
with a little more than 500 each: the 4th Division, owing to
the mishap to the Fusilier brigade and Stubbs's Portuguese,
had very nearly 1,000 casualties. Pack's five battalions lost 386
men in the onc short episode of the battle in which they were
engaged, thc unsuccessful attack on thc Great Arapilc, and
were lucky to fare no worsc. The cavalry total of 173 killed
and wounded was also very moderate considering the good
work that the brigades of Le lIIarchant, D'Urban, and Arent-
schildt performed. In the 1st, 7th, and Light Divisions, the
triRing losses were all in the na~lk-colllpaniessent out in skir-
mishing line: of the battalions none was engaged as a whole 1.
The artillery wcre ovcrmatched by thc Frcnch guns all through
the day, and it is surprising to fllld that they returned only
four men killed, and ten wounded. The casualty list of officers
of. high rank was disproportionately large-not only was Le
Marehant killed, but Marshal Bcres[ord, Staplcton Cotton,
commanding the cavalry 2, and Leith and Cole, each a divisional
general, were disabled. Of officers in thc Portuguese service,
Callins, commanding a brigade of the 7th Division, was mor~
tnlly hurt, and the Coude de Rezende, who led the Portuguese
of the 6th Division, waS wounded.
The victory of Salamanca was certainly an astonishing Ceat
of rapid decision and instantaneous action. The epigrammatic
description of it as ' t.he beating of 40,000 men in forty minutes'
hardly ovcr-slates its triumphant celerity: before that time
had elapsed, from the moment when Pakenham and Leith
1 The 7th Division would have had practica.lly no loss but for the
skirmishing in the e:nly morning near Nucstm Sefiora de la Pena, and the
heaviest item in the 1st Division casualties Wll!I the 02 men of the Gunrds'
flank-companies who were hit while ddending the village of Arapiles.
• Cotton WllS shot lIfter the battle wus over by a eaQlldor t;entry, whose
challenge to hult he had disregarded wllile riding baek from the pursuit.
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struck the French left, the battle was undoubtedly in such
a condition that the enemy had 110 chance left-he could only
settle whether his retreat should be more or less proqlpt.
Clausel ehose to make a hopeless counter-offensive move, and
so prolonged the fight till dark-he would probably havc been
wiser to break off at once, and to retreat at six o'clock, covering
his routed left with his intnet reserve divisions. He would
certainly have lost several thousand men less if he had retired
after repulsing Cole and Pack, and had made no attempt to
press the advantage that he had gained over them. It may
be argued in his defence that the last hour of battle, costly
though it proved to him, prevented Wellington's pursuit from
commcncing in the daylight, an undoubted boon to the defeated
army. But at the most the victor would have had only one
hour at his disposition before dusk; the French were taking
rdugc in n forest, where orderly pursuit would have been
difficult; and looking at \Yellington's usual methods of utilizing
a victory (e.g. Vittoria) we may feel doubtful whether the
beaten enemy-if covered by Sarrut, Ferey, and Foy, as a
regular rearguard, would have suffered more than he actually
did. For Wellington's whole idea of pursuit turned on the false
notion that the castle, bridge, and ford of Alba de Tormes were
still blocked by the Spaniards whom he had left there. By the
time that he had discovered that the enemy was not retreating
towards Huerta and Villa GOllzalo, but escaping over the
Tormes in some other way, the hour would have been late.
UndoubtedJy the best 8ummaryand encomium of Wellington's
tactics on this eventful day is that of an honest enemy, the
very capable and clear-sighted Fay, who wrote in his diary six
days after the fight 1 :
• The battle of Salamanca is the most masterly in its manage-
mcnt, the most considerable in the number of troops Cllgllgcd,
and the most important in results of all the victories that the
English havc guincd in thcse lattcr days. It raiscs Lord
Wellington almost to the level of l\Iarlborough. Hitherto we had
been aware of his prudence, his eye fOr choosing a position, and
his skill in utilizing it. At Salamanca. he has shown himself
a great and able master of manceuvres. He kept his dispo·
1 Diary ill Vie lIIilitaire, cd. Ginxl de I'Aill, p. 178.
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sitions concealed for almost the whole day: he waited till we
were committed to our movement before he developed his own:
he played a safc game 1: he fought in the oblique order-it
was a battle in the style of Frederic the Great. As for ourselves,
we had no definite intention of bringing on a battle, so that wc
found oursclvt'S let in for it without any preliminary arrange-
ments having been made. The army was moving without
much impulse or supervision, and what little there was stopped
with the wounding of the Marshal.' III another note he adds:
, The Duke of Ragusa committed us to the action-he brought
it on contrary to Clausel's advice. The left was already checked
when he received his wound: aftcr that moment it was impos-
sible citherto rduse to fight, at' to give thc fight a good direction:
all that could be done was to attenuate the sum of the disastcr-
that Clausel did. Therc was no gap in the command-we
should havc becll no bettcr orr if the Marshal had never been
hurt. He is not quite honest 011 that point in his dispatch 2.'/"
With this criticism we may undoubtedJy agree. Foy has
hit upon the main points in which Salamanca was a startling
rcvelation to the contemporary observcr-no one on the Frcnch
side, and but few upon the British, bad yet realized that Welling-
ton on the offensive could be no less formidable and efficient
than Wellington on the defensivc. Arter July 22, 1812, no
opponent could dare to take liberties with him, as Soult, Musscna,
and l\Iarmont, caeh in his turn, had done up till that date.
The possible penalty was now seen to be too great. Moreover,
the prestige of the British gcncral was so much enhanced that
he could safely count upon it as not the least of his military
assets-as wc shall sce him do in the Pyrenees, a little more
than a year alter Salamanca hud been won. To the othcr thesis
that Foy lays down-thc statement that Mil.rmont had, by
his initial movement, made disastcr inevitable before he was
wounded-wc may also givc our assent. Jourdall came to thc
same conclusion-the Emperor Napoleon nlso fixed the respon-
sibility ill the same way_ The Marshal's ingenious special
pleading, to the effect that but for his personal misadventure
, If ajend 8urt. This idiom is explained in thc Dictionary or thc Academy
as' jOllcr slIns riCll hnsnrdcr.'
I Kotc in I:lIImc volume, p, 171.
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he would yet have won the day, will convince nOllC but blind
enemies of Wellington. Of some of the charges whieh Napoleon
laid to his charge he must be acquitted: he did not know in the
least that King Joseph was on his way to join him from Madrid
with 15,000 men. The dispatches sent to "'o.rn him of this fact
had all miscarried, and thc last news from the Army of the Centre
which bad reached him had intimated that no immediate help
was to be expected from that quarter. Nor was he wrong in not
waiting for thc succours from Caffarelli : these werc so trifling-
BOO sabres and onc horse battery-that their presence or absence
could make little differcnce in the battle.
But the Marshal's flagrant and irreparable fault was that,
having made up his mind that \Vcllington would not fight
under any provocation-a conclusion for which the earlicr
episodes of the campaign gave him some justification-he got
his army into a position in which he had battle suddenly forced
upon him, at a moment when he was not in a position to accept
it with advantage. 'fhe attempt to turn Wellington's right
wing on the afternoon of July 22nd was an unpardonable
liberty, only takcn beeausc the Marshal had come to despise
his opponent. ~he liberty wns resented in the most forcible
way-and there was no means of avoiding disaster when
Thomicres and Maueune had once started out on their rash
turning movement.
SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER VIII
TH.E CONSEQUENCES OF SALAMANCA
TlIE dawn of July 23rd revcnled to Wellington that the
French army had passed the Tormes a.t the bridge and forts of
Alba, and that nothing remained on the western bank of the
river save small parties of lugiti\'cs and wounded, who had lost
their way in the forest. Some of these were gleaned up by
Anson's and )Jock's brigades of cavalry. who were pushed
forward to search the woods and seck for the enemy. Anson's
patrols reached the bridge, and found a French rearguard
watching it. This was composed of Foy's division, to whom
Clauscl had committed the coveri,W of his retreat. It cleared
off, aftcr firing a few shots. Foy had been told to block the
passage till n o'clock, but went off long before, when the
disordered main body had got a good start. On the report
that he was gone, 'Wellington sent Anson's squadrons across the
bridge 01 Alba de Tonnes, while Dock lorded the river lower
down at La Encina. The state of the roads, strewn with baggage
and wounded men, showed that the French had used all thc
three roads leading east lrom Alba " and were on their way to
Arevalo, lIot towards their base ut Valladolid: to have marched
in that direction would have brought thcm right across thc front
of the advancing British army. Wellington sent out detach·
ments on all the roads whieh the enemy had taken, but urged
the main pursuit by the centra.l and most important road, tha.t
by Gareia Hernandez on Peilaranda. Contrary to his wont,
he pushed on this day with great celerity, riding himself with
the head of the column formed by the main body of Anson's light
dragoons. This vanguard was followed, at some distance, by the
l See 'l'omkill!lOIl'1l Diary, p. 100. Bc gives the three roads used as
(I) Albll, i'lIllncerll de Almxo, JunilllOOIl; (2) Alba, Gureil1 Hernl\lldez-
Peiinrandu; (3) Encinll, Zoritn, Cebollll [names ull badly spelledJ, It is
doubtful whether the troops on the lust rond were not disorderly masses
of fugitives only, The bulk 01 the arJny eertuinly went hy Pe(\urundll,
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1st and Light Divisions. Those infantry units which had fought
hard on the previolls da.y were allowed a. rest. About seven
miles beyond Alba de Tormes Anson's patrols came upon
a regular rearguard of the enemy, behind the Caballero brook
(0. tributary of the Almar), in and about the village of Gareia
Hernandez. This was, of course, Foy and the French
1st Division, the only troops in Clauscl's army which had not
been seriously engaged in the battle. They were accompanied
by a. battery and a brigade of Curto's cllasscurs. Around and
about the formed troops scattered parties wcrevisible--the village
was lull of men drawing water from the wells. On the approacll
of the British cavalry column-the infantry were still miles
behind-Foy prepared to resume his retreat, the cavalry drew
up on a rising ground, to thc north of Garcia Hcrnundcz, to
cover the movement: the leading regimcnts of the foot started
orr at once along the high-road, the othcrs halted for a space,
to the right of the chasseurs, out of sight of the British, whose
view of them was intercepted by the slope on which the Freneh
cavalry were drawn up.
Wellington, as it seems, saw only the hostile squadrons, and
resolved to drive them orr without delay, in order to bc able to
press in upon the infantry columns which were retiring farther
away. He directed Ansoll to attack the c!IQSseurs with so
much of his brigade as was up at the front: several squadrons
were absent, some guarding the prisoners of yesterday, others
exploring on distant roads. Two squadrons each of the 11th
and 16th Light Dragoons delivered the frontal attack on the
Freneh brigade, while the leading squadrons of Dock's brigade,
whieh was coming up rapidly from the flank, and was not yet
formed in linc, were to turn its right wing.
'fhe French light cavalry, which had been much mauled on
the preceding day, and was evidently in no fighting mood,
gavc way precipitately before the attack of the Light Dragoons,
and rode off in confusion to their own right rear. There was
no time for Boek's Germans to eOllle up with them: but the
leading squadrons of the 1st Heavy Dragoons of the Legion,
pushing on in pursuit, received, to their surprise, a heavy volley
in their flank from a French battalion in square, which they
had not noticed in their advance.
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There were, in fact, two regiments of infantry to the right of
the routed chasseurli, and b)' the sudden flight of their comrades
they found themselves suddenly uncovered und engaged.
They were the oth Leger and 76th Line, each two battalions
strong, and counting together about 2,400 bayonets. Of these
the unit nearest the cavalry was a battalion of the 76th in
square: it was the fire of this body which had struck the
leading German squadron in flank, and thrown it into disorder
as it was charging the routed French horse. Farther to the
east were the other battalion of the 76th and the two of the
6th I,eger, on the slopes above the road, which here winds
below the small eminence which the French cavalry had
occupied and the hill of La Sema, a long and fairly steep
height, which gives it.s name in many histories to the combat
that ensued.
What followed on the unexpected discovery of the French
infantry was the effect not of Wellington's direct orders, nor
of the leading of the short-sighted Bock, who had hardly
realized the situation when his subordinates. were alrcady
making their decision. It was entirely the exploit of the
gallant squadron-leaders of the two regiments of German
dragoons. They wcrc coming up in a sort of echelon of squad-
rons, the first regiment leading, so that when the Hre oC the
French square struck and disordered the leading unit, the re·
sponsibility for action Cell on the officers commanding the others.
Captain von dcr Dcckcn who led the ard squadron determined
without hesitation to charge the French square-his men were
already getting up speed, and the enemy was but a short
distance Crom him. Shouting to the squadron to throw forward
its right wing and ride home, he led it straight at the French.
The first fire of the square, delivered at eighty yards, brought
down several mcn and horses, and wounded (mortally as it
proved in the end) van der Decken himself. He kept his
saddle, however, and only fell when the s~ond fire was given, at
twenty yards range. This volley WllS destructive, but did not
break the impetus of the squadron, which charged right home.
In most cases where cavalry reached the bayonets of a square
during the Peninsular 'Var, it had proved unable to break in,
and had recoiled with loss-like Crnufurd's squadl'Olls at the
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combat of Barquilla \ and Montbrun's at FUClltcS de Onoro.
Here, however, the rare feat of. riding down well-formed
infantry was performed-it is said by scveral eye-witnesses
that the breach was originally made by a mortally-wounded
horse, which reared right on top of the kneeling front rank of
the French, and then rolled over kicking, and bore down six
or eight men at oncc. Scveral dragoons Icapt thc bank oC
struggling and ovc~thrown soldiers, and broke into the rear
ranks-thereupon the whole square fell to pieces in disorder.
Many of the Frenchmcn were hewn down, but the majority
dropped their muskets and surrendered unhurt. The lists oC
prisoners at the Uecord OJIice give the names of sixteen officers
of the 76th sent to England, of whom only two were wounded.
Of the .rank and fllc not morc than fUty, it is said, got
away 2. Observers who came on the field later in the day
noted with curiosity the long lines of muskets laid down
in orderly rows. This was un astonishing achievcmcnt for a
single squadron of 120 men-they btld captured or cut down
five times their own numbers of veteran troops of Ney's old
6th Corps.
Some way to thc right of this unlucky battalion were two
more, forming the 6th Uger. Seeing the havoc made of his
comrades, and noting the remaining squadrons o'f the Germans
sweeping aeross the slope toward him, the colonel of this regi-
ment ordered his men to retreat uphill and climb the steep
slope behind. He hoped to get upon ground where cavalry could
not easily follow. The two battalions, still in coltmlll, for they had
not (like the 76th) formed square, moved hastily upwards: the
vok-es of officers were heard shouting, 'allonge.:: lepas,gaglloM la
, See vot ill. p. 255•
• I took the t.roublc to work out the names from the iuunense list of
prisoners at the Record Office, in order to tellt tlle truth of the statement
that the whole battalion .....(lS captured. The following names appear from
the 76th-Dnilly, Cavie, Cntrin, Demarest, Denis, Duclos, Dupin, Dupont,
Dusan, Gautier, Guimblot, L'lIuissier, Hichard, Ravenal, besideS two
wounded officers, Lambert and Martinot. In addition, one officer (Lebert)
was killed, and in Martinien's Lisle des officiers 'uh et blmb we have
five more down as wounded, DeS$eSsllrd, Lanzavecchia, i\Iassibot, Norry,
ROS5ignol. The!le may havc died of their wounds, and 50pever have reached
England; or thcy may have escaped, though wounded. The twenty-two
names must represent practically the whole of tlte officers of the battalion.
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hauteur I.' The nearest enemy to them was the second squadron
of thc 1st Dragoons K.G.L., lcd by Captain von Rcizcnstcin,
who put on the pace when he saw the French scrambling higher,
and -came up with the rearmost battalion before it was very far
trom the road. The two rear companies laced about when the
dragoons drew near, ond deli\'ered a fire that was fairly eHectivc,
when it is considered that the men had been going as hard as
they could trot, and were halted I\nd put into action at a
second's notice. But it did not suffice to stop the dragoons,
who rode in, at the cost of many killed and wounded, and cut
up the companies that had stood to meet them; many men
were sabred, more taken prisoners. The rear of the column,
however, scrambled uphill in a mass, and there joined the
other battalion of the 6th LegeI', whieh formed square on the
sky-line. They hud on their flunk a squadron or so of c]wsseurs,
apparently a fragment of the brigade that had given way so
easily berore Anson's attack twenty minutes before.
Against this mass charged the leading squadrons of thc 2nd
Heavy Dragoons K.G.L., which had at last come up to the
front, and some of the officers and men of the 1st, who had
already done such good work lower down the hill. The French
square was not perfect or regular-apparently it was disordered
by the fugitives from the broken battalion, who ran in for
shelter, and formed up as best they could. The charge of the
Germans was delivered with splendid impetus-though the
regiment had been galloping for 800 yards uphill-and was
completely successful. The Frcneh cllasscurs rode off without
engaging: the ill-formed squarc_crumpled up: many of the
men threw down their arms and surrendered, the rest dispersed
and ran in coveys along the slopes of the plateau, towards the
nearest friendly troops. Thcse were the four battalious oC the
80th and 09th Line, the surviving regiments of the division.
Foy himself was in onc of the squares; his surviving brigadier,
Chemincau, in the other.
Intoxicated with the glorious successes that they had gained,
a large but disordered mass of the victorious dragoons rode
alter the fugitives, and charged the ncarest of the Freneh
squares-onc of the 69th Line. The enemy held firm, their
• All this from SCh....'I!rtleger. i. p. 381.
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fire was given with effect, and killed the olHccr who led this last
drort (Captain yon Uslar) and many of his men. The rest
swerved back, and rode away under a pelting fire from the
battalion that they had aLtach..'<1 and from the other three,
which lay dose on its flank.
So ended the charge of Garcia Hcrnandcz, the most dashing
and successful attack made by any of Wellington's cavalry.
during the whole war, as Foy-the best of witucsscs-formally
states in his history 1. Though not more destructive in its
results than Le l\Iarchant's onslaught on Maucune at Salamanca,
it was a Car more difficult atfair. For Le l\Iarchant had charged
troops not in square, and already shaken by conflict with
Leith's division; while the Germans attacked without any
infantry support, and fell upon intact battalions, of whieh two
at lenst had formed square. Moreover, the French were
supported by artillery and cavalry, though the fonner cleared
off promptly, and the latter allowed themselves to be routed
very easily by Anson's squadrons. Altogether it was n glorious
Hrst experience of war for the Heavy Dragoons-neither of the
regiments had ever charged before, and they had seen hut
a little skirmishing during the six months sinee their arrival at
Lisbon. They were duly grunted the battle-honour, 'Gareia
Hernandez,' which they continued to bear on their guidons as
long as Hanover was an independent state. Two Hanoverinn
cavalry regiments of to-day in the Prussian army continue to
show it, as theoretical heirs of the old Heavy Dragoons. The
most astollishing feature of the exploit was that it was the sole
work of the squadron-leaders-Wellington had only given the
general order to attack-Back had been with the fraction of
the 1st Dragoons which charged along with Anson, and was
not directing the marvellous uphill ride. It was a regimental
triumph, !lot an exhibition oC cavalry tactics by the Commandcr-
in-Chief or the brigadier 2.
1 Foy, Cuerre de lf~ PtnimJUle, i. pp. 200-1.
• I luwe used for Ule llllrn,tive of thiS interesting Ilght not only the
Ilumerous llnd vulnable K.G,L. sources IHlnted or (Iuoted by HCllrnlsh alld
Schwertfeger, uut the letlers or von Hodcn1Jerg, uidc-de-colllp to Dock,
lent me by his representative, Major \'on Hoden1Jerg, now resident in
Hanover. For this ofl1eer's inleresting career see BlackuXJOd for May 1012,
where I published large sections from these letters.
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The losses of the victors were very heavy-the Ist Regiment
had 2 officcrs and 28 men killed, 2 othcr officers woundcd (onc-
von der Decken-mortally), and 37 men. The 2nd Uegiment
lost 1 officer (von Uslar) killed, with 21 men, and 1 officer and
29 men wounded. In this total the striking figure is the high
proportion of killed to wounded-52 to 69-which bears witness
to the murderous power of the old musket-ball when delivered
point-blank, into the bodies of mcn who were pressing right up
to the muzzles of the infantry in square. There were six men
missing to be added to the total of 10sscs-127 in all-whether
these were individuuls who were taken prisoners in the last
attempt to break the square of the 69th, or whether they were
mortally wounded men, whose horses carried them far from
the scene of action and whose bodies were not found, it is
impossible to say. The loss of 127 officers and men out of about
770 present was, howevcr, by no means disproporLionatcIy
heavy, when the results of thc charge are considered.
Of the two French regiments engaged, a whole battalion of
the 76th was captured or destroyed-oC the 27 officers with it
onc was killed, 5 wounded, 16 taken prisoners: taking the same
proportion of its rank and file, very few out 01 650 can have
escaped. The 6th Legcr was less completely annihilated, but
it had its colonel (Molard) and 6 other officers taken prisoners 1,
and 8 more wounded, with about 500 rank and file taken or
hurt. Allowing lor some small losses to the cha.s.seuT.s, the total
casualties of the J~reneh must have been about 1,100.
When the last charge 01 the Heavy Dragoons was over, Fay
led his surviving battalions oIl, followed at a dis~nee by
Anson's brigade, when it had re-formed. 'fhe Germans were
too latigued to do more: the leading British infantry, the Light
Division, was only just coming in sight far to the rear. The
pursuit, therefore, by the four British squadrons had no lurther
results-if they had chanced to have 1\ horse battery with thcm
it might haNe been much more effective. Six miles from Gareia
Hernandez, Fay was relieved to Hnd, waiting for him by the
roodside, the long-expected cavalry brigade Irom the Army 01
I Their names were Ule colonel, Molard (who died, 11 prisoner, of his
wounds, August 4), Baudart, l'aulin, Piancct, Turpin, l'aris, Boutcille;
they were verifled in the prisoners· rolls at the RC?lrd Office by me.
O.lUN, V Ji
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the North-Chauvcl's hot Hussars and 31st Chasseurs: these
fresh squadrons took up the rearguard duty for the rest
of the day, and covered thc march of the infantry to
Penaranda.
From this day onward 'Wellington's pursuit cannot be said
to have been urged with any grcat vigour. On the Bloming of
the 24th the vanguard entered Peiiaranda, to find that the
Freneh had started off before dawn. G. Anson's brigade
followed, accompanied this time by Bull's and Hoss's horse
&Iiillery, which had come up from the rear. The tail of the
enemy's column was found at Aldea Seca, a lew miles beyond
Pefiarandn: he started off without firing a shot, and was
out of sight before more than two gUlls had becn brought
to shell him. It seems that opportunities were lost this
day-an intelligent observer remarks that 'if only the
whole brigade and twelve guns had come up, we might
have taken 500 of them-great part of the infantry were
without arms 1.'
That night the British head-quarters and vanguard were at
Flares de Avila, hut the enemy were quite out of sight. 'How
they get on their troops at sueh 0. rate I eannot l.'onecive,' wrote
Wellington, ' but they left this about two in the morning, and
they will arrive in Valladolid to-morrow 2.' He gave up all
attempt at close or rapid pursuit 011 the 25th, reporting to Lord
Bathurst, ' I find the troops so much fatigued by the battle and
their previous and subsequent marches, and the enemy have
got so far before our infantry, that I halted tlLis day, and have
sent on only the light cavalry and guerrillas.' After this there
was no prospect of doing any further harm to Clausel, or of
scattering his demoralized army before it had time to recover
its cohesion. 'This does not look like the quick advance
following up a great victory,' wrote a critical dragoon i\ 'and
I think they will be let off too easily. The peasants report
them as in 0. dreadful state: all their cavalry, except a few
for their rearguard, is employed in carrying their sick.' It may
be taken for certain that a general of the Napoleonic sehool
1 Tomkinson's Diary, p. un .
• Wellington to Lord Bathufst, night of July 24. Dis]"Jldu:g, ix:. p. 309.
I Tomkinson, p. 101.
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would havc urged on his cavalry ut all costs-there was plenty
of it, and none save Le Marchant's and Bock's brigades had
sutfered any serious loss. Nor can it be doubted that such
a hunt would have been richly rewarded by captures. Clause!
wrote on the 25th that he could only rally 22,000 men 1 j and
o.s some 48,000 hud fought at Salamanca, and the actual losses
seem to have been about 14,000, it is clear that he must be
allowing for over 12,000 stragglers and unarmed fugitives-
whom an active pursuit might have swept up.
Wellington's defence for the slownc.<;s of his mO\'cment would
undoubtedly have bcen that a headlong chase might have cost
him over-much-he would have lost too many men, and-what
was even more important-too many horses by forcing the pace.
Clauscl's army had been put out of action lor some weeks by the
battJe of Salamanca-to smash it up still further would give him
no such profit as would justify the expenditure of several thou-
sands of his precious British troops. He was looking forward to
the possibility of having to fight Soult and Suehet-not to speak
of King Joseph-and wished to be as strong as possible for the
present. It is probable that he made a mistake in holding
baek-Clausel, being left practically unmolested, was able to
rally his army somewhat sooner than his adversary calculated.
By August it was again able to give trouble: in October its
strength was sufficient to wreck the Durgos campaign. If it
had been well hunted in the last days ol July, it would seem
that no such reorganization would have been possible-only
negligible fragments of it should have reached Valladolid or
Burgos. Yet it must alwllys be remembered that economy of
men was the cardinal necessity for Wellington-his total llritish
force was so small, the difficulty of getting up dralts and rein-
forcements was so enormous, the totalllumber of the enemy's
armies in the l'eninsula was so overpowering, that he could
not afford to thin down his regiments by the exhausting
forced marches that were necessary in an active pursuit.
It would have been little profit to him if he had exter·
minated thc Army of Portugal, only to find himself left
victorious, indeed, but with a fOl'ce so weak and so tired
out that lurther exertion was impossible. As it was, many
1 Clausel to King Joseplt from Arevalo. Joseph's Cortupofllunce. ix. p. 54.
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of his battalions in August showed only 300 bayonets in line 1,
and only recovered their strength, by the reappearance of
Badajoz and Salamanca convalescents, and the arrival of
drafts, during the following winter.
It was at Flares de Avila on July 25th that Wellington
received the news that a new factor had come into the game.
King Joseph had left Madrid four days earlier with the Army
of the Centre, and was marching northward by the Guadarrama
Pass and Villa Castin, with the obvious intention of joining
l\farmont. This move would have been all-import..'l.nt if it had
taken place ten days earlier: but when the Army of Portugal
was in absolute rout, and flying by forced marches towards
tile Douro, the appearance of the King was too late to be
dangerous. He could not strengthen the beaten army suffi·
ciently to enable it to fight-and he would expose himself to
some peril if he continued his forward march, and came any
nearer to the British line of advance.
Joseph's long hesitation and tardy start require a word of
explanation. It will be remembered 2 that his last communica-
tion whieh had got through to l\farmont was a dispatch dated
June 30, in which he had expressed his surprise that the Army
of Portugal was refusing battle, and stated that he could offer
no immediate help. If Hill, from Estremadura, should march
to join Wellington, he had directed that D'Erlon should movo
up in a similar fashion northward, and he himself would come
also, with all or part of the Army of the Centre. But supposing
that Hill should remain in the far south, beyond the Guadiana,
Joseph gave no promise o[ coming to Marmont's aid. Indeed
he never mentioned this contingency at all, except to say that
if Wellington had not been joined by his lieutenant, 'you
should choosc a good position and givc battle with all your
troops united.'
Sinee writing this epistle Joseph had experienced many
scarchings of heart. On the vcry day on which it was sent oH
he had received a dispatch from Soult, whieh filled him with
dismay: the Duke of Dalmatia said that he had forbidden
, Already 011 the dlly of Suhllllunen there were eight Imttaliol\s iu the
"frn)' with less than 400 men present. See the tHbles in Appendix.
, Sce chapter v above, pp. 3()oA-5.
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D'Erlon to eross to the north bank of the 'l'agus, even if it were
cerw.in that Hill and his corps had gOJle to join Wellington.
Writing in high wrath, the King, on July 2nd, threutened to
remove Soult from his conunund in Andalusia. • If you have
formally forbidden D'Erlon to pass the l'agus, in case the
English force in Estremadura goes off to join the enemy's
main body, you have given him orders contradictory to
those whieh I sent both to him and to you. You set your
authority above mine, you refuse to recognize me as Com~
mander-in-Chief of the Armies of Spain. Consequently, placed
as I may be between the two alternatives-of either dcpri viug
myself of the service of your talent and military experience, or
of allowing the powers confided to me by the Emperor to be
broken in my hand almost as soon as given-I can have no
hesitation.... Painful as it is to me, therefore, I accept the
offer which you formerly made mc, to resign your eommund
if I do not revoke my original order; for not only do I refuse
to revoke it, but I hereby repeat it again both to you and to
Comtc d'Erlon. If you prcfer to take this extreme step of
disobedience, resign your command to D'Erloll, as your senior
general of division, and he will take it up till the Emperor shall
nominate your successor t.'
This angry dispatch was followed by another, written on
July 6th, which varied thc original order to Soult in all i.mpor~
taut feature. For instead of speaking of a northern movcment
of D'Erlon's troops as consequent on a similar transference of
Hill's corps to Castile, it makes no mention of Hill, but pre-
scribes a definite manreuvre without any reference to the
action of that British general. • Send at ouce to Toledo a force
of 10,000 men: 8,000 infantry, 2,000 horse, with the men and
horses for 12 guns. Dy leaving the guns behind, the march of
the <:orps will be made more rapid, and the roads are good....
I authorize you to evacuate allY part of the occupied territory
that you may choose, in order to hastcn the departure of these
10,000 men, whose arrival I await with great impatience 2,'
Clearly it would take many days for these orders to get to
Soult, who was at this time before Cadiz. As a matter of fact
1 Joseph to Soult, Mudrid, June 30. Corres]Jol/llcllu of Joseph, ix. p. 42 .
• Correspondence or Joseph, ix. pp. 44-5.
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the)' only rcached his hands on July 16th, and long before that
date Joscph was lx:coming very anxious at the slate of affairs
on the Douro. He got news that ea!rarclli, seared by Home
Popham's diversion, had sent no SUl.'COurs to ~Iarmollt, and he
received letter!'! from Suehct, which showed him that hc l.'Quld
not count on any reinforcement from Valencia 1. It was
certain that, even if Soult yielded to the peremptory orders .
sent on July 2 and July 0, the detachment under D'ErlOIl could
not reach Toledo till somewhere about the 1st August. That it
would start at all seet.lll.'t1 doubtful, in face of a letter of July S
from D'Er-Ion, stating that he was being' contained' by no less
than 30,000 men under HiJl-a scandalous pcrnrsioll of fact,
for Hill had not over two-thirds of that force 2.
The days were rumling on, Marmont was still unsuecoured: it
seemed likely that neither from the North, from Valencia, nor
from Andalusin., would any help come to halld. The King grew
more and more anxious-all the more so because he had ceased
to receive reports from Murmont, sinee the linc of communi-
cation with him had becn cut by the gucrrilleros. Finally, on
July 9th', he made up his mind that, sincc no other help could
be got for the Army of Portugal, he would march himseU with
the Army oC the Centre, e\'en though to concentrate it he
lUust evacuate all ~ew Castile and La l\Iancha, and e\'en
imperil the s,'lfety of Madrid. On that day he issued orders la
'l'reillard to evacuate the vulley of the Tagus-aU the Tultwcra
and Almuruz region-and to the Ubeinbund Germans lo
abandon Lnl\lanchn. All the small posts in the direction 01 the
eastern mountains were also drawn in, even those watching
the passes of the Somosierra and the Guadarrama. Only in
'1'0100.0. Guadnlajara, and ScgO\;a, were small garrisons left
behind. lly the morning of the 19th July" the most distant
detachments had all eome ill, and the Army of the Centre wn.s
, JosclJh to Chlrke. July 1:1, CrJrTupomknn, bc. p. 45.
• F'or d'Erloll'~ letter sec JoseplL to Chlrkc of .Iul)' 17th; COrTesl'fJllderlet,
ix. p. 48.
• This tlllte j~ fixed by a letter of JOlicph to l\Inrmont, of tJll\t day, hi
the S<..-ovell ciphcl'8. It lIever got to l\I11rrnont.
• JOUnlUII in hi~ MtmoirQ (I" 410) Sll)'!> thnt the concentration took place
011 the 17th, but .Joseph·s letler to Clurl:e of .llIly HI Kays th3t Treillllrd'S
dragoons would only reach Naval Carneroon the 19th, which is oonclush-e.
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concentrated at Madrid, about 14,000 strong, and able to spare
10,000 for the Held when the capital had been garrisoned. Hut
the lGng resolved la wait two day~ longer before marching,
because he hOO just received news of the approach of an unex·
peeled but most welcome reinforcement. Early in the month
he had heard that Palombini's Italian division of the Army of
Aragon was hunting the Empecinado and Mina. in the direction
ol Calntayud and Tudela. He had scnt out a Spanish emissary
with a letter lo Palombilli, bidding him to draw in towards
Mndl'id, if he had not nlready marched to join Marmont, who
had hoped to get his assistancc. It does not seem that the
King had built much upon the results of this letter: orders
sent to Suchet's troops had generally been disregarded. But
it chanced to reaeh the Italian gcncral at Alfaro on the Ebro
on July 12th, and Pulombini, having no opportunity of referring
the responsibility to his inlDlediate commander, who was
200 miles away at Valencia, resolved to obey. He marched for
Soria Ilnd Sigucnza, brushing orr guerrillero bands that strove
to molest him, and sent to Joseph the uews that he might be
expected at Madrid 011 thc 21st. These tidings came to hand
011 the 18th, and filled the King with such high satisfaction
that he resolved to wait for the Italian division. It arrived
on the appointed day, having made n most creditable forced
mareh of 150 miles by mountain roads, through a burnt-up llud
desolate country. Without leaving it even one night's rest at
Madrid, the King started it orr in company with his own troops,
which had been a.waiting all day the signlll lor departure!.
Joseph's expeditionary force, thus increased to 14,000 men,
consisted of his Guards, horse and foot, onc F'rcneh brigade
(28th and 75th Ligne), D'Annagnae's Gcnnans (five battalions
llnd one cavalry regiment), Treillard's strong division ol
dragoons, llud purt of Hugo's division ol Spanish Juramentlul08,
together with Palombini's detaellment, which amounted to
six battalions and a regiment of dragoons. The garrisons of
Madrid, Toledo, Scgovia, and Guadalajarn were made up partly
of JuramentadQs, and partly ol the large body ol drafts for the
Army of Andalusia, which had accumulated at Madrid since
, All thi~ from Vncnni, vi. p. 110, where the mo\·ements of Pnlombini
are ver~" carefully detailed.
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the posts in the Sierra Morena h3d been givcn up in April. The
King had been in no hurry to send them on to Soult, a.nd now
found them very useful. Thc command of the garrisoll was
left to General Lafon Blaniac, who was acting as b'OVemor of
)[lldrid and Captain-General of New Castile. A few days after
Joseph's departure a welcome addition turned up, in the shape
of Sucbet's garrison of Cucnca, under General iUaupoint. consist-
ing of two battalions of the 16th regimcnt and a squadron of
c!1a.$seur8. On getting the King's order to cvacuate CuenCR,
this officer (like Palombini) had obeyed it, and, instcad of
rctiriug Oil Valencia, had come all to :Madrid, with his 1,000
men and three millions of rcals, representing the provincial
treasury 1.
Having once collected his army, the King marched with
great speed. pllSSt.'<1 thc defiles of the Guadarrama on thc 22nd,
and reached Espinnr, the great junction of roads in the province
of A\;la, ne.."t day. The cavalry that night were at Villa Castin,
eight miles farther to the front, on the road to ArevaJo and
Valladolid. Here the news eame to hand, not from any
authorized source but from the rumours of thecountry-sidc, that
Marmont had crossed the Domo on the 17th, and was closely
engaged with Wellington somewhere in the direction of Sala-
manca. On receiving this information Joseph and Jourdull
resolved not to continue their march towards Valladolid, but
to swerve westward, with the intention of joining the Duke of
Ragusa on the '1'ormes. Turning olf from the main road, the
cavalry reached Villanueva de Gomez ou the night oC the 2·Uh;
the King and the infantry got to Dlasco Saneho. Orders were
issued Cor the whole army to march on Pefiaranda next morning.
Dut during the hours of darkness rumours oC thc battle oC
Salamanca and its n.--sults came to hand. and on the following
morning they were confirmed by the arrival of two Spanish
emissaries, onc bearing a letter Crom thc wounded Marmont,
the other a second from Clause!. The MiU"Shal's letter was
insincere and inconclusive-after giving a long account of the
battie, which threw all the blame 011 Maueune, he said that
• Ma.upoint's letter to the King, announcing his arrival lit Mlldrid on the
29th-OOth Jul)·. wo., captured by gucrrillerOl', and is in the SeoveU collectioll
of ciphers.
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he had lost 5,000 men. the enemy infinitely more (!), and that
the army was falling back to take a position behind the Eresma
river l , or perhaps behind the Douro. Clausel's epistlc was
a far JUore honest docwncnt; it said that he was in a state of
incapncity to resist Wellington, that he could not put e,'en
20,000 men in line for some days, that he must retreat as fast as
possible on VaUadolid, to pick up his depOts and magazines,
which he must send oH without delay, and that he would then
fall back on the Army of the North. He distinctly lold the
King that, cven if the Army of thc Centre joined him. they
would be unable to rcsist Wellington for a moment, lie
rerommended. Joseph to caU up succours from Soult and
Suchet: if Wellington and thc English main body marched on
Madrid thc Army of Portugal would remain on the Doum, but
only in that case. If pursued by Wellington he must retirc
towards Burgos. He cvidcntly regarded any jW1CtiOll betwcen
his troops and thcl<ing's as impraclicll.ble and useless 2,
ConfTonted by this new and unpromising situation. Joseph
and Jourdan had to ehoose between two policies-they might
retire towards Madrid llnd cover the capital, in the hope that
Soult might conceivably have carried out thc orders given him
on July 6th, and have scnt n. detncluncnt toward Toledo and
Madrid. Or they might, despite of Clause1's advice and warn-
ing, movc northward towards the Douro and try to get into
communication with the Army or Portugal. If thc direct TOad
by Arevalo to Valladolid was too dangerous, there remained
another and more circuitous route by Cuellar, which Wellington
was too far off to reach.
Thc King and .lourdnn chose the first altcrnatiw without
a momcnt's hesiLlltion 3: if they joined the Army of Portugal,
they had Clauscl's nSSUCllilec that they could eHect nothing.
They would be driven bnck 011 Burgos; ~Iadrid would be
exposed to n raid by any small detachment that Wellington
might send against it. and touch with Soult and Suchct would
be lost. The King, thcrclorc. marc)l{.'d back by thc way that
, Which fallsillto theAdaJ'a near Olmedo twentymile~ southof"lllhldolid.
• •C1ausel to JOliCph. CorrQp<mdan«, ix. pp. 54-5.
• 'Certainemeot, e'~tait le meilleur,' say. JourdllO, commentilli on the
choice )'eaI'S after.
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he had come, and had reached on the 26th the Venta de San
Rafael, at the foot of the Cuooarrama pass. lIe had got so
rapidly out of Wellington's way that their armies did not touch
-save indeed that a patrol of Arentsehildt's brigade surprised
and captured near Arcvalo 2 offieers and 25 men of the King's
light cavalry I-Juramentado cltaSs/:urs.
Whcn informed that the Army of the Centre had fallen back
in haste toward Madrid, Wellington resolved that his duty
was to continue pushing Clausel northward, and away from
the King. The latter might be disregarded; his strength was
known, and it WIl.S almost certain that he would not be rein-
forced. For Hill had just sent in a report, which had come
through in fOUT days, that Dronet was showing no signs of
moving toward Toledo: and he enelosed an intercepted dis-
patch of Soult's, which proved that thc latter had no intention
whatever of carrying out the King's oft-repeated orders z.
Accordingly the British head-quarters were moved on to
Arevalo on the 27th of July, and to Olmedo on the 28th•
..\nson's and Arentsehildt's light cavalry went on in front:
they reported that the enemy was still in a complete state of
disorganiwtion. He wai:l burning the villages as he went, und
leaving many stragglers dead in the cornfields beside the road,
for the wounded were sinking by the 'Ht)', and nuy marauders
who went far from the main column were being killed by the
peasantry nnd the guerrilleros 3.
Clausel crossed the Douro by the two bridges of '1'udela and
Puente de Douro on the 27th-28th, leaving only some light
troops to the south or the river, and entered Valladolid, where
he set to work at once to evacuate nil the more vnluable stores,
and so many or the siek and wounded as could find transport,
along the high-rond to Palencia and llurgos. The Anglo·
Portuguese infantry was already approaching Medina del
Campo and Olmedo, while Santoeildes, with the section of the
1 For this business see Hllmillon'~ Uiswry of the 14th Light Dragoons,
p. 109. The leader of the patrol, 1\ Corpornl Hllllley or thnt regiment, had
only eight men, but surprised the cllWlltl:Urlt in Illl inn, and blurred thelll
into ijurrcnder.
• ~e Wellington to Hill of Jul)' 26. Dispute/les, ix. p. 314. The Soult
letter is in the SoovelI collection or ciphers.
• I"or details, sec Tomkinsoll, p. 1112.
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Army of Galieia which was not employcd on the siege of
Astorga, was ordered to march past 'l'oro and Tordesillas to
threaten VaUadolid from the north bank of the Douro, and
Silvcira was directed to resume the blockade of Zamora with
his militia-division.
On the 29th the Light and 1st Divisions, Wellington's
infantry vanguard, drove in the screen of light troops which
Clause! had left in front of the Douro: the French retired and
blew lip the bridges. But tlLis was of little avail, lor thc British
cavalry lordcd the river at Boccillo and continued their advance.
Thereupon the enemy evacuated the eity 01 VaUadolid, and
withdrew along the direct road to Burgos, save one division
(Foy's), which retreated cxccntrieally, up the north bank of
the river toward Aranda. In Valladolid were found 17 guns,
800 sick and wounded, whose condition had rendered it impos-
sible for them to travel, and a large magazine filled with
artillery material, besides other stores. The people received
Wellington with every mark of ent.husiasm, though they had
the reputation of including a greater proportion of Ajrance8udo8
than any other city of northern Spain 1. They treated him to
illuminations, a ball, and copious harangues of congratulation.
Meanwhile Anson's brigade swept the country to the cast and
north, and reported no enemy visible; while the guerrillero
MiU'quinez enter/..'<i Palencia, and captured 300 stragglers (ram
Clauscl's rearguard. The French had gone back beyond the
Arlallza river, and were lying at Lcrma, Torquemada, and
Santa Maria del Campo, ready to retreat to Durgos itsel( if any
further presswe was applied. It was not forthcoming-much
to Clausel's surprise-and he baIted and bcgnn to reorganize
his shattered army. What stln'ived of his train and stores, his
sick, and the cadre, of several skeleton battalions were sent bock
to Burgos. The rest stood still, awtLiting further developments.
Wellington, meanwhile, had brought none of his infantry
north of the Douro, though all were now near ut haud, nnd the
Light Division had repaired the bridge of Tudela. He had
resolved to turn his attention to King Joscph and Madrid. Only
Sll.ntocildcs and his two Galician divisions were ordered up to
Vnlladolid (where they arrived on August 6th) to support
• &!e von Hodcnherg's lelt~rOOllOCnling lhis in lJ/ad..n;ood for June )912.
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Anson's cavalry, who look up cantonments at various villages
in front and to the flank of the city.
The movements of the King and his army on July 21th-31st
had been somewhat puzzling to the British general. On
arriving at the foot of the Cuadarrama pnss, they had halted,
and thcn (instead of pursuing the straight road to Madrid) had
swerved off to Segovia, which lies on the northern slope ot the
mountains, as if they had abandoned their original intentiOIl
of leaving the Army of Portugal to its own dcvices. This nauk
march was the result of the receipt of letters borne by l\Iarmont's
aide-de-camp, Fabvier, whieh said that Clausel was no longer
being pursued with energy, and that it was possible that he might
stop on the Adaja and cover Valladolid I. It was a momentary
inspiration, with no renlity behind it, for Clausc1 was in tull
retreat again before the King reached Segovia. But misled by
its fallacious cheerfulness, Joseph had made a move which
rendered it possible for him to join the Army ot Portugal, it it
had really halted. He was soon undcccivcd, and atter remaining
three days at Segovia in some peril, for Wellington had now
turned against him, he evacuated that high-lying city on
August 1st, and made his filial retreat on Madrid by the
Cuadarrama pass.
Just attcr he had lcft Segovia ~ King Joseph receivcd
a dispatch from Soult, dated July 16. It was a reply to the
peremptory orders I>eut him on July 6th, which had directed
him to evacuate part of Andalusia and to send a largc detach-
ment to Toledo. Tllis was a strange document, which amounted
to an absolute refllsal to obey instructions. After stating (quite
falsely) that Hill was advancing with 30,000 men in Estrcma·
dura, and that in consequence he was himsclf about to l'cpair
thither, he aunounced that the evacuation of Andalusia would
be ruinous to the French Cllllse in Spain. • 'Wc could not find
means to subsist eithcr on the Tagus or in Estremadura, and
from onc position to another wc should retreat as tur as the
Ebro. There is a way to avoid this; by tuklng the initiative
we can save 6,000 sick und maimed men whom I should prob-
ably have to abandon, as well as 200,000 Spaniards (who have
: Printed in Josel'h's CorrelpOfIdence, ix. pp. 46-1.
On thc next day, Augu~t 2, the letter clime to hund ut Gulapagar.
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declared for your Majesty, and will be lost without hope), also
2,000 guns, and the only artillery arsenal now existing in
Spain. A single order by your Majesty can effect this, and
shorten the Spanish war by six campaigns. Let your Majesty
come to Andalusia in person, with every mall that can be
coUectcd: if the number is large wc can increase the expe-
ditionary force in Estrcmadura to 25,000 or 30,000 men, and
transfer the seat of war to thc left bank of the Tagus. The
Army of Portugal, being relieved of pressure, will be able to
comc into line again. Whatever occurs, your Majesty will find
yourself at the head of a splendid army, ready to deliver battle.
If the worst came, and wc were unlucky, there is alwllYs the
resourec of retiring on the Army of Aragon [in Valencia) nnd
so keeping the field.... I havc the honour to repeat to
your Majesty that J cannot send any detachments beyond
the Sierra Morena or the Guadiana, savc by evacuating all
Andalusia and marching with my wholc army. I must have
a positive order from your Majesty to that eUcct 1.'
TIlis was an astonishing letter for a Commander-in-Chief
to receive from a subordinate. Instead of obeying a very
definite order to move n certain number of troops to a certain
point, Soult replics by sending to thc King an alternative plan
of campaign. And this plan, it is not too much to say, was an
absolutely pervcrse and insane onc. It must be remembered
that, when Soult was "Titing, the bntUe or Salamanca was still
six days in the future, and the Army of Portugal was known to
be at close quarters with Wellington and in urgent need of
reinforcements. SOlut urges his master to abandon Marmont
to the enemy, to evacuate Madrid, to give up his communica-
tion with France, and to retire into Andalusia, where he would
be cut orr from all the other imperial armies, for it was not
possible even to communieatc with Suehet and Valencia, since
the Spanish Army of Murcia blocked the way. The cardinal
sin of this project was that if the French werc to hold Spain at
all, it was necessary for them to be strong in the North: 50\llt
proposed to deliver over the North to ·Wellington, by leaving
Marmont in the lurch. As Napoleon had observed, five months
earlier, • a check to the Army oC Portugal would be a caJamity
I Soult to JOlICph, C(J1Tuponda~. ix. pp. 45-1.
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which would make itself felt all over Spain. A check to the
Army of the South might force it back on Madrid 'Or Valencia,
but would be of a very different degree of importance 1.' He
had said much the same thing four years bcIorc. when first his
n.rmies were invading Spain; Ior he then expressed the opinion
that a disaster to Bcssicrcs in Castile would be the onc ruinous
possibility: defeats in the South or East mattered comparatively
little. Sou It, blinded by his own interest in the viceroyalty of
Andalusia, rclused to sec this obvious fuct. Long alter he had
received the news of Salamanca, he persisted in maintaining
that the true policy was to hold on to Seville, even when the
British army was at Madrid, and the 'I'i'Iccks of Marmont's
forces were retiring on Burgos. or this wc slHill hear more
presently.
King .loseph on receiving Soult's letter returned answer:
, You will see by my letter of the 29th July the errors that you
have been labouring under as to Lord Wellington's real designs.
Hasten, therefore, to carry out the orders which I give you-viz.
to evacuate Andalusia and march with your whole army on
Toledo 2: Even so the King did not obtain exact obedience
to his commands, but received a second series of counter-
projects: and in the end Soult marched not on Toledo but on
Valencia, and only many days after he had been instructed to
commence his movement.
\Yellington was, of course, unaware of the exact motives
which had induced King Joseph to make his Rank march to
Sego....ia, but he considered that it might mean that there was
some intention on the part ol Clauscl to bring the Army of
Portugal to join the Army of the Centre by way of the Upper
Douro [i.e. via Arnnda]. He therefore resolved to make such
u. conjunction impossible, by driving the King over the moun-
tains and towards Madrid 3.
While Anson's and Arentschildt's cava,lry continued the
I Berthie.r to iUarmollt-wriling from the Emperor'! personal dircetio[}--
or I<'elJruury 18th, 1812, printed in lUarmont's COTT;M>nlltknce iv. p. 382.
. -,'. ,
.1oseph to Soult of 2D ,lnly anti August 2, Correspondence, ix. pp. Oo-t.
• Wellington to Dathurst, Olme<.lu, July 28: 'I think it probable tllat
they [the Army of Portugal] will eudeavour to join the King on thc Upper
Douro, if the King should continuc on this !ide or the mountains, unless
] should previously have it in my power to strike a blow against his corps.'
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pursuit of Clauscl on the 29t-h-8Oth, and the 1st and Light
Divisions were brought up to the neighbourhood of 'Iudela,
opposite Valladolid, the rest of the anny was turned against
King Joseph. It was necessary to find out. as a preliminury,
whether be was really making a stand at Segm·ia. To ascertain
this point D'Urban's Portuguese horse pushed out from Olmedo
on the 29th, and found the King's cavalry in Santa Maria de
NicVI\, ten miles in front of Segovia. Deserters from the
Spullish Guards here came in to D'Urbun, und gave him llseful
information as to the exnet strength of the Army of the Centre.
On the 30th Wellingtou placed at D'Urhan's disposnl the
German Heavy Dragoons, a huttulion of Halkett's brigade of
the 7th Division, nnq a British battery, telling him to drive
in the enemy's screen. Tbe Freneh gave way reluctantly, and
on hearing of their attitude Wellington ordered the whole 7th
Dh>i.sion to follow D'Urb.'tn's detachmcnt. and other divisions
to make rcady to move in succession. But the report that
Scgovia was being firmly held, as the poi"l tk rQJIUmblet1Uml l
for Clause], turned out to be fn1sc, for whell thc flying column
approached that city it learnt that the main body of the
enemy had left it in the morning for t.he Guadarrama p.'\Ss.
A considerable rearguard, under General Espert 2, however,
was left to guard Segovia till thc King should have got a lair
start; and its mediaeval walls madc it defensible for n. short
time ngninst a force without heavy artillery. D'Urban could
do nothing with bis cavalry, but sent to Wellington a request
that the 7th Division might mm'e round to intercept Espert's
retreat towards the Guadarrama by 8. forced march. His
chief replied that he had no great faith in the success of any
of these attempts to • eut the French off,' and that it did .not
appear to him more practicable at Scgovia than elsewherc.
• The result of such attempts would merely be to fatigue the
troops in getting into Segovitl., and it might as well be done
without fatiguing them.' And so it was, for Espert decamped
by night on August 3 unmolested, and D'Urban entered the
1 'l'hls was the term that D'Urbull lI~ed when describing, on July 00, the
position of the French .
• Apparently two battalions of the Badel! regiment, some JW'runenlad08,
and a regiment of dragoons, about 1,800 rrnlll.
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place next morning, Iollowed some time later by the infantry.
He at once explored tbe mountain road toward the pass,
and found that the French bad completely disappeared: not
even at the 'Puerto' of the Guadarrama was a vedette la
be seen.
Wellington had now to revise his whole plan o( campaign,
since it had become clear that the two armies opposed to him
hnd retreated in different directions, and could not possibly
combine. While it was still conceivable tha.t Clausel might
dcCcnd the line oC the Douro, he had brought up the main body
of his infantry to Olmedo. But alter his entry into Valladolid
on the 30th, and the precipitate retreat of the Army oC Portugal
toward Burgos, he had been for two days under the impression
that King Joseph might stand at Segovia. Kot only had he
sent on the German dragoons and thc 7th Division to follow
D'Urban, but on Jul)' 31st he moved his own head-quartcrs Dlld
the 3rd Division to Cucllar, while the 4th, 5th, and 6th Di ...;sions
were at El Pino on the Cega rh'cr, a (ew miles behind. He
wrote next morning (August 1st) that he was in such a position
that Joscph and Clauscl could not possibly join, nnd that iC
the King lingered any longer at Scgovia, • I can move upon
him, and make him go quicker than he will like 1.' But he
imagined that the Army of the Centre would fall baek instantly
on Madrid-as indeed it was doing at the very moment that
he was writing his dispatch.
On receiving the information that Joseph bad vanished,
Wellington halted for three whole days [August 2nd, 8rd, 4th]
with his head-quarters at Cuellar, and his infantry gaUlered
round him ill its neighbourhood. The 1st and Light Divisions,
which had marched ss far as the Douro, came southward to
join the rest. But it was only on t.he 5th that orders were
issued for the march o( nearly the whole army on Scgovia, by
t.he road to M07.cneillo. During these three days o( halt Welling-
ton had made up his mind us lo his general policy. Clausel,
whose army was haml1ess for the present, was to be ignored:
only a small containing force was to be left in front of him,
, All these details are (rom tlispntches of Wellington to D'Urbatl in the
unpublished D'Urban papcl'8, datal between July 30 and August 2, or
from D'Uroon', report. to Wellington.
1812J TIIE ltURCH ON MADRID o1,D7
while the main body of the Anglo·Portuguese host marched on
?lladrid.
The slrategicul purpose that determined tills decision was
never set forth in full by Wellington. His contemporary
dispatches to Lord Bathurst and to Hill 8re short, and lack
explanatory detail-he states his decision, but says little of
his reasons for making it. ~or did he, at the end 01 the cam·
paign, write any long official narrativc 01 his doings, as hc had
done in 1810 and 1811. The causes that governed his action
have to be deduced from scattered opinions expressed in
many different documents. We nccd hardly take seriously the
common French dictum, found in many u book written by his
exnspcrated opponents, that he 'wished to parade himscl! as
conqueror and liberator in the Spanish capital.' That was not
the sort of moti,-e which any serious studcnt of Wellington's
character would dream of imputing to him. Nor, if wc translate
it into less offensive terms, would it be true to say that it was
the political advantage of expelling the King from Madrid, and
so demonstrating to nU Europe the weakness of the French
hold OIl the Peninsula, that was the determining cause of the
march into Kew Castile and the abandonment of the campaign
on the Douro. We must rather look for definite military
reasons. And of these the predominant onc wus thut he con-
ceived that the most probable result of the battlc of Salamanca
would be to force the King to call up Soult and Suehct to
Madrid, in order to check the Anglo·Portugucse army, evcn
at the cost of abandoning great tracts of conquered land in
Andalusia. and Valcllcia. Such indeed, as we havc already
seen, was Josepb's purpose. The order to Soult to evacuate
his viceroyalty and to march on Toledo with his whole anny
had been issued a day or two before Wellington had made up
his mind to turn southward. Suehet had been directed at the
snme time to send all that he could spare toward Madrid.
Though the pursuit of Clausel to the Ebro ofCered many ndvan·
tag-cs, it would be n ruinous movc it thc cnemy should concen-
trate 70,000 men at l\1acU:id, and then march on Valladolid, to
take the allied army in the rear and cut it of( from Portugal.
It was quite uncertain whether Soult or Suehet would
Olake this move. But that it was the correct onc is certain.
tnw;. ~ K k
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Wellington was aware that Soult had been summoned to send
troops Ilorthwn.rd. Hitherto he had found excuses for refusing
to obey, as his last intercel'tcd dispatch of July 8th sufficiently
showed. But the results of Salamanca might probably render
further disobedience impossible: and the moment that Soult
should hear of that tremendous event, it was reasonable to
suppose that he would abandon his viceroyalty, and mnrch to
join the King with every available man. n he found Joscph
and bis army still in possession of Yndrid, they would have
a central base and magazines from which to operate, and a
very favourable strategic position. It was true that Welling-
ton could call up Hill's 18,000 men, but this wns the only
succour on which he could count: neither llaUasteros nor the
numerous garrison of Cadiz would ever appear in New Castile, if
old experience was to be trusted. If some Spaniards did arrive,
they would be very uncertain aid. Granted, therefore, that
Soult marched on Toledo and Madrid to join the King, Welling-
ton must take almost every mnn of the Salamanca army to face
them, even allowing for the certain junction of Hill. He could
only afford to leave a small' containing force' to look afkr
Clauscl.
But there was another possibility which made the situation
still more doubtful. Would Suchet also push up to join King
Joseph with the Army or Valencia, or the greater part o( it 1
If he should do so, the odds would bc too great, and a dclensive
campaign to covcr l'ort,ugnl, and so much as was possible of the
newly regained Spanish provinces, would bc the only resource.
But Suchet's action depended upon a factor over which Welling-
ton had some influence, though not a complete and dominating
control. When he had started on the Salamanca cnmpai!,'ll be
had been relying on Lord William Bcntinek's Sicilian expedition
to keep the F'rench in Valencia engaged: an attack on Cata-
lonia would draw Suehet northward with all his reserves, and
nothing would be lelt which O'DonneIl and the Spanish army of
Murein could not' contain.' It will be remembered that a few
days before the battle of Salamanca 1 Wellington had received
the disheartening news that Bentinck had countermanded bis
expedition, and was turning himself to some chimerical scheme
, See ftl>ove, p. 408.
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for invading Italy. This had lelt Suchet's attention free for lhe
moment, and he might conceivably have sent troops to join
the Army of t.hc Centre. Fortunately he had not done so-
only Palombini's w"ision and the small garrison of CucJlea had
been swept up by King Joseph, without the i\larshal's consent
and mueh to his disgust.
~o"" however, the whole prospect in eastern Spain had
bccn t.ransformed by the cheering news, received on July 80th
near Valladolid I, that Uentinek had once more changed his
mind, and that a considerable expeditionary force und!,;r General
Mnitland had been sent to Majorca, to pick up the Spaniards oC
Whittingham ~md Hoche, and to cxeeute, atter all, the projected
diversion. Maitland's own dispatch arrived four days lntcr; it
had trs,·clled with extraordinary celerity from Palmn to Cuellar
in fifteen days, and announced his arrival on the Spanish
coast and his intention to operate at once. This being so,
Suchct would be • out of the game' if all went well, and only
the King and $oult need be taken into consideration for the
next month. But it was alHmportant that the diversion on
the East Coast should be executed with firmness and decision.
The best summary of Wellington's views at this moment is
to be found in his letter to Lord WillilllO Bcntinek', explaining
t.he importance of Maitland's action in August.
• I have lately, on the 22nd, beaten Marshal Marmont in
a general action ncar Salamanca, and I havc pursued him
beyond the Douro and entered Vll1ladolid. The King is at
Segovia with 12,000 or 15,000 men, and, having driYeJl l\,larmont
from the lower Douro, my next object is to prevent him and
Mannont (if possible) from joining: this I am about to attempt.
Either tbe French [i. e. King Joseph) must lose all communica-
tion with their troops in the north of Spain, or they must oblige
me to withdraw towards the lronticrs of Portugal. This they
cannot effect Witllout bringing against me either Suehct's
army, or Soult's army, or both. I cannot hut think, therefore,
that it is very important that the attention of Suchet should
be diverted from his possible operations against me by the
Sicilinn urmy, which will go to such important objects as
1'nrragonu and Valencia.... If Suchct's attention cannot be
• See DiBpalcM., ix. p. 320. I Iltid., p. 821.
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diverted from mc, and (notwithstanding Marmont's defeat)
the French become too strong for mc, 1 shall at lenst have
the satisfaction of reflecting, while I am retiring, that Gcneral
Maitlulld's progress will be unopposed, and wc shall takc
Tarragona and Valencia.'
A few days later Wellington was pleased to find that Suehet
had been duly scared. An intercepted dispatch from him to
King Joseph showed that he was thinking of nothing but the
appearance of an English flcet on the Valeneian coast, and that
it was most unlikely that he would send any serious Succours
to the King 1. There remained therefore only Soult to be
considered. The natural thing for him to do would be to
evacuate Andalusia: as Wellington wrote a fortnight later,
, any other but a modern French army would now leave that
province 2., Hill wns writiug at thc same time, 'Lord Wellington
continues advancing, and if he is able to kcep his forward
position, Soult will bc ordered to reinforce the King. Indeed
I think that he rn~t quit this part of the (,'Ountq entirely, if
matters do not go bcttcr with them' [the Frcnch] 3.
What neither Wellington nor Hill could foresee, in early
August, was that the Marshal would still hang on to Andalusia,
and renew, in a more pressing form, his proposal 01 July 16th
that Joseph and the Army of the Centre :;hould take refuge with
him beyond the Sierra Morena. But whether King Joscph
rceeived, or did not receive, succours from the South or East, it
was clearly good military policy to turn him out of Madrid,
while the Army of Portugal was still completely negligible as
a factor in the game. The loss of Madrid would be ruinous to
him il he was left without reinforcements: if he received them,
the enemy would find the problem of subsistence rouch more
difficult if he had not Madrid to rely upon ns his central base
and magazine. Toledo would not serve him half so well. And
the political effects or the recovery oC the Spanish capital, even
if only for a time, must be well worth gaining. It would shake
the confidence of the AJranccsudn party all over the Peninsula,
and it would be noted alll'Ound Europe.
: Wellington to Maitland, Cucllar, August :lrd, Dispatc1j/i$, ix. p. :l27.
Wellington to Bathul'St, Dispatchcs, ix. p. :no.
• Letter in Sidlley'8 Lile 01 Hill, p. 211.
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Accordingly Wellington resolved to leave only a small con·
ttlining detachment on the Doura, to look after Clausel. whose
recuperative power he somewhat underrated, &Dd to mareh on
Madrid with a force that would enable him, if joined by Hill, to
fight Soult and King Joscph in combination. The containing
body was put in charge of Clinton, who was almost the only
divisional general of the old stock who still remained with the
army. Graham and Pieton were invalided, Leith and Lowry
Colc hnd been wounded at Salamanca. along with Bereslord
and Staplcton Cotton. Nearly all the divisions were under
interim commanders. Another reason for choosing Clinton
tor the detached duty wus that his division, the 6th, hud
511ffered more than any other unit at the recent battle. [t was
vcry low in numbcn, only 3,700 men, including its Portuguese
brignde. nod needed to pick up convalescents and drafts before
it could be considered eUecti\'c for field service. Along with
thc 6th Division there were left the five battalions t that had
recently joined thc army from England or the Mediterrancan
stations: they werc all Walehcren regiments, and still riddled
with sickness; and all had suffered (rom thc forced marches
which had brought thcm to the front just before. Wcllington
was discontentcd with their condition. 'The truth is, neither
officers nor soldiers l\rc l\ceustomed to march. The mcn arc
very irregular, and owing to their irregularities not ablc to
bear the labour of marching in the hcat of the sun 2: They
werc left to strengthen Clinton. and to ft(:<:limatizc thcmselves
to the Spanish summer: if taken on to i\fndrid they would
have sown the roadside with broken-down stragglers.
The five newly-arri\'ed battalions brought Clinton's strength
up to 1.000 infantry. The whole of this force was cantoned in
and about <\1cllar, whilc the cavalry allotted to it, Anson's
brigadc, took a morc ndvllI1ccd position, along and beyond the
Douro, covering not only its own infantry but the two Spanish
divisions of Santocildes, who had occupied VnUadolid on
t viz. the 2/4th, 1/5th, 1/:l8lh, 1/42nd, which had Arrived in time for
tile bn.ltlll 01 Salam:mC!l, Ule l/a8lh on the very bltttle morning. ltnd the
1/8211d which came ull arter lhe !lalllc. They were nil Wnleherenreglmellu:
1/82nd came from Gi!lrnltnr, 2/4lh rroln Ceutll, the other three from
f:nglaru.l direet. The l/IHh nmI2/8:!lId went on to Madrid in September,
• Wellington to Dathurlit, Cllcllu.r, August 4. DiJpatchu. ix. p. 330.
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August 6th. The remninder of the Army of Galieia was still
occupied in the interminable siege of Astor~a, which to Welling_
ton's disgust still lingered on. The heavy guns had at last come
up from Corunna, but the bombardment seemed to have little
erred. Silveira had resumed the blockade of Znlllora, but
having no siege artillery could only wait till starvation should
compel its garrison of 700 men to submit. Toro and Tordcsillas
were the only other places where l\Iarmont had left a detach-
ment; the latter sUl'l'cndercd to Santocildcs on his march to
Valladolid-about 800 French were taken there. The former
was still holding out, observed by a small Spanish force. The
task of keeping a close look·out upon Clauscl was handed over
to the gucnillcros-thc Castilian ehiefs Saornil, Marquillcz, and
Principe. An English officer, who spent some days with the
two last at this juncture, describes them as' bandits, but vcry
troublesomc ones for the French.' Deducting the Spaniards
left before Astorgll, and the Portuguese Idt beforc Zamoro.,
there were some 18,000 men in all told orr to ' contain' Clause!.
The orders left behind 1 were that they should remain in thcir
cantonments unless the cnemy should move-which 'Wcllington
did not think a likely contingency, 'as they havc nothing but
their cavalry in a stale fit for service.' But if, rallying sooner
than he expected, thc Frcnch should march by Palencia to t.ry
to rescue thc garrisons of Astorga and Zamora, Santocildcs
was to retirc, and to endeavour to defend thc line of the Esla,
while Silvcira. was to raise the blockade of Zamora ~nd fall
back bchind that same river. If, instead of making a. raid.
westward to save the ganisons, Clauscl should move against
Valladolid and the line of the Douro, Anson's cavalry was to
retire and join Clinton at CucUar; and if the enemy eame on
against them in full force, both were then to fall back on
Segovia. Santocildcs was then directed to cndeavour to move
round Clausel's real', and to cut his communication with Burgos.
Contrary to \Vellington's expectation 2, as wc shall presently
, Memorllllllum ror General ClintOll, to be communicated to General
Santocildes. JJUq/fllclU!1/, ix. pp. 344--6.
• It is curious t.o rind that while ill the 'Memorandum' or August 4
Wellington states t1ml it is ' not very probable' that Clausel will mOVe,
ill 1\ letter to Santodldes sent off the very next day, he remarks that all
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sec, the }'rench general made both the mo\'es suggested-he
seot a colWlln to relieve Astorga and Zo.mora, and marched
l\;th his main body on Valladolid. Thc consequences or his
ad\'IUlcc \\;11 be related in their due place.
advance from Burgoe: into the kingdom of Leon, to relieve Astorga, ill
•m06t likely.' I fancy UmL the former Wll.'I hi, real opinion, and that the
latter WII.Ii slden of with lIOllIC 1Itres6 in the directiollll to Santooildes,
mainly beeause Wellington wisluxl to iml)re8i!I on the Spalliard the duty
of being cautious ami retiring to the EsJa \o1tbollt offering battle.
SECTION XXXIII: CHA PTER IX
D
THE PlJRSUlT OF KING JOSEPH. MAJA'f.AHONDA.
WELLINGTO~ AT MADRID
HAVING thus mnde 0.11 his mTnllgcmcnts for' containing'
Clallsel, and for denling with what he considered the unlikely
chance of an ofCcnsivc move by the Army of Portugal, Welling-
ton was at liberty to carry out his new strategical move. The
mass of troops collected at Cucllar and its neighbourhood was
at last set in motion, and, after his short halt and time of
doubting, he himscU marched against Madrid with the whole
remaining force at his disposal-the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, and
Light Divisions, Arentschildt's, Dock's, and Ponsonby's llate
Le Marchant's] cavalry brigades, the Portuguese infantr')' of
Pack and Bradford, wit.h D'Urban's horse of that same nation,
as also Carlos de Espul1a's Spanish infantry and Julian Sanehcz's
lancers. 'fhe wholc, allowing lor SAlamanca losses and the
wcur ond tear 01 the high·roads, amounted to about 36,000
mcn 1. It was ample lor the hunting of lGng .Joseph, lllld
sufficient;. if Hill were called up, to facc the King and Soult in
conjunction, supposing that the latter should at last e\'fLCuate
AndaJusia and march on Toledo. Sa.ntocildes and Clinton were
inlormed that it was the intention of the Commande:r·in·Chief
to return to Castile when affairs in the South had been settled
in a. satisfactory fashion. No date, of course, could be 8ssigm:d:
all would depend on Soult's nc:~:t move.
On Augu·st 7th the vanguard, consisting of thc force that had
occupied Segovia-D'Urban's Portuguese squadrons, the hellvy
German dragoons, Macrlonald's horse artillery troop, and onc
• The 1st aml 7th Divisions alooe were up to ll'eir uSllul strength. 111e
4th Ilnd Lighl DivitliollS were stlll showing very wCllk lmU.uliollS, owing to
their dreadful nu,tuJoz losses; and the formcr had nl>l() ~urrcred very
IlCvcrely (1,000 ClUlunllies) at Salamanca. The llth IIlld 3rd loud compllra·
lively modemle ellH""lUCll at each of these llghbl, but tht: cornbilllltiot1 of
tile two lIuceessive IletH of los!lCS had reduced lhem vcry collllidembly.
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light battalion of the German Legion-marched forward. six
leagues, • fivc 01 them against the coUar,' remarks an artillery
officer. The steep route lay past the royal swruner·palace of
San Udefonso, • a beautiful place, and most magnificently
fitted up: what is vcry singular, the French have not destroyed
a singlc stick of it: the rooms arc bung as thick as can be with
paintings of sorts 1.' No hostile vcdcttcs were discovered on the
Guadarrama, and a rcconnoitring party pushed as far as the
Ese~rjal, and reported that the enemy's most outlying picket
was at Galapagar, three or four miles to the south-east of that
melancholy pile. Meanwhile the mrun body, a march behind the
v!\llgunrd, started from Segovia on the 8th, Ponsonby's dr!\goons
and the 7th Division leading; then came Alten's brigade, the
3rd, 4tb, and 5th Di"isions, and Pack. The rear was brought
up by the 1st and Light Divisions and Bradford, who only
started from the neighbourhood of Scgovia on the 9th 2. The
necessity for moving the whole army by a single mountain
road-though it was a well-engineered one-eaused the column
to be of an immoderalc lcngth, and progress was slow. Head·
quarrers werc at San I1defonso on the 8th and 9th August, at
Nfl.va Ccrrada (beyond the summit of the Guadarrama) on the
10th, at Torre Lodoncs nlilllr the Escurial on the 11th.
l\Ieauwhile D'Urban, far ahead oI thc main body, occupied
the Esellrio.l on thc 9th, and pushed on cautiously to Galnpagnr,
Irom whence the enemy had vanished. His rearguard was
discovered at Las llos..'\s and Majalahonda, five milcs nearer to
:Uadrid. Wellington's orders were that his vanguard was to
keel» well closed up, the Germans elose behind the Portuguese,
and that nothing was to be risked till support from the leading
divisions of the army was close at hand. Wherefore on thc
10th D'Urban, finding the Freneh in torce at Las Rosas, only
advanced a few miles, and bi"ouaekcd on the Guadarrama river
at the bridge of Retamar. lIe received news from the peasantry
that King Joscph WitS »reparing to ev!\cuatc Madrid, that
convoys had already started, llnd thot the main body of the
, Dylll'lcy's diary in U. A. JOllTlwl, vo1. xxiii. p. 454..
• "'Iully of tbe brigadCII did not rnnrch through Segovia, but by cross·
roods llround it: sleep grlltlient8 Ilnd faligue we", thcreb;r avoided. Onc
route WQ.II by the deserted puh",,'e of Rio .'rio, nn old ro:t--al hunting·box.
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Army ol the Centre was to march by the road of Atostoles on
Toledo, where Soult wa.s expected in 11 few days. The informa._
tion-true as regards the evacuation, false as regards the
approach of Soult-was duly sent back to Wellington, who
lay that night at NaVll Cerrada, fifteen miles to the rear, with
the 7th Division and Ponsonby's cavalry 1,
Madrid was at this moment a scene of tumult and despair.
'fhe King had retired from ~>'()via still in a state of uncertaint)'
as t.o whether Wellington intended to turn against him, or
whether he would pursue CI:mscl. Hc quite recognized the
fact that, even if Soull obeyed the last dispatch sent to him on
August 2nd, it would be too late for him to arrive in time to
save ~ladrid. But there was (L pause of some days, while
Wellington was making up his mind at Cucllar, and it was only
on the moming ol the 8th that the news arrived that a strong
column (D'Urban and the advunc<:d guard) had started lrom
Segovin on the preceding duy, and that more troops were
following. The orders to make re.'l.dy for departure were issued
at once, and a veritable panie !';et in among the Freneh residents
and the L1franusados. • Every OIlC: wrote a keen observer
on the 9th August, • is packing up his valuables and making
ready for a flitting. Not to spcak of the many Spaniards
of birth and fortune who have committed themselves to the
King's cause, there is an infinite number ol minor officials and
hangers-on of the palace, who by preference or by forcc of habit
stuck to their old places. All these poor wretches dare not slay
behind when the King goes-their lot "{Quid be undoubtedly
a dreadful one, they would fallvietims to the ferocious patriotism
of their fellow-citizens, who havc ncvcr forgivcn thcir desertion.
Since the word for dcparture went round, every onc has been
hunting for a vehicle or a saddle-beast, to get off at all costs. Add
to this crowd a swarm of valets, servants, and dependants of all
sorls. Most oC the merchants and officials are. as is natural,
taking their families with them: the caravan will be inter-
minable. All night the noise of carriages, carts, and wagons,
rolling by without a moment's cessation under my windows,
kept me from sleep.' On the next morning he adds, • More
1 :"11 thi.!l from D'l:roan·, unpublished diary, as are nllO mOlit or lite
details about the movements of the ttoop!!_
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than 2,000 vehicles of onc sort and another, loaded with bundles
and bales and furniture, with whole families squatting on top,
118.\'e quitted Madrid. Adding those who follow on root or on
horseback, there must be easily 10,000 of them. They are
mostly without arms, there are numbers of women, old people,
and children: it is a lamentable sight: they take thc Aranjucz
road, guarded by a considerable escort 1.'
The King, after resigning himself to the retreat, and gi,,;ng
orders for the departure of the convoy and the greater part of
his infantry, had still onc troublesome point to settle. Should
he, or should he not, leave a garrison behind, to defend the
great fortified enceinte on the Retiro heights, outsidc the
eastern gate of the city, which his brother had constmcted, to
serve as a citadel to hold down Madrid, and an arsenal to
contain the assortment of stores of all kinds. Hetl.vy material,
especially in the way of artillery-had been accumulating there
since the French occupation began. Here were parked all the
guns captured at Uclcs, Ahnonll!Jid, and Ocaiia, and tens of
t.housands of muskets, the spoil of those same fields. There was
a whole convoy of clothing destined for the Army of the South,
and much more that Joseph had caused to be made (or his
skeletou army of Juramentados. There were 900 barrels of
powder and some millions of rounds of infantry cartridges, not
to speak o( much arsenal plant or all kinds. All this would
have either to be blown up or to be defended. The fortifications
were good. against guerrilleros or insurgents: there was a double
ellceinte and n star-fort in the interior. But against siege-guns
the place could obviously hold out for not more than a limited
number of days. After twenty-four hours of wavering, Joseph-
contrary to Jourdll.n's advice-resolved to garrison the lletiro,
011 the chance that it might defend itself till Soult reached
Toledo, and a counter-attack upon Madrid became possible. If
Soult should not appear, the plaec was doomed clearly enough:
and the previous behaviour of the D\lke of Dalmatia made it
by no means likely that he would present himself in time.
However, the King directed LafoH Blaniac, the governor or thc
province of La Mancha, to shut himself in the works, with some
2,000 men, consisting mainly of the drafts belonging to the
1 Hcisct's SQlwetlir8, H. pp. 358-60.
\508 THE PURSUIT OF KING JOSEPH [AUG. 11
Army of Andalusia; he would not leave any of the Army of the
Centre. Probably he considered that Soult would feel more
interest in the fate of the Retiro if his own men formed its
gnrri!>on. They were a hnpha7.l\rd assembly, belonging to some
dozen different regiments \ under·officcfCd and mostly con.
scripts. But they were all French troops of the line; no
Juramentados were among them. To their charge were handed
over some 500 non-transportable sick of the Army of the Centre,
mostly men who had collapsed under the recent forced marches
to and from Dluseo Sancho. They were not in the Retiro, but
at the military hospital in the Prado, outside the fortifications.
Having sent of( towards Aranjucz his convoy and the largcr
part of his troops, the King was suddenly seized with a qualm
that he might be flying from an imaginary danger. What if
the column tha.t had been heard of on the Guadarrama was
simply a demonstration-perhaps half a dozcn squadrons and
a few battalions of infantry? Hc would be shamed for ever if
he evaeuatcd his capital before a skeleton enemy. Obsessed
by this idea, he ordered General Treillard to take the whole of his
eavalry-over 2,000 sabres-and drive in Wellington's advanced
guard at all costs: Palombini's Italian division marched out from
Madrid to support thc reconnaissance. Treill.a.rd was ordered
to use every effort to take prisoners, from whom information
eould probably be extracted by judiciolls questioning.
On the morning of the 11th the French outpost-line outside or
Madrid had been held only by Reiset's brigade of dragoons
(13th and 18th regiments), about 700 sabres, It was these
troops that D'Urban had discovered on the previous night at
Las Rosas: at dawn he procceded to drive thcm in, making
sure that they would retire, as thcy had regularly done hithert.o.
His own force was mueh the same ns that of the enemy, his
three wcak regimcnts (seven squadrons) amounting to a litUe
over 700 men. But he hud with him l\1acdonald's horse artillery,
and the French were gun!css, Demonstrnting against Reise.t's
front with two regiments, D'Urban tmncd him with the thud
, The slIrrc"dcr-wl]s show that there Were OIlso o;ome small leavillljS or
Marmont's troops in the £letiro, notably rl'1:ll11 the 50U. Line [of which there
were no less thUll six officersJ. Of the Army or the SOllth the 12th I\ud 27th
Uger, and 45th Ilnd 511,t Line were strongly represented,
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and two guns. The flank movement had its due effect, and the
dragoons gave back, whcll shelled diagonally from a conveuient
slope. They retired 3S far as the village of Las Hosas, and made
a stand there: but on the flanking movement being repeated,
they again drew back, and passing a second villagc-Majala-
honda-went out of sight, taking cover in woods in the direction
of Mostoles and Boadilla. D'Urban was lIOW within seven miles
of Madrid, and thought it well to write to Wellington lo ask
whether he should endc(wour to enter the eity or not. The
l'cply I'ent to him was that he was to go no further than Ara\'3e3
-threc miles outside the walls-till he should be supported; the
head of the main column, beaded by Ponsonby's heavydrngoons,
would be up by the e\-ening.
Long before this answer reached him D'Urbtlon was in terrible
trouble. The mnn<euvring o( the morning had taken up
some (our hours; it was about 10 when the French dis-
appeared. '''1rilc waiting (Or orders, the brigadier direeted
his regiments to quarter themselves in Majalahonda, water
their horses, and eook their midday meal. After the pickets
hnd been thrown out, all went quietly (or five hours, and
most of the men were enjoying a siesta at 3.30. They had
now support close behind them, as the heavy German brigade,
and the 1st Light Battalion of the K.G.L. had eome up as far ll.'l
Las nosas, only thl'cc·quarters of a mile to their rear. 'fhc
advance was to be resumed when the worst heat of the day
should be over.
But a little before (our o'clock masses o( Frcnch cavalry wcre
seen debauching from the woods in (ront of lloadilla. This
was Treillard, who had come up from the rear with (our !resh
regiments (19th and 22nd Dragoons,Palombini's Italian Dragcm,
de NapoUon, and the 1st Westphalian Lancers I), and had
picked up Reiset's brigade on the way. The whole (orce was
over 2,000 strong, and was advancing in three lines at a great
pace, evidently prepared to attack without hesitation. D'Urban
had barely time to (arm a line in front o( Majulahonda, when
the enemy were UpOll him.
I Tl'dllard rolls Uu:m only u, /ulIcieTS in his report. Dyneley in his
IlRrrative C3l1s them J'olish Innoors, but the;y wue really the Wcstphalillo
Cllevauz..Ugen·laJll;ier, or the Army of the Centre.
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It is certain that the wise policy would have been to make
a running fight ot it, Imd to tall back at once on the Ccrlllull~
at Lus nasus, tor the Portuguese were outnumbered three to
onc. But D'Urban was 11. dal;ng leader, honourably ambitious
of distinction, and the excellent behaviour oC his brigade at
Salamanca had inspired him with an exaggerated couHdcllcc in
thcil' steadiness. He sent back messengers to hurry up the
German dragoons, and took position in front of Majalaholldll,
throwing out onc squadron in skirmishing line 1, deploying
fiye more ill line or battle (1st and 12th regiments), and keeping
onc iu reserve 011 his Jetl flunk to cover lour hOI'SC artillery
guns there placed. Here also were placed n party ol IortyoC the
German Dragoons, who had been sent out on exploring duty,
and joined thc POl'tugucse in time for the fight.
Trcillard camc on iu three succcssi ve lincs oC brigadcs, each
composed of six squadrolls, Rcisd's dragoons (13th and 18th)
forming the front line, the other dragoon brigade (19th and
22nd) the second, and the two foreign regiments the reserve.
The clash came very quickly, beCore the British gUllS had time to
fire more than tlu'ee or Cour rounds. The Portuguese rode
forward briskly enough till they were within a few yards of the
enemy, when they checked, wavered, and went about, leaving
their brigadier and their colonels, who were riding well in
Cront, actually in the French ranks. D'Urban cut his way out-
the Viseonde de llarbac;eno. nnd Colonel Lobo were both
severely wounded and taken prisoners. The broken line
shivered in aU directions, and wcut to the rcar pursued by the
French: some of the fugitives rode into and carried away the
reserve squadron, which abandoned the guns on the left as they
were limbering up. There was a wild chase 101' the mile that
intervened between the battle spot in lront or Majalllhonda
and the village of Las Rosa.<;. In it three of the four horse
artillery guns were captured--olle by a wheel breaking, the
other two by their drivers being eut down by the pursuillg
dragoons. Captain Dyneley, commanding the le[t section of
the battery, and fourtecn of his mcn were taken prisoners-
mostly wounded. The small party of German dragoons, llllder
, Thill was Il lKJulldron or U1C II tll, whose other ~Illadron {ormed the
reserve,
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an officer named Kuhls, who chanced to be present, made
a desperate attempt to save the guns. 'Oh, how those poor
fellows behaved!' wrote DYllclcy, 'the)' wcrc Hot much morc
than twenty in number, but WhCll they saw the scrape our
gUllS werc in, they formed up to support us, which they had
no sooncr done than down came at least 150 dragoons and
lancers: the poor fellows fought like men, but of course they
were soon overpowered, and every soul of them cut to pieces.'
The main body of the leading French brigade rode, without
a check, up to the first houses of Las ]losus, where they found
the German heavy brigade only just getting into order, so swift
had the rout bcclI. \Vhen D'Urban's Hrst alarm came to hand,
the horses were all unsaddled, the men, some asleep, some
occupied in grooming thcil' mounts or leading them to water.
The trumpets blew, but thc squadrons wcrc only just assembling,
when in a confuscd mass and a cloud of dust Hying Portuguese
and pursuing French hurtled in among them. That no irre-
parable disaster took place was due to twocauscs-two captains 1,
who had got a few of these mcn already together, gallantly
charged the head of the French to gain time, and some of the
light infanlry opened a spaltering fire upon them from the
houses. Reiset called hack his rcgimcnts to rc-form them, aud
meanwhile the Germans came pouring out of thc village and
got into line anyhow, 'some on barebacked horses, some with
bare hends, others in forage-caps, mUIlY in their shirt-sleeves.'
By the time that the French were advancing again, all the
four squadrons of the helwies wcre more or less in line, and
D'Urhan had rallied the greater part of his l)ortuguese on their
left. The fight in front of Las Rosas was very fierce, though
lhe Portuguesc soon had cnough of it and retired. But the
Germans made a splendid resistance, and ended by heating
back the front line of the enemy. Treillard then put in his
second Iinc, and under the chu.rgc of these fresh squadrons the
dragoons of the Legion, still fighting obstinately, were pressed
back to thc entrance of the village: Colonel Jonquieres, com-
manding the brigade in Bock's absence, was tnken prisoner
with a few of his men. The salvation of the overmatched
cavalry was that the light infantry battalion of the Legion
I Reizenstein and Marshalk.
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had now lined the outskirts or thc village, and opened such
a hot firc that the cncmy had to dra w back.
What 'l'reillard would have done had he been ldt undisturbed
it is impossible to say, but just at this moment l'onsonby's
cavalry brigade and the head of the infantry column of the
7th Division came in sight (rom the rear, hurrying up to support
the vanguard. The French drew off, and retired in mass, with
sueh hastc that they did not even bring 0[1 the captured gullS,
which were found by the ro<,tdside not much damaged, though
an attcmpt had been made to destroy their carriages.
In this fierce fight, which was so honourable to the Germans
and so much the reversc to the Portuguese, thc \'anguard lost
nearly 200 men. The heavy brigade had 1 oJnccr and 13 men
killed, 5 officers and 35 men wounded, 1 officer (Colonel
Jonquieres) and 6 men prisoners. The IJortuguese naturally
suffered much more-by their own fault, for it was in the
rout that they were eut up. They had;} officers and 30 men
killed, 3 officers and 49 men wounded, and 1 officer 1 and
22 men missing. Macdonald's unfortunate battery lost 6 killed,
6 wounded, and its second captain (Dynelcy) and 14 men
missing: most or the latter were morc or less hurt. The K.G.L.
light Imttalion had 7 wounded. 'I'he total casualty list,
therefore, was 15 officers and 182 men. It is probable that the
French did not suffer much less, for they had as many as
17 officers disabled, including Rciset, the brigadicr who led
the first line, and 11 more of thc officers of his two regiments :
the supporting corps lost only 5 officers wounded among the
four of thcm 2. But a loss of 17 officers must certainly imply
that of at least 150 men: the Germans had used their brond·
swords most effectively. Treillard sought to diminish the
effcct of his loss by making the prepostcrous statemcnt that he
had killed 150 of the allies, wounded 500, nnd carried off
60 prisoners; he forgot also to mention that he left the three
capturcd guns bchind him.
I Colonel Looo: the other colonel (the Visconde de Barbuycna) who was
taken, Illl.d been 90 severely wounded tlUl.t the Freneh left him behind.
• Three in Uw lOth Dragoons, onc in the 221ld, onc in the Italian regi·
ment. Oddly enough, of seventeen officers in the casually list, only one
(u cllef ucscallron of the 13th) WllS killed. The subre disables, but does nol
usually slay outright.
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After this affair Wellington made the memorandum: 'the
oceurrenees of the 22nd of July [Salamanca] had indueed me
to hope that the Portuguese· dragoons would have conducted
themselves better, or I should not have placed them at the
outposts of the army. I shall not place them again it} situations
in which, by their misconduct, they can influence the safety
of other troops 1.' It is fair to D'Urban's men, however, to
remember that they were put into action against superior
numbers, and with a knowledge tha.t they themselves were
ullsupported, while the enemy had two lines of reserve behind
him, To be broken under such circumstances was perhaps
inevitable. But the second rout, in the vicinity of Las Rosas,
was much more discreditable. Their brigadier, very reticent
in his dispatch to Wellington, wrote in a private letter: 'The
same men who at Salamanca followed me into the French
ranks like British dragoons, on this 11th of August at the first
charge went just far enough to leave me in the midst of the
enemy's ranks. In the second, Which, having got them rallied,
I attempted, I could not get them within ten yards of the
enemy-they left me alone, and vanished from before the
helmets like leaves before the autumn wind 2.'
Trcillard brought back to King Joseph the news that ·WcUing.
ton in person was certainly marching on Madrid 'with the
greater part of his army. Indeed his prisoners had tricd to
scare him by saying that 8,000 horse were coming down on him,
and otherwise exaggerating the numbers of the allies. The
cavalry brigades fell back to form the rearguard of the King's
army, which moved on Valdcmoro and Arnnjuez, not toward
Toledo, for certain infonnation had come that none of SouIt's
troops werc' anywhere near that ancient city. The convoy had
been turned towards Oeaiia, and the road to Valencia.
, Di8patch~8, ix. p. 354.
• There are very full narratives of Majalabonda to be got from D'Urban's
eorn:spondence,Ileiset's memoirs, and the letters oC Dyneley, who was lucky
enough to escape a rew dnys later and rejoin bis troop. 5chwertfegcr's
llistory of the German Leg~1l gives the rnets nhollt the part taken by the
K.G.L. Light Bnttalion, whose service Wellington ignored in his dispateh-
wrongly stating that it was not engaged. Treillard's dispatch is a fine
piece of exaggeration, but userul as giving the official French view of tile
Il.frair.
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Wellington entered iUadrid unopposed next day-vexed that
his arrival should have been marred by the untoward business
at )lajalahollda, • a devil of an affair,' as he called it in a private
letter to Staplctoll Cotton I. But the inhabitants of the Spanish
capital took little heed of the mishap-the departure of the
French was the only thing that mattered. Their enthusiasm
was unbounded .
• I never witnessed,' wrote an intelligent observer in the
ranks 2, 'such a scene bclore. For a distance of five miles
lrom the gates the road was crowded with the people
who had come out to meet us, each bringing something-
laurel boughs, flowers, bread, wine, grapes, lemonade, sweet-
meats, &c. The road was like a moving forest from the multi-
tude who carried palms, which they strewed in the way for us
to march over. Young ladics prcscnted us with laurel, and
even fixed it in our caps: others handed us sweetmeats and
fruit. Gentlemen had hired porters to bring out wine, which
they handed to us as we passed by: every individual strove
to outvie each other in good nature. On the other hand the
feelings of cach British soldier were wound up to the highest
pitch-Wellington himself rode at the hend of our regiment,
wc were flushed with victory, and a deCeated enemy was fl)~ng
in our front: proud of thc honour paid us by the people, wc
entered Madrid, the air rent with cries of" Long live Wellington,
Long Jive the English." The crowd and shout.'i and ringing of
bells was beyond description. The men on the flanks were
involuntarily dragged out of their subdivisions into houses, and
treated with the best that could be found for them. It wos
with difficulty that Lord Wellington could keep his seat on
horsebaek---every one was pressing round him.' They kissed
his hands, his sword, even his horse and the ground he had
passed over. It would have been a moment of intoxicating
cxultation to most men: but \Vellington looked beyond the
laurels and the shouting. 'It is impossible to dcscribe thc joy
of the inhabitants on our arrival:' hc wrote, in his rather
ponderous style, 'I hope that the prevalence of the same
sentiment of detestation 01 the French yokc whieh first induced
1 Dispatches, ix. p. 351-
• Journal of Wheeler of the 51st, p. 27.
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them to sct the example or resistance to thc usurpcr, will
again induce them to make exertions in the eausc or their
country, which, being more wisely directed, will be more
efficacious than those they rormerly made I.' But hope is not
the same o.s expectation.
That evening the whole city was illuminated, and the streets
were so rull, till long after midnight, of crowds tumultuously
joyrul, that some cautious officcrs fearcd that the French
garrison of the Retiro might sally out to make mischief in
the confusion. Lafon·Bianiac, however, kept quiet-he was
already quailing ovcr two discoveries-the one that his watcr
supply was very short, the other that the inner cnceime of thc
works was so full of miscellaneous combustible stuff, shot in
at thc last momcnt, that nothing was morc probable than
a general conflagration if he were to be bombarded. It had
also begun to strike him that his outer line of defences was
very weak, and his second onc very constricted for the amount
of men and material that he had in charge. The larger enceinte,
indeed, only consisted, for the greater part of its extent, of the
loopholed wall of the Retiro Park, with some jlcchcs plae(:d in
good flanking positions. On the side facing the Prndo were
buildings-the Retiro Palace and the Museum, which had been
barricaded and made tenable: they formed the strongest section
01 the exterior line. The inner clluillU was a. more lormidable
affair-with ten bastioned fronts on the scale of a powerful
field-work. The stur-tort, which constituted the fmal refuge
for the garrison, WIlS built around the solid building that
had once been the royal porcelain manufactory (where the
celebrated Bucll Retiro chinu was made): it had a ditch
twelve feet deep and twenty-four wide, and was formida.bly
palisaded.
Wellington reconnoitred the works on the 18th, and directed
. tJlat the outer line should be stormed that night. Three
hundred men of the 3rd Division were told off to break into the
Park wall on the north, near the Bull-Ring: 300 more from
the 51st and 68th regiments of the 7th Division were to attack
the south-west angle oC the enceinte, which was formed by the
wall of the Botanical Garden. Both assaults were completely
To Lord Bathurst, August 13. Dispalclltli, ix. 3511.
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successful-the walls were so mmsy that they were easily hewn
through with picks, or beaten in with beams used as battering-
rams, and the 68th found and broke open a postern. The
resistance was very weak-only ten of the storming-parties
were killed or wounded, and the enemy retired almost at onec
into his second line, abandoning thc Palace and other fortiflCd
buildings.
Lafon-Blaniae was now in n dcplorable position, for there
was only one well of moderate capacity within the second enceinte
to serve the whole garrison. He had lost those in the Palace
at the foot of the hill: and the old porcelain manufactory,
within the star-fort, had been wont to be supplied by a little
aqueduct, which had of course been cut by the British. It was
clear that a laek of water would soon be a serious problem: but
a superfluity of Hre was a still more probable onc-the garrison
was crowded up among buildings nnd stores, and the large
factory inside the star-fort was specially dangerous-a very
few shells would suffice to kindle it and to smoke out or smother
its defenders.
On the morning of thc 14th Lafon-Blaniac scnt out a flag
of truce, ostensibly to deliver a threat to fire upon the town
if he were pressed, really to see if he could get tolerable lcrms,
before the British hud begun to butter him, for he could note
preparations to bring up hcavy guns being madc. Wellington
saw the padementaire in person, and a conclusion was arrived
at in a very lew minutcs. Tolerable conditions of surrender
werc granted-the garrison to march out with honours of war,
the officers to keep their swords, horses, and baggage, the men
their knapsacks unsearehed. AIl arms and stores were to be
handed over intact. At lour o'clock the Frcnch marehcd out,
, most o[ thcm drunk, and affecting a grcat ragc against thc
governor for surrendering so tamely.' Yet it is clear that he
could not have held out for morc than a day or two, with great
loss 01 lire and no strategical profIt, since there was absolutely
no chance 01 the place being relieved. The prisoners were sent
off under escort to Lisbon. On thc way they were joined by
the garrison of Guadalajara, which had surrcndered with equal
facility to the Empecinado--this was a force of JurOtnen1o.do$
and foreigners-regimcnts Royal-Etranger and Royal-Irlandais,
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about 900 strong, under a General de l'rieux, of the Spanish not
the French service. They feared for their necks if they resisted
the guerrilleros, and made practically no resistance.
The stores in the ltetiro proved most useful-nearly every
regiment ut Madrid was supplied with new shoes from them:
the stock oC blue French regimental eoats was issued to the
artillery and light dragoons, to be eut up into jaekets; Joseph's
Juramentado uniforms served to reclothe Carlos de Espana's and
Jllliun Sanchez's men. The most llne....pccted fIDd in the fort
was the eagles of the 51st Line and 12th Leger, which had
somehow got into the lletiro, though the bulk of those corps
were with Soult's army, and only detachments of them were
at l\Iadrid. They were scnt to the Prince Regent, and now
hang in the chapel of Chelsea Hospital 1. The garrison was
Cound to consist of 4 chefs de bataillan, 22 captains, 42 other
officers, and 1,982 men-the latter including some 200 non·
military employcs. In addition, 6 officers and 429 rank andfile had been surrendered in the hospital, which was outside the
Retiro, beCore the attack on the place began 2.
Here we must leave Wellington for a space, triumphant in
the Spanish capital, and much worried by the polite and
eICusive attentions of the authorities and iqhabitants, who
lavished on him and his offieers banquets, balls, and bull-fights
Ior many days, in spite of the penury whieh had been prevailing
for years in the half-ruined city. Never was an army better
treated-wine could be had for the asking, and at last the
men had to be confined to their quarters for many hours a
day, lest they should be killed by kindness. The Constitu-
tion was proclaimed in state, a patriotic municipality elected,
and CarIos de Espaiia was made governor. He signalized
his appointment by arresting a good many Afrancesados and
garotting with much ceremonial the priest Diego Lopcz, who
had been one of King Joseph's most noted spies.s
, The sccond eagle is in error described in Wellington's dispatch as that
or the 18th-which was in Russia at the timc.
t For thc 'siege' of the Retiro sec (besides the official sources) Burgoyne's
Diary, i. pp. 208-9, and the narratives of Green of the 68th and Wheelcr of
the 51st. For tlle use of the Freneh uniforms sec the Dicl.:$(m, Paprrs,
cd. Major Leslie, ii, pp. 738-9.
• Grattan's With ti,e Connaught Rangers, p. 275,
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Non:.-For the gnm!lOlI of the Rttiro ( CUll lind no regular dttllil•.
Wellington gives only tota.1s of I-lie surrendered force. Hut 11 paper or Jour:
Jlln'l! (ut Paris), tllOUgh dated S(' fur back 118 July 17th, speaks or UIC Madrid
garrison 1UI colltaining 230 men of UIC 3/12th U,;,'cr, 250 or the 3/45tll, lmd.
11 whole baJaiUon dl marche more of &Mdt'l> amlY, 75() strong, together
witb 200 hommes "-'ftt, and a eonsidcl1Iblc lIumber or !fu;mOllnted fl8\-a.lry.
I rlUspe<-t that these ronnel the Retiro garrison in August 1UI weU III in
.July. The other troops noted lIa left at Madrid on July 18th_ battalion
or Nnssau, the d~pOts or tile Ho)'ul Guard, 28th and 15th, nod three Spnnish
bnllnlions, were cutalnly Ilol in the surrender, and Imd lIlarched otr 011
Augu~t 10th with the ]Gng. Dut 11 good mnn)' SCOres of the 50th, belonging
to ManIlOlll" army. were llmong tbc prillOlleN. I suspect that these "·ere
tile garrison o( Avill1, which retired OD Madrid on getting the ne...·• of
tile battle of Salamanca.
SECTION XXXUI: CHAPTER X
AFFAffiS IN THE SOUTH. JUNF..-AUGUST 1812.
SOULT, HILL, AND DALLASTEROS
Two months elapsed between "'ellington's passage of the
Agucua on his ofIclIsivc march into the kingdom or Lean, and
his triumphal entry into Madrid. During this critical time
there had been constant alarms and excursions in Andalusia
and EJ:itrcmaclul'a, but !lothing decisive had occurred. This
was all that Wellington wanted: if employment were found
for the l~rcnch Army of the South, so that it got no chance of
intcrCcring with the campaign on the Doul'o, he" was perfectly
satisfted, and asked for nothing morc.
It will be remembered that his instructions to Hill, before he
started on the march to Salamanca, were that Soult must be
diverted us far as possible from sending troops northward.
The main scheme was that BaUasteros and Hill should, if
possible, combine their operations so as to bring pressure
upon the ellemy alternately I. The Cadiz Regency had readily
agreed to stir up the Spanish general to activity: if he would
demonstrate once more (as ill April) against Seville, so as to
attract Soult's attention, and cause him to concentrate, Hill
should press in upon Drouet and the French troops in Estrema--
dura, so as to force the Marshal to draw off from the Spaniard.
Similarly, if Soult should coneentmte ugainst Hill, Ballnsteros
was to strike again at Seville,or the rear of the Cadiz Lines, which
would infallibly bring the Marshal southward again in haste 2.
I Wellington to Henry Wellesley at Cadiz, Dispatches, ix. p. 109, snme
to same of June I, Disl'alehu, ix. p. 197, WellingtOI\ to Hill (June Oth),
Dispafches, ix. p. 215, and more especially the last paragraph of Wellington
to Henry Weltesley of June 7Ul, Dispatches, ix. p. 219, rltld same to snme
of June lOth, Di$paleMs, be p. 224.
I To quote 'Wellington's own rather heavy but quite explicit phrases:
, I am certain that the enemy will move intn Estrem,,(Iurn. urnn Hill, fill
soon [l.$ it is known that I have moved: and] hore everything will then
bcdone hy Rallf16teros, and the Army of Murein, and lhe troops in Cnd,"" to
divert the enemy lrom their inlel1t.ions up-on Hill.' And, on the other
Imnd, in n letter differing in dale from thllt nrst cited by three dllys, 'The
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When Wellington crossed thc Agueda (Junc 13] Hill had
his corps collected in ecntral Estremadura-hcad-quarters at
Almendralejo, the troops cllntoned about Ribera, VilIll.tranca,
Fuente del Maestre, and Los Santos, with Penne Villemur's
Spanish horse in front at Zafra. Hill had in hand his old toree-
the 2nd Division u.nd Hamilton's Portuguese, with two (instead
of the usual one) British and one Portuguese cavalry brigades.
He could also call up, it needed, the three strong Portuguese
infantry regiments (5th, 17th, 22nd) which were holding
Badajoz till a sufficient native garrison should be provided for
it. At present only a few hWldred Spaniards [Tiradores de
Doyle] had appeared. Far away, to the north of the Guadiana,
observing the French posts on the Tagus, there was a detached
Portuguese cavalry regiment at Plasencia. This outlying unit
was also put under Hill's charge: its object was to givc
carly notiee of any possible stir by the French, in thc direc-
tion ot Almaraz or the recently restored bridge of Aleantara.
Morillo's infantry division of Castaiios's army was lying on
thc right of Hill, in south·wcstc1'll Eslremadura: Wellington
suggested that the Spanish general might be willing to throw
it into Uadajoz, and so liberate the Portuguese regiments
lying therc, if Soult should advance before the regular garrison
intended tor the great fortress should arrive from Cadiz. The
whole forec watching Soult amounted to nearly 19,000 men,
not including the Spaniards. Of this total about 7,500 sabres and
bayonets were British-something oyer 11,000 were Portuguese.
In addition, MOl'illo and Penne Yillcmur had not quite 4,000
Spanish horse and Coot. Supposing that a minimum garrison
were thrown into Badajoz-Morillo's inCantry for choice-Hill
could dispose of 18,000 Anglo-Portuf:,tUcse for field-operations,
not including the Portuguese cavalry by the 'l'ngus, who had
the separate duty of watching the Army of the Centre.
The French in Estremadura still consisted of the old con-
Spanish government have desired that in CllSC of a movement by Marshal
Soult on General Rallastcros, General Hill should make a movement to
divert his attention from llallasteros. 1 have directed this movement,
in the notion tbat the Conde de VilIemur [the Spanish commander in
Estremaduro] will Mw co-operate in it.' The see·saw of alternate distrac-
tions is clearly laid down-but Dallasteros (as usual) proved a difficult
factor to manage.
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tingent which D'Erlon had been administering since the year
began, viz. his own and Darieau's inIantry divisions, with
Lallcmand's and Perreymond's cavalry-altogether not more
than 12,000 men, for several of the infantry regiments had
lost a battalion apiece when Badajoz fell. Since his excursion
to DOll Bcnito and Medellin at the time of IIill's raid on Almaraz,
D'Erlon had drawn back, abandoning all southern and most of
eastern Estremadura to the allies. He himself was lying at
Azuaga and Fuentc Ovcjuna, 011 the slopes oC the Sierra Morcna,
while Daricau wns more to the north, about Zalamea, rather too
far off to give his chief prompt support. Daricau's detachmcnt
in this direction seems to have been caused by a desire to make
communication with the Army oC Portugal easy, if the latter
should ever come southward again from the '1'agus, and push to
Truxillo as in 1811. It was clear that unless Soult should
rcinCorcc his troops to the north of the mowltalns, Hill nt.-cd
fear nothing: indeed he had a distinct superiority over D'Erlon.
Early in June, however, there was no danger that any troops
from Seville would come northward, for Bullusteros's diversion
had taken pluce somewhat earlier than 'Wellington had wished,
and the disposable reserve of the Army of Andalusia was far
away in the extreme southern point of the province. Alter
his succcss at Alhaurin in April, and his subsequcnt pursuit
by Soult's flying columns, llallasteros had taken refuge-as
was his wont 'when hard pressed-under the guns of Gibraltar.
The French retired when they had consumed their provisions,
and fell back to their usual stations at Malaga and Ronda, and
along the lille of the Guadalete. When they were gone, the
Spanish general emerged in May, and recommenced his wonted
incursions, ranging over the whole of the mountains of the
South. Having received the dispatches of the Regency, which
directed him to execute El. divcrsion in favour of thc allied army
in Estremadura, he obeyed with unexpected celerity, and took in
hand a very bold enterprise. General Canronx, with the column
whose task it was to cover thc ren.r of the Cadiz Lines, was
lying at Bornos, behind the Guadalcte, in a slightly entrenched
camp. He had with him about 4,500 men 1. Ballasteros
• 9th Uger, 06th Ligne, a battalion ot the 16th Uger, and the 5th
Chllsscun.
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resolved to attempt to surprise him, on the morning of
June L Having got together all his. disposable troops, 8,500
infantry and a few squadrons of horse \ he made a Carced
march, and, favoured by a heavy mist at dawn, fell upon the
enemy's cantonments and surprised them. He won a con-
siderable success at first: but the French rallied, and after a hard
fight broke his line by a general charge, and drove him back
across the Cuadaletc. Conroux was too exhausted to pursue,
and Bollastcros remained in position, apparently meditating
a second attack, when on seeing some cavalry detachments
coming up to join the enemy, he sullenly retired. He had lost
1,500 men and 4 guns, the :French over 400 2. The first lIote
of alarm from Domos had caused Soult to send what rcscr\'cs
he could collect from the Cadiz Lines and Sevillc-six battalions
and two cavalry rcgiments, and sincc IJallasteros had been
beaten, but not routed, he thought it neccssary to givc prompt
attention to him. Thereupon the Spuniard retreated first to
Ubriquc, and whcn threatened in that position, to his old refuge
in the lines of San Uoque before Gibraltar.
Soult would havc liked to make an end of him, and would
also have becn glad to direct u. new attaek upon Tarifa, which
served as a seeond base to the ro\'ing Spanish corps; he
mentions his wish to capture it in more than onc of his dispatches
of this summer. But his attention was drawn away from
Ballastcros and thc South by the prompt advance or Hill, who
(as had been settled) pressed in upon Drouct at the right
moment. On the 7th June he moved forward his head-quarters
from Almendralejo to }~ucntc del l\Iaestre, and two days later
to Zafra. On thc 11th, Pellne V.ilIemur's cavalry pushed out
from Llcrenn towards Azuaga, while Slnde's brigade, advancing
parallel with the Spanish general, pressed forward tram Llern
on l\Iaguilla, a village some I1fteen miles in front of Drouet's
hend-quarters at Fuente Ovejuna. This rc<;onnaiSSllllee in
force brought on the most unlucky combat tha.t was ever fought
1 Figures in La~ Ejcrcilo~ e.'}l(l1wles, 1). 128•
• P(l/jsihly llIore--the elOsllulty list of officel'1l in J\lurtinien's lldmiruhle
tahles is very henvy-Il officers hit in the \llh Leger, la ill the \lOth Ligne,
a in the lUll, LCger, r. in the 15th Ch'\AAClln; U chevul. Thirty oll1cers hit
mighl very probably (but not certainly) mean 000 casualties in nil.
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by the British cavalry during thc Peninsulnr War, the skirmish
of Maguilla.
Sladc, an officer whose want of capacity wc havc before had
occasion to notice 1, after some hours of march began to get
in touch with Freneh dragoon vcdettes, and presently, after
driving them in, found himself facing Lallemand's brigade.
Their forces were nearly equal-eaeh ha\'ing two regiments,
Slade the 1st Hoyals and 3rd Dragoon Cunrds, Lullemand the
17th and 27th Dmgoons-they had about 700 sabres a side:
if anything Slade was a little the stronger. 'fhe French general
showed considerable caution and retired for some distance, till
he had nearly reachcd l\Iaguilla, wherc he turned to fight.
Slade at once charged him, with the Royals in front line and
the aro Dragoon Guards supporting. The first shock was corn·
plctcly successful, the Frcnch linc being broken, and more than
100 men being taken. But Slade then followed the routed
squadrons with headlong recklessness, 'each regiment,' as he
wrote in his very foolish report of the proceedings, ' vying with
the other whieh should most distinguish itself.' The pursuit was
as reckless as that of the 13th Light Dragoons at Campo Mayor
in the preceding year, and resolved itself illto a disorderly
gallop of several milcs. After the French had passed a dcmc
beyond Ml1guilla a sudden ery wns heard, ' Look to your right'
-a fresh squadron whieh Lallemand had left in reserve was
seen bearing down on the flank of the disordered mass. Charged
diagonally by a small force, but onc in good order, the British
dragoons gave way. Lallem3.nd's main body turned upon
th~m, and 'the whole brigade in the greatest disorder, und
regardless of all the exertions and appeals of their general and
their regimental officers, continued their disgraceful flight till
victors and fugitives, equally overcome and exhausted by the
overpowering heat and the clouds of thick dust, eamc to
a standstill near Valencia. de las 'forres, some four miles from
Uaguilla, where at last Slade was able to collect Iris regiments,
and to retire to thc woods Ocyond Llera t.,
In this discreditable affair Slade lost 22 killed, 26 wounded,
and no less than 2 officers and 116 men taken prisoners-most
, ~e '\IO\. iv. pp. 181 and -\.l11.
• St.>(: Aillslie's fljsrorlJ (If tile 181 Royals, p. 133.
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of the latter wounded-a total casualty list of 166. Lallemand
acknowledges in his report a loss of 51 officers and men I. The
defeated general irritated Wellington by a vcry disingenuous
rcport, in which he merely wrote that' I am sorry to say our loss
was severe, as the enemy brought up a support, and my troops
being too cflgcr in }JUrsuit, we were obliged to relinquish a good
number of prisoners that we had taken, and to fall back on
Llera.' Hc then added, in the most inappropriate phrases,
, nothing could exceed the gallantry displayed by both officers
and men on this occasion, in which Colonels enleralt and
Clinton, commanding the two regiments, distinguished them-
selves, as well as all the other officers present 2.'
1\Telliugton's scathing comment, in a letter to Hill, was:
• I havc never bccn more annoyed than by Sladc's alfair, and
I entirely concur with you in the necessity or inquiring into it.
It is occasioned entirely by the triek our officers of cavalry
have acquired, of galloping at everything-and then galloping
back as fast as they galloped on the enemy. They never consider
their situation, never think of manccuvring before an enemy-
so little that onc would think they cannot manccuvre except
on Wimbledon Common: and when they use their arm as it
ought to be used, viz. offensively, they never keep nor provide
(or a rc~erve.... The Royals and Brd Dragoon Guards were
the best cavalry regiments in lLi~ country, and it annoys me
particularly that the misfortune has happened to them. I do
not wonder at the French boasting of it: it is the greatest blow
they have struck 3.' It is curious to find that Slade retained
command of his brigade till May 1818. Onc would have
expected to find him relegated to Great Britain at a mueh
earlier date. But Wellington was not even yet in full control
of the removal or promotion or his senior officers. Other
generals with whom he was equally discontented, such as
Erskine and Long, were also left upon his hands after he had
set a black mark against their names.
I Including onc officer killed "nd rou~ wounded.
I SCe Slade's report ill Dispatches, ix. pp. 242-3. 'l'omkinson (p. 174)
says that Slade's rcport to Cotton, commanding the cavalry, was' the
best I ever saw. Hc made mention 01 bis son haYing stained his lTUliden
sword! '
• Wellington to Ilill, Dispatches, ix. p. 238.
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l'he combat of J\faguilla, however unsatisfactory in itself,
made no difference to the general strategy of the campaign.
Drouet, having drawn back on Hill's advance, sent messages
to Soult, to the effect that unless he were strongly reinforced
he mllst retire from the Sierra l\Iorena, and cover the roads to
Cordova on the Alldalusian side of the mountains. He reported
that he had only 6,000 men in hand, and that Hill was coming
against him with 30,000, including the Spaniards. Both these
figures were fantastic-for reasons best known to himself
D'Erlon did not include Darienu's division in his own total,
while he credited Hill with 15,000 men in the 2nd British division
alone [which was really 8,000 strong, including its Portuguese
brigade], and reported with circumstantial detail that the 7th
Division had come down from l'ortalegre and joined the 2nd 1.
Soult sent on D'Erlon'sdispatch to Madrid, with the comment
that Hill's advance showed that the main intention of Welling-
ton was certainly to attack Andalusia, and not to fall upon
?lIarmont. But that he did not consider such an attack very
imminent is sufficiently shown by the fact that he detached
to Drouet's aid only one division of infantry, that of Barrois-
whieh eomposcd his ccntral rcserve-and one of cavalry, that
of Pierre Soult, or a totul of 6,000 infantry and 2,200 cavalry:
such a reinforcement would havc been futile if he had really
believed that Wellington was marching against Seville. His
real view may be gathered [rom his estimate of Hill's force at
15,000 Anglo-Portuguese and 5,000 Spaniards-a total very
remote from the alarmist rcports of Drouet, and not far from
the truth. The reinforccment sent under Barrois would givc
the Estremnduran detachment a practical equality in numbers
with Hill, and a great superiority in quality. The orders sent
to Drouct were that he was to advance against Hill, to strive
to get him to an engagement, a.t any rate to 'contain' him, so
that he should not detach troops north of the Guadiana to join
Wellington or to demonstrate against Madrid. If things went
well, Drouet was to invest Dadajoz, and to occupy Merida, from
whence hc would try to get into communication via Truxillo
with the troops of the Army o( the Centre. The final paragraph
, Lctten; or D'Erloll lo Jourdull on June Oth,nnd or Soult to King Joscllh
Juuc 12, copies from the Paris ILrclLives---lcnl me by Mr. Fortescue.
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of his directions stated that Drouet's main object must be to
make such a formidable diversion that Wellington would have
to reinforce Hill. • Whcn the Army of Portugal finds that it has
less of the English army in front of it, we may perhaps persuade
it [i.c. Marmont] that the enemy's plan is certainly to invade
the provinces 01 the south of Spain bclore he acts directly
against the North: then, no doubt, changed dispositions will
. be made.' Unfortunately for the strategical reputation of
Soult, Wellington crossed the Agueda with seven of his eight
divisions to attack Marmont, ~n the vcry day after this
interesting dispatch was writtell.
D'Erlon had been promised that Bnrrois should march to
his aid on the 14th, but it was not till the 16th that the column
from Seville started to join him, and then it marched not by the
route of Constantina and Guadale3nal, asD'Erlon had requested,
but by the high-road from Andalusia to Badajoz, via l\Ionasterio.
If Hill had been pressing the troops in front of him with vigour,
the French would have been in an awkward position, since they
were on separate roads, and might have been driven apart,
and kcpt from junction by a decisive mO\'ement from Llerena,
where Hill's cavalry and advanecd guard Jay. But the British
genernl had orders to attract the attention of Soult and to
, contain' as many of the enemy as possible, rather than to
risk anything. Hc resolved, when he heard oC the approach of
Barrois, to retirc to thc heights of Albucra, which Wellington
had pointed out to him as the most suitable position for standing
at bay, if he were pressed hard. AccOl'dingly hc drew back by
slow stages from Zafra towards Badajoz, covering his rear by
his cavalry, which suflered Iittlc molestation. Burrois joined
DrotIct at Bienvenida near Zafra on the 19th, und their united
force, since Daricau had come in to join them from the direction
of Zala'!1ca, with the greater part of his division, must have
amolUlted to over 18,000 men, though Drouet in a report to
King Joseph states it at a decidedly lower figure 1, They
, In this report (UIC copy of whieh 1 owe to f1lr, F'orwscue's kindnC!lS)
Drouet says that Soult hnd told him to e"pcd reinforcements to the total
of some 1;',,000 men, bnt thKt BIIITois brought him only 3,!SOO infantry and
1,500 horse, Ilnd Daricall 4,!SOO infantry lInd 1,000 horse, so t;hat hill
reinforcements were only 10,500 men instelld of 15,000. Drouet stated his
own force, horse and foot (his own division and Lallemand's cavlllry) ill
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advanced cautiously as far as Villafranca and Fuente del
Macstre, whieh their infantry occupied on June 21, while their
numerous cavalry lay a little way in front, at Villalba, AzcuehaI,
and Almendralejo. On the same day Hill hll.d taken up the
Albuera position, on which several poiitts had been entrenched.
As Hill had just called out the three garrison regiments of
Portuguese from Dadajoz, he had now between 18,000 and
10,000 of his own army in position, besides VilIemur's Spanish
cavalry. This last, together with Long's and Slade.'s squadrons,
were thrown out in front of the Albuera river, with their
vcdcttes in Santa Murtn, AImendral, and Corte de Pelens, only
a mile or two from the French advanced posts. They were
directed not to give way till they were sevcrely pressed, as
Hill wished to avoid a~ all costs the kind of surprise that hnd
befallen Beresford in 1811, when Long had retired so prceipi-
tately before the French horse that he could give no account
of their strength, Ilor of the position of Soult's infantry. But
the expected advance of the enemy hung fire-from the 21st
onwards Hill was waiting to be attacked, and sending almost
daily accounts of the situation to Wellington: but the main
body of the French moved no farther forward. This was 0.11 the
more surprising to the English general because he had inter-
cepted a letter written on May 31 from King Joseph to Drouct,
in whieh thc latter was directed to' passer sur le COrps iJ.lIill \'
and then to come up to the Tagus to join the Army of the Centre.
Not knowing how cntirely Soult and D'Erlon were ignoring all
orders from Madrid, both WelJjngton and his trusty lieutenant
thought that such instructions must almost certainly bring
about an action. The former wrote to the latter on Junc 28th,
after receiving several statements of the situation: • if you
should find that Drouet separates his troops, or if he pretends
a preceding letter or June Olll nt 6,000 or I'll arms, so tlmt the OOllcentrn.tiOIl
would only give 16,000 men. I fancy tllllt he is delibemtely understating
Bnrrois, for thlltgeneml had 7,000 men in March, and 5,000 still in October
at the end of along and fl.tiguing cnmfluign, find Pierre Solllt too. Drouet's
object in giving t.hese figures to Joseph WIlS to prove thnt he WIIS so weak
that he could make no detllcllmcnt towards the 'J~lgUS, as tile King hnd
directed him t.o do. 'Vas it for the llll.IllC Jlurpooe that he alwnys over-sluted
Hill's army? Or did he renlly loelieve thut the laUer had SO/lOO men
nrranged opposite him, us he repeutedly told Soult?
, cr. Wellington to Hill or July 11th. DispolcJu;8, ix. p. 280.
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to hold yOll In check with a smaller body of men than you
think )'ou can get the better of, fall upon him, but take care
to keep a vcry large proportion of your troops in reserve....
I should preler a partial affair to a general onc, but risk a general
aCCulr-keeping always a large body ol reserve, particularly of
cavalry-rather than allow Dronet to remain in Estrcmadura
and keep you in check.' But the enemy neither came on for
a general action, nor scattered his troops so widely as to induce
Hill to risk an attack on any point of his line. He remained
with his infantry massed about Villafranca and Fuente del
\
r.facstrc, and only demonstrated with his cavalry.
The cause of this inactivity on Drouct's part was partly,
perhaps, his over·cstimate of Hill's strength, but much more
Soult's unwillingness to obey the orders sent him from Madrid.
He was determined not to detach a third part of his army to the
'l'agus, to join the Army of the Centre. He was by this time
fully embarked on his long course of insubordinate action,
with which we have already dealt when writing of the King's
desires and their frustration 1. On the 26th May Joseph had
sent him the dispatch whieh directed that D'Erlon must come
up northward, if ·Wellington's main attack turned out to be
directed against :Marmont and the Army of Portugal: < his
corps is the pivot on whieh everything turns: he is the counter·
poise which can be thrown into the balance in one scalc or the
other, according as our forces have to act on the onc side or
thc other 2.' Drollct himself had at the same time received that
order to the same eUcct, sent to him directly and not through
his immediate superior, which so much scandalized Soult's sense
of hierarchical subordination 3. On getting the Madrid dispatch
of May 26 upon June 8th, Soult had written to say that Welling-
ton's real objective was Andalusia and not the North, that
Marmont wus utterly misled if he supposed that he was to be
attacked by the main body of the allies, that Graham, with two
British di\'isions, was still at Portalcgre in support of Hill, and
that Drouet had therefore been forbidden to lose touch with
the Army of the South by passing towards the Tagus. If he
• See chapter i alrove, pp. 309-10.
• Joscph to Soult, May 26, intercepted dispatch in thc Scovcll ciphers.
• Sce alrovc, p. 332.
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departed, the whole fabric of French power in the South would
go to pieces, ' I should have to pack up and evacuate Andalusia
after the smallest check.' Drouct J:ihould • contain' Hill, but
could do 110 morc. In a supplemcntary dispatch of JWlC 12..
provoked by the receipt of Joseph's direct orders to Drouet,
Soult went further, definitely J:itating that the troops in Estrema-
dura should not go to the Tagus, • where they would be lost
to the Army of the South, but would never arrive in time to
help the Army of Portugal.' If Drouet passed the Tagus, Hill
would march on Seville, and on thc sixth day would capture
that insufficiently garrisoned capital, put himself in communi-
cation with Ballasteros, and raise the siege of Cadiz. 'I repeat
that the Army of the South callnot carry out its ordcrs, and
send Count D'ErlOll and 15,000 men to the valley of the Tagus,
without being compelled to evacuate Andalusia within the
lortnight. ... If your Majesty insists, rcmovc me from command,
I do not wish to be responsible for the inevitable disaster that
must follow 1.'
At the same time Drouct, much vexed at having personal
responsibility thrown upon his shoulders, by the King's direct
orders to him to march without consulting Soult, wrote to
Madrid that he was very weak, that Hill was in front of him
with a superior force, and that Barrois and Pierre Soult, who had
just joined him, were under strict orders not to go beyond the
Guadiana, so that if he himself marched towards the Tagus it
would be with tl very smull force. But he dare not make that
move: • I am absolutely obliged to stop where I am [Villa-
francaJ in presence of Hill, who still remains concentrated on
the Albuera position, which he has entrenched, with at least....
25,000 men.' Indeed an attaek by Hill was expected day by
day: • at the moment of writing thcrc is lively skirmishing
going on at the outposts, and news has come in that the whole
allied army is advancing 2.' Drouet, in short, was determined
to evade responsibility, and summed up the situation by the
conclusion that he was acting for the best in • containing' Hill
, SouU to JoseI'll, printed in JClSepll'lI Corrt!$JJO.,dellce. ix. pp. 31-3.
I Drouct to Joscph, ViIlafnmcn, July 8, Paris Archives [pupcr communi-
cated\o mc by Mr. Fortcscllc]. cr. Drouet to ,IOUrtlllll to much the sumc
I,'eneral effect, or June 18, in King Joscph's COl'1'eapOJlCleil«, ix. pp. 36-7.
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and his vcry largc detachment, who eould be of no usc to
Wellington in the campaign which the latter wns IlOW reported
to have bcgun against Marmont in the North. He could do
no more,
The deadlock in Cront oC the Albuera position lasted for many
days-from June 21st till July 2nd. This was a vcry trying
time for Hill's corps-thc weather was excessively hot, the
ground was hideous with the insufficiently buried corpscs oC the
battle of last year, Ilnd sickness was very prevalent in some regi-
ments. For the first day or two aCter the arrival of the l;'rcnch
at Villafranea and Almendl'alejo. un attaek was expeeted eaeh
morning, but nothing in particular happened. Drouet kept
quiet behind his cavalry screen, and did no more than send
foraging parties out on his flanks, which ravaged the country·
side as far as Merida and Feria. Over-valuing Hill's strength,
he dreaded to commit himself to an attack on a superior Corce,
covered by field-works and in a fine position. Nothing was
seen oC him for tCIl days, save that on the 26th he Celt the posts
of the allies at Carte de Pclens and Santa Marta, and retired
after a little cavalry skirmishing. On July 1, however, he
executed a more searching reconnaissance, with three brigades
of cavalry under the direction oC Pierre Soult, Vinot's in the
centre, Sparre's on the right, Lallemand's on the left. Barrois's
infantry division came up in support. Vinot drove in a Portu-
guese cavalry regiment of J. Campbell's brigade from Carte de
Pcleas 1, but retired when he found it supported by Long's
light dragoons in front of the Albuera position. Lallcmand
found Santa Murta held by Pellne Villemur's cavalry, and turned
them out of it with considerable loss, for the Spanish general
unwisely oUered battle, and was routed aCter a very short
contest, He retired into the wood oC Albuera, whose cdge was
occupied by Slade's heavy dragoons, supported by the pickets
oC Byng's infantry brigade. A troop .oC the Brd Dragoon Guards
made a gallant charge to cover the retreat of the Spaniards,
and suffered some loss in bringing thcm off. Lallemand at
dusk pressed Corward, and cut on a small party oC the Buns, who
would have been taken prisoners if a troop of the 2nd Hussars
, Espinchal says that the 2nd Hussars captured a Portuguese gUll l
I have DO corroboration for this,
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K.G.L. had not rescued them by a sudden counteNLttack.
Sparre's brigade on the right did no more than skirmish with
the allied outposts along the lower eourse of the river Albuera.
At night all the Frcnch cavalry retired, and D'Erlou wrote to
Soult that his feeonnaissanee had 'completely fulfilled its
object,' by making him certain that Hill had 25,000 foot,
3,000 horse, and a very strong force of artillery in position,
so that it would be insane to attack him 1.
On the next morning, July 2nd, Hill determined to makc
use of Wellington's permission to bring Oil an nction, if he
should judge that Drouet was not strong enough to face him,
The weakness of the French demonstration had convinced him
that the enemy was not ready to fight. Collecting the whole
of his army, he advanced from thc Albuera position towards
Santa :Marta, thus challenging Drouet to a fight. The enemy's
\·ooettes made no stand and retired when pushed. On reaching
Santa J\larta Hill halted for the night in battle order, and on
the morning of the 3rd resumed his movement, which was
directed to cutting oU Drouet !rom the great road to Seville.
While Ersklne with the light cavalry (Long, and J. Campbdl's
Portuguese) advanced down the high-road to Villalba, sup-
ported by one British and one Portuguese brigade of infantry,
Hill himself, with the rest of his army, executed a flank march
to Feria, and, having got behind the French left wing, turned
inward and moved toward Los Santos, The enemy's main
body, at Villafranca and Fuente del Maestre, were thus pre-
vented from using the high-road to Sc\,illc, und placed in
n position which compelled Drouet either to fight, or to retire
south-eastward towards Usagre and Llerena.
Next morning (July 4) Hill expceted a battle, for Barrois's
division and all Pierxe Soult's cavalry were found in a strong
position at l"uente del Maestre, and the rcst of the }rench were
close behind at Almendralejo. But whcn he continued his
movcmcnt toward the right, outJIallking Barrois instcad of
attaeking him, the encmy gu\'e WILy and retired, protected by
• t Details of all this in Soult's disjlatch to Joscph of July 10, in Espinehars
i\1t1IlQires (he served in Vinot's brigade), and ill the diaries of Swabcy of the
R.A. and of Stob.cnbcrg of the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., printed ill full in
Schwcrtreger's His/Dry of the K. G. I-tgioJl, ii. pp. 257-8.
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his cavalry, retreating on Ribera, llinojosa, and Usagre I. There
was lively skirmishing between the squadrons of the British
advanced guard, and those of the :French rearguard, but no
serious engagement.
The samc general plan of action continued on the 5th. Hill,
keeping his army well concentrated, moved in two columns on
Usagre and Dienvenida, the hulk of his cav.alry riding at the
head of his left·hand column and pressing in the French horse.
Drouct took up a position at Valencia de las Torres, where he
had found strong ground, and thought on the 6th that he would
risk a defensive action. But Hill, instead of marching in
upon him, continued his flanking movement towards Llerena.
Thereupon Drouet, finding that he would be cut off from
Andalusia if he remained in his chosen position, evacuated it
and fell back by Maguilla all Derlanga and Azuaga [July 7]. Tlte
two armies had thus got hack into exactly the same positions
in which they had lain on .Tune 19th, before Hill's retreat to
Albuera, The talc of their manccuvrcs bears a curious resem·
blanee to the contemporary movements of Wellington and
Marmont between Salamanca and Tordesillas. In each case
one combatant, when pressed, retired, and took up a strong
position (l\1armont at Tordesillas-Pollos-Toro, Hill at Albucra).
He then issued from it after some days, and by persistent
flank movements dislodged his opponent, and drove him back
to the same position from which he had started, so that the
situation came back to that which it had been three wceks
before. But here the parallel ended-Marmont pressed his
advantage too far, and gotentangled in the disastrous manreuvrc
oC July 22, which brought on the battle of Salamanca and his
own ruin. Hill, contented with what he had achieved, halted
at Llerena, and did not push matters to a decisive action, He
had done all that Wellington desired in keeping Sault's atten-
tion diverted from Marmont's peril, and in • containing'
a hostile force as great as his own. Moreover he had driven it
oU the road to Seville, and if it retreated on Andalusia it would
have to be ou Cordova, by the road of Constantinn, sinee no
other remained available.
But a new development of tlLis complicated and indecisive
1 All thi~ froln Hill's dispatch to WelllngtoD of July 4. from Los Santos,
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campaign began on July lOth. Drouet, thinking apparently
that Hill's farther advance might be stopped as effectively by
assuming a position on his flank as by direct opposition in
front, shifted his right wing (Daricau's division and Sparre's and
Vinot's cavalry) back to Zalamea and its neighbourhood, where
Darieau had lain in May and June. He himself resumed his
old head-quarters at Fuente Ovejuna. Now just at this time
Hill received an intercepted letter of King Joseph to Drouet,
dated June 21st, which repeated in angry terms the long·
ignored orders that the Estremaduran detachment of the Army
of the South was to mareh on Toledo without delay. • Vous
aurez sans doute re.yu les renforts que j'ai donne l'ordre au due
de Dalmatie de vous envoyer. Vous devez avoir quinze mille
bommcs. Agissez avec cc corps, et tout cc qui est sous le
commandement du general Daricau. RapprochC".6-vouS de
moi: passez le l'age, et mettez-vous en ctat d'agir suivant Ies
evenements; n'attendez aucun ordre 1.'
The capture of this dispatch coincided with the news that
Drouet had pushed Darieau and a large body of cavalry
towards Zalamea. Hill drew the natural deduction that the
French opposite him were at last about to obey the King's
orders, and to march to the TllgUS, via Zalamca, MedelIin, and
Truxillo. 'The intelligence that I have of the enemy's move-
ments' (he wrote to 'Wellington) 'indicates his intention of
carrying ,]oseph's instructions into execution.... I have
received information [false as it chanced] that Drouct was
yesterday at Zalamea, with his main body, having sent troops
by Berlangn and Azuaga. I shall move immediately in the
direction of Zalamea.' That is to say that if Drouct was going
oU northward towards the King, Hill wu..s prepared to carry
out the original instructions which Wellington had left him,
and if he could not stop the enemy, would move parallel to
him, so as to join his chief before Drouct could transfer himself
to the northern sphere of operations. His route would bc by
Badajoz or :P.ferida and the newly-restored bridge of Alcantara
on Ciudad Rodrigo, a much shorter one than that of his
, See Wellington to Hill of July 11 (Dispatches, ix. p. 280) and Hill to
Wellington of July 9. The te~:t of the order is in Joseph's COTTesponde'lct.
ix. p. 41,
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opponent. He bad just begun to mo\'e his left wing in the
direction of Merida, when he received a let~er from Wellington
exactly conforming to his own ideas. If Drouct is making for
the Tagus in full force, wrote Wellington, you must takc all the
cavalry cxcept one English regiment and Campbell's Portuguese,
along with llyng's and Howarcl's brigades of the 2nd Division,
and Hamilton's division, and send orders to have all prepara-
tions made at Aleantnra to lay down the bridge: your route
across thc mountains will be by the pass of Perales: you will
find elaborate instructions for the further movement at Ciudad
R~drigo~ If Drouct only takes n small force, marc allied
troops may be left in Estremadura j Zafra had better be their
hend-quarters. Hill would conduct the marching column as Car
as Perales, and then return to take charge of whatever is left in
the South to watch Soult I.
A few days latcr it becamc evident that no gencral move·
ment o[ thc French towards the Tagus was in progress. Dad-
eau's infantry and the attached cavalry settlcd down at and
about Zalamea, and pushed nothing but reconnaissances in the
direction of thc Guadiana-parties oC horse appeared about
Don Benito and MedeIlin, but no solid columns in support 2. Hill
therefore halted, with his head-quarters at Zafrn. IInd bis rear-
guard (which had but a moment before been i.lis advanced
guard) at LIcrenR: only u few o[ J. Cl.lmpbcll's Portuguese
squadrons moved to ]\Icrida, though some Spanish infantry
came up to the same direction 3. Things then remained very
quiet till July 24th, when Drouet at last appeared to be Oil the
move with some deflllite purpose. On that day Lallemaud's
dragoons appeared at Hinojosa, pressed in a Portuguese
cavalry 'regiment, and seemed inclined to push towards Hibcra,
but retired when Long's brigade came up against thcm: the
losses on both sides were trifling. Three days later (July 27)
a brigade of Daricau's infantry advanced to Medcllin and drove
ofC the observing foree of the Spanish inCllntry, while Vinot's
, Wellington to Hill, Rueda, July It.
I There is plent.y ot detail about these quite unimportant movements
in Espinchal, ii. W. 26-33.
• Not, however, the bulk of Morillo's division, which was at ltledina de
tu Torres ncar Z:lfra, as thc'geneml's corrCllpondence of that date shOWll
[Villa's !.iJI! 0/ Morii/o, ii. p. 2'H].
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cavalry executed it raid on :Menda, expelled the Portuguese
detachment there, and exacted a requisition of food from the
town. They then retired in haste; but Hill thought it well
for the future to strengthen his left, and moved up Byng's
British and A. Campbell's Portuguese infantry brigades to
Mcrida. But Drouet was only fcinting, and had no serious
intentions of drawing up to the Guadiana, or crossing that
river northward. His main purpose was simply the raising of
requisitions; for his detachments in the mountains of the
Serena were living on the edge of famine, and could only feed
themselves by keeping constantly on the move. It is curious
to find from the dispatches of the two opposing generals at this
time that both were fairly satisfied with themselves: each
thought that he was' containing' a somewhat superior force
of the enemy, and was doing his duty by keeping it from
interfering in the morc important theatre of war. Hill knew
that he was detaining Drouet, when he was much wanted at
Madrid: Dronet knew that he was preventing Hill fropl
joining Wellington on the Douro. But the real balance of
ndvantage was on the sidc of the allies: Hill, with only 8,000
British and 11,000 Portuguese was claiming the attention of
three veteran divisions of the infantry of thc Army of the
South, and of the major part of Soult's cavalry. The French in
Andalusia werc left so weak by thc absence of 18,000 men
beyond the Sierra Morena, that they could neither molest
Cadiz nor the Army of 'Mureia. Indeed, Ballasteros, though'
his forces wcre less than they had been at the timc of his defeat
at Barnos, was able to provide employment for all the troops
that Soult could spare for operations in the open ficld.
Six weeks after his disastcr of June 1st, that enterprising, if
irresponsiblc, gencral started out again from the lines of San
Roque with between 5,000 and 6,000 men. Kceping to moun-
tain roads and concealing his march, he surprised, on July 14,
the great harbour-city of Malaga, though he failed to capturc
its citadel, Gibulfaro, into which the wrecks of the garrison
escaped. Ballasteros got money, stores, and recruits from the
captured town, but knew that he dare not tarry there for long.
For Soult, naturally enraged at sueh !1 bold und successful
raid, turned troops toward him Trom all sides. Leval, the
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governor of Granada, marched against him with every spare
battalion that could be got together from the eastern side of
Andalusia, some 5,000 bayonets. Villatte, in command before
Cadi~, came from the other quarter with 6,000 men; they had
orders to cateh BnUasteros between them, to intercept his
retreat upon Gibraltar, and annihilate him.
In order to cutoff the Spaniard (rom his usual place of refuge,
VilIatte took a turn to the south, appeared ill sight of Gibraltar
on July 20, and then, keeping himsell between the British
fortress and Ballasteros, advanced northward to wait for him.
r.c ....al was to have driven him into VilIatte's arms, advancing
from Antequera and pressing the hunt southward. But the
raider, instead of retreating ill the expected direction, slipped
unseen across Villatte's front by Alora, and made off into the
plains of central Andalusia. On the 25th at dawn he appeared,
most unexpectedly, at Osuna and surprised the small Freneh
garrison there. The governor, Colonel Beauvais, cut his way
through the strects to a fortified convent, where he held out.
But Bnllasteros, satisfied with having captured a quantity of
stores, mules, and baggage, and a few prisoners, vanished.
Lcval was on his track, and he had to evade his pursuer by
a flank march, first to Grazalema and then to Ubrique. This
was bringing him dangerously near to VilIatte's position. But
that general had no accurate knowledge of what was going Oll
to the north, and having waited for ten days in the mountains
heyond Gibraltar for a prey that never appeared, found himself
starved out. On the 30th he started on his enforced return
towards the Cadiz Lines, and had reached Medina Sidonia when
nallasteros, who had quite outmarehed Leval, came down in
safety to Ximcna 011 August 1, and placed himself in touch
with Gibraltar once more. Thereupon Lcval, seeing that it was
no use to push the Spaniard (for about the tenth time) under
the guns of the British fortress, and finding his column utterly
worn out, went home to Granada 1.
Thus Ballasteros gave no small help to the allied cause by
distracting some 11,000 or 12,000 French troops for a long
fortnight, while Hill was detaining Drouet in Estremadura.
By the time that the hunt after the evasive Spaniard had
1 The best aCC<111nt of aU this is in Schcpelcr, pp. 661-3.
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come to an cnd, the battle of Salamanca had been fought, and
the aspect of arIairs in the Peninsula had been completely
changed. Even Soult, who had so long shut his eyes to the
obvious, had at last to acknowledge that a new situation
had arisen.
The news of Salamanca had rcachcd Hill on July 29th, and
caused a general expeetation that the French in Estremadura
would retreat at once, and that Soult would be retiring from
Andalusia also in a few days. No such results followed-the
intelligence was late in penetrating to the French camps; and
Soult, still hoping to induce King Joseph to join him,lingered for
man)' days in his old posture. On August 4 Hill wrote that the
, recent glorious event' appeared to have had very little effect
on his immediate opponent, who continued in a strong position
in his front. 'Therefore for the prescnt I shall rcmain whcre
] am, and watch for a favourable opportunity of acting 1.' Soult
at Seville had, as late as August 8, no official news of Marmont's
defeat, and only knew of it by Spanish rumours, which he-
of set purpose-discounted. 'Les relations qu'ils ont publiecs
exagerent sans doute les avantages: mais il parait que quelque
grand evenement s'est passe en Castille 2.' He continued to
urgc King Joscph to come to Scvillc, join him, and attack Hill
with sueh superior forces that 'Wellington would be forced to
fly to the aid of his subordinate. It was only on August 12th
that certain information regarding the battle of July 22nd
reached the head-quarters of the Duke of Dalmatia, in the form
of Joseph's Segovia dispatch of July 29th, containing the
orders for the complete evacuation of Andalusia, and the
mareh of the whole Army of the South upon Toledo. Even
then 50ult did not think it too late to make a final nppcal to
the King: 'the los~ of a battle by the Army of Portugal was
nothing marc than a great duel, which can be undone by
another similar duel. But the loss of Andalusia and t.he raising
of the siege of Cadiz would be events whose effeets would be
felt all round Europe and thc New World.... What does it
mattcr if the enemy is left in possession of the wholc space
between Burgos and the Sierra Morena, until the moment when
I Letter of August 4 in Sidncy's [.'fe of TfjU, ". 210.
• SOli It to Joseph, August 8, Paris Arehives (l(lnt me lly Mr. ForlRseue).
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great reinforcements come from France, and the Emperor has
been able to make his arrangements? Dut this sacrifice of
Andalusia once made, there is no way of remedying it. The
imperial armies in Spain will have to tCPass the Ebro-faminc
perhaps will dri vc them still farther \, &c.
On reflection, however, SOlut did not venture to disobey, and,
before his last appeal could possibly have reached the King's
hands, began to issue orders for evacuation. But so great was
his rage that he wrote an extraordinary letter to Clarkc, the
I'tfinister of 'Var at Paris, in which he made the preposterous
insinuation that Joscph was about to betray his brother the
Emperor, and to come to an agreement with the Cadiz Cortes.
The evidence which he cited for this strange charge was flimsy
in the extreme. 'I ha....e rend in the Cndiz newspapers the
statement that His Majesty's Ambassador in Russia has joined
the Russian army: that the King has opened intrigues with
the Insurrt.-ctional Government z. Sweden has made peace
with England, and the Hereditary Prince (Bernadotte) hos
begun to treat with the Regency at Cadiz 3•.•• I draw no
ded.uetion from all these facts, but I am all the more attcnti\'c
to them. I have thought it necessary to lay my fears bclorc
six: generals of my lLI'my, after having made them take an oath
not to reveal what I told them save to the Emperor himself,
or to some onc specially commissioned by him. nut it is my
duty to inform your Excellency that I have a fear that all the
bad arrangements made [by the King] and all the intrigues
that have been going on, have the object of forcing the imperial
armies to retreat to the Ebro, or farther, and then of represent-
ing this event us the" last possible resource" (an expression
used by the King himseU in a letter of .fuly 20), in the hope of
profiting by it to come to some compromise 4.'
This letter, us obscurely worded as it was malicious, wus not
, Soult to Joscph, Seville, August 12, ill Joscph's C()rnsl)(mdell~.
ix. pp. 67-8.
• There had been such intrigucs betwwn thc King and persons in Cadi"
(sec above, p. 140). but they had been opened by Napoleon's own advice,
in order to BOW seeds of dissension among the pntriots.
• The point of thi8 insinuation i8 that Bcrnadotte and Joseph were
brothers·in-Iaw, having married the two sisters Clary.
• l'rintcd in Joseph's Correspondenu, ix. pp. 08-70.
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sent to France by the usual channels, lest the King should get
wind of it, but consigned to the captain of a French privateer,
who was about to suil from Malaga to Marseilles. By an ill
chancc for Soult, the vessel was chased by a British ship, and
compelled to run for shelter into the hnrbour of Valencia.
There the King had recently arrived, on his retreat from
Madrid. The privateer-captain, who did not know what he was
currying, sent the lettcr in to thc royal head-quarters. Henee
came an explosion of wrath, and a series of recriminations with
which we shall have to deal in thcir proper place.
The evacuation of Andalusia commenced from the western
cnd, because the retreat oC the army was to be directed east-
wards. The evacuation of the Castle of Niebla on August 12th
was its first sign-the troops in the Condado had retired to
San Luear near Seville by the 15th. A little later the garrisons
in the extreme south, Ilt Ronda and Medina Sidonia, blew up
their fortifications and retired. These were small movements,
but the dismantling of theCadizLineswas a formidable business,
and took several days. Soult covered it by ordering a furious
bombardment of the city and thc Puntales fort from his
batteries across the bay; during each salvo of thc hcavy guns
onc or two of them were disabled, others being fired at an angle
against their muzzles, so as to split them. More were burst
by intentional over-loading, others had their trunnions knocked
off, but a good many were only spiked or thrown· into the water.
The a.mmunition remaining after two days of reckless bombard-
ment was blown up; the stores set on fire; the flotilla oC gun-
boats was sunk, but so carelessly that thirty of them were
afterwards raised with no difficulty and found still seaworthy.
This orgy of destruction continued for the whole of the 24th:
at night the sky WIiS red all round the bay, from Rota to
Chiclana, with burning huts and magazines, and the explosions
were frequent.
This was the moment when the large allied force in Cadiz
might wcll have made a general sortie, for the purpose of
cutting up the enemy while he was engrossed in the work of
destruction. \VeIlington had written a week before, to General
Cooke, then in command of the British contingent in the Isla
de Leon, to bid him fall upon the enemy when opportunity
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should offer, considering that the French troops in the Lines
were reduced to a minimum by the detachment of the division
that hud gone out to hunt BalIasteros. He suggested that the
Allies should cross the Santi Petri river and attack Chiclana,
taking care, however, not to be cut off from their rctreat.
Unfortunately this letter of August 16th came too late, for
Cooke (after conferring with the Spanish authorities) had
committed himself to another and a more circuitous expedition
to molest the French. General Cruz Murgeon, with a Spanish
division of 4,000 men (which had originally been intended lor
the reinlorcing of Ballnstcros) had landed at the port of HucIva,
in the Condado de Niebln., on August 11th. Cooke reinforced
him with the pick of the British contingent-six companies of
Guards, haU of the 2/87th 1, two companics of Rifles B, part of the
20th Portuguese, and the squadron of thc 2nd Hussars K.G.L.,
which was the only cavalr)' at his disposition. These, placed
under the charge of Colonel Skerrett, made up 1,600 men in al1 3 ;
they landed at HncIva, joined Cruz lIIurgcon, and advanced
with him against Seville. On the 24th they discovered the
French outposts 3t San Luear la Mayor, and drove them out
of that town. But they hesitated over the idea of attacking
Seville, where French troops werc collecting from all quarters,
though the divisions of Conroux and Vil1tl.tte from the Cadiz
Lines had not yet eomc up.
On thc night of August 26th-27th, however, Soult, apprised
01 the near approach oC his column from the Lincs, evacuated
Seville with the main part of his force, escorting a vast horde
of Spanish refugees, who feared to remain behind to face their
countrymcn, and a long train of wagons and carriages loaded
with the accumulated spoils of three years of tyrannous misrule
in Andalusia. He left a rearguard to occupy the outworks of
the city, which was to be picked up and taken on by Villatte
whcn he should appear on the next day.
On hearing of the departure of the Marshal, Crnz Murgeon
1 l'llinus four companies left at Tarifa .
• Two from the 2/1l5th, those of Cn(lollx nod .Tenkins•
• SkerretL in hill dispntch (Wellington, Sup/J/emetllary DblJJali:!les, xiv.
p. 108), spenkll of nttaeking San Luc:.r with 800 men: but thill was not
his whole force.
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and Skerrett resolved to attack Seville, knowing that the troops
left behind to guard it were insufficient to man effectively all
its long line of defences. Being on the western side of the
Guadalquivir, thcy had first to. win the large transpontinc
suburb of Triana, the home of potters and gipsies, tlll'ough
which alone access could be got to the city. It was attacked
at several points and stormed, but the enemy then held to the
grcat bridge over the river linking Triana and Seville, and made
n long resistnnee there. The bridge had been barricaded, part
of its planks had been pulled up, and artillery had been trained
on it from the farther side. Notwithstanding these obstacles
the Spaniards attacked it; the well-known Irish adventurer
Colonel Downie charged three times at the hcad of his Estremu-
duran Legion. Repelled twice by the heavy fire, he reached
the barricade at the third assault, and leaped his horse over
the cut which the French had made in front o[ it, but found
himself alone within the work, and was bayoneted and made
prisoner 1. But soon after the allies brought up guns through
the streets of Triana, and so battered the barricade that the
French were compelled to evacuate it. Skerrctt sent the Guards
across: they passed by the beams whieh had bccnle£t unbroken,
and many Spanish troops [ollowed. After a running fight in
the streets of the city, in which some of the inhabitants took
part, the garrison was completely driven out, and fled by the
Carmona Gate towards Alcala. The victors captured two field·
pieces, about 200 prisoners 2, and a rich convoy of plunder,
whieh was to have been escorted by the French rcurguard 3.
Villatte's column, approaching the city in its march from the
I Toreno (ui. p. 151) and other historiaIUI tell the tale how Downie,
finding that none of his men had followed him, though they had reaehed
. the other side of tIle cut, fiung back to them !lis sword, which was the
rapier of the Conquistador Pi:t~lrro, presented to him by 0. descendallt of
tllat great advellturer. It was caught und saved, and lIe recovered it, for
he was left behind by the French II few miles from Seville, beCllusc of his
woundli. They stripped him and Idt him by the wayside, where he was
found and Cllred for by the pursuing Spanian1ll•
• The defence of Seville seems mainly to have been by the }'rench
63rd Ligne, which lost eight officers in the fight •
• For a curious story of the contents of a captured Cllrriagc, which turned
out to be stuffed with silver plate, sce the Memoirs of Hade;)' of the 47th,
11. p. 24.
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Cadiz Lines and Xcres, found it in the hands of the allies,
so swerved off eastward and followed Soult, picking up the
expelled garrison by the way.
CnlZ Murgeon and Skerrett did not pursue, not thinking
themselves strong enough to meddle with the French, but only
sent their cavalry forward to wateh their retreat. They stayed
in Seville, where the Cadiz Constitution was proclaimed with
great enthusiasm on August 20th. On the other flnnk of the
French Ballasteros was trying at this moment to molest the
eolUlml formed by the garrisons retiring from Ronda, Malaga,
and Antequern on Gl·anada. He followed thcm for ten days,
and fought their rearguard at Antequera on September 8rd,
and at Loja on September 5th; but though he captured many
stragglers and some baggage, as also three guns, he was unable
to do any material harm to the main body, which Gencral
Semele brought in to join Leval at Granada on September 6th.
Soult, meanwhilc, with the troops from Cadiz and Scville,
had to halt at Cordova for some days, to allow of the junction of
Drouct from EstremaduCll; for that general had to collect his
troops and to bring down detachments from places so far away
as DOll Benito and Zalamea, before he could concentrate and
march across the Sierra Morena to join hi!> chief. Drouet had
kept up a bold countenance in front ot Hill to the lost moment,
even after he had received orders from Soult to prepare for
a sudden retreat. Indeed onc of the most lively of the many
cll.valry arfairs fought in Eslrcmadura during the summer of
1812 took place in August. On the 1st ot that month, when
Hill was already expecting that the news of Salamanca would
have driven his opponcnt away, Pierre Soult tried a raid upon
Ribcra, with two regiments of cavalry and two battalions, and
drove in the 2nd Hussars of the Legion, who maintained a long
and gallant skirmishing fight, till General Erskill€ came up
with Long's brigade, whcn the French retreated. Erskine was
thought to have missed a fine opportunity of cutting up the
raiding detachment by his slow and tentative pursuit I, On
1 • Confound all spiritless and dilatory generals,' writes Swabey of the
n.A. in his diary, •... Sir W. E. aetlUllly halted while four squadrons and
400 infantry were doing what they liked ill Ribera, though he had tile
Hussa.rt, the 9th and 13th Light Dragoons, the Srd Dragoon Guards llnd
our guns, nnd he might have bad the 71st regiment also, though it did not
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the 18th Soult roude another reconnaissancc in force, 'with
Cour regiments, in the same direction, on a false report that Rill
had moved from llibera and Almendralejo. This brought on
another long day oC bickering, with no definite result: it was
mainly remembered afterwards Cor thc courteous behaviour
of Drouct in sending back unhnrmed Erskinc's aide-dc-camp
Strenowitz, the most daring ofUccr for raids and reconnaissance
work in the Gcrman Legion. He had been captured while
scouting, and a general fear prevailcd that he would be shot,
for he had servcd lor a short time in the French army, and
might have becn treatcd as a deserter. Drouct most handsomely
dispatched him to the British eamp on parole, with a request
that he might be cxchanged for an officcr of his own, who had
been takcn a few days beforc. 'A most courteous and liberal
enemy!' wrote a diarist in Hill's camp, ' Strcnowitz's exploits
are well known: ccrtainlyin strict lawhe might have becn hung l .'
It was not till August 26th that all the French troops in
front of Hill suddcnly vanished, Drouet having had orders to
keep his position till Seville was ready to be cvacuated; lor
Soult feared thut if he withdrew his forces in Estremndura
too early, in the direction of Cordova, the allied troops might
make a forced march on Seville, and arrive there before the
divisions lrom the Cudiz Lines had gonc by. Wherc!ore Drouet
WIlS in evidence before Hill till the precise day when Soult left
Seville. He then retired through the Sierra MOTCna, going by
the remote mountain road by Belalcazar with such speed that
he reached Cordova on the Courth day (August 30). He was
not pursued by Hill, whose orders from Wcllington were to
eome up to the '1'agus and join the main army, and not to
involve himself in operations in Andalusia. Only some of
Penne ViIlemur's Spanish horse, under the German colonel
Schepeler-onc of the bcst historians or the war-followed on
Drouct's track, and saw him join Soult at Cordova 2. The
arrive till all was over. The tronsaction was calculated to dispirit the
soldier, to discontent the officers, and to take away all confidence in the
general.'
, Swabey's dinry, p. 001. There is an interesting account of Strenowi\z'a
capture and relelL'Ie in Espinelml's l,lbOloireB, ii. pp. M~, as also of
the tong skinni~h of this day.
I Schepcler liR)'ll that he llCllred the French rearguard out or Cordova on
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united French force then marched on Granada, where the
garrisons of eastern Andalusia, under Lcval, had concentrated to
meet the Marshal. Up to this moment Soult had been unccrtain
whether he should retreat by way of La Mo..ncha. or across the
kingdom of Murein. His decision was settled Ior him by news
brought by Drouct, who had heard in Estremadura of King
Joscph'li evacuation of Madrid and Toledo. Since the Army
of the Centre was now known to be on the road lor Valencia,
to join Suchet, it would be too dangerous to cross La Mnncha
in search of it. Wellington might descend from Madrid in
force, upon an enemy who dared to march across his front.
Wherefore Soult resolved that his retreat must be made across
the kingdom of Murein. It was true that O'Donnell's army was
in occupation of the inland in that direction, hut it was weak
and disorganized. Moreover, Suchet had lately inflicted a
severe defeat upon it at CastaIla (on July 21st), and O'Donncll
was pro.ctically a negligible quantity in thc problem. A tar
more important factor in determining Soult's exact route wns
the news that the yellow fever had broken out at Cartagena
and was spreading inland: it had rcached the city of Mureia.
Wherefore the French army avoided the coast, and took the
\
inferior roa.ds across the northern part of the province.
SOlut, when onec he had concentrated 45,000 men at Granada,
had nothing to fear from any enemy. The gloomy pict.ure of
• n. retreat harrassed by 60,000 foes,' with which he had tried
to scare King Joseph a month before, turned out to be a work
of pure imagination. Hill had turned off towards the Tagus :
Cruz l\1urgcon and Skcrrctt remained at Seville, awaiting the
appearance of the 10,000 men left in Cadiz. Dut these were
slow to move, because they had been on garrison duty for long
years, and had to provide themselves with tl'Ullsport. Only
llallasteros hung about Granada, bickering with thc outposts
of the French army, and as he had no more than 5,000 or
6,000 men he WlIs not dangerous, hut only tiresome.
Soult therefore was able to spend many days at Granada,
rrtaking deliberatc preparations for the toilsome march that
was before him. He only started out, after destroying the
September II by lillhting fires along the Illount.uin slopes, and giving out
that Hill WlL~ behind him with his army. See p. 666 or his history.
1812] SOULT'S RE'fREAT TO VALENCIA 545
fortifications of thcAlhamhra and other posts, on September 16th.
His route was by Ba~ Huescar, Curavaea, and Hdlin, through
It 1ll0Wltwnous and thinly-peopled COWltry, where his troops
suffered considerable privations. llut these were nothing com-
pared to the misery of the immense convoy of Afrancesado8 of
aU ages and both sexes, who had joined themselves to his train,
and had to be brought through to a place o[ safety. Nor did the
6,000 siek and wowlded whom he was dragging with him enjo)'
a pleasant journey. Yet it was only the September heat and
the mountain roads that harassed the army and its train;
Ballasteros did not pursue Iarther than the borders of Anda-
lusia; the l\Iurc:ians were cowed by the approach 01 a force
which could have destroyed them with ease if it had lingered
within their borders. Some of thcm shifted north toward Madrid,
others south toward Alieantc; none did anything to attract
the notiee of such a formidable enemy. Touch with Suchet's
outposts was secured before September was quite ended, and
by the appearance of the whole Army of Andalusia near
Valencia, a ncw military situation WUi) produced by October 1st.
With this wc shall have to deal in its proper place-the fortunes
of.Wellington and the main army of the allies have not been
followed beyond the middle of August.
Summing up the events of Junc-July-August 1812 in
southern Spain, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that
Soult's personal interests wrecked any chance that the French
might have had of retaining their dominant position in the
Peninsula, when once Wellington had committed himself to
his offensive campaign upon the 'formes and the Dour·o. If the
Duke of Dalmatia had obeyed in June King Joscph's peremp-
tory orders to send Drouct to Toledo, he would have had, no
doubt, to evacuate certain parts of Alldn.lusia. But Joseph and
Jourdan could have marched many weeks earlier, and with
a doubled lorce, to interfcre with 'Wellington's campaign against
Marmont. It is true that Hill would havc made a corresponding
movement by Alcalltara, and would have joined the main
oUicd army uIH.lcr his chief many days before the King an!
Drouet would have been able to link up with 1tIarmollt. But
Bill, on leaving Estremadura, would ha"'e removed the larger
and more efficient part of his corps from Soult's vicinity, and
o)W,'. v N n
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the Marshal might easily have held Se....ilIe and the Cacliz Lines,
when faced by no stronger enemies than Ballastcros and the
garrison in the Isla. It Soult had made up his mind to sacrifice
Andalusia, and had marched with his whole army on Toledo,
in JUlle or even early in July, 'Vel1ington's whole game would
have been wrecked. It was, perhaps, too much to expect that
the Marshal would consent to such a disinterested policy. But
if, without making this sacrifice, he had merely obeyed King
Joscph, and rcinIorced the Army of the Centre at an curly
date, he would have made the Salamanca campaign impossible.
Wellington would probably have retired behind the Agueda
and abandoned his conquests in Leon, without risking it battle,
j[ the French Iorccs in contact with him had becn 25,000 men
stronger than they actually were. The junction oIHiIl and some
12,000 men of the best of his Estremaduran detachmcnt would
have given him the power to fight out a defensive campaign 011
the Portuguese frontier, but hardly to dclivCl' an offensive buttle
like Salamanca. The net results of all his manccuvres in June
would then have been !l0 morc than an indirect success-the
delivery of eastern Andalusia from Soult. Seville and the Cadiz
Lines might still have remained occupied by the Frcneh.
It is scarcely necessary to repeat once more that Soult's
counter-plan of inviting the King and the Army of the Centre
to retire to Andalusia, throwing up all communication with
France and the imperial armies beyond the Douro, was wrong-
headed in the extreme, though Napier calls it 'grand and
vigorous 1.' Joseph could have brought no more than the
15,000 men that he owned, and they, when added to the 50,000
men of the Army of the South, would not have provided a Ioree
large enough to make a decisive move. For, as we have already
seen, half the Freneh in Andalusia wcre necessarily pinned down
to garrison duties, and the' containing' of 13allasteros and other
partisans. Soult could never bring more than 25,000 men of
his own into Estremadura: if 15,000 more arc added Ior
King Joseph's troops 2, only 40,000 in all would have been
, Nnpicr, iv. p, 87],
• Soult suggested lhnt the less efficicnt or Joseph's troops should go
on garrison duty, and set tree 11 (.'Qrtel;ponding number or his own best
bll.ttnliol15.
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available for a demonstration (or a serious invasion) in the
direction of Portugal. Such a force would havc given Welling.
ton no vcry great alarm. It would havc had to begin by
besicging Badajoz and El vas, ill faee of the existing' containing: ,
army under Hill, a dclieate business, and onc that would ha ve
taken time. Meanwhile Wellington could have come down,
with reinforcements strong enough to make up a total sufficient
to fight and bcat 40,000 men, since he had the advantage of
a central position and the shorter roads. At the worst he would
have blocked the French advance by taking up an unassailable
position, as he had before on the eaya in June 1811. But now
he would have had a far superior gaIDe in his hands, since
Bndajoz was his and not his cncmy's, and his total disposable
force was considerably larger than it had been in 1811.
Thus, if SouIt's plan had bcen carried out, all central Spain,
including the capital, would have been lost just as much as
it was by the actual campaign of July-August 1812, and the
disorgani7.cd Army of Portugal could have done nothing. For
Wellington could have left not Clinton's OllC division (as hc
actually did) but three at leust to look aftcr it-not to spcak
of the Gulieiulls and the p01"t'idM. Isolated and cut off from
all communication with other French armies, Soult and the
King would have had to evacuate Andalusia in the end, if
they did not suffer a worse fate-a crushing defeat in a posi·
tion from which there would have bcen no retreat possible.
Hypothetical reconstructions of campaigns which might have
happened arc provcrbially futile-but it is hard to scc how
any rmal proHt to the French could have come from Soult's
extraordinary plan.
Nn'
SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER Xl
THE '1'\'\'0 DI VEHSlONS : (1) OPEllATlONS IN TilE KORTH:
srn HOl\ffi POPliAM Al\'U CAFFAUELLI. (2) OPERATIONS
IN 'I'HE EAST: SUCl-lET, O'DONNELL, AND MAITLAJ.~D.
JUl\"E-AUGUST 1812
IT has already been made clear that the whole 01 Wellington's
victorious advance, from Ciudnd Hodrigo to Madrid, was
rendered possible by the fact that he had only to deal with
the Army of Portugal, succoured when it was too late by the
Army of the Centre. If CuITarclli and his 35,000 men of the
Army of the North bad been able to spare any helpior l\Iarmont,
beyond the single cavalry brigade of Chauvcl, matters must
have tukCll a vcry different turn from the first, and the Douro
(if not the 'formes) must hu\'c been the limit of the activity ol
the Anglo-Portuguese army. How Caflarelli was to be detained,
according to Wellington's plan, has been explained in an
carlier ehapter 1• The working out of the scheme must now be
described.
'I'he essential duty of the French Army of the North was
twofold, according to Napoleon's general conception of the
Spanish war. It was Marmont's reserve, bound to assist hun
in time of trouble; but it wo.s also the force of occupation Ior
the Biseayan provinces, Navarrc, Santandcr, and Burgos. Of
its H5,000 men more than half were at all times immobilized
in the illnumcrable garrisons which protected the high-rolld
from Bayonlle to Burgos, and the small harbours of the CD.'lst,
from San Sebastian to Santona. The system of posts was
complicated and interdependent. Since the great gucrrillero
Mina started on his busy career in 1810, it had bcen necessary
that there should be fortified places at short intervals, in which
convoys moving to or from France (whether by Vittoria and
San Sebastian, or by Pampclunrl. and llonccsvallcs) could take
1 See above, pp. 340-].
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re[uge when attacked by the hands. And sinee a convoy,
whcn it hn.d sought shelter in one of the minor garrisons, might
be blockaded there indefinitely, unless the high-road were cleared
bctimes, large movable columns had to be ready in threc 01'
[our of the larger places. Their duty was to march out on the
first ahrm, :md sweep the guerrilleros away from any post
that they might have beset. Such bodies were to be found at
Bayonne, where the 'Reservc of the Army or Spain' kcpt
a brigade of 3,500 men under General D'Aussenae to watch for
any c:'i:eeptional outbreak of trouble in Guipu7.coa j Il.t Pampe·
luna, where General Abbe had the head-quarters of his division;
and at Yittoria, where the General-in-ChieC, Ca([arelli himself,
normally lay with the brigade of Dumoustier-the lust unit
of the Imperial Guard still remaining in Spain-ready to keep
the line of the Ebro under surveillance, and to communicate
whcn necessary with the three large outlying garrisons of
SUlltoiia, Santander, and Durgos. Each of thesc last consisted
of some 1,300 or 1,500 men 1; cven so, they were only strong
enough to provide for their own safety in normal times, and
might require nssistance lrom head-quarters in lace of any
specially large and threatening combination of the insurgents.
But the larger half of Caffarclli's army was locked up in small
towns, forts, and blockhouses, in bodies ranging down from
a battalion to halt a company. Every onc of the dozen little
ports on the Biscay coast had. to be held, in order to prevent
the bands of the inland from communicating with the English
cruisers, which occasionally appeared iil the offing to throw
weapons and ammunition ashore. And similarly all the little
towns along the Ebro had to be garrisoned, in order to keep
touch with Rcille at Saragossa j wherever there was a gap
Mina's Navarresc slipped in between.
Since the autumn of 1810, when llorlicr and Renoyalcs had
made their vain attempt, with British naval aid, to break up
the line of communication along the eonst,2 there had been
no general n,ttcmpt to shake the French occupation of Biscay
, In :md ahOllt ~ant'l.ndcr, 2 h:Ltt:llion~ or thc l:JOtll, 2 S'111adron~ of
gendarmes, &e. In Santona,!la olrmcn ami 1,:l82 mcn of the 28th, 75th,
and 84th. In UllrgOS, ~ lmUuliOllS or a-Ul, Line.
I Sce vu!. iii. {lp. 480-1.
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nnd Cantabria. The Spanish resources were at a low ebb
whenever Bonnet held the Asturias, and (as wc have seen) he
was generally in possession of that province, or at least of its
capital and its chief harbours, from 1810 down to the summer of
1812. The idea of attacking the harbour-fortresses of the
northern coast with a considerable naval force, which should
get into regular touch with the patriot forces of the inland, and
establish posts to be held permanently on suitable jX)ints of the
northern littoral, had been started b)' Sir Home Popham,
approved by Sir Howard Dougl:\S, the British Commissioner in
Galicia, and warmly adopted by 'Velling-ton himself, who at
ollce realized the pressure which such a policy would bring upon
CuJfurelli. He counted upon this diversion as one of his most
vnluable assets, when he drewup his scheme for the invasion of
Leon in May 1812. It more than iulftllcd his expectation.
On June 17th, four days after the Anglo-Portuguese army
crossed thc Agueda, Sir Home Popham sailed from Corunna
with two line of battleships I, five frigates 2, two sloops 3, and
onc or two smaller vessels, carrying two battalions of marines,
and several thousand stand of small-arms ior the insurgents.
Popham had credentials from Ca.<;tanos, as captain-general
of Galieia, for Mcndizabal, the officer who was supposed to
exercise authority over all the bands oC Cantabria and Biscay.
These scattered forces consisted in the more or less organized
brigades of Porlier in the Eastern AstUl'ias, and Longa in
Cantahria-both of which were reckoned part of the natiollal
army-and in addition of the gucrrilleros o[ Jauregui [' El
Pastor '] in Guipuzeoa, Ucnovales in Biscay, Marquine7., Saornil,
the CUl'C Merino, and others in the mountains between the
Domo and the sea. These were bands of varying strength,
often scattered by the French, but always reassembled after
u space, who roamed Irom region to region according as the
enem)' wns stronger or weaker nt one point or another. Occa-
sionally Jlcndizabal was in touch with Mina and the Navarrcsc,
, The Vttlerab~ (his f1ag-sllip) and the MagnijiUIlI. 'I11e Magnifiuuf
went home with prisoners some weeks later, and was replaced for a time
by the Abercrombie, from the Drest blockading squadron .
• 1l1edusa, lsis, Diadem, Surveillaule, and Hllin. 'fhe Helle Poule looked
in for a sJlOrt time later in the season.
• SJlamr.o Ilnd Lyra.
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but generally the French were in too great force about the
high-road from Burgos to Pampcluna to make co-operation
practicable.
At the moment 01 Popham's start matters were exceptionally
favourable along the Biscay coast, because BOllllet was just
evacuating the Asturias, in order to join his chief Marmont in
the plains ot Leon. His departure isolated Santoiia and
Santander, which had been the links by which he was joined
to Carlarelli's army. It Rlso gave Porlier and Longa an open
communication with Galieia., from which they had hitherto
been cut orr by Bonnet's presence in Asturias, alld a safe retreat
thitherward if they should be pressed. In nddition Marmont
had called up all the small garrisons and detached columns
from his rear, lor the main struggle with Wellington; so that
the Upper Douro valley and the Soria country were much more
free from the French than they had been For a long time. The
opportunity lor molesting Caffarelli and his much-scattered
Army or the North was unique.
The idca which lay at the back of Popham's plan was that
a fleet furnished with the heaviest ship guns, and with a landing-
force or over 1,000 mcn, could operate at its choice against
anyone of the long chain of posts which the French held,
calling in to its aid the local bands in each case. The insurgents
had never been able to capture any of these places because they
lacked a battering-train. The fleet supplied this want, and
with few exceptions the French strongholds were not suited
for resistance against heavy gullS. They were mediaeval castles,
fortified convents, or the patched-up walls at little towns, all
defensible f1gainst irregular bands without cannon, but most
vulnerable to 18- or 24-poundcrs. The number of the French
garrisons gave ample liberty ot choice between onc antI another:
individually they were generally wcak-not ovcr BOO, 500, or
1,000 men. There were succouring columns, no doubt, ready
to relieve them, at Bayonne and Vittoria and elsewherc. But
the squadron hfld thc powcr of misleading these forces to any
cxtent-of drawing them from one remote port to another by
false attacks and demonstrations, and then of attacking some
third point when the enemy had been lured as far as possible
from it. Here lay the beauty of naval operations-the squadron
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(.'auld appen.r to threaten any objective that it chose, eould
attract the enemy thither, and then eould vanish, and be filty
miles away next day. The relieving column could only follow
slowly over mountain roads, and would invariably be late in
learning what new direction the squadron hud taken. It was
something like the advantage that the Danes had in their
attacks on England in the ninth century: a defending army
cannot guard all points of a coast-line at once against a movable
landing force on shipboard. The weaker points of the scheme
were, fIrstly, the dependence of all operations on fine weather-
contrary winds could in those days delay a fleet lor whole weeks
on end j sccondly, the want of a base nearer than Corunna,
till some good and defensible haven should have been captured;
and third and greatest of all, the difficulty of inducing the
local chicIs to combine: they paid a very limitcd amount at
obedience to their nominal chief, Mendizabal: they had private
grievances and jealousies against each other: and each of them
disliked moving far :Irom the particular region where his men
werc raised, and where every inch of the mountain roads was
known to him.
However, all these dangers were known and were ehanced,
and the game was well worth the risk. The operations began
with the appearance of the squadron before Lequeitio on
.Tune 21st. Popham landed a heavy gun and some marines, and
the band of El Pastor [' Don Gaspar ' as the English dispatches
call him] appearcd to co-operate from the inland. The defences
consisted of a fort and SI. fortified convent: the 24-pounder
breached the former, which was then stormed by the !,'Uerrilleros
in a very handsome tnshion 1: its garrison was slain or captured.
The gun was then brought up agninst the fortified convent,
whose commander, the chef de bataillon Gillort, surrendered
without further fighting j the prisoners amounted to 2DO men,
a half·batta.lion of the ]]9th regiment (June 22). Poplmm
then moved art to Bermeo and Plelleia, both of which the
French evacuated in hnstc, leaving guns unspiked and sOllle
useful stores of provisions. The British force had set the
• 50 sa.ys Popham in his dispatcJl at the llceord Office: though Napier
(iv.p. 246) says that the 5paniardsattac.ked and were repulsed. Dut Popham
must have known best! Sir IIoward D<luglas c.orroborates llim, Life, p. 168.
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wildcstrurnours abroad, and. Renovales, the Spanish commander
in Biscay, appeared at Orduiia with his bands and threatcned
Bilba.o, the capital of the province. It was these reports which
made Caffarelli suddenly break off bis project for sending
rein[oreements to Marmont, and prepare rather to march
northward when he was most wanted on the Domo 1.
Popham's next blow was at Guetaria, a most important post,
owing to its nearness to the great chaussee leading to Bayonnc,
which passes quite close to it betwccn Toloso. and El'Ouni. If
it had [alien, the main road from Franee to Spain would havc
been blocked for all practical purposes. But being far to thc
East and near the French border, it was remote from the haunts
of the guerrilleros: fcw of them turned up: after a few days
Popham had to rc-embark guns and men, and to take his
departure, owing to the arrival in his neighbourhood of a strong
French flyipg column. He then sailed off to Castro Ur~iales,
where he had much better luck: Longn. had left the Upper
£bro 'wi.th his brigade and joincd him there on .July 6th, by
Mendizabal's orders. Thcir united force drove ort on the 7th
a small French column which came up from Laredo to raise
the siege. The governor of Castro then surrendered with some
150 men, and 20 guns on his walls fell into Popham's hands
(July 8). The place seemed so strong that the commodore
resolved to keep it as a temporary base, and garrisoned it with
some of his marines.
Three days later Popham appeared before Portugalete, the
fortified village at the mouth of the Bilbao river, and bombarded
it from the side of the sea, whilc Longn. (who had marched
parallel with the squadron along the shore), demonstrated
against its rear. But a French flying column happened just
to havc arrivcd at Bilbao, and the force which marched out
against the assailants was so powerful that the)' made off,
each 011 his own clement [July 11th.] Popham now turned
his attention for a second timc to thc important strategico.l
post of Guetariu; he had enlisted the support of the Guipuzeoan
bands under Jauregui, and the dist.ant ?>llnu hud promised
to send a battalion to his aid from NltVarre. Popham got heavy
guns 00 shore, aod began to batter the place, while Jauregui
1 Scc above, p. 318.
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blockaded it on the land side. Tlus move drew the attention
of D'Aussenae, commanding thc flying column wluch belonged
to the Bayolille reserve: he marched with 8,000 men towards
Guetal'ia, and drove off Jauregui, whereupon Popham had to
rc-embark in haste, and lost two guns which could not be got
off in time and thirty men [July 19J. Mina's battalion came
up a day too Jate to help the discomfited besiegers.
This petty disaster was in the end more favourable than
harmful to Popham's general plan, for he had succeeded in
drawing all the attention of the French to the eastern cnd of
their chain of coast-fortresses, between SantOlla and San Sebas-
tian. But now he used his power of rapid movement to attack
unexpectedly their most important western stronghold. On
July 22nd he appeared in front of the harbour of Santander,
while (by previous arranbrcmcnt) Campillo-one of Porlier's
lieutenants-invested it on the land side. Podicr himself, with
his main body, was hlockading at the moment the not very
distant and still stronger Santoiia.
There was very heavy fighting round Sallwllder between the
22ud July and August 2. Popham landed guns on the water-
girt rock of Mouro, and bombarded from it the castle at the
mouth of the port: when its fire was subdued, he ran his
squadron in battle order past it, and entered the harbour,
receiving little damage from the other French works (July 2010).
The enemy then evacuated the castle, which the marines
occupied: but an attempt to storm the town with the aid of
Campillo's men failed, with a rather heavy casualty list of two
British captains 1 and many marines and seamen disabled
(July 27th). However, Popham and Campillo held on in (rant
of Salltander, and Mendiwbal came up all August 2nd to join
them, bringing n. captured French dispatch, which proved that
the enemy intended to evacuate the place, a strong relieving
column under CaITarclli himself being at hand to bring oH
the garrison. And this indeed happened: the General-in-Chief
of the Army of the North had marched with all the disposable
troops at Vittoria to save his dewehment. 'fhc governor
Dubreton-the same man who afterwards defended Durgos
so well-broke out o( the place with his 1,600 men on the night
, One of them, Sir George Collier, commanding the ilIttlusG.
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of the 2nd-3rd and joined his ehief in safety: he Ielt eighteen
guns spiked in his works. Carrarelli then drew oU the garrison
of the neighbouring small post of Torrelavegn, but threw
a convoy and some reinforcements into Santofia, which he had
determined to hold as long as possible. He then hastened baek
to Vittoriu, being: under the impression at the moment that
Wellington was in mareh against him from Valladolid, in
pursuit of the routed host of Clause!. But the Anglo~l'ortuguese
main army-as will be remembered-had really followed the
retreating Frcnch no farther than Valladolid, and no longer
t1mll the 30th July. Instead of finding himscU involved in
the aUairs of the Army of Portugal, Caffurelli had soon another
problem in hand.
The capture of Santandcr by the allies was the most impor-
tant event that had happened on the north coast of Spain since
1R09, for it gave the squadron of l'opham possession of the
sole really good harbour-opcn to the largest ships, and safe
at all times of the year-which lies between Ferrol and the
French frontier. At last the Spanish' Seventh Army' had
a base behind it, and a free communication with England for
the stores and munitions that it so much needed. It might be
developed into a formidable force if so strengthened, and it lay
in a position most inconvenient for the French, dircetly in
the rear of Clausel and Ca£Iarclli. l'opham saw what might
be made of SUlltnllder, and drew up for 'Wellington's benefit
a report on the I)Ossibilities of the harbour, in which he details,
{-rom the information givcn by Porlier and his sta[[, the state
of the l"oads between jt and Burgos, Valladolid, and othcr
points. Six weeks before the siege or Burgos began, hc wrote
that by all accounts six or eight heavy guns would be required
to Luke that fortress, and that he could manage that they should
be got there-a distance of 115 miles-by ox-draught, if they
were w!mted 1• But 'Vellington, at the moment that this
I 1'0l'tuLm's prescicnec is shown by the fact that his papers relating to
Burgos bc~'tm to be drawn up as early as July 26. He cross-questioned
not only Porlier but other Spanish officers. Their answeI'!l did not always
tully with each othcr. Sce all Popham's disp.1.tche$ or the time, in the
Admiralty Section at the neeord Office-nnder the general head I Channel
FI~t!' They have this misleading heading becnusc Popham was under
Lord KeiUl, thcn commanding that nClCt.
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useful information was being compiled, was turning away from
VnllndoIid and Burgos townrd Madrid; and when his attention
wa.<; once more drawn back to Burgos, he made no use of
Popham's offers till it was too late. Of this more in its proper
place.
Having brought all his squadron into Santander, and made
himself a fixed base in addition to his floating one, l'opham
began to concert plans for fmthcr operations with Mendizabal,
whom he described as a man of 'vacillating councils,' and
hard to screw up to any fixed resolution. Thc scheme which the
commodore most recommended to the general was onc for
a general concentration of all his sc..'\ttercd forces against Bilbao,
in which the squadron should give its best help, Bnt he
suggested as an alternative thc scnding of Porlicr to join
Longa, who had already gone south to the Upper Ebro after
the loilure at Portugalete on July 11th. Porlier and Lollga
would together be strong enough to cut the road between
Burgos and Vittoria, and so divide Clauscl from Caffarelli. If
the two French gcnerals combined against them, they eould
always escape north-westward into their usual mountain
refuges.
According to Popham's notes Mendizabal first seemed to
ineline to the second scheme, llnd then decided Ior the first. He
even in the cud ordered up Longa-then \'ery useCully employed
against Clauscl's l'enr about llaneorbo and Cuba-to join in the
attack upon Bilbao. But Longa eame late, being busy in
opcrations that he liked helter than thosc which his chief
imposed on him. After waithlg a few days 101' him in vain,
l\Iendizabal marchcd ngainst Bilhao by land with two bnttalions
belonging to Porlier and onc recently raised in Alava, while
Popham took three Biseayan battalions belonging to Renovales
on hoard his squadron and sailed for Lequeitio, where he put
them ashore. He himself then madc for Portugalete, at the
mouth of the Bilbao river. The triple attack, though made
with no very grcat total force was successful. The officer
commanding in Bilbao, went out to meet l\Iendizabal, and in
order to collect as many mcn as possible, drew off the garrison
of Portugalete. The British squadron, arriving in front of the
port, round it undc!Clldcd and threw the marines ushore.
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Hearing of this descent in his rear the French general, then
indecisively engaged with Mendizabnl and Uenovales, thought
that he was in dangcr of bcing surrounded, and retired hastily
toward DUl'ango, abandoning Bilbao altogethcr [August 13].
Learning next day that they had overrated the encmy's force,
the l~reneh returned and tried to reoccupy the Biscayan capital,
but wcre met outside by all Mendizabal's troops, arrayed on the
position of Ollorgan. An attack entirely railed to move them,
and the French fell back to Durango. General Rouget, the
commanding officcr in the province, then drew in all his minor
ga.rrisons, and sent CaUarelli notice that all Biscay was lost,
unless something could be donc at onec to check l\1cndizabal's
progress (August 14]. Indecd thc situation looked most
threatening, for Longa had at last eome up and joined his chief
with 8,000 mcn, and the Biscayans wcre taking arms OIl every
side. A general junta of the Basque provinces was summoned
by l\1endizabal to meet at Bilbao, and the French had for the
moment no foothold left save in Sail Sebastian and Guctaria.
Thereupon eulfarelli, collecting cvery man that he eould ut
Vittoria, marched to join Rouget. Their united forces, making
some 7,000 men, attacked Bilbao on August 27th-29th, and
aftcr much eOllfuscd fighting drove Mcndizabal and Longa
out 01 the place, only a IOI'tIlight o.!ter it had come into Spauish
hands. The defeated troops dispersed in aB directions, each
section seeking the region that it had come from-Podier's men
retired towards Cantabria, Longa's toward the Upper Ebro.
Renovates and his Biseayan battalions were caught in their
retreat, and badly cut up at Dima.
Wh.ile tltis fighting was going on around Bilbao, Popham
was trying [L last attack Oil Guetn.ria, with his own resources only,
as nearly all the Spaniards were engaged elsewhere. He had
accomplished nothing decisive when he hetlrd or Mendizabal's
defeat, and had to reship his guns and take his departure berore
the victorious Caf(arelli came up. lIe retired to Santander, and
heard there that Wellington was leaving Madrid, and once more
m:ll'ehing on Burgos. He determined to open up communications
with the British army without delay, and on August 31 sent off
Lieutcnant Mucfarlulle to seck for the hCtld or the approaching
columns. That officer, skirting the flank of Clausel's retl'eating
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host, reached Valladolid bctimes, and explained to Wellington
that the Santander road would be open and available for the
transport of ammunition, gUllS, and C\'CU food, so soon as he
should have driven the }i'rench pust llurgos. And-as will be
seen-it was so used during the unlucky siege of that fortress
again and again-but not (as Popham recommended) for the
bringing up of the heavy artillery that Wellington so much
lacked.
IJy September 1st Cartarelli had patched up matters for
a time on the side of Biscay, but though he had recovered
Bilbao and preserved Guctaria, all the other coast-towllS were
out of his power save SantOlia, und that imporlant place was
cut off rrom the nearest French garrison by a gap of some
sixty miles. Even now Popham's useful diversion had not ceased
to have its crfect. But its further working belongs to a later
chapter.
So much for the annals of the war in northern Spain from
June to August. The diversion which Wellin~:ton had planned
had been brilliantly successful. A very dirtcrcnt story must
be told of the equally important scheme that he had concerted
for keeping his enemies distracted on the eastern side of the
Peninsula, by means of the Anglo-Sicilian expedition and the
Spanish Army of Mureia.
Suehet, it will be remembered I, had been stayed from further
conquests after the fall of Valencia partly by the indirect results
of Wellington's operations on the Portu~:ucse fronticr-starting
with the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo-partly by Napoleon's action
in drawing back to the Ebro the two divisions of lleille, and
calling out of Spain the numerous Polish battalions serving in
thc Army of Aragoll. But not the lcast of the h.indcring causes
was a purely personal onc-the long illness which kept Suchet
confined to his bed for ten weeks in February, March, and
April. By the time that he was in thc saddle again a notable
change had come over the aspeet of the war all over the Penin-
sula. During his sickness his lieutenants, Habcrt and Harispe,
maintained their position in front of the Xuear ri vel', and
observed the wrecks of the Valcncian and l\Iurcinn divisions
that had escaped from Blakc's disaster in January. The whole
• S~ above, p. 80.
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force remaining under Suehet-exeluding the troops left
behind in Catalonia and Aragon-was not above 15,000 men,
an.d of these nearly 4,000 were locked up in garrisons, at
Valencia, Saguutum, Peniscola, :Morclla, and othcr places.
It is not surprising, therefore, that no farther advance was
made against the Spaniards. Joseph O'Donncll, the successor
of the unlucky Mahy, was able during the spring to reorganize
some 12,000 men on the cadrc$ of his old battalions. In
addition he had Roche's reserve at Alicante, 4,000 strong, whieh
had now becn profiting for many months by the British subsidy
and training, and was reckoned a solid corps. He had also
Basseeourt's few battalions in the inland-the troops that
D'Armaglluc had hunted in December aud January in thc
district about Reqlleiia 1. Cartagena, the only fortress on the
coast still in Spanish hands savc Alicantc, had been strengthened
by the arrival of u British detachment 2. Altogether there were
some 20,000 enemies facing Suchet in April, and he regarded it
as impossible to think of attacking Alieante, sinee he had not
nearl)' enough men in hand to bl.'Siege a place of considerable
size, and at the same time to provide a sufficient eovcdng army
against Joseph O'Donnell. So little was the :M:ureian army
molested that General Freire, O'Donnell's second-in-command,
ignoring Sllchct altogether, took atlvantage of Soult's abscll(.'c ill
Estrcmadura, at the time of the fall of Badajoz, to nlarm
eastern Andalusia.. He occupied Ba7.& on April 18th, and
when driven away after a time by Leval, governor of Granada,
turned instead against the coast-land of the South. On Muy 11th
an expedition, aided by English war-Ships from Alicante, landed
near Almeria, and cleared out all the .French garrisons from the
small towns and shore batteries as far west llS Almuneear.
Already before this (on May 1-3) an English squadron had
made a descent on Malaga, seized and destroyed the harbour-
works, and carried oU some privateers and merchant vessels
from the port. But naught eould be neeoffil'lished against
the citadel of Gibalfaro. Soult did little or nothing to
reseut these insults, beeausc he was at thc time obsessed
, See noove, 1)' 50•
• The 2!67UL nnd It pnrt or the foreign Regiment or de \Vatle"ille, also
a Britisb buttery, from Cudi1;.
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with his cvcr-n:curring idea that 'Wellington was about to
invade Andalusia, and his attention was entirely taken up with
the movements of Hill and BallasLcros in the West und North,
so that the East was neglected. Le"nl at Granada had a
troublesome time, but was in no real danger, since Frcirc's raids
were executed with a trifling force.
Suchct was u{.'(:upicd ut this time morc with civil than with
military aUairs; for some time after his convalescence he was
engaged in rearranging the ndministration of the kingdom of
Valencia, and in raising the enormous war-contribution which
Napoleon had directed him to cxacL-200,OOO,OOO Teals, or
£2,800,OOO~in addition to the ordinary taxes. The :Marshal
in his lJtemQires gives a most self-laudatory flccount of his
rule; according to his rose-coloured narrative 1, the imposts
were raised with wisdom and benevolence, the population
became contented and even loyul, the roads werc safe, und
material prosperity commenced at once to rcvive. Napier hus
reproduced most of Suchet's testimonials to his own wisdom
and integrity, without any runt that the Spanish version ofthc
story is diUerent. The Marshal who drove the civil popula-
tion of Lcrida under thc fire of the cannon 2, and who signalized
his entry into Valencia by wholesale executions of combatants
and non-combatants 3, was not the benevolent being of his
own legend. Since that legend has been republished in many
a later volume, it may be well to give as a fair balance the
version of an enemy-not of a Spaniard, but of a Prussian, that
Colonel Sehepcler whose authority on the war of Valencia wc
have so often had occasion to quote.
'Napoleon Bonaparte looked upon Valencia as the prey of
France, and Suchet did not fall behind in his oppressive high-
handedness. The long-desired goal, the wealthy city, now lay
open to their rapacity, and the riches that the clergy bad denied
to the needs of the nation went to fill the plunder-bag of the
conqueror. The miraculous statue of Our Lady of Pity was
stripped of her U1.lcient jewelled robe: only!l. light mantle now
draped her, and· showed the cut of the nineteenth ccntury.
The silver apostles of the cathedral took their way to l'TaIlCC
1 Sce Mtllloir~$, ii. pp. 2$3-99. 1 See vol. lii. p. 307.
• Sce above, p. 75,
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with many other objects of value, and the Chapter was forced
10 pay ransom for hidden treasures. The magnanimous marshal
imposed on the new French province, as a sort of "benevolence,"
six million dollars (ten had been spoken of at first), with an
additional million for the eity of Valencia. The churches had
to buy oIl their bells with another 60,000 dollars. Suchct. in
his moderation, contented himself with exacting 500 dollars
a day for his own table and household expenses•
•Political persecution began with a decree of March 11, which
ordered the judges of the local Audiencia [Law Court] to meet
as before, but to administer justice in the nnme of Nnpolcon
Empereur et Roi. The patriots refused to serve and fled;
whereupon their goods were confiscated, their families were
harried, and when some of them wcrc captured they were
threatened with penal servitude or death. A decree drawn up
in words of cold ferocity, declared every Spaniard who continued
to oppose the French to be a rebcl and u. brigand, and there-
fore condemned to capital punishment. Several villages were
punished with fire and sword, because they were too patriotic
to arre~t and deliver up insurgents. Contrary to the promise
made at the capitulation in January 1, many patriots were
arrested and executed, under the pretence that they had been
concerned in the murder of Frenchmen in 1808, even though
they might actually have saved the lives of certain of those
unfortunates at that time.
'Valencia produces little wheat: there was much lack of it, and
the French would not accept rice. Their requisitions were exacted
with cruel disregard of consequences, even from the poorest,
and quickly brought back to the patriotic side the mutable
Valeneian people, who had already been sufficiently embittcred
when they found that they were annexed to France. All over
the province there began to appear slaughter, rebellion, and
Hnally guerrillcro bands 2.'
The point which Sehepeler makes as to Valencia being
practically annexed to France-as shown by the administration
of justice in the namc of Napoleon, not of King Joscph-should
be noted. It ilI11strates Sllehct's determination to consider
himself as a French viceroy, rather than as the general of one
1 See p. 73 above. • Schepeler, pp. (109-10.
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of the armies recently placed by thc Emperor under the King
as Commander-in-Chief in the Pcninsula. We h:we already
noted the way in which he contrived to plead special orders
from Paris, cxempting him from the royal control, whenever
Joseph tried to borrow some of his troops for use against
'Vellington 1. At the snme time it must be conceded that he
had a mueh better excuse than Soult for his persistent dis-
obedience to such orders-his whole available force was so small,
that if he had sent 6,000 men to San Clcmcnte or Ocaiia, as
Joseph directed, therc would have been little or nothing left
in Valencia save the garrisons, and the Spaniards from Alic:mte
and 1tIurcia could have takcn their revenge for the disasters
of the past winter 2. He represented to thc King that to draw orr
such a body of troops to La l\Iuncha implied the abandonment
of all his recent conquests, IUld that if something had to be
evacuated, it was better that Soult should begin the process,
since Andalusia was a more outlying possession than Valcncia-
'les provinces du sud devaient ctrc evacuees avant cellcs de
I'cst.' And here he was no doubt right: as we have been
remarking again and again, the only solution for the situation
created by Wellington's successes was to concentrate a great
mass of troops at all costs, and thc Army of the South could
best providc that mass. It h(td 50,000 men under arms at the
momen~uchet had not in Valencia, more than 15,000.
Hitherto we have spoken of those parts of the cast coast of
Spain whieh lie south of the Ebro. But if the situation in
VaJencia had not altered much bctween February and June,
the same was also thc case in Catalonia. Since Erolcs's victory
ovcr Bourke at Roda in Mareh 3 there had been much marching
and counter-marching in that principality, but nothing decisive.
Lacy, the unpopular captain-gcneral, was 3t odds with the
Junta, and especially with Eroles, the best of his divisional
officers, who was the most influcntial man in Catalonia, owing
to his IoclLl conncxions and his untiring energy. Lacy wa.'>
a stranger, an enemy of the' Somaten' system, and a pro-
nounced Liberal. The political tendcncies of the Catalans were
, See above, pp. 30""-5.
• This is Suehet's own view, sec his 1lUmoirc8, ii. p. 251 .
• Sec above. p. 98.
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distiJ1Ctly favollfablc to thc other or • Servilc' party. The
captain-general was also accused of nourishing jealousy against
Sarsficld. his second-in-command: und it is certain that both
that officer and Erolcs believed him capable of any mean
trick toward them. llut though divided counsels and mutual
suspicions often hindered the co-opcration of the commanders
and thc people, all wcre equally bitter enemies of the invadel',
and none of them showed uny signs of slackening in their grim
resolve to hold out to the cnd. The Clltalan army did not now
count more than 8,000 mcn in thc field, but its central position
in the mountains of the interior, round which the French
garrisons were dispcrsed in a long scmicircle. gave it advantages
that compensated to a. certain extent for its lack of numbers.
It could strike out at any isolated point on the circumfe.rence.
and. whether its blow failed or succeeded. generally got ort
before the enemy had concentrated in sufficient numbers to do
it much harm. On the other hand, Deeaen, now commanding
in Catalonia, find MllUrice 1\1athieu, thc governor of llareelona.,
though they had some three times as many men under arms as
Lacy. were reduced to a position that was little more than
defensive. It is true that they occasionally eolleetcd a. heavy
column and struck into the inland: but the enem)' avoided
tllem, and replied by countcr-attacks on dcplctcd sections of
the French circle of garrisons. On April 9th, for example,
4,800 men marched from Gerona against 010t: the loeallcvics
undcr Claros and Rovira skirmishcd with thcm, giving ground,
and finaJly losing the town. But though they did not stop the
advance of the enemy,~liIans,with a hnger force. moved on
the important harbour of Mataro, and laid siege to the garrison
thcrc (April 22), a stroke which soon brought the bulk of Frcneh
troops back from Olot to drive him off. At the same time
Sarsfidd's division prcssed in upon thc garrison of Tllrragona.
and cut of[ its communications with Barcelona.
This forced Dccaen to mllrch to open the road, with all the
mcn that Maurice l\Iathieu eould spare from Barcelona (April 28).
Letting them go b)'. Lacy at once rencwed the attack on
Mat.'l.ro, bringing np the forces of SarsficId and Milans, and
borrowing four ship-guns from Commodore Codringtoll to battcr
the fort, in which the French had laken refuge after evueuating
002
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the town [May 3]. Decnen and Lamarque promptly turned
back, and on the third day of the siege came hastily to break
it up. 'fhe Spaniards dispersed in various directions, after
burying the guns, which (much to Codringtou's regret) were
discovered and exhumed by the enemy. The net result of all
this marching and counter-marching was that much shoe-
leather had been worn out, and a few hundred men killed or
wounded on each side: but certainly no progress had been made
ill the conquest of Catalonia. Indecd, Manso, at the cnd of t.he
campaign, established himself at l\lolins de Rcy, quite elose to
llareelona, and Sarsfield occupied 1I-Iontserrnt, so that between
them they once more Cllt off the commnnications from Barce-
lona southward and westward. Both had to be driven off
in June, in order that the roads might again be opened.
Early in July Lacy devised 0. scheme which made him more
hated than ever in Catalonia. He concerted with some Spanish
employes in the French conunissariat service a plan for blowing
up the powder magazine of the great fortress of Lerida, and
arranged to be outside its walls on the day fixed for the explosion,
and to storm it during the confusion that would follow. Eroles
and Sarsficld both protested, pointing out that a whole quarter
of thc city must be destroyed, with great loss of life. Lacy
replied that the results would justify the sacrifice, persisted in
his scheme, and moved with every available man towards
Lerida to be ready on the appointed day. He miscalculated
his hours, however; and, though he left hundreds of stragglers
behind from over-marching, his column arrived too late. The
explosion took place on the 16th, with dreadful success; not
only did a hundred of the garrison perish, but a much larger
number of the citizens; many houses and one of the bastions
fell. The governor Henriod, a very fum-handed man whose
record in Lcrida was most tyrannical 1, had been entirely
unaware of the appron.ch of the Spaniards, but proved equal
to the occasion. He put his garrison under arms, manned the
breach, and showed such a firm [ront, whcll Lacy appeared,
that the C'..;..pt<'l-in-general, having tired troops <'lud no cannon,
refused to attempt the storm. He went off as quickly as he
, &:e notes in Vidnl dc la Blache's L'E!J(U;1wtitm d'Espaglle, 1914, which
reachcs IIlC just lIS this goes to press, for anecdotes concerning his doings.
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had come, having caused the death of several hundred of his
countrymen with no profit whatcvcr. If hc was ready to adopt
such terrible mcnns, he should nt leust hnve had his plans
correctly timed. The Catalans never forgave him the useless
atrocity 1.
Operations in Catalonia and Valencia were thus dragging on
with no great profit to onc side or the other, when \Vellington's
gre:lt scheme for the Allglo-Sieiliun diversion on the east coast
bcgan at last to work, and-as he had expected-set a new
face to arrail'S. Unfortunately the expeditioll wus conducted
VCI}' differently from his desire. We have already shown how,
by Lord WiIliam Dentinck's perversity, it stn.rted too late, and
wus fur weuker than wus originally intended 2. But on July 15th
General Maitland mrived at Port Muhon with a fleet currying
three English a and two German battalions, and parts of three
Ioreign regiments, with a handful of cavalry, and two companies
of artillery. Hc sent messcngers across Spain to announce to
Wellington his arrival, nud his purpose of landing in Catalonia,
as had been directed. At ]\[njorca he picked up Whittingham's
newly-organized Balearic division, and after some delay be set
sail on July 28 for Palamos, a central point on lhe Catahm coast,
oIl which he arrived on the morning of July 31st with over
10,000 men 011 board.
• About the sume time rt. still more dreadful plot was said to have been
fonned in Darcclorm, with the knowledge and approval of Laey-afsenie
wa.s to be mixed with the flour of the gnrriSOIl's rations by secret agen\:l.
[See Suchet's AUl/loires, H. p. 25U, llnt! Arleehe, xii. p. aMI.] flow fllr the
plan WIIS 1\ renlity is dillieult to decide. There is II large flle of pupers ill
the Puris , ...·ur Olllce eonccruing eXIK:riments curried out by I' c01ll111ilSSion
or lIrmy-doclors, in cousequence of Il sudden outbrclIk of sieknClls IUIlOlll!
the troops in July. One or two 1I01t!icl"ll died, 1\ grellt llumbef were seized
with vomiting IInd stOllluch-eramps: poison being suspected, the doctors
took pOSseSSioll of the flour, attempted to analyse it, and tried its crreets
oa a number of street dogs. A few of the animnls died: most were violently
siek, but got over the dose. Poison was not definitely pl'Oved, and dirt),
utensils and bad baking might conceivably have been the cause of the
outbreak. Some C.1.talan writers say that there was a poisoning-plot,
or I should have doubted the wllole story. Sec the Appendix to Artcehe,
xii. p. 483. • Sec above, p. 3'17.
• ljl0th,l(81st, 1(58th, 4th and 6th Line battalions 1{.G.L., and parts
oC the foreign battnliolls of De JWIl, DHlon, and the Calabdan Free
Corps. Sec table in Appendix XIV. Tile total was 248 officers, and 1l,043
milk llnd lUc.
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Owing to Bentillck's unhappy hesitation in :i\Iay and June,
after the expedition had been announced nnd the troops ordered
to prepare for embarkation, French spies in Sicily had found
the time to send warning to Paris, and Suehet had been advised
by the Minister of War that u fleet from Pa1ermo might appcllr
in his neighbourhood ut llny moment. He received his warning
in the cnd of June, n month before Maitland's arrival!, and
this turned out in the end profitable to the allied cause; for,
though the fleet never appeared, he was always expecting it,
and used the argument that he was about to be attacked by
1111 English force us his most crCecLivc rcply to King Joseph's
eonst..'lnt demands for assistance in New Castile. 'fhe arrival
at Alieante of transports intended to C<'lrry Hoehe's division
to Catalonia, and of some vessels bearing the battcring-train
which 'Vcllingtoll had sent round for Bentinck's use, was duly
reported to him: for some time hc took this flotilla to be the
Anglo-Sicilian squadron. Hence he was expecting all through
June and July the attack whieh (through llentinck's perversity)
was never delivered. The threat proved as crrective as the
actual descent might have been, and 'VellingtoH would have
been much relieved if only he could have seen a fcw of Suchet's
many letters refusing to move a man to support the King 2.
Suchet's great trouble was that he could not tcll in the leasL
whether the Sicilian expedition would lllnd in Catalonia or in
Valencia. It might come ashore anywhere between Alieante
and Rosas. He prepared a small movable central reserve,
with which he eould march northward if the blow should fall
between Valencia and 1'ortosll, or southward-to reinforce
Habcrt and Harispe-if it should be struck in the South.
Dccacn was wurned to have a strong force concentrated in
centml Catalonia, in ense the descent came in his dire<:tion, and
Snchct promised him such assistanec as he could spare. On
a rumour that the Sicilian fleet had turned northward-as a
mattcr of fact it was not yct in Spanish waters-the Marshal
thought it worth while to make a rapid visit to Catalonia, to
concert matters with Dccacll. He marched by Tortosa with
1 Clarke's dispatch with the informatioD was dated June 9th .
• '1'wo or thcm datcd July 22 and August 12 did ultimately full into his
hunds, but onl~' IIrter the vietory of Snlamnnca. Sce below, I'll. 617-18.
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3. flying column, and on July loth met Decaen at Reus. Here
he learned that there were no signs of the enemy to be dis·
covered, and after visiting 'l'rrrragona, inspecting its fortificR-
tions, and reinforcing its garrison, returned southward in a more
leisurely fashion than he had gone forth. ........-
During Suehet's absence from his Valeneian viceroyalty the
captain-general of Murcia took measures which brought about
onc of the most needless and gratuitous disasters that ever
befell the ever-unlucky army of which he was in chargc.
Joseph O'Donnell knew that the Sicilian expedition was due,
and he had been wUl'llcd that Rochc's division would be taken
oU to join it; he was aware that Maitland's arrival would
modify Rll Suchet's Rrrangemcnts, and would force him to dmw
troops away from his own front. He had been requested by
Wellington to contcnt himself with' containing' the French
force in Ius front, lLnd to risk nothing. But on July IBtli. he
marched out from his positions in front of Alic.'t.nte with the
design of surprising General Harispc. He knew that Suehet had
gone north, and was not aware of his retufll; and he had been
informed, quite truly, that Harispc's cantonments were much
scattered. Unfortunately he W[lS as incapable as he was
presumptuous, and he entirely lacked the fiery determination
of his brother Henry, the hero of La Bispal. According to
contemporary critics hc was set, at this moment, on making
what he thought would be a brilliant descent on an unprepared
enemy, without any reference to his orders or to the general
state of the war I, And he wished to fight before lloehe's troops
were taken from him, as they must soon be.
Harispc hud only some 5,000 men-his own division, with
one stmy battnlion belonging to Habert 2, and Delort's cavalry
hrigade 3. He h,'ld onc infantry regiment in reserve at Aleoy 4,
another at Ibi 5, the third 6-with the bulk of Dclort's horsemen
-in and about Castt~lla, the nearest point in the French canton-
ments to Alicante. O'Donnell's ambitious plan was to surround
the troops in Castalla and Ibi by a concentric movement of
• See Sehepeler, pp. 017 amI 023. • or the 4.Uh T~inc.
• 'rhe 13th Cllirn!olSier~ "",1 24th Dragoons.
• The 116th Line, 2 batt.ulions. • The 1st LCger. 3 bll.ttulions.
• The 7th Line, 2 battalions.
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severnl columns mnrching far apnrt, and to destroy them before
Harispe himself could come up with his reserve from the rear.
Bassecourt and his detachment from the northern hills was
ordered to fall ill at the snme time on Alcoy, so us to distruct
Harispe and keep him cngaged-a doubtful expedient since
he lay many marches away, and it was obvious that the timing
of his diversion would probably miscarry.
O'DoIlncll marched in three masses: on the right Roche's
division went by Xixona with the order to surprise the French
troops in Ibi. The main body, three weak infantry brigades
under Montijo, Mijarcs, and Miehelena, with two squadrons of
cavalry and Do battery, moved straight upon Castalla. The
main body of the horse, about 800 strong, under General Snntes-
teban, went out on the left on the side of Villena, with orders to
outflank the cnemy and try to cut in upon his rear. The whole
force made up 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, not taking
into account the possible (but unlikely) advent of Bassecourt,
so that Harispc was outnumbered by much marc than two to
onc. As an extra precaution all the transports ready in Alicunte
were sent out-with only one battalion on board-along the
coast, to demonstrate opposite Denia and the mouth of the
Xucar, in order to call off the attention of lIabert's division,
which lay in that direction.
Having marched all night on the 20th July, the Spanish
columns found themselves-in a very fatigued condition-in
front of the enemy at four o'clock on the morning of the 21st.
They were out of tOllch with each other, Roche being separated
from the centre by the mountain-spur called the Sierra de Cata,
and the cavalry having been sent vcry fur out on the flank.
General Mesclop was opposed to Uoche at Ibi, with four
battalions and a squadron of euirassiers-Gcncral Delort, at
Cnstallu. had only one squadJ'on of the cuirassiers, two batta-
lions, and a battery, but was expecting the arrival of the
24th Dragoons from the neighbouring town of Biar, some WU)'
to his right, and of the remaining two squndrolls of the 13th
Cuirassiers from Oni! on his left. :Mct\ll\vhile he evacuated
Castalla, but took up a position on a hillside covered by a stream
and a ravinc crossed by a narrow bridgc, with his trifling forcc.
He had alrendy sent orders to Mesclop at lbi to come in to his
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aid, leaving only u rearguard to hold ocr as long as possible the
Spanish column in front of him, The latter did as he was bid;
he threw into the Castle of Ibi a company of thc 44th and two
guns, and left the rest of that battalion and n troop of cuirassiers
to support them, With the rest of his force, the three battalions
of the 1st Legc! and the remaining troop of cuirassiers, he set
off in hastc for Cnstnlla,
O'Donnell assailed Delorl in a very leisurely way after occupy-
ing the town of Castalla-his troops were tired, and four of his
six gUlls had Callen behind, But l\fontijo's brigade and the
two pieces which had kept up with it were developing an uttltck
on thc bridge, and Miehclcna and Mijares had passed the ravine
higher up, when the Freneh detached troops began to appear
from all directions, The fIrst to get up were the 400 men of the
24th Dragoons, who-screened by an olive wood-camc in with
a tremendous impact, and quite unforeseen, npon Mijares's
flank, and completely broke up his three battalions, They
then, after rc-forming their ranks, formed in column and
charged across the narrow bridge in front of O'Donnell's centre,
though it was commanded by his two guns, An attack delivered
across such a defile, passable by only two horses abreast,looked
like madness-but was successful! The guns only fired onc
round each before the)' were ridden over, and the brigade
supporting them broke up. Delort then attacked, with his
two battalions and with the cuirassiers who had just come up
from Onil, M:ontijo's brigade, the only intact Spanish unit
left, was thus driven from the field and scattered. The 6,000
infantry of O'Dollnell's eentre became u. mass of fugitives-
only one regiment out of the whole 1 kept its ranks and wcnt
off in decent order. Of thc rest nearly half were hunted down
and captured in droves by the French euirassicrs and dragoons,
Mesclop with the three battalions from Ibi arrived too late to
take any part in the rout, Delort scnt him back at once to
relieve the detaehmcnt that he had left in front of Ruche,
The latter had driven it out of the village of Ibi after some
skirmishing, when he saw approaching him not only Mesclop's
column, but Harispe coming up from Aleoy with the 116th of
the Line. He at once halted, turned to the rear, and retired
I CUCUCl<, of Montijo'8 brigade, Schepeler, p, OHI,
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in good order towards XixOIl:1: the enemy's cavalry tried to
break his rearguard but failed, and the whole division got
back to Alicantc without loss. The sumc chance happened to
Salltcstchnn's cavalry, which, marching from Villcnaat 7 o'clock,
hOO reached Biar, in the enemy's rear, only when the fighling-
which had begun at 4--was all over. O'Donnell tried to throw
blame on this officer; but the fact seems to be that his OWII
calculation of time and distance was faulty: he hud sent his
cavalry on too wide a sweep. separated by hills from his main
body, and had kept up no proper communication with it. KOf
does it appear that if Santc~'tebanhad come up to Biar a little
earlier he would have been able to accomplish anything vcry
essential. Bussceourt's diversion, as might have been expected,
d~d not work: before he got ne.,'l.r Aleoy the main body had
been cut to pieces: he retired in haste to Almanza on hearing
the news.
O'DonneU's infantry was so shattered that his army was
reduced to as bad a condition as it had shown in .January, after
Blakc's original disaster at Valcncia. He had lost ovcr 3,000
men, of whom 2,135 were unwouJlded prisoners, thrcc flags, and
the only two guns that had got to the front. Thc survkors
of the three broken brigades had dispersed all over the country·
side, and took weeks to collect. It was fortunate that Roche's
division had reached Alicunte intact, or that city itself might
have been in danger. The French had lost, according to thcir
own account, no morc than 200 men 1: only thc two cavalry
regiments, two battalions of the 7th Line, and onc of the 44th
had been put into action. As Suehct truly remarks in his
Memoires 2 the total numbers engaged-3,000 men 3-on his
side were somewhat less than the casualty list of the enemy.
The rout of Cnstallu put the l\Iurcian urmy out of action for
months-a lucky thing for Suchct, since the force of the allies
at Alieante was just about to be increased by thc arrival there
I This is thc fli\lrc givcn by Suchct in his contemporary dispatch to
King JOSCll!l, of which a copy lies ill the Scovcll po'lpcrs. In liQIDe French
accounts the numbcr is cut down to 70.
• Vol. H. p. 260.
• 7th Line,llbout 1,200; 13th Cuirnssicrs o'Iud 24th Dr:tgoons,about 1,000;
one battalion 44th, about O£>O; nrtillery, &e., about 150 = 3,000 in Illl.
The 1st Uger and 116th Line wcre practically not cngllgcd.
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of l\Iaitland's expedition, and if O'Donnell's army had been
still intact, a very formidable body of troops would have been
collectcd opposite him. It remains to cxpluin the appearance of
the Anglo-Sicilians in this direction, contrary to the ordcrs of
Wellington, who had expressed his wish that they should land in
Catalonia, join Lacy, and lay siege to Tarragona-an operation
whieh he thought would force Suchet to evacuate Valcllcia
altogether, in order to bring help to Deeaen.
Wc left Maitland anchored in the Day of Palamos on July 31.
The moment that he appeared Eroles went Oll board his ship,
to urge his immediate disembarkation, und to promise the
enthusiastic assistance of the Cataluns. The energetic baron
gave a most optimistic picture of the state of affairs, he declared
that the whole country would rise ut the sight of the red-coats,
that Tarragona was weakly held, and that the total force of
the :Freneh, including Suchet's column near Tortosa, was only
13,000 men. Lacy and Sarsficld appeared later, and gave much
less encoumging inlormntion: they rated the encmy ut a far
higher figure than Eroles, and were right in so doing, for Deeaen
had some 25,000 men, and could by an effort have concentrated
15,000, exclusive of succours from Suchet. The Spanish Army
of Catalonia could only furnish 7,000 foot and 800 horse, of
whom many were so far off at the moment that Lacy declared
that it would take six or cight days to bring them up. By the
time that they were nll arrived, the French would have concen-
trated also, and would be equal in numbers to the whole force
that the allies could collect. Tarragona was reported to IJc in
a oetter state of defence than Eroles allowed, and the cnginccrs
ded3red that it might t3ke ten days to reduce it. But the
greatest problem of all was that of provisions: Lacy declared
that the country could furnish little or nothing: he could not
undertake to keep his own small army concentrated for more
than a week. The Anglo-Sicilians must bc fed from the fleet,
and he could provide no transport. Evidently the expedition
would be tied down to thc shorc, and the siege of Tnrragona
was the only possible operation. Since the Anglo-Sicilian army
could not mall<XlUVrC at large or retire into the inland, it would
have to fight Dccuen, to cover the investment of Tarragonn,
within il few days of its landing. On the other hand if, as
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Eroles promised, the 80m(llencs rose on cvery side at the news
of the disembarkation, the outlying Freneh troops might lIot
be able to get up to join Decaen, the roads would be blocked,
the enemy might never be able to concentrate, and the force
about Barcelona, his only immediately availa.ble field urmy,
was not more than 8,000 strong, and might be beaten.
There were those who sa.id that Lacy never wished to see
the expedition land, because he was jealous of Eroles, and
thought that a general rising which cnded in success would
have meant thc cnd of his own power and tenure of office 1. It
is at least certain that the views which he expressed caused
l\laitJand much trouble, and made him to flinch from his original
idea. of landing without delay and attacking Tarragona, accord-
ing to Wellington's ucsirc. The English gcneral took refuge ill
a council of war-the usual resource of commanders of a waver-
ing purpose. His lieutenants all advised him to refuse to land,
on the ground that his for<.'Cs were too small and heterogeneous,
that Lacy could give no prompt assistance, und that there was
no sign as yet of the general rising which Eroles promised.
Moreovcr, some of the naval officers told him that anchorage
of! the Catalan coast was so dangerous, even in summer, that
they could not promise him that the army could be taken
safely on board in case of a defeat. To the intense disgust of
Eroles and the other Catalan leaders, but not at all to Lacy's
displeasure, l\Iaitland accepted the advice of his council of war,
and resolved to make oft, llnd to land farther south. The
original idea was to have come ashore somewhere in the midst
of the long coast-line south of the Ebro, between Tortosa and
Valellcia, with the object of breaking Suchet's line in the middle.
But the news of Joseph O'Donnell's gratuitous disaster at
Castalla, which obviously enabled the Marshal to use his whole
army against a disembarking force, and the suggestion that
Alicante itself might be in danger, induced Maitland in the cnd
to order his whole armament to steer southwm·d. He arrived
at Alicantc on August 7th, and commenced to send his troops
ashore-both his own 6,000 men and Whittingham's 4,000
auxiliaries of the llalcarie division. Since llochc was already
, This seems to have bceu CodringtOll'S view, see his l\lemoirs, i. p. 218,
and he knew Lacy and the Camlans well.
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there, with his troops in good order, there were 14,000 mcn
collected in Alieantc, ovcr and above the wrecks of O'DonneU's
force. If only the J\{ureians had been intact, thc mass assemblcd
would have caused Suchet serious qualms, sinee it would have
outnumbered thc French corps in Valencia very considerably,
and there was in it a nucleus of good troops in Maitland's
British and German battalions. The news of Salamanca had
also come to hand by this time, and hlLd transformed the
general aspect of arIairs in Suehet's eyes: King Joseph was
again demanding insttlnt help from him, in the hope of retaining
Madrid, and had cnlled in (without his knowledge or consent)
the division of Palombini from Aragoll, and the garrison of
Cuenea 1. If Wellington should advance-as he actually did-
against the King, il.nd should drive him from his capital, it was
possible that the main theatre of the war might be transferred
to the borders of Valencia.
The Marshal therefore resolved to concentrate: he ordered
Habert and Harispe to faH back behind the Xucar with their
8,000 men, abandoning their advanced positions in front of
Alicante, and placed them at Jntiva; here he threw up some
field-works and armed a tcte-de-prmt on the Xuear at Alberiqllc.
He ordered Paris's brigade to come down from northern Aragon
to l'eruel, and he warned the generals in Catalonia that he
might ask for reinforcements from them.
Maitlnnd therefore, after his landing, found that the French
had disappeared from his immediate front. He was joined by
Roche, and by the 67th regiment from Cartagena, and proposcd
to drive Harispe from CastaIIa and Ibi. But he marched
against him on August 16th-18th, only to find that he had
already retired behind the Xucar. Further than l\1onfortc he
found himself unable to advance, for want of transport and
food. For the expedition from Sieily had not becn fttted out
for an advance into the inland. It had been supposed by
Bentinek that the troops would be able to hire or requisition
in Spain the mules and carts that they would require for
a forward movement. But the country-side about Alieante
was already exhausted by the long stay of the l\lurcian army in
that region; and O'Donncll-beforc Maitland had come to
1 Scc above, pp. 487 and 488.
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know thc difficulties of his position, got from him a pledge that
he would not take anything from it either by purchase or by
requisition. The British general had hired mules to draw his
guns, but found that hc could not fccd thcm on a forward
march, because the resources of the district were denied him.
He himself had to stop at Eldn, Roche at Alcoy, because the
problem of transport and food could not bc solved. All that
he could do was to feel thc French line of outposts behind the
Xucar with a flying column composed of his own handful of
cu.valry-200 sabres-and a detachment of Spanish horse lent
him by Elio, the successor of O'Donnell [August 20th-21st].
Dut even the thought of farther advance had now to be given
up, for the news arrived that King Joseph had evacuated
Madrid on the 14th, and was marching on Valencia with the
15,000 men that he had collected. To have tried any further
attack on Suehct, when such an army was coming in from the
flank to join the Marshal, would have been insane. The French
force in this region would be doubled in strength by the King's
arrival. Wherefore Maitland drew back his own division to
A1ieante, and brought Roehe hack to Xixona, not far in front
of that fortress, expecting that he might ere long be pushed
back, and perhaps besieged there. ·Wellington in the cnd of
the month, having the same idea, sent him elaborutc directions
for the defence of the p13ee, bidding him to hold it as long as
possible, but to keep his transports close at hand, and to
rc-embark if things came to the worst 1.
On the 25th King Joseph's army and its vast convoy of
French and Spanish refugees, joined Suchet's outpost~ at
Almanza, and the dangerous combination which Maitland and
\Vcllington had foreseen came to pass. But what was still more
threatening for the army at Alieante was the rumour that
Soult was about to evacuate Andalusia, and to bring the whole
of the Army of the South to Valencia. This would mean that
nearly 80,000 Freneh troops would ere long be collected within
striking distance of the motley force over which l'Itnitland
and Elio now hcld command, and it seemed probable that
Soult in his march might swecp over the whole country-side,
disperse the Spanish forces on the l\1ureian border, and perhaps
, Scc Wellington to MaiUand, lJilrJJakhu, ix. p. 386, dutctl Aug. 30.
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besiege and take Cartagena and Alicante as a parergon on
the way. Wc have seen in chaptcr X that nothing of this
kind happened; Soult hung on to AllduJusia for a month
lOllger than Wellington or anyone else deemed probable: he
only left Granada. on September 17th, and when he did move
on Valencia he took the bad inland roads by Huesear, Calas-
parra, and Hellill, lelwing Murein nlld Cartugenu and the
whole sea-coast undisturbed. The reason, as has been alre.'l.dy
pointed out, was the outbreak of yellow fever at Cartagena,
which causcd the Duke of Dalmatia so much concern that he
preferred to keep away frolll the infection, even at the cost of
taking inferior and circuitous roads.
For the whole of September, therefore, Suchct on the onc
side and :M:aitland and the Spaniards on the other, were waiting
on Soult: in the expectution of his early arrival both sides
kept quiet. Thus tamely cnded the first eampnign of the Anglo-
Sicilian army, on whose drorts Wellington had so much counted.
And its later operations, as wc shall prcscntly sec, wcre to be
wholly in keeping with its unlucky start.
SECTION XXXIII: CHAPTER XII
WELLINGTON RETURNS '1'0 THE DOURO. FL."nS
TIlE garrison of the Retiro hud surrendered on August 14th:
Wellington remained for seventeen days longer in Madrid, and
did not leave it, to take the field again, until August 31st.
His stay in the Spanish capital wal> not due, in the fir!>t inf>1;ancc,
to the causes which might seem most lllausible--a desire to give
his war-worn infantry n rest during the hottest weeks of the
year, or a determination to reorganize the military resources
of Madrid and New Castile for the profit of the allied
cause 1. Both these ideas existed, and the laLLer in especial
absorbed much of his nttention-hc spent long hours in trying
to concert, with Carlos de Espai'ia, measures for the utili;o:ation
of the captured munitions of the Retiro, and for the recruiting
of the regiments of the Spanish' Fifth Army.' Lt this hc
accomplished less than he had hoped, partly because of the
dreadful exhaustion of the central provinces of Spain after the
famine of the preceding ycar, partly because of the inefficiency
of most of the Spanish officials with whom he had to deal. He
was much discontented with the list of persons appointed by
the new Regency to take up authority in the reconquered
provinces; and Castaiios, whom he most trusted, and desired
to have with him, was lingering in Galieia 2.
But the main reason for the halt at "Madrid was the uncer-
tainty as to the movements of Soult. Was the Duke of Dalmatia
about, as would seem reasonable, to evacuate Andalusia?
And if so, would he piek up King Joseph and the Army of the
Centre in La l\fallcha, and march on Madrid with the 65,000 men
1 Wellington to HenI)' Wcllcslcy, Dispatches, ix. p. 364.
• Samc to samc, DispatdletJ, ix. p. 313. He was pa.rticularly indignant
nt the supcn;eljsion of Mexia, Inteml:J.nt or Castile, by Lozano de Torres,
with whom he had quarrelled in Estrcmadura in 1809, • t11e most useless
:~nd inefficient of all God's creatures, and an impediment to all business.'
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whom they could collect? Or would he retire on Valencia and
join Suchet? Or again, would he persist in his intention,
c-\:prcsscd in dispatches to Joscph, which uad fallcll into
Wellington's hands, of holding on to Andalusia and Dlaking it
11 separate base of French power, despite of the fact that he
had been cut off from eommw\ication with the imperial armies
of the East und North?
, Any other but a modcrn French army would now leavc the
province [of Andalusia],' wrote Wellington to Lord Dathurst
on July 18 \ , as they have now absolutely no communication
or any kind with Francc or with any other French army; and
they are pressed on all sides by troops not to be despised, and
can evidently do nothing. Yet I suspect that Soult will not
stir till I force him out by a direct movement upon him: and
I think of making that movemcnt as soon as I can take thc
troops to the South without injuring thcir health.' All military
reasons wefe against the probability of Soult's holding on in
Andalusia, yet he had certainly expressed his intention of
doing so us late as the middle o[ July, and, whut was more
important still in judging of his pluns, he had not made a
sudden movcment of retrcat whcn thc news of Salamanca
reached him. Hill writing on August 4th, six days after the
receipt of thc tidings of Marmont's disaster, had to report 2 that
'the rceent glorious cvcnt' seemed to have had very little
effect on the enemy, who' continued in a strong position in his
front.' And tills was true, (or Soult. after hearing the ncws
of Salamanca, bad made his last frantic appeal to King Joseph
to fall back on Andalusia, and make his base a.t Seville if Madrid
were lost. Wellington was right in suspecting that, if the
Marshal had got his desire, the South would have been main-
tained against him, and he would have had to march thither
in person, to pick up Hill, and to bring matters to an issue by
another pitched battle. It was only on August 12th that
Soult reluctantly resolved to evacuate Andalusia: his first
Ilrccautiollary movements for retreat were made on August 15th,
but it was not till the 24th that the Cadiz Lines were destroycd,
or till the 26th tha.t all the French troops in [rant o[ Hill
suddenly vanished. Wellington was therefore kept Ior more
l Di$patchu. b:. p. 370. • Sce above, p. 631.
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than a fortnight in a. state of complete uncertainty as to
whethcr he might not have to march southward in the cnd,
to evict Soult from his viceroyalty. It was only on the 2oJ.th
that he got information from Hill (written on the l7th) whieh
gave the first prcmonitory warning that the French seemed
to be on the move 1. Next day confirming: evidcnce began to
come to hand: 'it is gcncrally reported, and I have reason to
believe, that the Army of the South is about to make II general
movement ... it is supposed in the direction of Granada and
Valencia~.' On August 30, 'though Sir Rowland Hill on the
17th instant had no intelligence that the march was commenced,
there was every appeurunec of it.' The luct that seemed to
make it incredible that Soult eould be proposing to hold
Andalusia any longer, was precise information that King Joseph
and the Army of the Centre had marched upon Valencia to
join Suchct, and had passed Chinchilla on August 24th, going
eastward 3. If the King had gone by the passes of the Sierra
Morena southward, to join Soult, doubt might still have been
possible: but since he had made Valencia his goal, and was
crawling slowly along in lhat dircclion with his immense
convoy of refugees and baggage, Soult-left entirel}' to his
own resouTces---could not retain his present position. He
must march on Valencia mso, and it would be many
weeks before he could place himself in touch with Suehet,
and produce a threatening combination on the Mediterranean
coast.
On August 81st, therelore, with no absolutely certain news
yet to hund as to Soult's retreat, but with every military
probability in favour of its having been begun, Wellington
resolved to leavc Madrid IInd to return to the valley of the
Douro, where the movements of Clauscl and the French Army
of l)ortugal demanded his attention. He never thought Ior
a moment of endeavouring to march through La Mancha to
intercept or molest Soult's retreat. The distance was too great,
the roads unknown, the problem of feeding the army in the
1 Dispatelles, ix. p. 317.
• Ibid., i". pp. 380-1 .
• News from Joscph O'DonuclJ corumnnding the Spanish army of
Mureill. Dispute/les, ix. p. 388.
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desolate and thinly-peopled country about the l\Iurcian and
Andalusian borders too difficult. Wellington made up his
mind that he had some time to spare: he would march against
Clauscl and then' return to this part of the country [Madrid] as
soon as I shall have settled matters to my satisfaction on the
right of the Douro. And I hope I shall be here [Madrid] and
shall be joined by the troops under Sir Rowland Hill, before
Soult can have made much progress to form his junction with
the King 1.' It is important, therefore, to realize that, in
Wellington's original conception, the operations in Old Castile,
which wc may call the Burgos campaign, wcre to be but a
side-issue, an intermediate and secondary matter. The rcul
danger in Spain, as he considered, was the approaching, but not
immediate, junction of Soult, Suchet, and King Joscph at
Valencia. AmI the Commander-ill-Chief evidently proposed
to be at Madrid, to face this combinntion, by October 1st.
How and why he failed to carry out this intention mnst be
explained at length in the next volume.
Meanwhile, when he marched off to the Douro with part of
his army, he had to make provisions for the conduct of affairs
in the South during his absence. Hill, as has been shown in
another chapter, had been tolu to march on Madrid, as soon as
Soult's forces had made their definitive departure for the East.
As Drouet only disappeared from Hill's front on August 26th,
the northward march of the army from Estremadura began
late: it had not commenced to cross the Guadiana on Sep-
tember 1: its progress to and along the 'l'agus valley was slow,
owing to the difficulty of procuring food, and its main body had
not reached Almaraz and Talavera before the 20th September,
and was only concentrated about and behind Toledo at the
cnd of the month. But though Hill's movement was not rapid,
it was made in sufficiently good time to face the danger that was
brewing on the side of Valencia. And there cun be no doubt
that if he had received orders to hurry, he could have been in
line some days before he uctually appeared 2. He brought up
, Wellington to Lord BaUIU[st, August 30, from Madrid. DisIlUtdJe!,
ix. p. 390.
• The ClLYlllry Ilt the heud of the column were nt Truxi1lo on the 15lh SeJl-
tem1Jcr, Almuraz 011 tile 19UI, 'l'nlnvem on till! 21st. Till! inrnntry in the
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all his force 1 except Buchan's Portuguese brigade 2, which was
lelt at Truxillo and MCl'idu, to kecp up his communication with
ElvtlS. Estremadurn, so long the contending ground of armies,
had now no solid body of troops left in it save the Spanish
garrison of Badajoz. For Pcnne VillemuI and l\Iorillo, with the
division which had so long operated in Hill's vicinity, moved
with him into New Castile. They wcnt by the rugged ronds
through the mountains of the province of Toledo 3, and took
post at Hercncia, on the high-road from Madrid to the Despcfia-
perros pass, in front of the British 2nd Division.
In the renr of Hill's column, und separated from it by many
days' march, was another small British force toiling up to
Madrid from a very distant point. This was the force under
Colonel Skerrett, whieh hud taken pUl·t in the fighting round
Seville. It consisted of the battalion of the Guards horn Cadiz, .
the 2/4'i'th and 2/87th, two companies of the 2/95th, a squ3drOll
of the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., the 20th Portuguese Line, and a
battery. By Wellington's orders no British troops were now
left in Cadiz save the 2/59th, part of de Watteville's regiment,
the • battalion of foreign recruits,' soon to become the
8/6Oth, and a few artillery. Skerrett's column, some 4,OUU
strong, marched by Merido. and Truxillo, and reached Toledo
in time to join Hill for the autumn campaign in front of Madrid.
Hill's corps, when joined by Skerrctt, provided a force of
ovcr 20,000 men, about equully divided betwecn British and
Portuguese.
It would have been profitable to Wellington, as matters
went in thc cnd, if he had handed over the entire task of
observing Soult's operations to lIill. But being Imder the
impression that he would return erc long to lIladrid, he left
rear oC the division only crossed the Gundiana ut Medellin on September 141 h,
was at Truxillo on the 17th, Almaruz; on the 20tll, Talavc:ru on the 20th,
Toledo on the 30th (Swabey's diary).
, Hill brought up the 2nd Division-Dritil:;h, 7,000; Portuguese, 2,900 ;
Hamilton's Portuguese, 5,300; Long's and Slade's' cavtllr)', about 1,900;
artillery, about 400 = 17,500 oC all ranks.
• Lute Power's brigade: The 5th and 17th, the old garrison oC Eh'as,
and the 22nd.
• They nmrehed from Cabcza del Duey, on tlle borders of Andalusia
and Estrcmadura, via Talarubia and Mal..urambros to Hcrencio.. • Journal
or Regiment or LeOll,' in Clonard, vol. iv.
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there and in the neighbourhood nearly hall the force that he
had brought from Salamanca. He only took with him to
oppose ClnuscJ. the 1st, 5th, and 7th Divisions, with Pack's
and l]radford's Portugucse, and llock's and Ponsonby's (late
Lc Marchant's) brigades of heavy dragoons, a force of some
21,000 men I. He ldt the 3rd and Light Divisions at Madrid,
the 4th Division at the Escurial, and CurIos de Espaiia's
Spaniards at Segovia. The cavalry of Victor A1tcn and ])'Urban
were assigned to this force, and remained, the former at Madrid,
the latter at the Palacio de Rio Frio, near Segovia. The British
infnntry divisions had all suffered heavily at Badajoz, and the
4th at Salamanca also-they were weak in numbers, but were
expecting ere long to be joined by numerous convalescents.
The total force left behind amounted to about 17,000 men,
including the Spaniards 2. Thus when Hill and Skerrett came
up from the South, there was a mass of nearly 40,000 men
accumulated round Madrid, while Wellington himself, after
picking up Clinton and the 6th Division, and the other troops
left on the Douro, had a little under 80,000. This proved in
the autumn campaign an ideally bad partition of the army, for
on each wing the Anglo-Portuguese (orce was decidedly less
numerous than that which the French could bring against it.
If Wellington had taken his full strength to the North, he
could have defied Clausel and Carfarelli, and they could never
have made head against him, or pressed him away (rom Burgos.
Hill, on the other hand, in front of Madrid, would have bcen
no more helpless with 22,000 men than he actually was with
38,000 men, when Soult and King Joseph brought 60,000 against
ltim in October. In either case he could only retreat without
offering battle. But Wellington, if the three additional divisions
left in New Castile had been brought to the North, would have
had such a superiority over the French in Old Castile that he
eould have dealt with them as he pleased. The only explanation
I Thcre marel1cd with Wellington-1st Division, 5,980 of all ranks;
5th Division, 4,720; 7th Division, 4,841 ; Pack and Bradford, 3,954; Dock
Ilnd Ponsonby, ],073; artillery, &c., about 500 = 21,074.
• There remaincd. at Madrid, thc Escurial, &c.-ArclItschildt's cavalry,
5]5 j D'Uroon's Portuguese cavalry, to,;2 j 3rd Division, 010,234; 4th
Division, 4,5408 j Light Division, 3,4G2; artillcr)', about aao; Carlos de
Esraila'~ SJlllniurds, Ilbout 3,000 = 10,001.
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of the unfortunate proportional division of his army, is that
Wellington under ....alued the task he had to execute beyond the
Douro, thought that he eould finish it more quickly than was
to be the case, and calculated on being back at :Madrid in
October before Soult eould give troubJe.
Yet when he started he was not comfortn,ble in his mind
about the general situation. It the French drew together, their
total strength in Spain was far too great for him. In a moody
moment he wrote to his brother Henry; 'though I still hope
to be able to maintain our position in Castile, and even to
improve our advantages, I shudder when I reflect upon the
enormity of the task whieh I have lUldertaken, with inadequate
powers myself to do anything, and without assistance of any
kind from the Spaniards.... I am apprehensive that all this
may tUl"ll out ill for the Spanish cause. If by any eause I should
be overwhelmed, or should be obliged to retire, what will the
world say? What will the people of England say? Whnt will
those in Spain say? 1 ,
Wellington's forebodings were, only too soon, to be justified.
But the tale of the campaign against Clausel and Caffarelli, of
the nd....ance to and retreat from Burgos, must be told in
another volume.
, Di8J,Jalches, ix. p.375.
APPENDICES
I
SUCHET'S ARMY IN VALENCIA. MORNING STATE OF
OCT. I, 1811
1st Division (1\Iusnier) : OjJlCCTIJ. Men. Total.
Robcrt's j1l4th Line (3 batu.) .
"
1,570 1,637
Brigade 1st 01 the VlstuIa (2 batts.) 27 830 863
Ficatier's 11218t Line (3 batts.) . 44 1,1(>0 1,200
Brigade 2nd of the Vistula (2 batts.) 20 ],103 1,129 = 4,82{l
2nd Division (Harispc) :
Paris's {7th Line (40 haUs.) . 55 1,584 I,U39
Brigade uoth Line (3 batts.) 42 ],105 1,147
Chlopiski's I<J..Uh Line (2 batts.) . . 35 J,191 1,226
BrigtltlC 3rd of tJlC Vistuln (2 bolts.) 20 724 750 = 4,762
3rd Division (I'L'lbcrt) :
Montmllric's 15th Line (2 baU:s.) . 31 771 802
Brigade 16th Line (3 lmtts.).
"
],261 ],317
Bronikowski's Brigade, 117th Line (3 bstts.) 40 1,291 1,340 = 3,450
Pn)omlJini's ltuliulI Divbion:
Saint Paul's l2nd Ugcr (3 batts.) . 59 2,141 2,200
Brigade 4th Line (3 batts.) . 57 1,603 1,060
Balathier's !5th. Line (2 batts.) 27 89' 030
DIigade 6th. Line (3 batts.)
"
],378 1,42{l = 6,219
Comphe's Neapoliron Division:
1st USer (1 batt.) 27 .15 440
1st Line (1 batt.) 24 1;30 '00
2nd Line (1 batt.) 27
""
385 = 1,391
CaYalry (General Boussard) :
4th Hussars (4 squadrons) 2. 72. 75<)
24th Dmgoons (2 squadrons) ]7 • 19 43•
13th Cuirassiers (4 squadrons) 27 557 ".
Italian' Dragoons of Napoleon' 2<' 442 '00
Neapolitan Chasseurs
'"
150 ]69 = 2,405
Artillery (Geneml Vallec)
"
1,757 ],8().')
Engineers (General Rognia.t). . 1O 584 600
EqnilHlges Milil.nires and Gendarmerie ]0 6.'>:1 uua = 3,008
916 25,217 26,133 26,133
N.D.-Fieatier's Brigade, 3 battalions of Palombini's dh'ision, and two
squadrons f 4th Hussars wcre not present at the battlc of Saguutum, bcing
on the line of communications, and blockading ]'eniscola and Oropesa.
This return, lent me by Mr. Forteseue who found it in the Pnris Arehives,
diffeI'8 by over 2,000 men from Suchet's figures given in hi" llUllloires, p. 4:l0
of vo1. ii. 'l'he M:lI'8lml has left out the:l bnl.lalions und 2 sqUlldrons on the
line of communications, mentioned above.
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[OCT.-DEC.
STRENGTH Ol~ nLAKE'S A!UlfY AT TIlE
BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM
I. "filli EX1'£.l)ITlONARY CoIU'S.'
Offu:ers.
Lardi7.abal's Division: Africa (2 batts.), Murcia
(2 batts.). 2nd of Baclajo7. (2 batts.). Cnmpo
Mayor (l batt.), Tirndores de Cuencu. (1 batt.). 149
ZIlYII,s'S Division: 2nd Spllui:sh GUllrds, 4th ditto,
1st \Vullootl Guards. Volunturioo de h. Plltriu,
Toledo, Ciudlld Hodrigo, Legion Estrlillgcru (1
I.mtt. each), CompaniC8 of Ca:z.udores . 17'1
Lay's Cavalry: Granaderos (2 squadrons), Hey
(1 ditto), Husarcs de Castilla (1 ditto) 50
Horse Artillery: two batteries 11
IUet!. To/al.
2,823 2,1)72
2,373 2,550
244 294
2H 225
Total of the' Expeditionary Corps' 387 5,654 6,0·n
II. VALESCIAN TROOPS (' SF.cmm An-MY').
Mirund,,'s Division: Valencia (tl butts.), VOIIIII.
tllrioo de CllstiHa (2 lmttll.), ht or Avila (1 batt.),
2nd Ca7.1"JOI'CI; de Valencia (1 batt.) . 120
Obispo's Division: Carifiena (2 bath.) 2nd of Avila
(1 batt.), 1st Voluntarios de Aragou (1 batt.),
Daroea (1 batt.), Tiradol'Cs de Doyle (1 batt.) 110
VilIacampa's Division: })rincesa (2 batts.), Soria
(2 batts.), 2nd Voluntarios de Aragon (1 batt.),
Ist Cazadores de Valcncia (I batt.), l\IoUna
(1 batt.) 162
Reserve (General Velasoo): 3rd Battalions of
Voluntarios de Castilla. Don Carlos, Avila, Caw.-
dores de Valencia, and Voluntarios de Orihuela 75
San .Juan's Cavalry: Cuenca, Dmgoucs del Rey,
Rcina. Numaneia, lIusares de Atagon, Cazadores
de Valcncia, Alcuntara, HIIsnres EspallolCll,
Husnres de Gmnadll (none over two squadrons
strong) . In
Artillery: 1 horse, 2 field batteries 21
a,844
3,290
3,IDO
3,5\)5
1,010
340
8,D64
3,400
3,352
3,670
J,721
361
Total' 2nd Anny , 59D 15,869 16,468
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Ill. 1\!URCTA."I TROOl'f1 (' 3rd ARM\[ ').
OffICers. Men. Total.
Creagh's Brignde: Corona. Alea7J1r, Tiradores de
Cadiz (1 balt. cad.) 97 2,121 2,218
MOlltijo's BrigmJe: ht of BadnjO'/;, 1st of ClIenca,
VOlunturios de Burgos, Sappers (1 balt. each) 108 2,:J0'..~ 2,·nO
Cavalry: Hcillll (2 squudroll~), PUV'" (2 ~qul.drolU~),
Granada (2 squadrons), Madrid (1 squadron),
HUl:\3res de Fernando 71ne (1 squadron) 83 743 826
Horse Artillery: 1 battery. 3 78 81
Total' 3rd Army' 291 5,244 5,535
General Toml or the Arlny: l,ZT1 ofllccl'l'i, 20,701 mell=Total, 28,O·W.
III
SUCHE'l"S Alll\rY AT THE
SIEGE OF VALENCIA. MORNING STATE OF DEC. 81
N .B.-The regiment.~of the Army of Arngon tire the same
us ill Appendix I.
I. ARMY OF ARAGo:-,- (officers nnd lIlen).
Musnier's Division (10 battalions)
Harispe's Division (10 battalions)
lIabert's Division (8 battalions)
Palombini's Division (10 battalions)
Compere's Division (3 battalions)
Boussard's Cavalry (l3 squadrons)
Artillery
Engineers, kc.
Total Army of Aragon
11. REILLE'S eQlIl'S (officers :md men).
Panneticr's I10th and SIst Line (1 battalions)Brigade
Bourke's I .Brigade 20th and 60th Line (7 battalions)
Severoli's Ita-lIst Line (3 batts.), 7th Line (2 batls.) I
!ian Division 1st U:gcr (3 butts.). . .
C. I 19th Hussars. .
va ry 1st Italian Chasscurs.
I\rtillery
Total Reille's Corps
Gcncrol Total or combined rorces, 33,718.
3,727
4,828
3,150
3,591
1,092
1,839
1,511
857
20,595
2,834
a,901
4,370
'43
262
1,163
13,123
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IV
SURRENDER·ROLL OF BLAKE'S ARUY OF
VALENCIA, JAN. 9, 1812
[JA~.
za)'as's Division.
Lurdil,ub«I' .. Divisioll
.Mirnndo.'s Division
Divhrion or TIescn;e, &e.
Cavalry
Artillery
Engineers and Sappers .
Total
n,,,k
Officers. dft'on e.
llO ],31ll
165 3,385
237 5,513
130 3,]71
77 818
73 1,581
38 383
816 16,170
General total, 16,ll86 of all ranks, not including 62 officers in staff or
administrative employment.!;, 23 chaplains, and ]1) surgOODs.
Of the remainder of make's army there had rallied at Alicante by
Janunry I'~ of inrnntry 361 officers and 5,]25 men, of eavnlry 164 officel'l'l
{lnd 6il men, of artillery 30 officers alld 7!..'O men-toml of all arms, 7,071.
V
FRENCH TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF
TARIFA (DEC. 18lI-JAN. 1812)
[l<rom the table in Bclmas, iv. pp. 40-2.]
From Leval's Division, 43rd Line, 7th and 9th Poles (2 batts. each)
From Darrois's Division, lOth Uger (3 batts.), 51st Ligne (2 batts.),
54th Ligne (2 batts.) .
From ViUatte'sDivisioll, 27th Uger (I batt.), 94th and 95th Ligne
(1 batt. each)
Cnvulry, lOth Dragoons, and onc squadron 21st DrUlioons
Artillery
Engineers, Sappers, MarinCll, &e.
Total .
O/all
tanks.
3,000
4,200
1,800
585
"l9
365
10,439
In addition three battalions of the 8th and 63rd line and two squadrons
of tbe 2nd Dragoons were occupied on tile lines of conununications, between
Vejer and Fasclroas.
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ANG[,Q.SPANISH GARIUSON OF TARWA
British (Colonel Skerrett) :
2/47th
2/87th
Battalion of Flank Companies
1 company 95th regiment
1 troop 2nd Hussars K.G.L..
Artillery (Hughes's Company R.A.)
Total
Spanish (General Copons) :
Cantabria (I batt.)
Irlanda (1 balt.)
Cnwdores
Artillery
Sappers
Cavalry
Of oIl
rankB.
570
560
"'"75
70
sa
1,758
450
3.'>7
a33
lOO
83
17
Total 1,846
N.B.-Another return lllilkes the total of the Britibh part or thc garriSOlL
67 officers and 1,707 men, u total of 1,774.
VI
CIUDAD RODllIGO
A. THE FRENCH GAIllUSON
'111c gnrrison, according to llclmll8, iv. pp. 282--3, stood on the dny 01
the investment M follows:
""
"l6
30
103
3
975 officcrs and men effective.
577
168
34th Ugcr, one battalioll
Uath Ligne. onc battalion
Artiller)',2 companies
Engineer!!
NOl\~omootants (Civil olliccrs, &c.).
Siek in HOI;llital
S"'"
Total . 1,937
u.
nmTlSll LOSSES DUnIKG 'fIlE SIEGE
The British losses betwecn the investment and the storm were, aeeordiug
to t11e official returns at tllll llceord OlfLee, I olfLccr and ti9 men killed,
19 officers find 462 men woundcd, 2 mcn (both Portugucse) missing, or
a tol.nl or 553. ThefiC flgurcs added to the Still lost in the storm (for details
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I;CC below), make nltogelher 1,121, wllieh does not agree with tllC sw.t.emCIlL
in Wellington Dis]Jalcllu, viii. p. 5.'i7; this gives liS the t.otol for the s~~>e
o oflk'ers nud 160 men killed, 70 olIlcer>l nnd 748 men wouulkd, 7 men
mis~illg, or only 1,003, over II hundred lc~s thllll UIC lotul from the return
quoted above. Nllpicr gives 1,290 a8 the casualties for the whole siege,
which mudl exceeds the return in tile RCCQrd Office; he also makes the
total for the storm GO officers Ilnd 050 killed and wounded, while the
official return here printed makes it only 59 olTtcers lInd 509 men. Lord
Londonderry and Sir .lohn ,Tones also give figures agreeing with no others.
I prefer to t,'lke the tOt111 of lhe allicin! report, which is here njlpended.
C.
BlUTISlI LOSSES AT 'I'HE STOUi\l OF CIUDAD HODlUGO.
JA.l'lUAllY 19, 1812
Campbcll's
Brigade
]CiUed.
OJft· Men.
Cl:rll.
1 •S"'"
Engineers
31'd Division;jl/45thl'lIackinnon's 5/UOthBrignde 74th
1/81:1th
j2/sth77th2/83rd
94th
Divisionul Total
3
1
2
JVolmded.
OJ[I- Men. Tl)lal.
ctrs.
2' ,
2 2 4
H • 27 ...
1 1 3 5
• • 18 21
7 • 23 :w
33 8 52 9'1
H , 31
'"1 •
,
13 G ...
"3:?G
Bnrnllrd's
Brigade
Light Division;
Vundeleur'S 11/5211d
2/!52ndBrigade 3/Doth
1'/13'd1/95tll
12/ 95th
Divisional Totul
Portuguese
Grand Total
2 2 23
"1 1 7 ,
, ,
7 , 3l 11
1 , IG 23
2 • G
113
13 • 31 114
8 117 51 '84 5GO
Adding 5 British and 3 l'ortugucsc missing, the total loss is 568 in the
storm.
, Gencrul I\InckinnOIl. • GcnCl$ls Craufurd und Vundclcur.
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VII
NOTE ON SOME POINTS OF CONTROVERSY
REGARDING TI1J,; STOIlM 011 CIUDAD IlODlUGO
Beside the controversy alluded to on page 183 about Ule exaet amount
of co.-operation by the J,ight Divi~ion in helping the Brd lo clear lI,e
French from iJehind the Greater Breach, thcre lire !;everul other vexed
points CQll(:erning ULC storm 01 Ciudlld Uodrigo, The one on which most
dispute llrose wn.s thllt concerning the (:upture of Ccncral BarriC. Gurwood
or the 52nd claimed to have been tlle first officer to enter thc Castle, und
to receivc the surrendcr of thc governor and his stafl'. lIe is mcntioncd
as doing so in Wellington's llodrigo dispatch, and generally had the credit
at the time. Dut Lieutenant Mnekie of the 88th, who had led the forlorn
hope of tlle 3rd Division, also put in a claim, Rnd had many supporters.
Many years after the war wus over, l'tIaxwell (the author of one of the
several Lives of I/Ul Duke of lVellillglO1l, whieh came out in early Victorian
times) championed Maekie's claim with such vehemence that Gunvood
issued a pamphlet defending his own credit. C01\~iderablc controversy
arose in the Ullited St!Tlliu Journal for 184·.1, Uln.l el~where. l\Iuckie'~
btory was that I,e, wiUI ~ome uf the 88th, arrived IIrst ut UIC Custle, sum·
moned the governor to sUITCnder, und_ was receivcd by several Frelleh
ofllcers, wht? JUl.Ilded him over a liword IInd linnounced that Ule general
yielded, Some moments after, lI(.'Cordiug to Mackie, Gurwood came up,
spoke to the governor h.imself, and obtained his sword, which, when the
prisoners were brought before 'Ve11ington, he presented to his commander,
who gave it him back, telling him to retain it as a trophy, and entered
Gurwood's lIame ill his dispatcll as tlle omcer who had received tlle sur-
render. Gurwood's story, told with as much detail and circumstance as
l\!aekie's, is Umt he, with two soldiers of the !i2nd, arrived at tile citadel,
got the gale opened by threatening the officer in charge that no qnarter
woulll be given if re~istance were made, and was received by Barrie, who
in n grent state of nervousness, Ulrew hi~ nrms l'(Iul\(l his neck, kissed him,
and lII.Lid, 'j~ SUUJ I~ GuuvemClIr d~ la place--je I./Ui,y wire prisotmier,' handing
lI"Cl' his sword ut the l;lllnc time. Hc accompanied the enptive ~tarr-omcers
to Wellington's IJrCliCUCC, and IJrcsculcd UICIIl to him. It is dimeult to
comc to allY ccrbl.in (''Ollclu~ioll in ruce of two ~nch contradictory talcs,
but there i!i ll. bare possibility of reconciling them, by liupposing that i'lIaekie
entered first, that the door was closed behind him and his party, and that
Gurwood was let in a moment later, and spoke to the governor, while
i\lackic llad been dealing only with his aide-de-camp, whose sword he had
received, But if so, it is odd that Gurwood ncver saw Mackie: Maekic is
quite positivc that hc saw Gurwood, and that he came in some minutes
later than himself. 'rile dispute tended to become a CQutroversy between
Light Division and 3rd Division veterans, eaeh backing their own man.
A synopsis of tile papers may be found in the last two chapters of vol. i
of Cratttl.n's second series of Adventures with the COnllQUgllt RQ11gers
(London, 18,;$). Napier, who was much interested in the discussion,
put ill his nUlll derutitive edition tbe lion-committal statement that' tbe
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gllrtisou fled to the CnsUe, where Lieutenant Gurwood, WllO though severely
wounded had entered among the foremost at the Lesser Breach, received
the governor's sword' (iv. p. 90). IIarry Smith says (i. p. 58); 'Gumood got
great credit here unfairly. Jolmstonc and poor Uniacke were the first on
the ramparts, GuI'Wood having been knocked down in the breach, anti
momentarily stunned. However, Gur\\"ood '8 a shllrp rcllow, Ilnd he cut
off in 8Cureh or the governor and brought his slI'ord to the Duke. He
made the "wsl of it.'
Another colltrovers)' is lIS to whieh troops or the 3rd Division got first
into the body of the town. The 88th claimed the priority, but also the
94th. The late Mr. Andrew Lang lent me a very interesting letter of his
kinsman. WilIiam Lang of the 9·Uh, very clearly stating that a solid body
of 200 mcn of his regiment were the first troops that penetrated in force
to the Plaza Mayor, nod received the sllrtender of the garrison there.
Still another controversy, ahout whieh there is Illlleh ill the Rice .Tones
papers, in Ule possession of Commander Hon. Henry Shore, R.N., is lI.S lu
what cllgiueer oUloors conducted the l>tormillg·cohunns. Apparently some
credit has 1Jcc1l misplllced alUong il\tlividlllll~ here, but 1.0 decide upon the
point would take more SllaCC than 11. book like this ean afford.
VIII
ARMY OF 'l'lill SOUTH
REORGANIZED AFTER TUE DEPARTURE OF TIIE POLES AND
OTFIEll REGIMENTS
7,5:;1
5,26.'1
7.115
182
lll."TunN OF M.utCB I, 1812
[From the returns in the Archives Nalionalu. Lent me by Mr. Fortescue.J
OJJicers. Men.
ht Division: COllrOllx. Head'qnarlers: ViIlamll.rtin
("ellr Bornos).
1st Brigade. "k'unier: 6th Ugcr (2 butLs.) *, 24th
Liglle (3 batt'.ll.).
2nd Brigade, Mocquery; !l6th Ligne (3 lm«s.).
Total, including artillery .
2nd Division: Bllrlois. Il<.:ad·qullrtcrs: Puerto Relll
(near Cadiz).
ist Brigade, Cassagne: lOth Ugcr, 8th Llgne (3 batts.
ClI,cll).
2nd Brigade, A.vril: 51st Ligne. 54th Ligne (3 batts.
each).
Total, including artillery .
3rd Division: Villattc. Head-quarters: Santu Maria
(near Cadiz).
1st Brigade, P~eheux: 27th Uger, 63rd Ligne (3 batts.
each).
2nd Brigade, Lcfol : 94th Ligne, 95th Ligne (3 batts.
each).
1'oml, including artillery .
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4th Division: Leval. Head-quarters: Granada.
1st Brigade, Rey; 32nd Ligne, <l3rd Ligne (4 battll.
each).
2nd Brigade, Vichery: 55th Ligne (4 batLs.), 58th
Ligne * (3 bHlts.).
'l'otal, including artillery .
5th Division: Drouct D'Erlon. HClld-qUllrtcl'll: ZlIfru
(Est~madura).
1st Brigade, Dombrowski: 12th Ugcr, 45th Ligoc
(3 batts. ea..:h).
2nd Brigade, Reymond, 64th Ligne * (2§ batts.),
88th Ligne • (2 batLs.)
Toml, including artillery .
Ut}l Division: Daricau. Head.quarters: Z:llamea
(Estremadum).
1st Brigade, Quiot: 21st J.kger, 100th Ligne (3 balls.
CI~eh).
2nd Hriguue, St. Pol: 28th lkgcr *, l03rd Ligne.
(2 hatts. each).
Total, including artillery
Officers.
273 9,131
5,927
4,854
1,84.0
'.rota.! ohilL uivisions . J,290 39,841
The regiments marked *'md each onc rnlUalion in b'llrrisoll ut Blldlljo-/;,
except the ij.Uh, which had two compnnics there only [IHh Ugcr, 28th
Uger, 68th, 88th, 103rd Ligne]. Tbe tot,,1 of the>;c 5t !JnUHlions ","us
2,951 oJllcen; lllld men. Adding these to the six divisions the rota! was
44,082 Freneh inf:lntry pre!lCot under arm.s.
CAVALRY.
1st Division. Head·quarten;: Ribera (Estrcmadura).
1st Brigade, Perreymoud: 2nd Huss..1fS. 21st Clms-
seurs, 26th Dragoons.
2nd Brigade, Bonnelllnin: 5th Cho.sseurs, 21th
Chasseurs.
'l'otal 1 Jij
2nd Division. Head-quarters: ConJova.
1st Brigade, Digcon: 2nd, 4th, 5th Dragoons.
2nd Brigade, Lallemand: 14th, 17tll, 27th Dragoons.
Total 170
3rd Division, Pierre Soult. Head·quarters: Granada.
Jst Brig-adc, Doille: 10th Chnsscurs. 12th Dragoons.
2nd Brigade, Ormn.ncey: 16th Dragoons. 21st Dragoons.
Total 135
Total Cavalry 421
3,307
2,203
7,350
N.D.-7th Lancers, a Polish regiment, is omitted here, but actually
sta)'ed with the Anny or the South till the end or 1812.
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Spanish Troops [by return of April 1] :
In1antry
Cavalry
Total Juramtlltados .
Artillery (deducting divisional batteries)
Engineers and Sappers
Three no.vill bnttn.lions (4Urtl and 44th tqtlipagu Ik floUt,
llod a battalion of auvriers de marine)
Gendarmerie, &C.
Officers.
218
163
:.181
lOO
20
00
10
Men.
2,732
2,358
5,090
2,800
!lOO
"00
000
Generlll Total of nfrny 2,282 58,381
Or adding the garrison of Badlljo;,; (2,951 infantry, 268 artillery, 265
sappers, 42 cavalry, of the Army of tile South, f10t inclUding 010 Hessians
of the Army of the Centre), a total of 64,189, without sick, &C.
When Soult on April 1st, 1812 marched to attempt the relief of Badajoz,
lIe .drew up the folJowing statistics as to the strength of bis army, omitting
the ?Wool troops, and l1Ie gU/lIlet8 0/ tile Cadiz Linea :
(1) Marched for Badnjoz :
Infantry
Cavalry
Artillery
EnginL~rs
Total
°fftUrlJ.
000
2a7
20
Stl5
Me".
17,IHl"
<1,0<14
613
no
22,6117=23,502
(2) Left before Cndiz and in Gmnada, &c.:
Illfnntry
Cavalry
Total
(3) Gardsons of the Provinces of Cordova, Jaen.
Granadn, and Seville:
Infantry
Cavalry
Total
(4) Spanish troops :
Infantry
Cavalry
Total
on 18,312
152 2,5,,5
703 20,867=21,680
90 2,;;47
01 J,054
l47 4,201 = 4,348
210 2,732
103 2,358
301 5,000 = 5,4'Tl
Adding up these four tOI.:tls we get officers 2,1.56, rank and file
52,705="'4,0,,). This total omits the ,.rtillery in the Clldi1, l.ines uml
other forlined places, Il.ud U,e three marine reg;mentll, uno ~ueh lSfippcrs,
gendarmes, militnry train, &c., as did not forl\l part of the expedition
t1mt marclJeu with Soult to relieve Bndajoz. Adding these, ut their
strength of March I, we b'Ct u totlll of aoout 59,000 of 11I1 ronks, nut
including the garrillOll or Bad'ljo:r,. This agrees well enough with the
March total of 00,063, :tHowing for a month's wear and tear.
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IX
THE SIEGE 01" 13AOAJOZ, MARCH 15-API1IL 0, 1812
(A) STRENGTII 01<' 'l'IIE FnE:-iCn GAUmSON ON MArtcn 15
[See the Tables in Uehnas, h". pp. ;}U4-5 and in Jones, i. p. 229.]
olneers and men
"
"
"
25
597
450
UOO
540
130
:110
54=3,8G1 infantry.
42
21jl
260
alm
:,80
"
"
"
"
S"'"Infantry:
3/9th Uger .
1/28th Ugcr
1/58th Ligne
3/88th Ligne
3/103rd Ligne
64th Ligne (2 companies)
Hesse-Darmstadt (2 batts.)
,TuraflleJllados
Cavalry .
Artillery.
Englneel'S and Sappers
Sick In Hospiwl
Civil Departments, non-comUlItunu;, &c.
5,003
A report of thc governor ut noon on April 5, founu Ulllong his pllpers
after the sbmll,gave lhcfolluwiug as surviving unuer arms (sick cxcJuded)-
infantry 3,403, artillery 282, engineers 211, envlIlry W, ,}ural/uml(U1QIJ 8G.
'I'his report, printed in Junes, i. p. 230, implies 11 higher origiuul toml thUll
Bclnms nllows-thc nrtillery llnd Juramelllw.JQ/J are o.ctuuHy more numerous
on April 5 thun on "'[ureh 15! And the infllntry lire onl)· 458 !en, despite
o[ Iw!lCS at a considerably higher figure, for another paper of the comman·
dant shows (Joncs, i. p. 230)---80rtie ot March 19: killed 30, wounded
287 = 317'. Storm of l'iellrina Fort: killed or prisonerr;, 8 offieers,
278 men=28(l. We have thus 603 casualties in these two alTairs only,
beside the ordinary wear and tear or the siege.
Noting the considerable number or 'round figures' in Relmas's table,
I am inclined to think that the total of the garrison must have been a few
hundreds over what he allows.
1 Phillipon's report to Clarke, drawn up Ull June 12, giv~ 2711 iusl'ead
ot 317 tor tile loss in this sully (sce Bclmus, IV. p. 414).
011.1."'. v Qq
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(D) LOSSES AT STOIUl 010' OADAJOZ, A.PRLL 6, t811
[From the Returns III the Reoord Office.]
KiUtd. IVolmded. Mining.
Offi- OjJi- O.Jli-
Men. Me/l. MM. TotalCUI. cer,. ct'r;,. •
Genernl Stnrr , 16 17
Ro)"al Artillery . , • I • 17Ho)·BJ Engineers , 3 5 J.
t\-"innnt EngillCCrs 3 3
TIIIRO DI\,SOl'.
Kempt'. Brigade:
l/Mlth Foot • IG 8 r.. 373/60th Foot , • • 20 :ta
1'4.th ,"'oot 12 7 aa 2
"1/88tb Foot 3 28 7 100 HI
J. Cl.Impbcll's Brigade:
2/5lh l~oot , 11 3
"
4:J
77th l~oot 3 11 H
2j83rd Foot 1 22 7
"
.,
94th Foot ,
"
1 51
"
Total ani Division 13 '68 .. 358 2 ,,21
)"OI,;"RTII DlvJSlo~.
Kcromis's Brigade :
3j27Lb Foot • 37 12 132 ""IJ40th Foot . , 51 13 110
"'"Dowu', Brig:ule :
l/'1th Foot , ... 12
'"
,,.
1f23rd Foot 3
"
,. .., 2G
'"Ij48th Foot . 3 33 ,. 122 173
Total4tb Di\'isioo 17 IS. G7 1135 2G "'J
FIFTII DIl'lSIO~.
Hay'. Brigade :
a/1st Foot
I/Dlh )"001.
2/38111 Foot ,
"
3 2. .,
WAlker's Brigade:
1/4111 :F'oot , •• 15 173
230
2/301h "'oot 38 G 8. 130
2/.101111 {"oot 2 37 7 88
'"
Total 5th Division 5 127
"
313 5:111
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Killed. TVoumled. 1I1is.sing.
OjJi.. OJfi- OJli-
LJOll'l' DIVISION: Men. Men. Men. Total.Ca'S. cers. cers.
l/43rd Foot 3 74 15 24. 341
1/521ld l"oot 5 53 14 248 320
1/95UI J<'oot 3 27 10 154 104
3j95U1Foot 4 5 4 47 04
Total Light Division 15 103 4S 60' 515
Brunswick OeIs, dispersed in com-
panies ill 4th uncI 5th Divisions 7 2 2G 35
Total British loss I'i<l. 507 200 2,1{H 22 2,983
POI\TUGUFSe • , 147 .:15 500 30 730
General Toml G2 744 251 2,604 52 3,713
Losses during previous operations 10 210 54 G61 13 957
'l'he tot.'l.lloss during the siege uod storm would therefore appear to have
been 4,670.
X
WELLINGTON'S AlUIiY AT SALA].Lo\NC.'\.. STRENGTH AND LOSSES
N.B.-Strcllgth by the Illorning state of JUly 15. 1812. Losses of the British by the
Ittllm allllexed to 'Vcllingtoll's dispatch: thQSc 01 UIC Portugucsc from the official returJJs
It Lisbon. The llghting strength 011 July 22, owing to losses at Castrejoll aod CastriUo,
Illd to weary mcn falling out during the retreat, may havc becn perhaps 1,000 IcSl!.
I. BRITISH '1'11.00I'S
LoI,e,.
Strength. KilW. Woundtd. .illu,- 'l'Qtal
C.l.V.n.ll.V (Sl'-Iplclon Cotlon): OjJi- ]ftm. ,."". Offi- .J[en. OjJi- Men. ing. .Lou.C",. "1". CI7'I. Men.
l,e )Ial"- {3rd DrugoollS . 17 322 33l) 1 • 11 2 20
chant's 4th Drugoons . 22 3aG 3.'>8 7 1 21 25
Brigade 5th Drugoon Guards 22 ala 3~5 0 2 42 3 56
G.Auson's ~ 11th L~ghtDragoons 3D 361 391
Bri d 12th LIght Dragoons 15 321 340 , 2 2 ij
ga c \J(jth Light Dragoons 14 259 273
I".l\lten's j14th r~ight)J~agoons 2[l :l24 347 , 2 3
Brigade 1st HUStiurs K.G.L. . 23 arG 300 2 5
'"
:m
~'s lIst Dragoons K.G.L. 25 :131) 364-
lltigndc 2nd Dragoons U:.G.L. 23 :184 407
Towl British Cavalry. :!18 3,)~l!l <1,543 2 27 • D4 0 13.
Q q 2
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INJ'ASTny.
Strength. j(ill~d. JVoundlld.Nllr 1'otdl
1st Division (H. Carnpbel1) : Off" ][611. Total. OJli- it" Offi- Mo illlf· Wt.(;(:Y'S. -:""$. en. un.' m. M~...
{1st Coldstre[ull Guards
"
928 0,,4 7 , 22 8
"Fermor's 1st Third Gun«ls . 23 938 'm , ,
"
,
"Brigade 1 comp. 5/60tll Foot , 56 '7
2/24th Foot 23 308 421 ,
,
, , t42'd Foot 4' 1,009 1,079 3 8
"helltley s 2/58th Foot I • 111 360 400 3 1 •
Brigade 1/7l)th Foot . 4'
'"
074 , 3 •
1 comp :5/601h ,
" "rLl" Battalion 8K.G.L. 2G 615 "" 1 8LOwc's 2nd Line Battalion
"
Brigade ICG.I•. 2G GOl GZ7 2 40 4
5th Line Battalion
"
K.G.L. 30 525 555 1 1 11
Total 1st Division 267 6,156 0,423 - H ;; 110
"
153
3rd Division (Pakcnhtun) :
rmh,'oot. .
"
416 442 , , 4'
"\\'allace's 74th Foot . . 23 420 443 3 2 40 4
"Brigade 1/88tll Foot. . 21 642 GOS 2 H 4 HO , 135
3 romps. 5/60to Foot 11 243 254 G 3 24 •
36
rOthFoot 32 870 \)02 10 G HO '"J. Camp- 2/5th Foot 10 280 308 1 2 21 ~Hbell's 2/83rd Foot 24 295 31' 2 2 30
"Brigade 94th Foot 24 32<1 347 1 3 3 21
"
Total 3rd Division 180 3.498 3,678 3 41 Z7 401
"
487
4th DivhliOll (Lowry Cole) :
W A . f/27th Foot . 19 0>4 083 , , 8
• IlSOll S / ., 24 558 582 12 5 115 J32Brignck 1 40th Foot .
1 (.'(/mp. 5/60th 2 44 40
1'/7t1. Foot . . 24 47l 495 1 19 10 105 195
Ellis's 1/23rd Foot. . 10 427 44G 1 2 G 00 '26
1/48th Foot, . 22 404 426 2 10 GO
"Brigade 1 comp. Brunswick
Ocls·. . . 1 53 54
Totul41h Division III 2,571 2,682 2 40 a2 "'7 Jlj!O
1 The 2/58th though prQl'erly belonginK to tile 5th Divisioll, "Ill',eun; to have llcted on
Ihis d"y with the 1st Division .
• The losses or the "twehed oompanies of BrUU!lwiek Ods ure 0111>' to l>c {ouad lI11deJ
ita regimental tot,,1 in 7th Division.
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Mill".
Str~"9t1I. K;lU!d. WQundM. Mw- 'lowl
5t.h Division (Leith): 0fI" Mm. TQlal. Offi· 1[,,,- Offi· .ill 17:' Loll.'..~,. c~,.~. CtT8. en.
f""'OO' . .
32 720 761 ~m 8 l:m 160
l/9th Foot • 31 635 66.
"
, 42 'l6
Greville'8 1/38lh F'oot1 • 30 7114 SOO 2 .. 1~ 111; ..3
Brigade 2j38lh Foot. . '0 281 HOl 0 , 40 5~
1 comp. Brunswick
Del,,'. • . , 76 78
r4tl. Foo' . . 36 421 451 1 n "2j4th Foot . 27 627 054 , 23 0 at
Pringle', 2/30th Foot. . 20 .320 340 3 1 22 1 21
Briga.de 2/44th Foot. . 20 231 251 2 4 23 20
1 comp. Bruns",;ck
Oels' . . . 3 66 0'
Total 5th Division 227 4,159 4,386 4 58 o· m 8 506.,
6th Division (C!intoll) :
,,0
rU"'FOO' . 31 485 516 1 ... 14 281Bulse's 2j53rd Foot . 21> 310 341 2G U 101i l'l~
Brigade 1/61st Foot . 20 517 540 5
"
19 303 3GO
] oomp. 5!OOUI 2 66 61
rnd l'oot 27 381 408 1 16
"
77 l:l 100Hiude's 1/320d !<'oot 33 570 006 , 15 6 III 137Brigade 1/80 .Foot 20 46<1 42» • 16 5 74
06
Towlllth Division "6 2,73<' 2,010 13 153 64 951 l~ 1,198
7th Division (Hope) :
0{'"ugh<n,tt. K.G.L. o· ..... 569 2 7.,
Halkctt's 2nd Light Batt. I{.G.L. 21 473 .114 1 5 1 , 16
Brigade Druoswick Oels' (9
compaoies). . 23 573 51)6 • 2 42 1 .0{""Foot 27 286 307 2 2De Beme· 68th Foot 21 317 338 1 3 2 14
'"\lib's ChMSCUTS Britan-Brigade
niques 27 686 713 5 10 14 20
Torol 7th Division 144 2,873 3,017 2 17 7 84 15 125
Light Division (Chas. .'\lten) ;
IIarulll'd's f/43rd l"oot. . 30 718 748 , 15 16
Brigade Detaclunents 2/95th
and 3/tl5th Rifles . 16 378 302 , ,
I'lndeleur's 11/52nd Foot . 38 77l 700 2 2
Brigade 1i comps. 1/95th 27 515 542 2 2 •
---
Total Light Division. 1114 2,377 2,481 1 24 2 27
---
I 'rhis battalion only joined the division on the battle.morning.
• 111C losses or the attached companies of Brunswick DeJs are only to be round uniler
Ill! regimcllbl total ill 7th Division.
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OJfi-
~..
Strength. Killed.
Men. Total. O.lfr .Men.
IJfJTS.
£wus.
Wvufld.!!l. ill;"":7'olal
Offi- iJltn. tng. ~.
CiIT8. M,ll-
ROYI.l Horse Artillery (troops of
R~, Macdonald. ••d Bull,
S
and drivers) 18
"'"
421
-
1 2
-
Field Artillery (oompaniel; of Law-
son, Gardiner, Greenc, Douglas, ,
May, and drivers) 35 050 685 1 •King's Genuan Legion Artillery ,
(battery of Sympher) ; 75 80 2 • ~
Artillery Totnl . 58 1,128 1,186 • 10 "~
ENGINEF.I\S 12 0 21
STAFF CORPS 5 81 SO
WAGON TRAIN 24 115 139
DIllTISII TOTAL
Jnfantry 1,209 24,3G8 25,577 2. 32() IS\) 2,387 (;9 ~,D6S
Cavalry 218 3,335 3,553 2 27 8 O. ~ 136,
Artillery 58 1,128 1,186 •
,.
"Engineers. 12 0 21
Staff Corps 5 81 SO
Train 24 115 130
General Staff , , , 2 0 U
---- 74 8,129
'l'otal 1,520 29,036 30,562 28 360 176 2,4l)l
n. PORTUGUESE TROOPS
Louu.
Str6l1gth. Killed. JVoun<led. MUS-Tot.u
OJfi- Men. 1'ot(.t. Offi- OjJi- ill n.~· Lou.C",vAl,.Jn' ; C6ra. Urt. N~ll. eer:. 6 ,,..
D'Urban'lI Brigade: 1st lInd 11th
Dragoons (12th Drngoolls ;)!J>;enl)' :32 45n 482 2 5 , IS JO 31
IN1'A~TIlY :
Power's Brigade, ard Division:
9th and 21st Line, 12th eal"'-
"
(lores 00 2,107 2,197 1 20 0 23
"Stu!J!Js's Brigade, <t" Division:
11th llnd 23rd 1,ine, 7th C(l~n-
dores 137 2,417 2,554 3 177 IS 267 11 47.
Spry's Brigade, 5th Division: lIrd
nnd 15th Line, 8th Ca~ndores 15G 2,149 2,305 3 45 •
,., 7 12'
• The 12th Dragoons were rnarchiDg to the rear in charge or the baggage-train_
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"",""
Slrell."II.. j(iIIed. 1V(>U1Ided. •Vitlr Totat
Ofji- U ,.~ I Ofji- M Ofji-" i,~, ",..,
CIJTIf. .I. eu. (l. CM'X. en. /:flt',. ' en. A1sII'
Rezcmle's Brigade, 6th Division:
8th and 12th Line, ()tli Cu~u.
'"
dores 13. 2,497 2,631 8 113
"
336
"CoIlins's Brigade, 7th Di\'ision: 7th 11
and 19th Line, 2nd ClIflldorcs 132 2,036 2,168 , 1
"
1
Pack's Independent Brigade:
'"and 16th Line, 4th Cn~dorcs
"
2,520 2,605 , 97
"
242 11 376
Bradrord's Independent Brigade:
13th and 14th Line, 5th Cafu,· 11dores 112 1,782 1,894 8 3 8
.o\ttacbed to Light Division: ht
and 3rd Ca~adorcs 3. 1,037 1,067 , 12 ,1
ARTlLLlmv:
Arringa's llllUcry • "' ".
1
----- -
Total 912 17,105 18,017 22 48·1, 5(1 078 -; 1,621
Ill. SP..\ ..."HSl-I TROOl)S
","""
Stre/If/lfl. J{;lltd. lVmmtktl. iJriss- Total
Ofji- Mell. '1"01(11. Olfi- ,lr81l. Ojfi- ilfln. 'Pg. ~I.
C/fft. Clr8. Clr8. MIll>
Carloo de Espui.u's Divi"ion: 2nd
of PrillCCSlI, 'l'iradorca de Cus-
tilla, 2ud of Jucu, 3n1 or 1IIt
Seville, C~lldorcs de Custillu,
Lunccros de Cuslilla 160 3,200 3,360 -
GENERAL TOTAL
.- 8
1,526 29.036 30,562
912 17.105 18,017
160 3,200 3,360
B'UT1SII
PORTUGUESe
SI'ANISII
Ofji-
C/lf"'.
Strength.
Mt/l. ToUtl.
Killed.
?~ Men.
28 360
22 484-
2
lA8'U.
Wounded. ~ri#- '1'o1al
Ojfi- Men. Ittg, L008.
CWt. All1',
176 2,491 74 3,129
59 976 86 1,027
• 8
Total 2,5118 49.341 51,930 50 MU 2a.~ 3,471 100 ....762
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XI
STRENGTH A.l.~D LOSSES O}~ :MAR~IONT'S AHMY AT
SALA~[ANCA
1'0 fix the figh~ing strength of ~larmOllt's army at &\lamllllCll ill com-
puratively ensy_ Jt consisted oC the 411,oao onicers llnu llleJl llCCO\lntc,j
for by the return of July 15th printed on the llllxt pllgC, minus some 700
men lost ut the comuat:> oC Custrillo nnd Cu~trcjorJ [lllso coiled' collibut
of the Guarena '] on July 18, und such few hundreds more ll3 mllY have
fallen behind from fatigue during the loog marches of July 20-1. Houghl)'
speaking, it must have counted some 48,500 men, as opposed to Welling-
ton's 50,000. The French translators of Napicr's PCllill~ular War (Mathicu
Dumns !llld Foltz) only give II table of June 15, which is of course u month
out of date for Salamanca, and apf)Cnd a 1I0te that' deducting artillery,
engineers, bjuipagcs militaires, olficers, sergeants, and garrisons, as also
1000000s between June 15 and July 15 the)' find the result of about 42,000
sabres and bayonets for the battle.' "thy any saae person slw«ld deduct
officers, sergeants, rllld artillerymen from a fighting totnl I am unable to
conceive, though contemporary British writers, including Wellington
himself, often did so. But the results of adding to tlleir • 42,000 sabres
and bayonets' tlte list of 1,\)25 officers, 3,2'J-~ artillerylllcn and artillery
train (both in the divisions and in thc reserve), 332 cngincers, and T·l2
equipage' mi!uaires, is to give the figure '~8,34:I, which practically agrees
with the totnl that I swte ahove; if sergeants are added it would much
exceed that tow!' 'Ve ma)' take this, l.herefore, as fairly correct,....-bearing
if! mind thnt the 2(; officers nnrl 742 lllen of the eq!.ipageJlllliliU/ircs cannot
be counted 115 combatnnts.
1'he.~ totals do not include thc 2:lrd J_l<ger (2 hntts.) and the 2/1st Line,
both from 'l'homieres's division, which were garrisoning Astorga, about
],500 strong. Nor do they includc the minor garrisons lert at Toro,
Zamora, Olmcdo, Vnldestilllls, 'l'ordcsillas, Sinlflncas, Cnbezon, Mcdina del
Cnmpo, Puente de Duero, Tudela de Douro, Amagro, &c., which apJl,ear to
Illlve 1Jce1l "llogeU,er llUOllL 4,18'~ ~Lrong, nor the depot:! at Vllllndolid,
3,307 ~Lrong on June 15, ulItllrobll.bly much lesson July 15, when MamlOnt
had remounted "eRrly J,OOO dilimounlcd dragoons lIIltl picked up nil
dewchments llnd convalescents lllllt he could gather. Nor do they include
Ule sick, who had Ueen 8,M3 011 .June 15th, find 8,332 on l\1u.y 15llt~
probably the totol in hospitnl wns n trille more on ,Iuly 15, owing to
the fatigues or the eumJllligns round San Cristobnl in the latler dnys
or .June.
PnrnJ[cl with the return of .July l5UI, I hnve printed that of August l.
The difference betwcen the hI·o-2lJ officers (Jnd JO,12'~ men-might be
sUPlloaed to represent the losses in the campaign between those dates. It
does not,however, because the total of Allgust] represenls Dot only UU~ sur-
'Ilivors from the battle of Salamanca, but all thc men from garrisons
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evacuated after it, and from the Valladolid d~p6t, who joined the oolours
after the disaster of July 22, in oollsequence of the district in which they
were lying having becn evacuated by the army. The garrisons of Toro
and Znmora held Ollt till they were relieved, that of Tordesilias sur·
rendered to the Galicians ; but the men from the oilIer smaller garrisons
and from the dl:p6ts fell in to their respective corps before August I.
I imagine that we may take these additions to be some 5,000 men at
least, but cannot give the exact figures, throngll being unable to S(l.y
what the Valladolid dcll6ts (3,il07 strong on .June 15) amounted to on
July 15.
Aller comparing U1C totals of the brigades and regiments shown under
July 15 and August 1, we must Ilrocecd to show the reasons why, in indivi-
duul C1llleS, the regimenlll.1 diITcrelll,OC/> between the Lwo sets of figures ClUU\ot
be l.aken to represent the sum of Lllc losses in ULC So.Jllffill.ncll. Cll.ffipaign.
The proof i~ c1eur.
THE ARMY 01" PORTUGAL BEFOHE A__I'm Al<"l'EH THE
llA'ITLE OF SALAMANCA
From two returns of cHcctivcs in the Archives of U\e Ministry of War,
Paris, dated July 1:'> and August 1, respectively.
1st DIV1SIO~ (Foy);
BI.'igndc IGth Ugcr (2lJatl::l.)
Chemincau 60th Lignc (2 batts.)
Brigade ) _ 0
..... _ . 30Ll! Llglle (_ lmtts.)
-,-",sgr'I.VlCrs- ..
Bcrlhelot 70th l~Lgne (2 bnlL~.)
Arlillcry Train, &c.
Divisionnl Totnl
J«ty 15. Augwst 1.
ODi-
•Hen. OJJi- Mlm•
=,- =,-
-IQ 1,0;;5 41 084
50 1,408 47 1,322
'~9
'"
., S12
50 ],351 45 887
7 207 7 207
208 4,930 ISO 3,972
2nd DlVlSlO)/ (Clausel) ;
Divisional Tol.:I.l
Brigade 150th Ligne (3 halts.)
Barbot 50th Lignc (21J,."l.tts.)
Artillery 'l'r;t.in, &c.
Brigade
Derlier I~lh Lcger (3 halts.)27th I,igne (2 halls.) iH 1,485 43 1,222
"
I,m:!7
"'
1,248
52 I,MIO 40 1,177
47 1,531 38 1,278
7 219 7 210
200 G,U02 105 :>,141
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JUly 15. AUgU3t I.
Olfi·
.Ue'1. Olfi·
:Iro DIVISION (Fcre;y) : ce's. CtT3. Men.
llrilf.lde 1315t Ugcr (2 batls.)
'"
1,350
"
1,325
Menne 26th Lignc (2Imtts.) .. 1,Bs
"
1,116
? j47th Ligne (3 batts.) or 1,558 02 1,65070th Ligne (2 batts.) 49 1,114 36 1,061
Artillery Train, &e. , a02 a 19:1
Divisional Total 211 5,478 189 5,345
4th D1VISIOS (5I1rrut) :
Brig'.Ide j2nd Uger (3 butts.) GO 1,7'72 08 1,702
I·'ririon 36th Ligne (3 batts.) GO 1,570 71 1,51"
Uriw"de 14th Uger (11 b:ltts.) GO 1,21lJ
'"
'so, 130lb Ligne (ubsent)
Artillery Train, &e. , 2:.18 5 21..
Divisional TO(..'I.l 203 4,799 207 '~,419
5tb Dlvlslo:s- (i\lnueune) :
Brigade I15th Ligne (3 butts.) 52 1,615 4<J 1,229
Arnnud 06th Ligne (2 batts.) 38 1,131 34 091
Brigade j82nd Ligne (2 bath.) 41
'"
SO 7"
Montfort 86th Lignc (2 bntts.) 30 1,155 28
'"Artillery Train, &e. , 212 4 212
Divisional Totul 105 5,070 U>1 3,792
6th Dl ~·ISION (Brenllier) :
Brigade 117t1l Uger (2 butts.)
"
1,074
"
855
Thupiu 05th Ligne (11 butts.)
"
1,527 52 1,302
, 122nd Ligne (3 bntts.) . . 61 1,486
'"
716
H.cgimcllt de j)rnssc (remnant of) 9 79 U 79
Artillery Train, &e. 4 21:.l , 213
Divisional Totul 179 4,:nO 147 3,165
7th DlVISIO:-: (ThomihcSJ :
Drigllde lIst Line (3 batts.)' 80 1,083 79 1,454
Donte 62nd Line (2 batts.) 47 1,076 4' I,OJ8
? I23rd Leger (al.lscnt)·101st Line (3 l.Intts.) 61 ],388 :W 412
Artillery Train, &:c. 5 203 nil nil
Divisional'l'ol..al lQ3 4,:150 ]53 2,914
Not including 211d l.Inttnlion, about 450 strong, at Astorgl' in garrisoll.
I" garri~on lit Astorgu.
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JIlly 15. August l.
Offi- Offi- iI1lIfel/.8th DIVISION (Bonnet) : CU8. cer8. ell,
Brigade t118th Lille(3 bulls.) 5a 1,584 37 1,024
Guutier ] Hlth Line (3 '-'utts.) &l 1,265 48 831
, 1120th Line (3 batts.) 63 1,745 66 1,152
]22nd Line (3 batts.) 55 1,582 40 1,000
Artillery train, &e. 3 107 nil nil
Divisional Total 238 6,283 191 4,007
LIOII'l' CAVAJ.,RY DIVISION (Curlo) :
Cd Hu=" (3 "luod,o",) 17 231 14 165
, 22nd Chasscurs (2 squadrons) 17 236 IB 233
26th Chasscurs (2 squadrons) 16 278 18 225
28th Chasscurs (1 squadron) 7 87 3 23
{13t1l ChasseuI'!l (5 squadrons) 20 406 2S 426, Hth Chasseurs (4 squadrons) 14 308 18 332
Eseadron de marcl,e . 11 141 , 52
Divisional Total 102 1,777 '08 1,472
EfuAVY CAVALltY DIVISION (Boyer) :
, 16th DragOOI18 (2 squadrons)
"
376 ID 332
11th Dragoons (2 squadrons) ID 4ll 18 350
Brigade I15th Dragoons (2 squadrons)
"
328 16 2D40
Carril: 25th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 18 3H 18 282
Artillery attaehed to cavalr)' . 3
'""
3 148
Divisional Total 74 1,622 74 1,415
Totul Cavalry Divisions 176 3,300 182 2,887
ArtillelJ' Reserve, Park, &c,
"
1,450 22 707
Engiueers amI Sappers
"
332 16 345
Gendarmerie 6 129 6 186
Equipages mitiwires 2(; 742 22 707
Etat-M,.jor Gl:nl:ral 5'~ 54
-- ------
{Infantry Divisions 1,59741,669 1,302 32,755
General Total Cavalry Di\'isions 170 3,3DD 182 2,887
Auxilinry Arms 153 2,653 120 l,tl45
----
1,D25 47,721 1,6D437,581
N.B.-Guns, July ]5, 78 j August 1, 58 j lost 7 12_poundcrs, a
8-flQunders, U4-pOllnders, I a-pounder. Horses, .July 15, 4,278; AUllust I,
3,231. Draught horses, July l1i, 2,037 j August 1, 1,841. Equipages
mWtaire8, horses, .July 1:'., SOO; Augustl, a:n.
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To these two tables we must append, as a side.light, the results ot:), COIn_
pilation of the totals or officers killed fUll] wounded at Salamanc."l, from
Mnrtinicu's admirable L'iste des olJicins IIICs et bfasa lJelldam kg guerres
ere {' Empire. This of COIlr.se does not include UllWQUllded prisoners.
Killed. Wountkd. KiUed. Wounded.
Foy's Division (including Brcnnicr's Division:
los.scs at Gnrcin HermuHler. 17th Ugcr 1 3
"011 July 23ft!): 65th Line. 1 8 ~
"6th Ugtt 1
"
11 22nd Line. 2 10 ~ 21 •
69th Line 2 8 10 'l'otnl
"39th Line 2
,
76th Line 1 7 8 Thomicrcs's Division:
1st Line
"
,
Toml 31 62nd Line. 1 H 15
Clausel's Division: IOIst Line , 10
"25th Li:ger ,
"
,,' Totul
"27th Line
, , 7
50th I.ine
"
17 20 Bonnet's Division:
5Uth I.ine , 15
'"
118th Line 2
'"
20
Totul (j(j 110th Lille 3 :.l~ 211
l"crey's Division; 120th Line 8 812211d Lille , 13 1031st Uger 1 , 7
26th Line. 0 0 Total 7G
47th Line. ; 13 18 Curlo's J..ight Cavnlry ;
70th Line. 2 3 , ;~rd Hussars 2'
Total :lU 13th ChUSSCllf'9 7
Sl\rrut'~ Division: 14th Chasscurs
"2nd L~ger 3 3 22nd CllUsscurs ;
36th Line. 3 3 26th ChllSSCUrs ••
4.tll Uger . , 2 28th Chasscul'.'1
,
-
'rotal 8 Total 25
Maueune's Division; Boyer's Division of D1'8goolls ,
15th Line . ., 12
'"
6th Dragoons
"{ltllll I,inc . , 15 17 11th Dragoous
"82nd Line , 7 , 15th Dragooll!J l'
8Gth Line.
"
3 25th Dragoons 0'
Total <. 'l'ol.al IS
Plus 1 killed and;; wounded at the oomlmt of the Guarclla, July 18.
Plus 2 killed G wounded at the Guarenll.
1>lu» 2 killed 1 wounded ut lhe Guarena.
l>lus!i wounded at 1Ile GU:l.1'clla.
J)lu" 1 killed 1 wounded ltl Custrejou.
j'lUll U wouuded ul Ca"trejoll.
Plus 1 wounued 011 JOlly 21, \Iud 2 wounded at Gardo. llemandez,
J lily 23.
• I'IUll] killed 1 wounded ut lhe Gunrenn, .July 18.
• Piu:; 4 WOUIIUc<.l at UIe Guarelln.
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2=2
Killed. WOllnded.
• 3 17 '"" 20
l\liscelltlneousoffi·
ccrll, whose regi-
menb were not
prescnt ut S(\la-
manca
Start
7
3=3
"
Total.
"
KWed. WOllllded.
Artillery, Horse 1
F'ield . r,
'rrnin .
Engineers.
Gener-..II total 60 officers kiJloo, 301-7 wounded at Salamanca and Garcia
Elcrmmde:r.; plus 7 officerll killed and :''7 wounded tit the Gunrena on
Jul,)' 18, und 2 wounded in minor engagements.
Loss in kille(llllul wounded, not including unwo\lllllet! prisoners, during
the cnllllmigll, 67 killed, 376 wO\luded_443 officcrs in all.
After llrriving ut this genen'l los>; in killed lint! wouuded officers, /;Q fllr
us is possible frum J\lurtillien'l; tubles, which lire not quite complete for lIlI
(.'Orps, it only rCHllIins to e~till1ute the \Il1waunuet! prisoners. I ocurched
the immense volumes or rolll; of 1;'rel1eh offieers ill cuptivit.)' ut the Reeord
alike, 1I11U found 63 lIl11rles of prisoners tuken l.t SulllnU.Ult:ll, the GUUtcllll,
unt! Gurciu Hernlludcz. A few of these duplieute the Ilumes of wounded
oflkers to be found in i'llurtinien's tables, the rcmuinder must represcnt the
unwounded prisoners. \\'ellington in his Salllmulleu dispatch wtote that
he had 137 French ofllccrs prisoners--cvidently the larger number of them
must have been wounded, as only 63 'were sent ofT to England that autumn.
Probably many died in hospital. Prisoners arc most numerous from the
101st, 22nd, tllId ftom Fo)"s two regiments cut up at Garcia Hernandcz,
the 76th and 6Ui Uger.
In the Library of the Archiu3 (l~ la Guerre at the Paris Ministry of War
I went t1uough the regimental histories of all the French infllntry regiment1l
present at Salamanca. Like our own similar compilations, they differ
much in valuc-some arc very full and witli statistics carefully worked
out from regimental reports and pay-books; others are very thin and
tactless. Fourteen lwits ghoe their losses, whieh I herewith :lllne:.: ;
Clausel's Division; 25th Ugcr, 336; 27th Line, 159; 59th Line, a50.
Fercy's Division; 70th Line, 111; 31st Leger, 340.
Sarrut's Division; 2nd Ugcr, 202.
Maucune's Division: 15th Line, 3!:il).
Brennier's Division; 17th Ll:get, 20(\,; 65th Line, 359.
Thomieres's Division: 1st Line, 227'; 62nd Line, 868; JOist Line, 1,000.
Bonnet's Division: 120th, 458; lZ'lnd,527.
The total of this makes 5,500 for these fourtccn corps; wc leave fifteen
others unaccounted for. AS:l rough enleulutioll I suppose that we may
hold Umt as these regiments lost, as we kno"' from Martinien's listl! [which
arc not q,,,'le complete), at le'lst IS::! ofllccl'!l o"t of 5,560 or nil tlmks,
then the other fifteen regiments wilh 181 olliecrs killed or wounded must
have lost somClhing like tl,t)(M1. The vagarics of Lhe proportion betwccn
officers and men hit ure e:.:tmordinury ill individual units, bul these
, Plul; 1 general wounded July 1(;, died next da.)· (Oembouski), und
1 general wounded lint! tukell July 18 ("t the Guurenu), Curdc, !lilt!
1 olUCOl' wounded tit Curda Hermlllde7"
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tend to rectify tJlcmsclvcs on a large total consisting of roany regimellts.
I therelore believe that 11,560 would be something vcry like the total loss
killed alld lCOIHlded in the French infantry. We have then to allow for
some 40 unwounded officers taken \)risoncrs, and corresponding to them
perhnps 1,200 UllWOUIll.1cd men. The total loss for the infantry would
thus 1.Je 12,800. For cavalry and artillery, &c., 53 officers lIit--as by
i'llnrtinicn's t~\bleli-rnust imply something over n thousand men lost. We
Iihoulc1 thus urrive \>t II tot...1 or 14,000 for the cnsuullies-the slim which
1 suggest in Ill)' text (po 469).
'1'0 show the worthlessncss of any attempt to deduce the French losses
by a mere comparison of the ollicilll 'morning states' of July 15 und
August 1, the following instances 1ll;l.Y suffice.
The 65th Line sbows 59 oflieers and 1,527 men present on July 15, 52
officers and 1,302 men on August 1. The apparent loss is"{ officers and
225 men. But this unit's regimental report shows 3 officers killed, (} officers
wounded, 20,:1, men killed or Ilrisollers, lOG men wounded, 39 missing;
total, 8 officers and 349 men. Therefore, as is obvious, one officer and
12'~ men must have joined from someW]lere (dt:pl>t at Val1adolid 1) between
the two dnlea, or the deficiency would be 125 grenter between the' present
under arms' of the two dntes than is shown.
A morc strikillll ease is the G2nd Line, ofThornillrcs's Division. It shOWl;
present 011 July 15, 47 olllccrs nnd 1,070 men, on August 1st 45 olliccrs IInd
1,048 men-the apparent loss is only 2 olllccrs lInd 28 men. Hut !\Jar-
tinien's lists show us that the regimellt lost at lelLst 15 officers, killed and
wounded, and the regimental report gives 20 oJllccrs nnd 848 men killed,
wounded, or missing! The real 10S3 is 868 not 30! Therelore 18 offiocrs
and about 800 men, the equivalent ot a strong battalion, must have joined
between July 15 and August 1. This corresponds to the tact that the
{J2nd showed only 2 battalions' at Salamanca, while the' morning state'
of June 15th showe<! it as having at the hont three battalions and 1,900 rank
and file. Cle..'lrly the third battalion rejoined the colours alter the battle-
having presumably been quartered in the small garrisons ofCastile eVll.Cuated
after the disaster of ,July 2'l. :Many men musl also have rejoined the
n! her two Imtlalions.
Bul the most absurd case of all is tha.t of the 47th Line, whose tot.'ll
figlJ~s .'lctually go up from 1,(125 to 1,712 of nil ranks hetween .Tuly 15th and
August 1st-in despite of the fact that it lost (ns Mnrtinien's lists show), 18
officei'll mul not less therefore thall :~tIO mnk and file (20 men per orricer is
11 low allowance) at Sulurnuucll. It IUllst have (lickcd uJl from Valhlllolid
uno the Slllllll garrisons 13 oll1eer>lllud 452 men 11t lellst '.
ClllUscl, writing to ({jng Joscph on July 25, said that of the whole Arlll~'
or Portugul he C<Juld 1I0t yct show in the ficld Oil that dl'Y 20,000 mCIl.
This tallies wcll enough with the conclusion thut wc hllVC ulrel,dy drUII'Il,
t.hat thc totulloss from the army, which on .July 15 had ••!Jout 48,000 "len,
must huvc IJccn some 14,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, IInd ovcr
10,000 men disper.:lCd who were only just rallying.
, And onc odd eompuny of its 3rd buttalion, 01 of a1l rnnks, while in
the return ul August I, thc 3rd battulion has 13 ufficen and 480 mCtl .
• The 2(47th shows 011 July 15, 310 of all ranks, 011 August 1, 513.
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BRITISH LOSSES AT THE COMBATS OF CASTREJON
AND CASTRILLO I, JULY 18, 1812
OJfI«TS. JUel1. Missing. Total.J(illcd. Wjnmded. Killed. Wounded. Metl.
G. Anson's Brigade:
11th Lt. Dragoons 2 3 10 15
12th Lt. Dragoons 1 5 11 1 18
Hith Lt. Dmgoons
V. Alten's Brigade:
1st Hussars K.G.L. 4 7 45 ., '0
14th Lt. Dragoons
"
14 49 0 75
IJock's Brigndc :
1st Dragoolls K.G.L. - 1 1
• 2nd Dragoons KG.L.- t; 1 1 7
Le l\Iarchunt's Brigade:
3nl Dragoons 9 10
·Uh DIV1SIO~.
·W. Anson's Brigade:
aj:''>7lh l'~oot . 2 1 11 58 72
l/40lh Foot. 1 , 59 (;0
Ellis's Brigade:
Ij7th l~oot 1 1 14 3
'"l!2;)rd Foot. 2 2 4
1/48tll l'oot . , I
"
5th DI"ISION.
Grcvillc's llrigudc :
3/18t 2 2
DctllchL'd COlnpl.mics
of 5/60UI . 2 3
Horse Artillery 1 2 2 9
German ,\rtillcry 2 2
!)ortugucsc 1 0 3;J 90 27 157
'fotal 3 21 SO 361 51 525
The fight ut Cnstrillo is often called tlJc 'Combat of the Guarcnu'.
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XIII
SPANISH TROOPS ON THE EAST COAST OF SPAIN
IN THE SPRI);fG OF 1812
(A) REMAINS OF THE 2ND (VALENCIAN) Al\'D anI) pWRCIANj
1\ Hi\lffiS, MARCH 1
Officers, Men.
321 1.565
US 1,070
"
O:il
17 5S2
8 202
1,2:!7 1{\,OIS
1st Division: Comic de Montijo, 1st of BlldajO't; (2 butts.),
Cucnca (2 batts.), 2 squadrolls ctlvlIlry llO
2nd Division: General Luis Hiquclmc, 2nd WllllOOIl
Guards, Gundalajarn (3 butts.), 1st of Burgos (3 batU>.),
Guadix (2 batts.), Dailen (1 batt.), Alpujarr..ls (1 butt.),
dismounted cavalry (1 batt.) . 335
Hcscrvc Division: GenerAl Philip Rochc. Voluntarios
de Aragon, Canaria!, Alicantc, 2nd of i\lurcill, Alcaz~1r
de Sal\ Juan, Chinchilla (1 batt. each), 2 squadrons
or Husares de Fernrllldo 7(> 300
Cavalry: General A. Rich. Principe (2 squadrons),
ESjl311a (2 squadrons), Hein::! (2 squadrons), Carbineros
Reales, Farnesio, Montes.a, Drag-ones del Rey,
Ca.,.adores de Valencia, l'avia, Rey, Granaderos a
calKlllo, Hus.arcs de Ca.stitra (one I;(ltladron each),
three provisional squadrons .
Cadres or dispersed battalions, now reorgnni7.ing:
Lorca, Vclc,,- !lInlaga. Alma1l7.a, America .
Artillery (Field)
Artillery (GarrillOn) in AliClIllle 1111\1 Curltlb>ellll.
Engineers
'fotal
5,214
5,570
2551130)
8l:H 2,Oa::>
,}!l7
50')800 2,152
013
24
20
33
27
Slrellglll.
Officers. i.11f11. Total.
jCorOJla (1 hntl.) .Vclcll. M"I:'gll (1 OOtt.)GUlld,x. . .
(2nd Wullooll Guards (1 bntt.)1Cuencu (2 batts.). .
1st of Hudujo"l, (1 butt.) .
Michclcnu's
Brigade
Montijo's
Brigude
(B) JOSIWH O'UONNELL'S ARMY••JULY 21,1812, AND ITS
LOSSES AT CAST/ILLA
[The figures of the former from l.oR Ejercj/i)s tSpUllo(cs. The list of prisoners
from Suchet's disp..'1tch in the Pilris Arclli~s de la GUCITc.]
UmJ;oundcd
prUJOnc"
Teporltd
by SlIchcl.
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Mijare!J's
Brigade
Strtnglll.
Officers. Men.7·Qlal.
lB:lilen (I wtt.) . .Alea:'--:lr de San JU:ln (1 bn.tqLore:!. (I batt.) . .
Cavalry (Provisional Rcgiment, 2 squadrons)
Ellglnccl'l:l
Rochc'!J Division:
1st of BurgO!! (2 batt:l.)
Canarias (I batt.)
Aliefinte (2 batts.)
Chinchilla (2 bn.tts.)
32
31
"21)
20
27
34
35
26
7°'f855 2,187
536
207
325
780
81'I,no
'"
U1lfllO'Ulldtd
prisrmttll
rc!'orttd
by SIIClltl.
40.
"".242
Torol . 421) 10,286 2,135
Suchet also TCJXlrls 6()7 woundcd prisoneu, of wbom 56 dicd of their wounds.
No figures are given tor tllC dctached cavalry division ot Santesteban, which
was not in action at Castalla.
XIV
THE BRITISH l"ORCES ON THE EAST COAST OF
SPAL'J" IN 1812
[A NOTE DY MU. C. T. ATKlNSON]
I. MAl'l'~A~rn'S FOnCE, E~1DAnKATIONRETURN, JUNE 25, 1812
1,230
953
I,O·n
32053.
33'
•
"8
1
5
1
33
31
..
3G
33
11
18
H
20th Light Dcugoom.
:Forcign Troop of Hussnrs
R.A. (including drivcr!<)
Marine Artillery
H.E. .
Staff Corps.
1/IOth Foot
1/58th Foot
I r8tst Foot
4th Linc Datt.'llion, I\:.G.L.
6th Line Dattalion, KG.L.
Dc HolI's Hegimcnt (3 companies) .
Dillon's Regimcnt (5 companies)
Culabrian Frec Corps (1 division) 1 •
(War OlUce : Sccrctary of Stalc'll Original CorrcsprmdetWt, Scrics I, vol. 311.)
0'11' N.C.Oo'sleers. (.md Men.
158
OS
73
"42
'"902
840
Total 247 6,543
, 'l'his e0I'lIS was organized ill livc • divisions,' cach or lhree companies.
O)u'N. v It r
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11. CAMI)BELL'S CORPS. EMBARKATION RETURN. PALERMO.
NOVEMBER 14, 1812
(Ibid., vo!. 312.)
20th Light Dragoons
Guides
R.A. (including drivers)
Grenollicr Batt.alion t •
Light Infuntry Battn.lion •
l/Z7th Foot
2nd Battalion, Anglo-ItaJian Levy I
Sicilian Artillery .
Sicilian Grenadiers •
Officers.
•
35
21
33
N.C.O.'IJ
and .Men.
J3
1>
J3J
0"
51:12
828
1.18·~
Hi;')
605
Totul . 118 4,43(1'
2
8
1>
22
77
Ill. SUBSEQUENTLY E~mAnKED, DECEMBER 25·
N.C.a.'s
OfficCTs. and Mell.
223
60
17'
325
204
1,185
20th Light Dragoons
n.A..
2nd Anglo-Italians
Calabrian Free Corps (1 division)
Sicilian Cavalry •
Sicilian Infantry (the Estero Regiment) •
Total. 123 2,173
It nmy be well to give here the gUlfisons of Cudill and Gibrllltur ill 1812,
as both of them supplied troops to the field army during lhnt yelll.
In Gibl'lllrnr, under GcncrllJ ClIlllpbell, there were the 2/0th, 2/1Hh,
37th, and the 4th und 7th Vetcfllll llattalions throughout the year. 'l'Ile
1/82nd WIlS there till the summer, when it was relieved by the 1/26th,
• From 2/JOth, 1/218t, 1/31st, 1/62nd, 1j75tlt, 3rd, 7th, nnd 8th K.G.L.
I Sehwertfeger, i. pp. 480-1, sny!; it WllS eOllll>oscd of 1I,e light oompanies
of De HolI's, Dillon's, De Wo.tleville's (this is inllocurllle. U8 ne WllUeville's
rcl,';ment Illld moved to Cadi.. before tile cnd of 1811), lIDd Ule 3rd, 7UI,
(lIld 8th K.G.L.
• 150 mcn were left behind from lack of room but sent Inler.
• 140 mcn were left behind fwm luck of room but sellt later.
I A' divisioll' of the Cnlo.brio.n .Free Corps, 300 titrong, wus lelt behind
for wlInt of room. liS well as the Sieilillll Regiment de PJ:'ClIidi, ] ,200 strollg.
• In a Ictter to Lord lluthurst of Decembcr 0 Bclltinek unnounces ilis
intention to add to this force 2/27th Foot and 1st Anglo-ltaJio.ns, who
had been 28 officers "lid 823 men llnd 40 officers and 1,153 men respeetivel)'
in the 'state' at October 25. but are not present in the 'slate' of
December 10 (except for 288 men of list Allglo-Italians). _Ji.
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sent back from Portugal by Wellington. The 1/82nd sailed lor J..isbon
and marched up to the front, but arrived just too late ror the battle of
Salamanca.
At Cndi,.; General Cooke commanded, at the commencement of the year,
the 3/1st Guards (which had arrived nud relieved the' eOIllI)Qsile bntlalion
of GUllrd~' IJefore the end or 1811),11100 the 2!,~71h, 2/07lh, 2/871h, two
oornpRnie~or tlic CJU,ISSC1ITS Hriumniques, De Wllttcville's regiment (which
Ilrrived before the cnd of 1811), the strange corps sometimes called the
• battulion of }'orcign Deserters,' somctimes thc • battnlioll of Foreign
Recruits,' two companies of the 2/95th, and a squadron of the 2nd Huss..1r.'l
K.G.L., also the 20th Portuguese.
Early in the ycar the 2/071h and five companies of De Wattcville's
regiment were sent off to Cartagcna.
In Scptembe[ the 1I/1st Guards, 2j,j,7th, 2/87th, two companies 95th,
and 20th Portuguese marched to join Hill at Maddd, taking with them
the German squadron :lnd two field-Imttcries: they were jUllt4,noo strollg.
The 2/59th Clune out rrom hOlllc uuout the llI,mc time, and wus in
OctoUc[ the only British Imttnlioll ut Cadi.". With them rcmnined thll
'}'Ol"Cign Ikscrtcns,' seven companies of Dc \Vt,ttcville, IUIU two (.'OlOlltluies
of Cl/(U/seurs BrifanniqllfS, liS also some adille[ymCll.
xv
THE SCOV~~LL CIPHERS
Dytllevery grout kindness of ~lr.G. Scovcll or Bdghton, I have hOO placed
at my disposition the papers of his great-uncle, General Sir Gemgc Scovell,
G.C.B., who I;Crved during the Peninsula[ \VU[ in the Intelligence braneh
or the QUH[termasler-General'~department. III the l.>egillning of 1812
the number of intercepted Freneh dispulches in eiphc[ which clImc into
\\'ellington's hun<!s, through the happy activity or Juliun SlLJlehe7. nud
other gll~rril1erochiers, begun to he so considerable that th~ Commander-
in-Chief thought it worth whiI~ to dctaitll mcmlJ.c.r of his stulT to deal with
them. Cuptain &'Ovcll Wall sdcctcd oc'."IlUSC of his ingenuity in this line,
and occamc responsible for uttempting to interpret tul the captured
uOCulnllnts. They werc madc ovcr to him, and, Jmving done what he could
with them, he placed the fai[-eopy of the' decoded' result in Wellington's
hands, but seem.'! to have been allowed to keep the originals--which were,
of course, unintelligible because of their form, and therefore useless to his
chief. The file of documents which thus remained with him is most
interesting; they range in si1.e (wm fonnal dispatclles of considerable
bulk--eight or ten folio pugcs long-down to scrap!! of the smallest size
\nitten on thin p..'lpcr, and folded up so as to go into some secret place of
concealment 011 the bearer'S {lel'flon. Some of them look as if they had been
sewed up in a button, or rolled under the leathc[ o( a whip handle, or
pushed along the seam or u g::l[ment. I take it that these must all have
been entnlsted to emissaries sent in disguise, AjulIlcfsados or 11C;I$.111ts
hired by lJ, great bribe. l'resllm.ably each of tilCS<: scraps cost the lire of thc
ltr2
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lJcllrcr when it was discovered-for the gucrrillcro elliets did not deal
mildly with Spaniards caught carrying l"rcnch secret order!!. The large
folio dispatches, on the other hand, must no doubt have been carried by
French aides-de-camp or couriers, whose cscort.s were dispersed or captured
by the partidas at some corner of the mountain roads between Madrid
and the head.quarters of the Armies of Portugal and Andalusia.
The cipher lcttc[~ are of two &lrls-in the rimt (Ullll more numerous)
cluss only lhe IIUllletl of Jl(~I'!l()ns und 1)lllL'eS. uud the most important
sClllen(:cs arc in dllhcr-invuriubly II numerical cillher of urbitrury jlgureli.
III the other c1u3!I the whole dispatcll is written in ligurcs. lIot merely its
more weighty clauses. 'rhe I"Casoll for adopting the former method was
that it saved much time; the transliterating of unimportant parts of the
disputeh (such as compliments, and personal remarks of no strategical
import) would havc takcn many extra bours, whell it was necessary to get
a letter sent olf in a hurry. But, as we shall sec later on, there was grave
danger in using this system, because the context might SOllletimCl:i allow
the decipherer to make u good guess at the disguised word~, after reading
1I1llt part or the lctler which was not ~o guarded.
Oet.:usiolllllly u }<'reneh dispatch is ciphered after the snllle iurllntile
system that readers of rOllUlnces will remember in POC'lI Gold Bug or Couan
Doyle's S/lf:rlock Holmes, where letters or numbers are merely substituted
for each other-whcre, for example, 2 always means letter c, or 25 letter t.
This sort of cipher is dangerously easy to an expert reader, cspecially if the
words are separated frotn each other, so that the number of letters in each
can be counted. 'fake, for example, a letter scnt to Soult in 1813 by
Cassau, the blockaded governor of Pampeluna '. Only one precaution had
been taken in this cipher-epistle, viz. that elaborate care has been taken
to defeat the attempt of the reuder to arrive at results by counting what
figures appear most fre'luently, and so deducing by their repetilion that
these mllst be I: (lhe most rre'luently used letter in French, lllI in English),
8, i, a, t, Rnd other oo,n01on letters. This is done by having six alternative
11I11l1lJcrs ror e, four ellch tor (j nnd i, three tor t, s, uud 11. Taking the
simple phrase 47.50.40.41.H.~6 58.24 3.51.1O.36.44.23.17.2,~.lO.50..53.27
47.46 11.18.39.17.46.21, which deciphers into <depuis le eommenccmCl1t
du bloeu~,'we,;ee thllt C llppeurs five tilllCll, but is rel'reSCl.lted by both 50,
:H, nnd 44; u three times, hut vuried as 14 llud 46; m thrice, vllriL'<.Ills
10 llnd 30. This mude the reader's work butder, but not ueurly 80 dil\icult
U~ t1mt n,quired for certain othcr ciphcrs: for the wIlOlc!;Ct or ~ign~, Ix:ing
not much over 60 in number, there Wl\.ll u limited lIluount or possibilities
ror cueh ligure-interpretatioll. And the words being sepatated by spaCC!l,
there was n certainty that some of the two-letter units must fCpl'CllCnt et, de,
ee, cu, du, und similar common }<'rench two-letter words. As a matter or fact
this purtieular dispatch was deciphered in a few hours owing to the lueky
guess fllat its initial words 10.45.23.21.10.2.41.25 5.2-' 10.4.25.24.3.9.8.5
might be ' 1\I!>llsieur le Marechal,' the preliminary address to the intended
recipient. 'l'his hypothesis was verified at once by finding that th.is render-
ing made good sense tor the two-letter words 23.24=lle, and lO.2=nll:, lower
down itl tlie letter. After this all was plain sailing.
1 This particular letter is tlot onc of the Seovell file.
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But the usual French cipher, the' Great Paris Cipher' as Scovcl1 called
it, was a very much more complicated amI difficult affair, as the list or
flgure!:I, insten,l or being only a few wore, ran to many hundreds. And or
these only some few rellTCSCntcd individual letters, more were part.!; of
n syllnlJflry: ma, me, mi, 1Il1l, mlt, ror cxmnplc, had cucl. l\ figure repre-
$Cnting them, und 00 hml IIU- /1/;' fui- Ilf- (,g_ <"e. Moreover, there wn~
n multitude or arbitrary numbers, representing under n single Jigure words
that must orten 1.0<.: used ill u di$putch, such liS lIommc8, urmk, gtnbaf,
'IJUlrclle. ennemi, corpB {rflrm~e, canons. In addition there WIIS 11 code or
proper names, c.g.1216 meant the Hiver DOliI'Q. 93 Portugal, 1279 'falavcra,
585 King Joscph, 1391 General DOl'!lCnnc, 1327 the Army of the SOllth,
1280 50ult,1300 Wellington, 400 Ciudad Rodrigo, &e. It the King wished
the Duke of Dalmatia to send 9,000 men of the Army of the South to
Talavera, he had only to write' 585 desire que 1280 dirigc 1156 (neuf)
602 (mme) 1102 (hommes) de 1327 sur 1279: He would tllen cut up
dfirire and dirige into the syllahles de-Ili-re and di-ri-ge, for each of which
the syllabary had set figures; there were also arbitrary numbers for sur,
de, amI que. So the whole liCntencc would L'lke up only fourtccn numbers
when wriuen out.
It would liCClll at first sight that lo interpret slleh :L dispfltch would he
a perfectly hopeless task, to finy onc who hud not the key to the cipher
before l,;lll. That the mlmirllbly jlllticnt uud illb'CniO\l~ Scovcll at last
mndc out for himself >l key from the laboriuus cOIllJlurillOlI of documents,
W!lll nevertheless the raet. He was stnrtL'<l on thc tmek by the fortunate
cireumstnncc thut most or thc intercepted dispatches wen: only porlty
in ciphcr. l\larmont would write' Avcc les moyens que j'ui, et 798, 1118,
602, 131, 1112.603.1135.502 all dcl1l. de Sabugal,' or • J'avais donn6
I"ordr<': que 1003, 4117, 1115, 1383, Gll,71l, 772, 530, de dcscclldr<': cette
rivillr<': et de se mettre en communication avee moL' Clearly the cipher-
figures in the first ease have something to do with a march on Sabugal, ill
the second wilh orders to some general or body of troops (to be identified
hercarter) to march down a river which the eontcxt shows must be the
Tagns. This is not much help, find the task looked still vcry hopeless.
Dut when intercepted dispatches aceumulated in quantities, and the same
cipher-figures kept oceurring among sentences of which part was written
out in full, it became evident that various cryptic figures must mean places
and persons who could be guessed at, with practical certainty. Occa-
sionnlly a French writer completely' gives himself away' by carelessness;
e.g. Dorscnne wrote on April HI toJourdan, 'VOllS voule7- de rellscignement
sur la situation milit.'lirc et administrative de 1238:' obviously the probable
interpretation of this number is 'the Arm;y of the North,' and this is
rendered almost certain by pnssngcs lower down the same letter. Equally
incautious i~ King Joscph when he \'I'1'iI£S to Marmont, '.T'lIi donn{, I'ordre
fill g,;n6ral Treill.'lrd de 117.8.7 la v.'l1l6e !lu 1:J8:J, arm de marcher ,\ 498.'
Considering the situntion of the moment 117.8.7 must ulmost cerl::~inly
mean etJaCUtIk, 1383 'I'flgU9, nnu 408 somc huge town.' [The particular
disJlutch ill wl,ieh this oe(,,,.'!! is Oil .. ffill'St curious piece of paper, lmlr "n
inch brand, II foot long, lIml ex{~ssivcly thin. Tt is bent into twelve folds,
t WellinglOIl wrongly guessed Plasencia: it was Aranjue1..
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and would Ill'. into !lily small reecptucle of onc inch I;y hull 1\1\ inch. I fear
the bcan:r who had it on Ilis person must have oomc to a bad cnd.] Suchct
also made SCQvcll the 11("Cscnt of some uscful words whcn he wrote on sep-
tember 17 to SoulI'., 'Le General )Iaitland commande I'cxp&l.itioD anglaise
venue de 7'~7: O'Donncll pent rt':unir 78G (I\)2 1102 en )' comprenant
le corps de l'Anglais Hochc. Le 10 nout jc n'avuis que 135 692 1102
a lui opposer.' Here it is quite clear that '7n' means Sidly; that
• O{)2.1102' ill the two ~latClllcnts or forces means UlQllSlllld men. A littJe
guessing und comparison wilh other crYl,lic stul.emcnls of forces would
soon show thut ] a5 lIlCl.mt 7 and 786 meant 12.
Nolwith",ltllJ(.Iillg much useful help it wws sWI n I1lnrvcllOllS fellt. of
&.<Qvcll to work out by the cnd or 1812 no kss tlUlIl flillt~ hundred SCpUl'lltc
cipher-numbers, ranging in complexity trom the simple vowel a to tile
symbol that represented' train des ~quipagcsmilitnires'! He must have
had a most ingenious brain, and wllimited jlatience. Down to the end
there remnined numbers of unsolved riddles, figures that represented
persons or places so unfrequently mentioned that there was no v,.ay of
discovering, by comparison betwcen several documents, what the number
WilS likely to mean,
Sometimes very slllall fish came into the net or the guerrilleros, :lIld were
!>Cut Oil to \Vellington; l~\ke, ror example, Ule tiny serl~p contniniug the
pathetic letter or the young wire of Geneml Merlin, ot the ClLvnlry or tile
Army of the Ccntro-I rear that the bearer must have fallen into the IUlmJll
of Julillll Sanehcz or one or hill lieult:nllntll, lIIU.! have hml tillOrt shrirt:-
'!\Ion eher Ami,-Dcllllis ton depart je n'ai rc~\l (Iu'un scul mot de toi-
pendant qu'il arrive dc.s eourriers (e·cst,..:\-dirc des paysanll) du quurtier
gen~ral. MOll onele qui ecrit reguliilrcmcnt dit tOUjOllrs qu'oll se
porte bien, mais tu peux te mettre 11 mu place! Je erains que ta goutte
lie soit revenue, je cruins tant de ehoses, qui pcut-Ctre passent le sens corn-
mUll, mais qui me tourmentent. Je ne dors plus, et n'ai d'autre plaisir que
celui de rcgurdcr mn fi1le, qui se porte bien, Encore si cUe pouvait m'en·
tendrc ct me consoler I Adieu! Je suis d'unc tristcsse insupportable,
parce que je t'aime plus que moi-mCffie.-Merc6des.'
It may suffice to show the general eharacter of a Lypieal eipher-dispatcb
if we give n few lines of one, "ith the interllret:ltion added below-the
following comes from a dispnteh of Mnrmont written OIl April 22, 1812,
to Bcrthier, from l'-uenle Guinaldo:-
Le . -c ' . I cl' rd 100(1 <1-112 81U HI5 1034 ]282
rol "Iu S lU aVOlr (onn' 0 rc de r"ire pur- tir deux divisions
971 21tl ]:1 Hl2 01-1 :!O 00 112 1~(l5 582 037 851 800 388 177
eL 1/1"s de III moi_ li- c de la eavlIlerie dis- IlO- ni- lJle, et Ilvoir
60{l ll2 {l23 2 786 6{l2 1102 I b' t " ...:.. ·bl
re- du- it iI douz.c mille hOllllllCS CUOill rcue 1'01lpcs(lueJ alutipolU e
'd 13 1040 1003 a70 800 400 817 6{l 862 718 llOO
III or OUlIC de cherehcr a IIl'ClI-dre Cilldad llodrigo lors que je ne Iii
423 815 501 7JO 850
pas un canon de siilgc!
It will be noted t1lllt of nil the words only Imr/ir, moi/it, llilllJOllilJk,
r~dui/, Im:ndrc, required to be spelled out iu the syllalmry: sillgle fixed
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llumbcnl eXisting fur nil Ule common word~, llnd for the military tcrffill
sitge, CIW/IU!Tie, IIlld dilJi&iQIl.
It was, of course, only by degrees that Soovcll suceccdcd in making out
the bulk of the French phrases. In Wellington's dispatches there ill often,
during the spring and SUlllUlCr of 1812, an allusion to information only
partly comprehensible, obtained from ca.ptured letters. On June 18
(Di3pat<:hts, ix. p. 24]) Wellington writes w L<>rd Liverpool that he • is not
able entirely to decipher' the intercepted papers that have been passing
between King ,Joooph and Soult nnd Marmont. On June 25th he sends to
the SJ).me recipient tile happy intelligence that he has now the key to
King ,fo&Cph's cipher. Yet again, on .July lOth (/mp(llches, ix. p. ~OO)­
with Nu. 36 of the file cnbllo.l,:ucd lJelow before him-he lllIYS: • J have tllis
duy got .. letter rroll' the King to l\Inrmullt of the Oth inst. in cipher, which
I cllllnot cntirely decipher: it appears, however, thllt he thinks Drouet
will not cross the Tagus, and I sllspect lit: ordeTS General 'l'rcillard to collcct
some troops ill the valley of the TagtlS, and to move 00 Plasencia..' The
interpretation was correct, save that Treillard was to move not on Plasencia.
but on Aranjucz. The code·numbers for the two places wcre ncith.er of
them known as yet. But by September all essential words were dis~
covered, and Wellington could comprehend nearly everything, unless
Joscph or Soult was writing of obscure places or distant generals.
A list of till: whole of Scovcll's file of 52 French dispatehes may be
useful: those whose number is marked with a star are wholly or partly
in cipher, the remaining minority are in plain French without disguise. It
is cle.u that 'Vellington had many more rrrenell papers not in cipher,
which did not get into Scovell's portfolio.
'", April 11 l\Iarrnont llrcnnicr
3*. April 14 Soult llcrthicr
4*, AprillG " :'tlarmont Dcrtlllcr
5*. AprillG Dorscnne Jourdan
'", Allril17 .. Soult Derthicr
'", April 22 .. Mannont Bcrthier
Date. Sender.
1. Mar. G, 1812 Col. JllrJet
Uecipil:111.
Mllrmont
Contellt8.
LolIg interview wiU, Berthier.
He suys you must' eontuin'
Wellington in the Korth. All
else in Spain matters COIll-
paratively little.
Sce that Silveira does not molest
my communications.
Marmont has betrayed me, and
eaused the loss of Badajoz.
Synopsis or Andalusian affairs.
As I prophesied, my raid into
Portugal produ~s no effect :
we begin to starve.
I refuse to acknowledge the king
as controlling my army.
Details of the fall of Dadajo~
'cv~nement fWlcste.'
I have been starved out of
Portugal. HaVt: seen no
British. troops, save a few
ea\'alry
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H'-, Mayt Kill!;! J)01'liCllnc
Jm;eph
20·, May 1
"
Jourdan Dorscnnc
21*, Mayt Jourdan Mannont
22*, May 1 .. Jourdnn lkrtllicr
10. April 26
"
Gen.l,a(oo- Gen. Trcil-
Hhmiuc I lurd'
U*, April 28
"
Mllf'ffiont DOrsclll1C
12*, J\pril28 Marmont Dcrthicr
13. April 28
"
Gen. Clarkc
L.'mtar-
tinicre •
14*, April :'.'1l
"
MllmlOnt •Tourdan
17. April:1O .. i\larmont
Contents.
Send me food. My divisioll is
nearly stan'cd.
I am yOllr Commander-in-Chief.
Send me a report of your
army.
Kcws trom Andalusia at last:
Soult has failed to save
BmJajO"'.
Semi me 8,000 quinlnls of wheat
lit oucc.
t lmvc !!Cut Bonnet, as ordctcll,
to invade the Asturias.
I selld parolc of Colquhoun
Grant, a suspicious character.
Thc poliee should look to
him'.
If I keep troops on thc Tagus,
I am too weak on thc Douro
and Tormcs. I must draw m~'
divisions northwurd.
I find that five BritiJ:Ih divisions
were chasing mc last week.
Wellington is very strong ill
the North.
Send me a siege-train, I am
helpless without onc: also
plenty of moncy.
Come up at onee to join my
anny.
'Ye will keep unhorsed guns for
yOll nt Talavera, 80 when
moving Sout.h bring g1ltlllcn;
nnd horses only.
Yon "re !Jlneed under my corn-
nmnd. Obey my orders.
Send l\ division to Valladolid, to
support J\humont.
You must scnd more troops 10
the Tagus: Drouet is hard
pressed in Estremadura,
Wellington is advancing in
Est.remadura. Marmontmust
send troops southward.
Gen.
Tirlct'
l'[[lrmont
Bcrthicr
Bcrthicr
Dorsennc
JW;ipicul.
Jourdan
Sender.
" .Jourdan
Date.
{l*, April 25 " King
.Trn;ellh
S*, :\pri12~1.1812 Foy
16*, April30 " MamlOnt
15*. April 2l) " Marmont
Governor of La Manclm.
Commanding cavalry on Ille Tagus.
Marmont's Chief-of-the-StafT. ' Sce above, p. 293.
Commanding nrtillery of the Army of Porlugal, on Icave.
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Army or the Centre.
Caffarelli
King
Joscph
King
JOSCllh
Killg
JOSCllh
King
,Toscph
King
Joscph
JOUnJUll
JOllroan
Marmont
Soult
Soult
Soult
" Snehet
". MnrmOllt
" MurmOllt
" King
.Toscph
" Marmont
" King
Joseph
" I';:ing
JOSCllh
,Tuly 1
Jnty 1
July 29 .. Gen. Lafon- King
Blaniae' .Joseph
Com.llmnding arlillery or thc
NolV governor of Madrid.
32.
31"'. Julyl
29"'. June 22 " Marmont
30"'. June 2,~ " l\Iarmont
28"'. June 1
27·, May 26 ".lollrllull
Dale. Sender. llccipiclll. Conlenl$.
23*, May 1, 1812 I\:ing Bcrthicr ObscrVlltions on tJIC military
Joscph situation.
" Col. DollS- Gen. Doguc. Technical artillery matters.
scroque rau •
25. Ma)' 20 "Proclam.1.tion by Suchct The I\:ing is appointed Corn·
mander-in·Chief in Spain.
Hilllms st,ormed Almnrnz. \Vby
WIIS not Drollct near enough
to Have it ?
Hill has stormed AlmnTllz. Try
lo re-open cOrIUlluuicutions
with 1"oy.
The (all of Almaraz mellos that
Wellington will attack me
next. He is not threatening
Soult, but mc.
I stop in Iront or Salamanca
manCl:uvring. I dare not
attack \Vcllington till CalTa·
rem's reinforcements arrive.
I am mam:cuvring opposite
Wellington. YOllr reinforce·
ments are required at once.
When the Salamanca forts feU,
I retreated to tile Douro.
I cannot fight Wellington till
I get 1,500 more horse and
7,000 more infantry.
Nnrmtive of guerrilla war in
Anlgon.
Favour f>!mll be ~hown to
A!rGllcCStl(/O.9.
1 IIn<..l to retrent lo lhe Douro
!x:eU\I>;C Cuffm'dli scut no help.
Can you lend me Treilh.lrd·s
cava.lry division?
Send 10,000 men to Toledo at
OF/ce.
1 shall march to your aid in
a few days, when my troops
arc collected.
I am much worried by Mait-
land's approach. Have beaten
.Joscph O'Donnell at Castalla.
Madrid remains tranquil.
:.l:l,
38.
:H"', July G
:17"', Jut)" 22 "Suehet
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52. Mar.16 " Col. Luoottc IGug
Joseph
46"', Sept. 17 .. Suchct Soult
47", Dec. 9 .. King Napoleon
Joscph
48", Dec. 22
"
King Napoleon
Joseph
42, Aug. 2 Gen. Killg
Espcrt 1 Joscph
43', Aug. 7 King )Iarmont
Joseph
44', Aug. 12
"
Suchet King
Joscph
45., Aug.12 " Soult Clarke
Dale. $ender.
41 ". JulyMO,l812 Marmont
40., .TUll. 8, HIla King
•Joscl,h
SOl', .Tun.28 .. King
Joscph
51"', Mar.14 " Kiug
Joscph
Recipient.
T{jng
Joseph
Napoleon
Napoleon
Gell. RciJlc
Cotlle/lts.
\Vc can never hope to unite. My
army retires via. Lerma on
nurgOfl.
Wellington is marching on Se-
govia.
Communicate with me by the
Somosicrra Pass.
I am much alanned at the
possible results of l\IaitJand's
landing.
The I{ing is betraying the
Emperor and negotiating ",iUl
the Cudiz Cortes',
Expltlillll situation in Valencia.
Plans for reorganizing the
armies.
Plans lor ne,.t year. Should
I make Durgos my capital,
and hold lIIadrid only as an
outpoot?
So"lt i~ intolerable. J..et D'Er1on
I'Cplace him. Send us money•
You r deei~ion nbout SouIt ~hockll
lIIe. I sl'all !SCnd him UWI'Y on
my own llUthority.
D'Erlon shall look alter Sala-
mallca. Send two divisiollll to
hunt the gucrrilleros.
Discouraging news from Paris.
No men or money for Spain!
In addition to the ciphers, the Scovell papers consist or short diaries of
Major ScovcU for tile Coronna Cllmpaigll, and ror 18Oll-1o-11-12-1a, as
also a large bundle of rej)orts and maps of roads and passes in Portugal,
all the I)llpcrs concerning the raising or the Corps of Guides, u number or
notes and reports 011 suggested travelling forges ror the artillery and
engineers, and somc whole or mutilated contemporary Spanish ncwspapcl'll.
There is some curious and interesting information scattcred through all
of UlI,llll.
GQvernor of Scgovia.
For the story or this letter sce above, pp. S3S-f).
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BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY IN THE
CAMPAIGNS OI<' 1812
[DE1'ArLS COLLEC'l'ED BY MAJOR J. H. LESLIE, R.A,)
I. ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY
The following troops were serving in the l'eninsuhl in 1812 :-
Troop.
A
D
E
I
Under Comma/id of
Brevet Major H. D. Ross
Captain G. Lefebure 1
(Later 2nd Captl,in E. C.
Whinyatesl
Captain R. Macdonald
Brevet Major R. Dull
Arrived in
l't7limmla.
July 1809
March 1810
August 1811
August 1800
Designation in 1914.
, A' Battery, R.H.A.
'V' Battery, R.H.A.
'E' Battery, R.n.A.
• I' Battery, R.n.A.
A, E, and I were serving with \Yellington's main army in 1812, attached
respectively to the Light Division, the 7th Division, and the 1st Division of
Cavahy (Stapleton Cotton). All three were present at Salamanca, but
A was left at Madrid in August with the Light Division, and did not take
part in the BurgOll Campaign. D was attached to Erskine's '2nd Cavalry
Division,' and served undcr Hill in Etitrcmadura from thc beginning of thc
ycar tiJIlIill marched lip to Madrid in October.
11. ROYAL (l<'OOT) ARTILLERY
A.
The seven complLlliCli shown in the rollowing tlLblcs were serving ill the
l'euillNulll in1812 with t.he field nrm~·.
No·n:.-In 1812 tJ,ere ...erc ten lJ11ttaliolls or HO)'nl (Foot) Artillery, the
companies of which were alwuys designll.ted by the 1I1111lC of thc command·
ing omccr, whether he WlIS u.d;unlly prt."·iCnt with his COl11jJIlny or no.
IInl- U'lIlcr CU/lwwml of Arrivel1i/1 lJc$ig.wlum in 11)14.la/iQ/i. l'elli"8tflo..
lot Cnpwin ,T. May 2 March l HOO 2nd Dattery, R.F.A.
4th Captain S. M"xwel1 October IHlO 72 Company, R.G.A.
5t.h Cllpwiu F. Glubb 3 !\I(.reh HmI) <IS COl11pany, n.G.A.
, Lefebure dicd or sickness in October, and the battery WRs commanded
tillne..xt spring by Wllinyates.
• Actually under commuml or 2nd Cllp",in H. Baynes.
• Aet'ullly under collulland of 2,,11 Curtain W. G. Power.
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nrn· Dwler Command af Arrived in DcsigrUllion ',~ HIU.
talion. Peninsula.
8th Brevet Major R W. April 1811 78 Company, RC.A.
Cat<!iner
Bth Captain n. Lnwson August ]808 87ttl Battery, RF.A.
8th Captain J. P. Eligc' October 1810 Reduced in 1819.
[L.'lter, Cuptain T. A.
Brandreth]
'U, Cnptain n. Douglas March 18]2 45th Bnltery, R.F.A.
or these, Gardiner's company was uttaehed to the Ist Division, l\luxwell's
to the 2nd, Douglas's to the 3rd, Lnwson's to the 5th, EligC'~ to the (ltll,
May's company accompanied the main army without guns, in charge oC the
Reserve ammunition train.
Clubb's oompan)' was attached to the heavy ]8-poumlers and Z4·pounder
howihers oC the Reserve Artillery.
Cardiner's, DOllgla.s's, l.nwson's, nnd Elig,':'S [now temporarily under
2nd Captnin W. Greenc, I':lib.c llflving been killed at the SlIlllnmncol forlsJ
compnnics were present at SnJnmllll(.~I, us wns also the Hescnre Artillery,
but the lnst-named wus not engaged.
MaxweU's company WM with Hill in Estremadura Crom January till the
mareh to Madrid in Septembcr-Oetobcr. Part or it was present at the
capture of Almaraz pn ID ;\lay.
n.
The Collowillg nuditiolll\1 compllllics were ill l'ortugal in 1812, but did not
join the fleld army ;-
n.,.
laiiml.
6th
'"6th
5th
Gth
Ullller Comnl/lml of
Brevet Major H. F.
Holoombc
Cartuin A. Bred in
Captuin C. Thompson
Captain H. Stone
Captuin W. Morrison
Arrived ill
P~lliIlSul(l.
April UHT
Septemher ]808
J',lareh 1809
Mnrch 1812
October 1812
Derigllwitm i,~ ]OH.
l02Compnny, R.C.A.
37tll Blltlery, R.F.A.
18th Battery, R.I?A.
92 Compnny, RG.A.
51 Company, RC.A.
or tllCSC Holcombc's company was employed at the sieges or Ciud:l(1
Rodrigo and Dndajoz. The other companies present at these lc..'lguers were
Clubb's nnd Lawson's at Rodrigo, and Glubb's and Gardiner's nt BadajO'l.
In .Tune HoJoomhe's ,,,,d 1'hompsoll's companies were 8Cnt round by se:.
10 the cast COMt of Spain, lInd there joined the Anglo-Sieilinn expedit.ion
of Cene!"..l l\1nillaud, with which the;y continued to serve.
, Elige was shot through the I,enrl on the SCOOllll ua)' or the siege or the
Sn.Jamanca rort~. 2nd Calltnin W. Grccnc colllnm"ded the company at
the battle oC Sulamanca.
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c.
02'
At the beginning of 1812, there were present at Cadiz, Cart.'1genn, and
Tarifa, doing garrison duty, the following companies under Lieut.-Col.
A. Dunean:-
Hat· Arrived in
talion. Untkr Command 01 PenillS'Ula. Desigllatum i11 1914.
2nd Captuin I'. Cnmphell' Mareh 1810' 02 Company, R.G.A.
5th Captain H. Owen .lanuary 1810 60 Company, R.G.A.
{lth Cnptain 1'. J. HugllCS Junuary 1810 Reduced in 1819.
10th CnIlll,in W. Ho1Jerts !\larch 1810 03 Company, R.G.A.
10th Mnjor A. Dick~on April 1810 21 Compuny, R.G.A.
10th Cuptuill W. Shcllley April 1810 11 Compuny. R.G.A.
or these Hughes's company WM detached to Tarifu, und took n brilliuut
part in itll defence in Dec. 1811-Jan. 1812. The rest wcre in Cadb'; and the
Isle of Leon. Owen's and Dickson's compunies (tIle lattcx until July 1812
being commanded by Captain R. H. Birch, whose own company of the
10th battalion was at Gibraltar, M Dickson, with the rank of Major, was
serving with the Portuguese Army) marched foom Cadiz to Madrid witb
Skerrett's column at the cnd of September 1812, and in October joined
\VeJlington's main field army. Hughes's, Roberts's, and Shenley's com-
panies remained in garrison at Cadiz, and Campbdl's was divided between
Curtagena and Tarifu.
D.
At Alieuute, under Genernl Mnithmd, there were preliCnt during the
later monthJ; of the yellr !lot only Hok-ollloo's /lnd '1'hOllljlSOn'S COIllJll1nks,
whieh Imd COlDe round from LiSUoll, but ulso the two following British
COmllllUiCl:l fTOm Sicily :-
",..
Udilm.
8th
4th
Under Commalld of
Cuptain J. S. WilliulIlson
Cuptain H. G. Lacy
Arriuedill
PwimrnltJ..
August 1812
Dcecmlx:r 1812
lJellil11/alimt ill H1l4.
40tll Battery, R.F.A.
25 Compl1ny, R,G.A.
Ill. laNG'S GERlIAN LEGION AItTILLERY
or the three companies of the Legionary Artillery ill the Penhlllllll1 only
one (No. 4) WUll with the Ileld army, that of Cuptnin j'. SYIllJlher,'l1ttnchcd
to the 4th Division. 'fhis unit wu.~ jJfCliCllt ut the siege of Ciudnd Rodrigo,
and also ut the battle of Salalllanell.
Cajltuin J<. Hettbcrg's (No. 1) and Captain A. Clcevcs's (No. 2) companies
were doing b'Urrison duty in the Lisbon forts; but Hettberg himself,
with a de~clUllctlt of two olllcers and thirty men of his company, Cllme up
to the siege 01 Badlljoz ill ?>Iurcb-April.
1 'I'hill COlllPlLllY went to Cllrtub'Clm fn}lll Cudi:r. ut the cnd of J"allunry
]812, where it reIIUlil1~'d until U,e end of the wur. CUlllpbcU wu,. not witb
it, haVing eomnullLd 01 Uti illll1ntry regiment in the SJluu.ish Army.
• F'TOm Gibraltar,
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IV. l'ORTUGUESE ARTILLERY
[The details are taken from Majot Teixeira Botelho's Subsidios.]
Only thJ'(:c field batteries uecompanicd the allied lIe1d army during the
campaign of 1812, though sevcn had llcen at the front in 1811. These
batteries were :-
Captain J. da Cunllll Freta's O.pounder [from the 1st regiment] and
Captain W. Braun's 9-pounder [from the 2nd regiment] batteries, both
attached to General Hamilton's Portuguese division, which always acted
with Hill in Estremnduro, and Major 8 . .1. de Arrillgn's 2.lt-pounder howit1oCr
battery, which formed part of the Artillery Re.'lCrve, Hnd IIccomflllnied
Wellington's own army to lludajo~,SuJumullclI, IInd Burgos. This t'Qlllpuny
came from the 1st (Lisbon) regiment.
But in addition the 2nd or Algarve regiment supplied onc company,
under Captain J. C. Pereirll do Amllral for the siege of Badlljo~.
'l'he 4th or Oporto regiment gave two companies (200 men) under
Captain J. V. Muon for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and one (70 men)
under Captain William Cox ror the siege of Dndnj01.. Cox's company
Vo"llll sent round lo Alieanle in June, along with tlte British companies of
Holcombe and 'l'hompson, and joined MuillllUd's Anglo-Siciliull COrjlS for
the rest of the wnr.
Another compuny of Ule 4th regiment under Cllpt.uin D. G.l"erreri formed
the divillional artillery of Silvcira's l'iUlitia t'Qrps, and WIIB prescnt at the
blockade of Znmora in June-July 1812.
The 1st or LJsbon regiment sent. a company tmder Captain M. A. Pencdo
to Alicante, along with the company of Cox mentioned above from
the 4th regiment. It also supplied onc company undet Lieutenant A. da
Costa e Silva for t.he siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.
The :lrd or Elvas regiment. supplied three comp,:mics, under the command
of Major A. Tlllloh " for t.hc ~iege of Dadllj07.-lhey were tho6C of Cnpt.:lins
A. V. BarreiJ'(lll, J. Elizeu, 1111<1 .J. M. Dclglldo.
J Captain R.A., but now serving in the Portuguese Artillery, wit.h the
rank or Major.
INDEX
Abadia, Francisco X(\,\'icr, gencral,
ordCI"!l ror, 220; tiresomc conduct
of, 337'.
Abbe, gencral, govcrnor of Navarrc,
his proclflmation flgninst guerril.
lerOl;, 102; defeated by Mina, W8.
Alba de Tormes, Carlos de Espaiifl.
fails to hold eastle of, 415, 466.
Al!.mcm, Hill in position nt, 2611 ;
combats in front of, 527-a0.
Alcantara, bridge of, restored by
Wellington, :ma.
Aldayll, cornbut or, 64.
Alicantc, occupied by MlIhy, I'C-
pulses t11011tbrun, 78, 79 ; Maitlllnd
lands nt, 573.
Almarllz, forts of, stormed by Hill,
322-30.
Almcida, re·fortificd by Wellington,
IOU. l'Cpulses the attack of
Cluuscl, 281-
Almcndralcjo, seized by Hill, 132.
Altafu1!a, combat of, 96.
Altcn, Victor, gencral, lails to assist
CnrlOli de Espniill at Hodrigo, 2l«1;
retreats to ViiI" Vclhn, 284;
results of his action, 290; with
Wcllington's advanoo into Spain,
a,,2 ; at Snlamanc.'l, n{I;'), ami,
372-3; ut PoUos, 389, SDO, 401 ;
his sut'CCssful eburge nt Castrillo,
405-(); woundcd at Salamanca,
422.
Americ.'l, Spanish colonics in, trou·
bles uf, 136-8, 337'.
Andalusia, position of Soult in, 80,
108,109,110,274,305; evacuation
of, proposed by Jourdan, ll07, :{08;
rcsio;ted by So"lt, 309-10; opern-
tions in, during June-August, 521,
522,535, 536; evacuation of, by
Soult, 5:m-4:J.
Al1,lriulli, Luis, colonel, defends
811guntum, 18, 17-30; surrenders,
45--6.
Ansoll, Georgc, major.gcncilll, opera-
tion~ of his cavalry, 'Lt)), 4U2; at
Sfllllmanea, 44\1, 461 j nt GllTcia
Hernulldez, 501.
Anson, Wi1liam, major-general, his
brigade at Castrillo, !loOO; at
Salamanca, 4<37, 458.
Aragon,Frencharmy of,5 j Suchct's
garrisons in, 6 j operations of
Duran and the guerrilleros in, 21-
3 j Freneh reinforcements for,
51-2; Palombini's and Scvcroli's
campaigns in, 98-101.
Arcntschildt, Friedrich, colonel,
tukes comllland of a brignde ut
Salamanca, 442-5, 454, 461, 494;
marches on Madrid, 504.
Arlificers, Royu.l Military, at siege
ot BndajlY/;, 225, 255-6; convcrted
into Royal Sappers and Mincrs,
250.
Artillcry, the allied, table of the, in
1812, Appendix, pp. 6HI-22.
lutorga, siege ot, 387-8, 388, 502.
Asturias, the, evacuated by Bonnet,
1l)~; reconquered by him, 338 j
cvacuated ag:'!in, 300, :lIll.
Aubcrt, eoloncl, govcrnor of Al.
lJlaraz, slain there, 324--6.
Ayerbe, skirmish at, 22.
I3lLCl,.oclur, Munucl, general, com-
mands Portuguese of the North,
219-21; concentrates to keep off
Marmont, ~82-3 j dissuades Trant
from llttl<eking l\1unnOllt, 285.
Dadajoz, siege of, 217-56; dis-
grnceful sack. of, 256-64.
Dallastcros, Francisco, gencral,
harasses Sonlt in south Andnlusill,
111 j harasses the besicgers ot
Tarifa,116-17; unwilling to receive
orders from British, 230 ; threatens
Seville, 274; l'Ctires premllturely,
275 j his incffcctive raids on
ZlIhara and Osuna., 275 j routs
Hey at A1haurin, 270; checked
at bntUe of BornOll, :130, 348,
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385 j in6tructed by Wellingtoll to
threaten Seville, 51!); detcntcd
at llornos, 521, 522; surprises
Malagn, 535; and Ostlnu, 536;
IUlfllSseS retreating l"rCllch, 542,
,...
Barcelona, alleged poisoning plot at,
505.
BlIrlllard, Andrew, colonel, ut lhe
storm ot Ciudad Rodrigo, 179 ; be-
comes commander of the Light
Division on Cnluturd's death, 182,
184,
Barric, general, governor 01 Ciudad
Rodrigo, J65, ]7:1, 1811.
BlIuois, general, takes part in siege
of Tarifa, 116; sent to Drouet's
aid by Soult, 525, 53l.
Balhurst, HCllry, st:eoml cnrl, his
correspondence with Wellingtoll
on financial difficulties, 350, 351.
Bentinck, Lord Frederick, ncgo-
tintes with Wellington, 344.
Bentinck, Lord William, com-
mander of British forces in Sicily,
proposes expedition lIgninst east
coast of Spain, 342, 343; sends
only a small force, 346, 347; his
indecision, a86, 408; the expe-
dition stnrts, 499, 565.
Beresford, William Carr, marshal,
his strict discipline for Portuguese
army, 149; ut 6iege of 13"dajoz,
217, 228; lea<.ls centre of urmy
advancing into Leon, 352; nomi.
nated by Wellington second in
command in event of his being
disabled, 353; before Snlanlanea,
359; with Wellington involved in
skirmish of Castrejon, 402; urges
tlelay in uttnck ut Salnmanea, 427;
in the battle, 450; wounded,
471-
Berkeley, :ulmiral, sends RU!llIian
guns for siege of BlldlljOZ, 2Z.~.
Berthier, Louis Alexander, marshal,
his dispatch to Marmont on re-
organi1~'1tion of army oC l'ortul,,''llI,
189; l>Cnds news of Joscph's
appointment as Commander-in.
Chief to the marshals in the
Peninsula, 298-9.
Bertoletti, general, governor of
Tarragona, 96.
Bilbao, taken by PophlLlll and lHen-
tli7.o.11ll1, 1i56; recupluretl hy Cuf·
farclli, 557.
mAke, Joaquim, general, Spanish
eOlllmll"dt:r';lI-chict ill Vnlcncia,
Il$ljUIllCS tlcCcnsivc lIgainst Suehet,
10; his plans, 19-23; advances
against Suehet, :ll; defeated at
lmtllc of Sagulltlllll, a6-43; be·
sieged by Suehet in Valencia, 47-
72; surrenders, 73; imprisoned at
Vineenlles, 7a.
llhmille, H. Lafou, gencoll, up·
pointed governor of Madrid on
.Toseph'& departure, 488; defends
the Hetiro against Wellington,
507; surrenders, 516.
Boek, Eberhard, major·general,
enmrrllllltling Heavy Dragoons
KG.L. at Badll.joz, 219, 229; with
army advancing into Leon, 352;
lit S:tIUmulle:t, 3li5, a72, 373; at
}Jollos, :lSO; lit CllStrillo, 31l0; lit
Salamanell, 403, ,125; at GlI.rcia
Hernandez, 476-7; marches on
Madrid, 504; gOCij north witb
Wellington, 581.
Bonnet, general, his expedition into
~he Aslurias, aas; summoned by
Marmont before Salamanca, 854;
joins him, 381,390,391; his feigned
advance against Wellington, 397 ;
ut SallllfllUlell, 4U-31l; Ill;>iumes
command on Marlllont's being
disabled, 440; wounded, 440, 409.
Bomos, 11'.OtUe of, 336, a84'i.
Bourkc, gcm.:f!tl, defeated by Eroles
lit rrOOa, 98.
lloussard, general, wounded at
Ald"y", 64.
llrennicr, Antoine l"ranc;,'ois, gcnerul,
blockades ROOrigo, 281 ; beaten at
Castrillo, 405, oiOG; his division
routed lit Snlanmnell, 451.
Burgoync, John, major of engineers,
takes charge of assault 011 castle of
Badajol'.,251 ; besieges the forts or
SulalllullclI, 362.
Cadiz, bombardment of by the
French, 167, 168; polities ut,
137-44: siege or, Tllised, 539, 540.
CarrareUi, Louis Matie, genera..l,
occupies Saragossa, 57; troubles
of, in Arngon, 82; vainly pursues
Mina, 103; \Vellington's pllUls
against, 339, 340; promises help
to l\farmont, aS6, 372; fails to
scnd it, 3TH, :ma, 394; sends
cavalry brigade under Clmuvel,
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4HI; relieves 5..'\ntander, 554;
reblkcs Uilollo from .Mclldizaoal,
550,557.
Culat.'\yud, cnpturcd hy Dur/m, 21,
22 i att&ckcd by Montijo, 51-2 i
eaptuted by Gayan, 101.
Cmnllbcll, Colin, general, governor
of Gibraltar, garrisons 'l'urHu, 112;
forbids abandonment of the town,
]23.
CUlllphclI, .John, colonel, commands
brigade of l'ortugucsc horse in
Estremadura, 219, 530, 531, 584.
Caro, .Jos';, gcneml, at batlle 01
SnguutulIl, 33, 41, 42.
Caroline, queen of the T?,'o Sieilies,
her intrigues against the British,
:i46,341.
Catrcra, La, Martin, brigadicr, cn·
compasses Boussard's cavalry at
Aldaya, 114; his gallant raid on
Mureia, 81; death, 81,
Carric, geneml, Ix:o.tcn and cap·
tured at Castrillo, 405.
Caslalla, battle of, 567-70.
CustUILOS, l'-'runcis Xuvicr, gencrul,
in command in Galieia, H17, 219,
337,388.
Castello Dranco, sacked by CllItlsel,
284.
Castlcrcagh, Lord, suceo::eds Can·
ning at the Foreign Office, 155,
849.
Custrcjon, oombat of, 401, 402.
Castrillo, combat 01, 405, 400.
Castro Urdiales, taken by l'opham,
553.
Cntnlonia, Frenelt army of, .~, 5 ;
(1)Crntiom; of Lucy, Eroles, mul
Dccncn in, UQ-9; formllllyanncxed
byNlIpolcon, 97; projected British
landing in, 3'J.o~; L'\cy's summer
oompnign in, 502-4; MlIithmd
rdllJ;e~ to Illlld ilt, 571.
Ccccopicri, colonel, slain nell~
Ayerbe.22.
Cerdo.gne, ravagcd by Eroles, 93 ;
by Sursfiel,l, 00.
ChUllVc1, gcncllll, urrives aftcr
Salamanca, and covers ~etreat of
I<'~eneh army, 482.
Chlopiski, general, commands l1ank-
guard ut Suguntum, 35; his vic-
torious charge, 37.
Chowne, Chfistopher Tilson, general,
'l"lkef\ false ILttuek on Cl\l'llle of
Mimvelc, 324-8.
O){AN. v
Ciudad Rool, SCi7M by Morillo, 134.
Chmscl. llertrllnd, gencral, fuils to
attack Almeida, 281; occupies
CasteUo Branco, 28·'; dissuades
i\lunnont from uU:.ucking o.t Suln·
manea, 367, 368 ; his unsuccessful
attack at Castrillo, 405, 40U i at
lmttle of Snlnmllnell, 430, 4-.'15 i
assumes command after IHarmont
and Bonnet arc disabled, 440; ad-
vanCCli on \Vellington's centre,
458; repulsed, 460; wounded,
469; his dispatch to Joseph,
48g; continues to retreat north,
4()l.
Clinton. Henry, general, his vic-
torious advance at Salamanca,
4.'W-60; lert to contain Chmsel,
501.
Codrington, Edward, captain R.N.,
operations of, on the coast of
Cntlllonill, {l2, 503, 564 i his views
on Lacy and Erolcs, 572.
Colborne, John, oolonel, leads
stnrming·party at Ciudad Rodrigo,
167; wounded, 182, 184.
Cole, Bon. Lowry, gcneml, his
operations on June' 10, 403-6;
his advance at Salamanca, 455 i
wounded, 456.
Conroux, Nicolllll, gencral, sur·
prised by Ballastcros, 522.
Constitution, tIle Spanish, drawn up
by the Cortes, 140, 144.
Copons, l~'nllleisco, gencral, at I.he
siege 01 Tarifa, 112, 118; opposes
evacuation of the town, 123, 125.
Corles, the, at Cadiz, Constitutioll
druwn LIp hy, 140.
Cotton, Stuplcton, general, routs
Drouct's rearguard at Yillagarcia,
278; commands rearguard on re·
trcnt to Snlnmnnea, 401 ; ill till'!
IJllttle, 434-47, 440; wounded
thcre, 471.
Craufurd, Robcrt, general, observ-
ing Cindad Rodrigo, Ui9; mortally
wounded in storm of Ciudnd
Hodrigo, 182; Clu.rlcs Stcwurt'ij
high estimate of him, 186.
Creagh, Juan, general, at Valencia,
60,65.
Cr1l7. Murgeon, .Jnun, hoclleml, storms
Seville, 540, 541.
Cueuca, occupied by Mahy, 24;
taken by D'Armagnac, 56; evacu-
Llted by MalllKJint, 488.
"
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Daricau, general, operations ot, in
Estremadura, 2;13, 275, 52], 52tl,
5aa.
D'Armagnac, general, goes to nid
Suchct in Valencia, 56-76; co-
opernrell with MOlltbrlln. 418.
Dl,.'C!\.Cn, Clll.rlea, general, COlllnmnus
in Catalonia, 4, 5, 90; llia difficul-
ties with Thlrcclona, 92; relieves
Barcelona, IH; harassed by the
Catulan army under Lacy, 56"~.
Decken, Gustav von der, captain,
his gallant charWl and mortal
wound at Garcia Hernnndcr., 477.
Dclort, colonel, dcfcuts 0'Do1l1101l
at Castalla, 568,509.
D'Erlon, 8« Drollct.
Den;n, c;.ptured hy General Harispe,
87.
Dickson, Alexander, colonel, brings
up siege-guns to Ciudad Hodrigo,
1110 ; prepares for siege of Badajoz,
201,224; his account of the slorm,
247; witb Hill's expedition to
Almaraz, 322; at Salamanca, 364.
Dombrollski, general, driven from
l\Icridu.131,132.
Dorscnne, Jean lIlark, general,
igno~s the danger of Ciudad
Rodrigo, ]87, 188, 19'~; meets
l\lurmont I~t Vu.lhulolid, 102;
declines to obey Jourdlln's orders,
300.304.
Dowuie. ,John, colonel, his gallant
conduct n.t Seville, 5'~1.
Doyle, Chl.r]CIl, g<:nerlll, suggests
fortification of Saguntum (t-lnr·
vicdro), 11, 12,
J) ..../lJct. ,lean Baptiste, Comte
d'Erlon, in Estrcmadum, observing
I-Iill, 106, 107; driven from Almen-
dralejo by Hill, 132; retires
beroTe Graham, 230, 2:n; ~ends
pressing summons to Soult, 267 ;
routed by Le Marchant at Villa-
gareia, ,}:,{7; fails to interec:pt Hill
nrter Almarmr.,330,:J:lI; threatened
by tIill, 525; his mall(£uvres
agai.nst Hill. 531-5; retreats
suddenly to join Soult, 543.
Dllran, JOIlt\, chief of gllcrrilleros,
seizes CulntJ.\Ylld, 21; attacks
Suchct's rear, 49 : scires Almunia,
and retires to Molina. 51.
D'Urban, Denjamin, colonel, chid
o[ thc Portuguese stafr, his \'iews
Oil 'Vel!ington's ndvunec: into
Leon, 317; with Silveira on the
Douro, 330; his netivity, 386, :187,
409; joius \Velliugton before
Salamanea,410-13; in the battle,
42G-36; his charge. 441-5, 0153.
4,'';4, ,~(ll; ill pursuit of .JO!Icph at
Segoviu, 'l95; enters the lawn,
496; marches on Madrid, 504;
routed by Treillard at Majala.
"ondo., !iOl)-IlI.
, El Maneo,' guerrillc~ochief, 102.
Empccinado, Juan Martin, the, his
oo·opcratioll with the army of
\/nlencia, 3, 5. to; seirA..'SCnllltnyuu,
21; a.ttaeks Suehet's rear, 49;
3ttneks Mazzuehelli, 51; l\ls
jealousy of Montijo, 52; his
disnsl;er uLSig\len1~1, 102; eal,turc!l
the garrison of Guoonlnjara. 51(1.
Engineers, Wellington's demand
for sappers [llld miners, 255, 256.
Erolcs, General BnrOll, raids "'rench
frontier. 93; destroys a l"reneh
column at VilIllseea, 95; defeated
lit Mt"Culln, 1)(;; defeats Bourke
nt Hodn, Q8; his differences willJ
Lucy. 562-.'J.
Erskinc. Sir William, lieut,-general.
sends false intelligence of French
nuvnncctoHill,330; Wellingtoll·H
comments on. 331-2; !lis slnck
pursuit of Pierre SOlllt. 542.
Espniill, CarlO!l de, general, 220;
retires from Hotlrigo before :\Iar-
mont's advanec:, 280, 281 ; rcport.~
laek of provisions to Wellington,
290 ; joins Wellington before
Snlrllnnncn, 355, 365; ut the rord
of Pollos. 389; ut Cast-rillo, 399 ;
at Salamanca. 411; fails to hold
castle of Alba de Tormcs, 415,
466; marches on Madrid, 50<10;
governor of Madrid, 517, 567.
Estremadura, invaded by Hill. 133,
134 ; operations by Hill and
Grnham in, 228-3.1; cnmpaign
of Hill Ulul Drouet in. Juuc-
August, 520-33.
Ferey, general, advises iUarmont to
fight lit Slln Crislohnl, 367; covers
retreat oC French at Salamanca,
462-5; slain, 464, 469.
Figueras, fall of, 1.
f'lcteher, Richard, colonel, engineer
onJec:r direct-ing siege of Ciudnd
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Gurwood, lieutenant, J., lead~ for-
lorn hope at storm of Cilldad
Rodrigo, 181; controversy con-
cerning, 51'\9.
Infantado, J. de Silva, Duke of,
ercnted a member of the Regency
144, 145.
H<lbert, general, at storming of
Saguntum, 17, 28, 33, 39; at
capture of Vlllencill, 58--63; joins
Harispe, 67; at Gandia, 85.
Hamilton, general A., commands
a Portuguese division under Hill,
130, 520.
lIarispe, general, in invasion 0
Valencia, 14 j at hatUc of Sagun-
tum, a4, 40; ut capture 01 Valencia,
58,61-4; moves toward AJicante,
8il ; defcats O'Donncll rat Cnstnllll,
51l7-70; retires behind the Xucu.r,
573.
Hay, Andrew Leith, captain, his
r<ceollnt of the storming of But!nj07.,
255; or the battle of Salamanca,
448-9.
Hellriod, b'Overnor of J.cridn, re-
pulses Lucy, 564.
Hill, nowland, General, his advance
into Estremaduru., 86: retires into
J>ortugul, l06 j sci~es Meridu,
130-2; forms covering force for
siegc of Dadajoz, 218, 228, 233 j
joins Graham at Albuera, 211l'1;
contuiJl!l1 Drouet in Estremuduru,
291; his raid on Almaraz, 311-29,
a48; Wellington's instructions to
him to Illlra88 Drouet, 519; nd-
vanccs to Zafra, 522; ilwaits
DrOllet'5 attack, 527; his mall-
(J'uvres against Drouet, 531-5;
does not plln;ne when Drouctjoins
Soult, 543; warns "'cllington 01
Soult's evacuation of Andalusia,
il78; marellcs on ::\Iadrid, 571).
Hodenherg, Kllrl, cllptl.lin in the
]{.G.L., his account of the sack
ot Dadajoz, 262; of Gareia
Hernande;", 480.
Joncs, John, colonel R.E., his
remnrks on llle siege of Ciudad
Hodrigo, 173; on thc stomling at
Dadajoz, 2,11; on the sicge of the
Salnmanca forts, :\71.
Joscph 130nnpllrlc, King of Slluin,
sa 2
Calicia, state of, in 1812,220,337,338.
Gareia Ilernandez, combat of,
467-8.
Gaspnrd-ThicITy, colonel, guvcrllor
of Picurina fort at lladajoz,
taken prisoner, 240.
Gaynn, gnerrillcro ehicf, sei7.cs
Calatayud, 101.
Gijon, occupied by the French, 338.
Gough, Hugh, colonel, takes llnrt
in defence of 'I'arifa, 118; opposes
its cvaCIL1.tion, 122-7.
Graham, 'l'homas. general, overruns
":strema..tun., 228; fails to (';It,:h
RCyluond, 230-2; falls buck on
AJbucra, 2138; obligcd to throw
IIll his command, :l52-;~; heforc
Sal11mllllca, 350, 31l0, 873-5.
Granada, evacuated by Soult, 544,
5'k').
Grant, Colquholln, major, cUllturcd
at Idanha Nova, 292, 318.
Guarda, 'front's disaster at, 285-6.
Gua"rerm, oomhat of thc, 404-5.
Gudin, colonel, lit the storming of
SagUlltum, 17, 18.
Glletaria, attacked by Home rop·
hum, 553, 557.
Rodrigo, 170; at lladajo7., 228,
237; WO\mdCld, 238; lIgt,in 011
duty, 243.
I<'ortClSCuCl, Hon. John, his Clstimate
of the Hriti.~h Ministers and their
dClalingil with Wellington, l!i2.
Fay, Maximilicn, general, moves
with Munturun uj,,'l.Iillst Vlllclll;i",
52-78; attempts to divert British
from Dadajoz, 2:m, 2tlG; fails to
help AlulIlraz, 32D; his dcscrip.
tion of Marmont'lI plans at
San Cristobal, 3(17; at Toro, 390;
makes feigned lldvnncc ngninst
Wcllington, 3\}7; uClSCrilJcs open-
ing of battle of Salamanca, 420,
421, 42'~, ,~aa; criticism of Mar-
mont, 4038, 461; sucecs9fully
covers l~rencll retreat, 467; his
account of battle of Salamanca.
472--:1; dcreu.tcd at Gnreia Her-
nnnuez, 475-8.
Frcire, Manuel, general. preventcd
from joining make at Vnleneia,
57; with _Uahy's force, 77, 78;
his raid on eastern Andalusia, 55\}.
Fx~re, general, protects Snchct's
renr in Catalonia, 6, fl2.
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Nllpoleon'a instructions to him to
send troops to Valencia, 53; he
negotiates with the Cortes at
Cadi\\, 138; receives news of the
siege of Ciudud Hodrigo, 188;
appointed commander-in-chicl by
Napolcon, 298; diffieultics of his
situation, a01, a02; determines
to nunch to 1II11rmont'a uid, 385 ;
authorizes l\Iarmont to give battle,
<195; marches north to join IIIar-
mont, 484; receives news or the
dcfcnt of Suhnnll"';lI, 488; re-
trents to Madrid, 489; Imlts at
Segovia, 492; evaellatcs Madrid,
505; ordcra orouct to join him,
533; murchcs on Valencill, 574-8.
Jourdan, Jean Baptiste, marshal,
appointed Chief-of-the-Staff to
Joseph, 298; his comment!! on
the ~itUlltioll, 301; his JH~l1wirl':
of !\Iay 1812, 303-7; urges
iHarmont to attack Wellington,
3114, :Wr.; his criticism of Mar-
mont's failure ut So.lumanCll, 430,
473; marches with Joseph to
aid Marmont, 488; and retrents,
48D; urges evacuation of the
Hctiro, !l07.
Kcmpt, JamC8, major-general, leads
assault on castle of Dadajoll, 239-
40; tnkes command when Pieton
is disnbled, 251; wounded, 2,~2.
Kinenid, John, his account of the
sack of Badajoz, 26t.
}\:ing, Henry, major, takes part in
defence of Tarifa, U2, 118;
opposes itscvucuutioll, 122, 123.
La Cancra, see Carrera.
Lacy, Luis, w::ner-.II, his raids against
19unlndn, Cervern, nnu i\lonlserrat,
5; his quarrels with the Catalan
Junta. 91; endeavours to starve
out Barcelona and Tarragona,
114; his unpopularity, IJI, 502,
563; his rruiUeSll attack 011
krida, 564.; dissuades MRitland
from landing at Palamos, 57t.
La(osse, g<Jneral, governor of Tor-
tosn., surprised and routed by
ErolC':l. !la.
Lnllemlllld, general, defellts Stllde
at Maguilla, 523, 524; skirmishes
with HiJrs cavalry, 530, 53i.
Y..amare, commandant of engineers
at Dadajoll, 235; his able conduct
in the defence, 2<16.
1.rl Pe,;n, Canon, secret ngent of
King Joseph, 13!), 140.
Lardizabal, Jos~. general, com-
manding a division in Valencia, 3;
at battle of Sllguntum, 32, 40, 44;
Ilt siege or Valencia, 00, 00; fails
to cut his way out, 70; surrender
of,73.
Leith, Jamcs, general, commanding
5th Division,hissueeessful eSCldade
ut andnjoz, 24-..'), 2MI, 254; ut Snla-
manea, 434, 435; leads central at-
tack, 446, 448 ; wounded, 44D, 471_
Le ~I"re1mut,.JohnGnspnrd,genernl,
commanding heavy drtlgoons, 21D,
228; routs Drouet's rearguard at
Villagareia, 277; with Welling-
ton's advance into Leon, 35:'.; at
SulnmuIlen, 365, 374; lit Pollos,
389; to I?uente la l'eoa, 39D;
at Salamanca, 403, 425, 447, 449 ;
ehnrges i\laueune's division, 450,
451; r"tully wOllnded, 452;
founder of Military College at
High W)"eombc, 452.
Le lUesurier, lIaviIalld, general,
governor of Almeida, fCpulses
Clallsel, 281: his report on the
defences of the city, 283.
LcvaJ. Jean Fran~is, general,
besieges Tarif(., 11(.....'.2\1; [ails to
cutch BlIlh.sleros, 536; llarllssetl
by }'rcire, 559, 560.
Liverpool, Lord, his support of
Wellington, 152-6, 1149; sanctions
Sir HOllle Pophnlll-" naval eXlJt~li­
tion on coast of Biscay, 340; and
Dentinek's seheme for attacking
Catalonian coast, 342, 343.
Y,lererm, Grnham's operationsround,
230,231.
Longa, Juan, guerrilIcro chief, 34-0;
joins ropham's raid on Discayan
coast, 553; joins i\Iendizabal at
Bil1)IlO, 557.
Liibcek, s"ek of, by Benmdottc's
troops a parallel to that of
lladajoz, 262_
Luddites, the, riots of, 153.
Mlledonald, Eticnne, marshnl, Dukc
of Tnrentum, recall of, 1.
Maekinnon, IIenr)', major-genernl,
at sieJl:C of Ciudad Roorigo, 178,
180; killed in the storm, 181.
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Madrid, 'Vellingtonmarches 011,497;
evacuated by Joseph, 506, 507;
Wellington's triumphul entry, 51:.1,
514.
!'tIaguilla, combat of. 385, 523, 524.
l\Iahy, Nieolas, geneml, commands
Murciall nrmy, 20; hili abortive
eXp1':dition against Cucnca, 23;
joins Rlake in attacking Suchet.
:n ; ut b"tl1e of SngulltUI1I, 36-8 ;
bis comn~cnts, 39; opinion of
Valencians,!lO; abandons Valencia,
escapes to \l.e south, 64, 68;
occupies A1icante, 78; ubundons
Denia, 87; removed from Ius
command, 87.
I\1nil1nud, F'rederick, b'ClLcral, lcads
Sicilian expedition against Catn-
lonia, :1,1-6, 347, 499. 500 ; 3ITivcs
ut J'nlnmot;, 571; lit Alicllntc,
572 ; thrcatens Harispc, 573;
withdraws to Alicantc, 574.
l\Iajalahonda, combat of, 509-13.
Mlllngll, surprised by llullastcrOli,
535; seized by English squadron,
559.
i\Iarmont, Auguste FrM(:rlc, mar-
shal, Duke of HllgUljll, sends
cxpedition to Valencia, 53, 157,
161 j recei....es news of fall of
Ciudnd Rodrigo, 187, 188; re-
org;.lllizatioll of his urmy by
Napoleon, 190, 191; warned by
'l'hiebault of "'ellington's advance
ou Ciudud Hodrigo, 102, H15;
coneentmlcs troops to OJlllOse
him, 196; retires to Valladolid
199; deprived of somc troops by
thc Emperor, ~OO, 20'~; ,,"everely
criticized by Napoleon, 203-6,
221--6; makes a raid on central
Portugal, 2<13; concert$ joint
action with Soult lIguinst Welling-
ton, 266; mllsks Hodrigo and
Almcida, and marehcs to Sabugal,
21:Hl; surprises '!'rant at Guarda,
285; returns tu Subugal, 288;
and }<'uentc Guinaldo, 288; es-
capes from Wellington at Fucnte
Guinaldo, Zllo-li; receivCli news
of Joscph's appuintmellt as com-
mander-in·chief, 298--9; sends in
report to Joscph, :lO'l; his partial
compliancc with JOliCl'h'li ortlcn;,
310-11; his intercepted disp.atehes,
318-19; evacuates Salamanca,
:lii4; hili dispatch to Joseph, :170 ;
waits vuinly for CaITurelli, 370-8 ;
retreats on to the Douro, 380;
requisitions horses, :lfll ; advances
against Wellington, :197; long
stratcgical movemcnts, :!D8-417;
0l'elll:l butUe 01 SUhllllllllCU, 421-
37; wounded, 437; Ills dispatch,
469; criticism of his actions,
472--4; his report to Joseph,
488.
Mathieu, Maurice, general, op1':ra-
tions of, in Catalonia, 94-6, 50ll.
Malleulle, general, ut SU!lUllUIlCU,
430-7.
May. ,John, brevet-major, It.A., in
chnrge of siCbte of fortll 01 Sa],.-
manca, 362.
Mazzuchelli, gcneral, his skirmishes
with Aragoncse guerrilleros, fil.
Mclito, Andr(:, Miot de, Joscph's
minister, his comments on his
master's situation, auL.
l'th:IU.li1.1I1",1, Gauricl, b'Clleral, com-
manding 7th army, clllplo~'ed
by Wellington to hUffiSS CalTarelli,
,\:.Ill, :H8; comes to aid Popham,
554; ill conjunctiuIl with l'oph'Ull
capturcs UiliXlo, 550-7; «(iVCll
out by Caftarelli, 557.
Mcrida, seized and evacuated by
HiII, 130-2; leOC<;lll'ied, :mll;
raided by the f'rcnch, 535.
Merino, guerrillero chief, Ius cruelty,
10'L
Millll, F'rlllldsco, guerrilla chief,
4, 6, 21; destroys Ccceopieri,
22; eludcs Musnier, 23; his
reprisals against the governor of
N"varre, 102; ~IIIJoe~ illloAragon,
103; sei1,cs ¥rcnch convoy in the
Pass of Salinas, 100; escapes
rrom Pannetier, 104; his activity
in the North, 190; dereuts Abbe
nc"r Pampehml\,198 ; hisaeti\'ity
548, 54.9; lICnds aid to l'ophllm,
115:1.
Mirlludu, ,Jose, b'Cllcrul. ut buttle of
Saguntum,36-44 ; at Valcncia, 60.
i\Iislata, combat of, M-G.
i\Iontbrun, Louis Pierrc. general,
leads c....pcdition uguinst Valencia,
::>3,76; advances on AlicanlC, 77 ;
retires, 78; returns to Toledo, 7U,
265.
Montijo, oondc dc, commands
irregular troops against Suchet.
'10,52; besieges Sorill, H18; witl.
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O'D<:mncll at rout of Castalla,
568-9.
!IIorillo, Pablo. gencml, his mid
on La Manc!lII, 134, 135; with
PCllnc-Villclllur threatens Seville,
274; co-operates with Hill, 520 ;
ffi3.rches with Hill on IIIndrid,
580.
Mosqucra, Joaquim, member or
the CouIlcil oC the Indies. created
member of tile SI}anish llegency,
"•.?olurat, Joachim, King oC Naples,
failure or his expedition against
Sicily, 341.
lIIurein, CIlI,turcll ullll eVllcual.ctl by
Pierre Solllt, 80, 8].
Murviedro, su Saguntum.
iUusnier, general, 11; opposed by
gucrrillcros, 21-3; nlUrches 011
Valencia, 57; attacks Valencia,
61, (i9; relieves Tanagona, 34--(;.
Nupier, George, m"jor, at the storm
orCiudadHodrigo, 181; wounded,
182.
Napier, Sir \\'illillffi, historian, his
rcmnrks Oil UIll surrender or
l'cnisco!a, 88; comments on Ule
fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, 194;
accountofthestorming of Dad.'ljoz,
~47; of Salamanca, 407, 457;
comments on Soult'~ Illlln for
retiring on Andalusia, 5-16; ac-
cept!; Suehet's version of lus
ndmillistr.'ltion in Vakllcln, 5HII,
561.
Napoleon, Emperor, his plllllS Cor:tlle
invasion of Valencia, 2 j arrange-
ments for reinforcing Suehet,ti3-ti,
80; withdruws t.roops frOIll Spuin
for tile Uussian "'ar, 83-4, 189 j Ilis
plan fortllcsUbjcctioll oCCatalonia,
116-7 j fuils to forescc Welling-
ton's ad\'llllcc on Cill<lad Hodrigo,
193,104 j withdraws troops CrOIll
Marmont, 203: his criticism on
the fall of lladajo7., 270; his fore·
bodings about the Russian cam-
Imign, ~97; appoinl./! .Toseph
commander-ill-chief of forces in
the Peninsula, 298; further in-
structions to JOSCllh, 312, :1l3;
his condemnat.ion of Jlarmont's
ruilufC ut SUlulllllllell, 396, 397,
431, 439, 473.
Nav.ano, Garclu, treacherously sur-
renders PClliscola, 87; deserts to
the French, 89.
N:lVusde Membrillo, combatoC, 131.
Ncveux, Cllplllin, eXllloit of, Ilt
Navas de Mcmbrillo, 131.
Nevill, }'. P., colonel, his account
of the sack of Dadll.joz, 2ij3, 2114.
Ney, Miehcl, JIIUI'8hul, Duke of
Elehingcn, his views on the
trcatment of a garrison that held
out to the last, 259.
Niebla, the CondruJu uf (westerll
Andalusia), opcratiolls in, 107,
274,539.
ObilljlO, .Jose, general, euls French
eOlumunielltions, 20; driven nwuy
by Palombini, 24; returns to
Segorbe, 30; advances Oil Sagun-
tUIII, 32, 35 j llrri\'~~ too lale for
thc battle, 36, 38 j at Vnlenciu,
60; retires to CuUera, 65.
O'Donllcll, Charles, gelleral, threat-
ens Suehet's flank, 20, 21 j forced
to retire from llenagullcil by
Suchet, 24, 25; at battle of
Saguntmn, 3!), 544.
O'Donnell, Henry, oollde de la
llis{lal, mude mcmber of tllc
Regency, 144.
O'Donllcll, Joseph, gCllcral, euptain-
general oC Mureia, reorganizes
Mahy's troops, 559 j routed by
l-larispc at CftstalJa, 567-70.
Ollorgan, combat of, 557.
O'Rollall, oolonel, ltt battle of
SuguntulIl, 32, 37.
Oropcsa, garrisoned by make, l3,
l.~; taken by Suellet, its gani-
60n ese.'lpes, :!:;.
O''1'oolc, Hryull, Illlljor, COllllllund-
i Ill!" Portuguese ear-tdores at Ciudad
Rodrigo, 179, 183.
Oviedo, captured by Uonnet, 338 j
eVllcuuled by Ilim, 38].
l'aek, Dcnis, general, conunanding
)'ortuguese brigade at Ciudad
Rodrigo, 179, 183; sent to
llmlujoz, 217, 229 j to l'ortl~lcgrc,
291 j willl Wellington's advancc
into Leon, 352; at Salllmallefl,
305; nt 1'01106, 389; at Salamanca,
411,424,425 j Ilis uUHck 011 the
Greater Arnpile,455, 457; marches
on Madrid, 504; with "'ellillgton's
anny moves North, 581.
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Pakenham, Hon. Edward, major-
general, tnkes oolmollllu of the
3rd Division beraTe Salamanca,
:.152, alia; in battle, (\.25, ,~2(1;
executes turning movement, .J.:.lG ;
routs Thomil::rcs, 443, 445, 461.
Palacia, 'Man\uis, clIllLain-gcncral
of Valencia, 20.
Palamos, Maitland at, 511.
Plllomhini, gCllernl, sent ag:.in~l.
Obispo, 24, 30; at siege and
battle of Saguntum, 28, 33, 41 ;
at Cilllture of Villcncia, (la, 65, UO ;
moved to sout.hern Aragoll, 85 ;
checked by Villacampa, 100;
summoned by .TOSCllh to !IIadrid,
487 j at I\Injlllllllondn, 509,
Puna La, Canon, employed b)'
•Toseph to negotiate with Cartes at
Cudi"" 13!!.
Pcniscola, held by General Garcia
Navnrro, ] 11; treacherously sur-
rendered b)' him, 87, 8B.
l)cnnc-Villcmur, Coode dc, threatens
Seville, 229, 230; with Marilla
makes a raid 011 Seville, 27-1.;
eo,olJernles with Rill, 520, 522;
routed by Lallemand l1t Santa
Marla, 530; pursues DrOllet, 543 ;
mnrelles with Hill on Madrid, 5S0.
Perl,:evul, Sp,eneer, l)rime lUinililer,
his troubles, 151-0.
I'hillipon,Annand,general,governor
of Dadaj07., 2aS; his energy and
nbilily, 236, 240, 242; hill gllllllnt
defence at the storm of the city,
24!i, 240; surreilders,254; Soult's
over-confidence in him, 270.
J)ieurinll, fort lit BlIdajoz, stormed,
239,240.
Ponsonby, Hon. WiIliam, COIIl-
I1lluuling c,'lvalry brigade nt
ViIlngnreia, 278; at Snlllmanell,
365; marches on Madrid, S04;
drives away Treillard from !'IInjala-
IlOndn, S12; goes north wilh
'Vellillgton's army, 58.
l'Ojlllalll, Sir Home, leads naval
expedition against coast-forts of
Cllntabrill and Biscay, 340-8;
prevents DJ.ffarelli from joining
Marmont, 378, 384, 393; his
descent on the 1Ji6eayan eoa.sl,
550; his successes, 552, 553;
captures Santunder, 554, 555;
captures Bilhno, ;,!ill, 557.
Porlier, JUUII DiilZ, guerJ'iIlero
leader, in C'lntabria, 3.'18, 339, 340,
555, 55G.
Hegellcy, the, of Portugal, its
llnllncilll difllClllties, 145, 350-51.
Regency, the, of Spain, its com-
position changed, 144.
Hcillc, Honor6 Charles, gcoerlll,
commands division on Ujlper
Ehro, <l-; joins Sllchet, 7, 18, 52,
57 j attacks Valencia, 61; np-
pointed chief of the army of the
Euro, 116; his plan for thc sub-
jection of Catalonia, 08; fails
to capture Mina, 104.
Reizenstein, AU~lIst von, captain
K.G.L., Icads charge ILL Garcia
Hel'llnlldez, 470.
Uenand Redoute, at Rodrigo,
6t.ormed by Coloorne, 167, l68.
Henovales, Colonel, his operation
in Diseay, 556---7.
HeymOlld, genernl, escapes from
Grllllam, 230, 231.
Ridge, Heury, lieut.-colonel, killed
at the storm of Dadajoz, 252.
n.ignollx, general, governor of
Seville, alarmed uy raids or
gllerrillel'OS, 274, 275.
Rivas, I~acio Rodrigucz dc, mem-
ber of the Cadi? Hcgellcy, J#.
Uochc, l'llilip 1(" gellernl, orgunizCll
a Spanish division at AIiCllnte, 85 ;
his operations at the battle of
Custlllln, 567-70; joins M:litland
at Alicante, 572.
lloda, combat or, 98.
ll.odrigo, Ciudad, siege or, Hi8,
161--86; deUeH l\Iurlllont, 281;
blockaded by Brennier, 281.
Uogniat, general, at the storm of
Saguntulll, 27.
Hoss, captain, killed lit Ciudlld
Hodrigo, 170.
Uouget, geileral, his campaign
uhout Bilbao, 557.
Hussia, Nllpoleoll'~wur with, CIlUses
withdrawal of l~reneh troops from
tlLe Peninsula, BB.
Saglilltum (or Murviedro), its
defences, 11, 10, 17; ineffectuall)'
slonned by Sllellet, J7-19; battle
of, 26--4!>; surrender of, 45.
Salamanca, evacuated by Marmont,
3,;01.; Wellington enters, 360; its
forls besieged, 301-79 j Mnrmonl
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and WellingtOll mall(Cuvre belore,
402-17; battle 01, 421-70.
Salinas (Puerto de Arlaban), Mina's
victory al, 100l.
Sanchez, Julinn, gucrriIJcru chief,
his activity in thc neighbourhood
of Salamanca, 188, 220, 299;
murchcs with WCllillgloll 011 Mu-
drid, 50'10.
San Juan, Jose, general, rout of
his Valencian cavalry at Sogun-
tUlll, ;17.
Sontllndcr, captured by Popham,
554-5.
Santcsteball,general, in the Cll8tlllk,
elllJlpai/{n, 568, 570.
SulltociJdes, Jos~ Maria, general,
his half·hearted attack on Astorga,
a86-9; comes to llenavente, oWl) j
sent to threlllen Vullndolid, 4-011;
occupies the town, 502, 503.
Salltoiia, I<'rcneh garrison at, 551,
555,558.
Snrrut, general, joinl> expedition
ag:lilll>t Valencia, 53; guards the
fords or lIuerta, 415-16 j his
action at Salamanca, 458--<i1.
Snrsllcld, Pedro, genernl, his raid
on Foix, DD; Lacy's jealousy or,
563.
Sehepcler, colonel, his account or
Blake at Snguntum, 4:1; and at
Valencill, (Jij; seizes Cordovll, 5·\.a ;
his nutes Oil Suehet's tPlUlllY, in
Valencia, 560, 561.
Scovcll, George, captain, his ingcn-
uit~· us eiphcr-seerctury to Welling-
ton, 317; accuunt or hiM liIe of
ciphers, Appendix, 611-18.
Scgovia, Joseph, halts at, 492;
occupied by D'Urb.·lIl, <i95.
Severoli, gcneml, commnllds 'I divi.
sioll 011 Upper libra, 4; joins
Suehet, 4; occupies western
Aragon, 22, 23; swnmoned to
VHlencill, 41'1, 5:!, 57.
SeviJIC,nttllcked by l)ellllC VilIemur,
274, 275; stormed by Cruz
Murgeon and Skc:r.rott, 540,
Ml.
Silveira, }'[llucifSCO, genernl, emu-
Illllnding Portuguese in TWl>-OS-
Montes, 2]D, 220; moves on
Lamego to protect Deira, 282;
toM off by Wellington to blockade
7.1IIllora, mm, :148, 386, 887, 4Dl,
502.
Sludc, John, gCllcrnl, defeated at
IHaguilla, 385, 523, 524.
Smith, Charles F., captnin RE-,
opposes cvneuatioll or 'rurira, 122.
Smith, Hurry, D5th n:gilUcnt, his
romalltiCJlUlrriage ot Badajoz, 204.
Souham, .losepll, general, put under
Milrmollt'Morders, 189; SUllunoncd
by Marmont to Salamanca, 198.
Soult, Nieolas, marshal, Duke 01
Dalmatio, Napolcon orders him
to 'l.Sllil;t Sllchct, 80; r"iluI'C of
his expedit.ion to 'l~llirll, 78;
disposition or his troops in Anda-
lusia, 106-]0; scnds Victor to
oosie~'C 'l'llrifll, 115; dellolllloos
I'i:ing Joscph to Nnpolcon, 140;
moves toward Uadajoz, 243, 268 ;
concerts action witb MarmOllt
llg"inst Wellinglon, 265, 260;
retires on hearing of the fall of
Badajoz, 269; reproaches Mar-
mont, 271; summoned back to
Seville, 274, 275; receive:> neWM
of Joseph'lI appointment as com-
mllnder-in·chief, 299; hiS recal-
citrance, 302, :109; threatens to
give "I' ool1llllllml or Army of the
South, 332; believes Wellington
is about to attaek bim, 357;
reruscs to obey JOfSCph, 485, 492,
4»a, .JU5, 5:l1l; den(lunee.'l .To!lCllh
to Napoleon, 538; oogius lo
evacuate Andalusia, 539,540,557;
at Granada, 544; joins Suchct,
5<k); results of bis insubordination,
645.
Soult, l~icrre, gcnernl, ~h:esMurcill,
SO, 81; marches against BlIlIas-
teros, 276; sent to Drouct's help,
5~5, 531 ; his raid on Ribern, 54~.
Stcwllrt, Cluulcs (Lord London-
derry), bis estilnlltc 01 Craufurd,
186.
Stuart, Charles, British Ambassu-
lIor in T.i~holl, 145, 1>&.8.
Sturgeon, Henry, colonel, restores
bridge 01 Alcllntare, 3.13.
Suchet, Louis Ga.briel, JlUlrshal,
invlldcs Valencia, ~; takCll Mur-
viedro nnd Vnleneill, 2; e6timulc
of hil> rurecs,4-9; CrUl>Wl; Vulcllcian
frontier, 14; fails to storm
Saguntum, 17-1D; besieges &lglUl-
turn, 2u-:.JO; wins battle, :1<1,-45 j
attacks and takes Valencia, 57-7:1 ;
viollltes treuty of elll'itulution, 74,
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75; deprived of troops for the
Russian WM, 8'~; his illness, 86;
his thn:ats to the governor of
TOrtOS:l, and governor of Tarrn·
g01lU, 25l:1; IInd make, ZGO;
n:ccives news of Joscph's appoint-
ment as eommander-in-el1ief, 20lJ ;
rcruse~ o\)cdience, 304, :lOO, 341 ;
alarmed by reports of the Sicilian
expedition, 345, 340, 500, 5GO;
wcnkness of his position, 550;
raises a war-contribution, 560;
Schcpc1cr's account of his mcthods,
.'l61.
Synge, Charles, his narrativc of
l'aek's attack on thc Gn:ater
i\mpile, 455.
Tarifa, garrisoned by General Colin
Cnmpbell,112; sie~of, IH-2U.
'l'aI"mgona, blockaded by the Clltu-
lans, 94, 95, 563; Wellington's
desiJ.:1ls against, 3"4.
TaUI,in, b'CllCrul, anccdote conccrn-
ing,392.
Thicbault, Palll, general, governor
of Salamanca, n:victuals Cimlad
Rodrigo, 159; warns Murmout
ancI Dorscnnc of \Ycllington's
movcmcnt on Ciudad nodrigo,
187, llJ2, 104.
Thomicrcs, b'Cncrul, his division at
Salamanca, 432; his rout and
dcath, 445, 469.
Todd, Alex., major, restores bridge
or Alellllu,rl', 333, 334.
Tordesillas,eaptured by Santocildes,
502.
Toreno, oonde de, his account of
Jo»cph's negotiutions with tile
Cortes at CncIi7., 139.
Trllnt, Kieholas, general, protects
Almeida, 281; moves to Guardn,
283; hill rush lIchelne for llttncking
Marmont, 284, 285; surprised and
routed at Guarda, 285.
Trei1lll.rd, ~neml, routs D'Urban's
force at Mujuluhol1Llu, 508-13.
Us1ar, Frederich 'lion, captain, lends
the host clwrge nt G'll'eia Herrllln.
tIe",480.
Valencia, kingdom of, invasion of
by Sllchet, 2; N3poleon's opinion
or the importnllcc of its subjection,
53; Suchet's Cllmpnign of con-
quest in, H7; Suchet's levy of
a war-contribution on, 560, 5(H.
Vulcnciu, city of, 10; rorlilied by
Dlake, 48, 49 ; attacked by Suehet,
IIl-ll; siege or, 7tHl; surrendered
by lllake, 73; oppression of by
Suehct, 560.
Valladolid, alnmdoned by French,
cntered by WcllillgtOl1, 4()1.
Vallce, general, at the siege of
Sagllntum, 27.
Vllndeleur, J. Onllsby, generlll,
eommnnds brigade at the stom\ of
Ciudatl Hodrigo, 170,181; wounded,
182.
Vere, Charles, A.Q,M,G., his ac-
count of the battle or Sallllmlllcn,
455-6.
Victor, Claude l'errin, marshal,
Duke of Delhlllo, his unsuccessful
siege of Tnrifa, 115-20.
Villaeampa, j'cdro, general, rout
or his infantry at Saguntum, 37 ;
at VlIlcncia, 60; moves to Arllgoll,
89; his activity in southern
Arngon, 100, 10l.
ViIlagnreia, combat of, 277, 278.
Villl' Vclhll, bridge or, its illll}()r-
tancc, 284, 333.
Villaviccocio, admiral, member for
the Cndi" Regency, 144.
Vives, generlll, governor or Ciud"d
Rodrigo, rduses Marmont's sum_
mons to surrender, 280, 281;
commended b)' Wellington, 200.
Wnchholz, Ludwig von, Captain
Brunswick-Oels Jagers, his accoullt
of Salamanca, 4a5, 4a0.
Wellesley, Richard, llUUfjuil;, resig-
nation of, ]53-6, 349.
\Vellington, Arthur Wellcs[ey, ;\Jar-
(Iuis of, takes Ciudnd Rodrigo, 2;
his rclutioos with the PortllJ,,'lJeoo
Regency, 145; IInuneial dilitcul_
ties, ]46--50; his support by thc
Home Government, 151-6; prc-
pnrCll for siege or Ciutlnd Rodrigo,
161-7, 186; prepare~ to be
attacked by Mnrmont, 199; plan~
nnaek on Badajoz, 201-17 ; moves
to )o;lvall, 219; his memOrrmdllTll
on 1IIl'rmont's lJro!.Jl\blc action,
221-3; comments on fall of
Badnjoz, 255; his views 00 .fiiviog
{I'Ulrt.er to a resiMing gt'rrisoll, 260;
soundness of his plan for taking
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lladajoz, 272; determines to
march on :\'arffiont, 200; Ilis plan
for Hill's raid on Almaraz,320, 321;
advances into Leon, 335; ap-
plOves Dentinck's pla'\ for attack-
iug French 011 Cnrolonian cOtI.~t,
343-8; his financial dillleulties,
348-52; advances on Sfllflffiflnca,
353--8 ; his adventure with French
Cl.valry skirmisherll, 402; IOllg
strategical movements, 402--17;
battle of Salamanca, 421-70;
summary of, 470-4; llrgc~ on
pursuit of enemy, 475; gives up
pursuit, 483; enters Vnlladolid,
491; marches on Madrid, '~97;
his letter to Bentinek, '~llll;
triumphal entry into Mndrid, 514,;
his colnffients on Slade's defent
at Maguilla, 524; leaves Madrid
for the valley of the Doum, 578 .
Ilivision or his rorees on udvlaneing
toward llurgos, 582.
Whigll, their factioUll opprn;ition
to the Peninsular War, 11l1.
'Vhittinghmll, Samucl }'onl,gencral,
leads Balearic division to desccnt
on coast or Catalonia, 505; at
Alieantc, 572.
'\'iloon, John, general, hriugll Por-
tugllese militia to GlIluda, 283 ;
surprised b)' l\Jarmont at Guarda,
285.
Zamora, besieged by Silveira, 386-7,
502.
7~...yas, .lose, general, commanding
a division in Valcncill, 3; at
battle of Saguntllm, 32, 3!l; at
siege of Valencia, 00-6.
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